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Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a full account of the origins and
development ofThomas Reid's political thought. Its central argument is that the
political thought of Reid's mature years was the inescapable result of a long-standing
confrontation with Humean scepticism, in which he steadfastly strove to reassert the
Moderate Christian principles he had imbibed in his youth and which he articulated
most fully in his common-sense philosophy.
This conclusion is based largely on manuscript evidence. The surviving lecture notes
on politics from Reid's moral philosophy course at Glasgow College are here
transcribed and presented for the first time, having been painstakingly reconstructed
on the basis of internal evidence and by means of close comparison with surviving
lecture notes taken down by Reid's students. Before the present author conducted his
research, none of the student material, amounting to several manuscript volumes, had
been systematically transcribed. One set of student notes particularly rich in politics
material was completely unknown to previous scholars.
In addition to drawing upon this manuscript record, this dissertation attempts to
reconstruct the content ofReid's early intellectual formation as this pertains to the later
development of his teaching on politics. Part 1 traces the origins and development of
Reid's political thought from his early tuition under George Turnbull at Marischal
College, Aberdeen and examines his philosophical development while he was librarian
ofMarischal and minister of the parish of New Machar. Part 2 continues the analysis
of the progress of Reid's thinking during his days as regent of philosophy at King's
College, Aberdeen. Part 3 concludes the argument by exploring the successive
changes that Reid made to his political teaching while he was professor at Glasgow,
i.e. at a late stage of his encounter with Hume's political science and Adam Smith's
jurisprudence.
The result of this encounter was the development of a neo-Ciceronean, Christian
political jurisprudence that was proof against Hume's Machiavellian politics and
Smith's restrictive definition of justice, which excluded the performance of duties of
humanity. In developing his own framework for a jurisprudence, Reid was forced to
re-evaluate the modern natural law tradition ofGrotius and Pufendorf, and the other
Scottish alternatives to that tradition, namely the jurisprudence of Gerschom
Carmichael and Francis Hutcheson.
At the centre of Reid's political jurisprudence was a newly conceived science of
politics formulated as a science of the highest prudence in which the restriction of
property rights was tied to the dictates of conscience and in which the possession of
common sense and a dedication to the pursuit of virtue were the minimum
qualifications ofmembership in a political body. This new science of politics was
premissed on a philosophical concept of power and underwritten by a rigorous
account of free will. This groundwork was designed to shore up the foundations of
moral accountability and human agency which had been undermined by Hume's
scepticism and, in Reid's critique, by Hume's necessitarianism.
Reid's political jurisprudence also incorporated aMontesquieuian treatment of the
denaturing effects of political constitutions. This must be regarded as a sceptical
concession to Hume on the question of custom and habit
The Epilogue reviews Reid's achievement as a political philosopher, tracing the
hitherto unappreciated relationship between his lectures on politics and his published
discussions on ethics in the Active Powers. It is the conclusion of this author that
Reid provided a coherent alternative to the politico-jurisprudential teachings of Hume
and Smith, although he failed to carry a full expression of the political jurisprudence
articulated in the classroom into print.
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Prologue
The subject of this dissertation is the political thought of Thomas Reid, who w as
Adam Smith's successor as professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow College. It has
long been known that in his public course Reid lectured not only on the "intellectual
and active powers of man," i.e. the areas in which he published and for which he is
most remembered today, but also on "practical ethics,... natural jurisprudence, and
the fundamental principles of politics", subjects on which he committed almost
nothing to print.1 It was undoubtedly this circumstance which led Gladys Bryson to
conclude in the 1940s in her influential survey of the eighteenth-century Scottish
philosophers that Reid
interested himself not at all in the problem's of man's past. He did not
concern himself with the physical aspects of man's life; he did not
write of domestic or political economy, of jurisprudence, of religion or
of government. His range was limited to psychology and theoretical
ethics, with a little attention given to aesthetics.2
Two important subsequent writers who pointed to the connection between Reid's
pneumatology and his morals and politics partly corrected this view. Father
Copleston, in his well-respected History ofPhilosophy, observed that "Reid and
Stewart... evidently regarded philosophy as of importance for man's ethical and
political life".3 Eric Voegelin also articulated this understanding of Reid in his
Anamnesis: "The civilized homopoliticus need not be a philosopher, but he must have
common sense."4
While these isolated remarks have helped to restore a traditional appreciation of Reid's
achievements, new textual scholarship has completely revolutionized our
understanding of the range of Reid's speculations. Knud Haakonssen's edition of
Reid's PracticalEthics, for example, has made available for the first time a
transcription of Reid's hitherto unpublished lectures on natural jurisprudence.'' My
own edition of Reid's lectures on politics in Appendix 4 presents the first systematic
' Dugald Stewart, "Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid," in Works, p. 10b.
2Gladys BrysonJV/on and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century (New York:
Augustus M. Kclley, 1968), p. 84.
3Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 5: Hohhes to Hume (London: Burns and Oatcs
Ltd, 1964), p. 394.
4Enc Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans, and ed. Gerhart Niemeyer (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1978), p. 212.
^Thomas Reid, PracticalEthics, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Pnnceton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
Kitagaw a 8
transcription of the surviving manuscript lecture notes on this subject, which have
been painstakingly reconstructed on the basis of internal evidence and by means of
close comparison with surviving lecture notes taken down by Reid's students. Before
the present author conducted his research, none of the student material, amounting to
several manuscript volumes, had been systematically transcribed. One set of student
notes particularly rich in politics material was completely unknown to previous
scholars. The present study articulates fully the conception of politics to which earlier
scholars had access only through hints and references scattered throughout Reid's
published writings.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a full account of the origins and
development of Reid's political thought. Its central argument is that the political
thought of Reid's mature years was the inescapable result of a long-standing
confrontation with Humean scepticism, in which he steadfastly strove to reassert the
Moderate Christian principles he had imbibed in his youth and w hich he articulated
most fully in "his common-sense philosophy.
In addition to draw ing upon the manuscript record for the purpose of reconstructing
the text of Reid's lectures on politics, this dissertation attempts to reconstruct the
content of Reid's early intellectual formation as this pertains to the later development
of his teaching on politics. Part 1 traces the origins and development of Reid's
political thought from his early tuition under George Turnbull at Marischal College,
Aberdeen and examines his philosophical development while he was librarian of
Marischal and minister of the parish of New Machar. Part 2 continues the analysis of
the progress of Reid's thinking during his days as regent of philosophy at King's
College, Aberdeen. Part 3 concludes the argument by exploring the successive
changes that Reid made to his political teaching while he was professor at Glasgow,
i.e. at a late stage of his encounter with Hume's political science and Adam Smith's
jurisprudence.
The result of this encounter was the development of a neo-Ciceronian, Christian
political jurisprudence proof against Hume's Machiavellian politics and against
Smith's restrictive definition of justice, which excluded the performance of duties of
humanity. In developing his own framework for a jurisprudence. Reid was forced to
re-evaluate the modem natural law tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf, and the other
Scottish alternatives to that tradition, namely the jurisprudence of Gerschom
Carmichael and Francis Hutcheson.
At the centre of Reid's political jurisprudence was a newly conceived science of
politics formulated as a science of the highest prudence in which the restriction of
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property rights w as tied to the dictates of conscience and in which the possession of
common sense and a dedication to the pursuit of virtue were the minimum
qualifications of membership in a political body. This new science of politics w as
premissed on a philosophical concept of power and underwritten by a rigorous
account of free will. This groundwork was designed to shore up the foundations of
moral accountability and human agency which had been undermined by Hume's
scepticism and, in Reid's critique, by Hume's necessitarianism. The only science
worthy of the name for Reid was one that incorporated both a proper understanding of
the nature of power and a coherent doctrine of accountability. For Reid, these
intellectual objectives could only be achieved on the assumption that the human will is
genuinely free.
Reid's political jurisprudence also incorporated a Montesquieuian treatment of the
denaturing effects of political constitutions. This must be regarded as a sceptical
concession to Hume on the question of custom and habit, albeit one which was used
to support an essentially anti-Humean notion of human perfectibility.
The Epilogue reviews Reid's achievement as a political philosopher, tracing the
hitherto unappreciated relationship between his lectures on politics and his published
discussions on ethics in the Active Powers. It is the conclusion of this author that
Reid provided a coherent alternative to the politico-jurisprudential teachings of Hume
and Smith. Although it is true that Reid failed to carry a full expression of the political
jurisprudence articulated in the classroom into print, a close study of the relevant
manuscript material reveals that Reid's political thought was never very far from his
reflections on pneumatology and ethics. Indeed, his politics lecture notes may be
demonstrated to be the direct source of a number of significant passages in the
published w orks. When considered together, the published and unpublished writings
on pneumatology, ethics and politics may be seen to form a unified reply to the
consuming scepticism of David Hume.
part 1
Reid as Student andMinister
In Part 1 I shall trace Reid's intellectual formation and the development of his moral
and political thought from his boyhood days through his first career as minister of the
parish of New Machar.
In Chapter 1 I shall deal with Reid's education, starting with w hat is know n about the
first instruction he received, progressing through his philosophical training under
George Turnbull and his studies for the ministry under Thomas Blackwell.
The intellectual world of the 1720s had been transformed by the rise of daring new
forms of scepticism. Locke had disputed the existence of innate ideas and Berkeley
had denied the existence of a material world. Turnbull resisted the ascendency of such
sceptical hypotheses. In his philosophy course he introduced the young Reid to the
Newtonian analogy between the government of the material and moral worlds and
advocated the application of the same method of analysis and synthesis to both. Such
a technique w as intended to generate a genuine knowledge of the mind in all of its
richness, free from the distortions caused by the admission of sceptical hypotheses.
Turnbull also acquainted his students with certain problems in the modern natural law
tradition, which w as constantly under threat from scepticism, w hether Carneadean or
Hobbesian.
Orthodox Calvinism itself contained its own sceptical tendencies in its claims for the
essential unknowability of characters and its denial of a connection betw een w orks and
destiny. Turnbull and Blackwell replied with a rational Christianity that emphasized
the formation of moral character and the pursuit of virtue as an empirically signposted
route to salvation. Turnbulfs emphasis on virtue was republican in its orientation and
it was Turnbulfs godly republicanism that Reid imbibed when he was a student at
Marischal College.
In Chapter 2 I shall follow Reid's activities and interests while he was librarian of
Marischal, including his participation in a philosophical club in the w inter of 1736-
1737 and the intellectual outcome of a year-long sojourn in England.
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Here Reid himself entered sceptical debate. In the Club, Reid and his fellow members
discussed among other things Hutcheson's theory of the passions and the question of
the liberty of human actions. Hutcheson had conceived his theory as a response to the
sceptical views advanced by Mandeville. Reid was evidently impressed by the Club's
discussion of Hutcheon's theory, for he would begin his own very informed exchange
of "Sentiments about the frame of the human Nature and the Origin of its Passions and
Affections" with an unidentified gentleman of sceptical views in London during his
visit to that city and would return to the question of the passions a year or two later.1
This discussion raised the issue of belief and probability and led to an account of the
encouragement of virtue, as I will demonstrate in my account of Reid's discussion of
hope and fear. I will also consider Reid's engagement with the question of free will
versus determinism, in which he struggled against necessitarianism, or fatalism, as
Reid called it.
In Chapter 3 I will consider the politically significant aspects of Reid's thought in the
period when he was preaching at New Machar. At the time Reid returned to the
question of belief and probability implicit in the debate on the passions. Butler had
educed moral certainty out of probability in order to answer the fatalists on the
question of the liberty of human actions, attempting to navigate between certainty and
probability with the aid of Butler even before Hume had published his Treatise of
1739. Reid thus had Butler's arguments at his disposal at an early stage of his efforts
to counter Hume's Pyrrhonian attack on probability in Book 1 of the Treatise. Reid's
subsequent resurrection of Epictetus may be regarded as an attempt to underwrite
opinion in the wake of the devastation caused by Mandeville's sceptical reaction to
hy pocrisy and Hume's more subtle efforts to undermine belief. Reid ended up turning
to Xenophon's account of shaping opinion as a response to what he evidently
perceived to be the political consequences of the sceptical assault on belief. This
appeal to Xenophon avoided the withdraw al from politics advocated by Epictetus and
foreshadowed the systematic reflection on politics that would be required of Reid
when he took up his teaching duties at King's College.
1 MS. 3/111/17, to. lr.
Chapter 1
Learning Moderate Morals: The Legacy of Turnbull
Reid was bom on 26 April 1710 at the manse of Strachan in the country parish of
Kincardineshire, situated about twenty-three miles from Aberdeen on the north side of
the Grampian mountains. His father, the Revd Lewis Reid, was minister there for
fifty years and was himself from a long line of clergymen, beginning with James
Reid, the first minister of Banchory-Ternan after the Reformation. Reid's mother,
Margaret Gregory, came from a family that contributed no less than fourteen
professors to British universities through three centuries. One of her brothers, David,
was Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford and a close friend of Newton. Her
uncle, James, another friend of New ton, was professor of mathematics first at St
Andrews and then at Edinburgh and is best known as the inventor of the reflecting
telescope.
Reid probably received his first instruction at the manse, but was sent to the parish
school in neighbouring Kincardine-O'Neil for his elementary education. In 1718 or
1719, the young Reid left for the Grammar School at Aberdeen. Very little is known
about Reid or his intellectual development in this period, other than the parish
schoolmaster's prophetic assessment that the twelve-year-old Reid "'would turn out to
be a man of good and well-wearing parts"".5 The broad outlines of the next phase of
Reid's education are considerably better known.
Reid entered Marischal College, Aberdeen in October 1722 at the age of twelve. There
he worked his way through the standard four-year arts course, studying under George
Turnbull, one of the regents of philosophy. Turnbull led the young Reid through
Greek in the first year and the different parts of philosophy in years 2-4, (i.e. logic in
the second year, ethics in the third and physics or natural philosophy in the fourth) and
presented him for graduation on 14 April 1726. It should be pointed out, however,
that before the start of classes in Reid's final year, Turnbull went to study with the
Huguenot Jean Barbeyrac (1674—1744) in Groningen. Accordingly, Reid received
instruction from Turnbulfs substitute, probably Robert Duncan, a former student of
Barbeyrac newly returned from Groningen, for the first half of the 1725-1726
5 Quoted in Dugald Stewart, "Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Rcid." in Works, p. 4b.
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session.2 But it was Turnbull who, in fact, taught Reid moral philosophy, including
natural jurisprudence.-^
It is important to realize the extent of Reid's indebtedness to Turnbull and the influence
of the arts curriculum on his own intellectual formation and in his own career as a
professor in the Scottish system in which he himself had been trained,
notwithstanding his own reported view that his education under Turnbull had been
"slight and superficial",4 and the fact that he nowhere acknowledged any intellectual
debt to Turnbull (a fact long ago noticed by James McCosh)7
The evidence that has been handed down to us of Turnbull's prelections during his
brief career at Aberdeen is admittedly not very satisfying. But from the theses6
published forTurnbulTs graduating classes of 1723 and 1726 and from his Principles
ofMoral Philosophy (although this was not published until 1740)7 it is possible to
form a fairly clear picture of the kind of philosophical training Reid received and the
sorts of problems to which he had been exposed while a student at Marischal. A third
text, A Philosophical Enquiry Concerning the Connexion betwixt the Doctrines and
Miracles ofJesus Christ, written in 1726 (but not published until 1731), may help to
fill out the picture of w hat Turnbull actually taught, although Turnbull nowhere
identified this work as being directly connected with his prelections.
I shall begin by considering the contemporary evidence afforded by Turnbull's two
graduation theses, Theses philosophicae de scientiae naturalis cumphilosophia tnorali
-See M.A. Stew art, "George Turnbull and Educational Reform," in Jennifer J. Carter and Joan H.
Pittock. eds, Aberdeen and the Enlightenment (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 97.
4It must be noted, too. that by the time Reid entered, the eminent Liddell Professor of Mathematics
Colin M'Launn had effectively stopped teaching at Marischal. Moreover, Reid would not encounter
the Principal and Professor of Divinity Thomas Blackwell, author of Memoirs of the Court of
Augustus, until he began his studies for the ministry at Marischal in October 1726.
4Ste\vart, "Account." p. 4b.
-''See James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1875). p. 104, n. 1.
6I.e. statements of doctrine published by a professor at the expense of his students, from which
candidates for laureation would choose topics of disputation to demonstrate their command of the
professor's teaching.
Turnbull indicated in the Preface to the Principles that the book "|was] (a few things taken from late
writers excepted) the substance of several pneumaiologieal discourses, (as they are called in the school
language) read above a dozen years ago to students of Moral Philosophy, by way of preparative to a
course of lectures, on the rights and duties of mankind" (London, p. [ 13]). Volume 2 (London, 1740),
entitled The Principles ofMoral and Christian Philosophy, may or may not have originated in his
prelections; he tells us in the Preface to this work only that his purpose in writing it was "to
compleat the scheme of moral philosophy there delineated" (in the Principles).
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conjunctione (1723) and Theses academicae depulcherrimamundi cum materialis turn
rationalisconstitutions (1726).
In the theses for 1723 on the connection of natural and moral philosophy, Tumbull
began by asserting that only by pursuing the method of analysis and synthesis and
avoiding hypotheses in natural philosophy could the knowledge of nature be
perfected.8 Here Turnbull alluded to Bacon's advocacy of the experimental method,
but his understanding of this method obviously derived from Query 31 of Newton's
Opticks ("And if Natural Philosophy, in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at
length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will also be enlarged"),9 for, he
continued,
Both the moral and physical worlds are equally directed by the
benevolent reins and prudent hand for all time. And if there is such a
completeness in the natural order, we ought to be able to extend it to a
knowledge of men and their various faculties, dispositions, and
organization; all things would seem to be one, and one source of power
binds the sum of nature. Just so the ancients believed, and Cicero
teaches us, how most beautifully all things throughout the whole of
nature are integrated, harmonious, and regulated.10
Thus, Turnbull perceived a regularity in the government of the moral and the material
worlds that marked them as analogous contrivances of the Creator and envisaged the
reduction of moral phenomena to an empirical science in much the same way that the
phenomena of nature were being so reduced by Newton and his follow ers, including
Edmond Halley and Bradley.1 1 Indeed in the Preface to his Principles, he even seems
to have subsumed moral science under the heading of the science of nature: "it is
certain, that the order and symmetry of this inward part [the human mind] is in itself
no less real and exact than that of the body. And that this moral anatomy is not only a
part, but the most useful part of Natural Philosophy, rightly understood, is too evident
to need any proof to those who will but take the trouble to consider what Natural
Philosophy, in its full extent, must mean."12 The linking of Bacon and Newton with
8Cf. Preface to Principles, p. 2.
9In fact Turnbuil used this passage as an epigraph on the titie-page of the Principles.
1 °Citcd in Peter John Diamond, "The Ideology of Improv ement: Thomas Reid and the Political
Thought of the Scottish Enlightenment" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University.
1986), p. 59.
1 1 CI. Principles, vol. 2, p. 10: "there is a perfect analogy betw een the government of the natural
world, and that of the moral, as far as the natural differences of the two allow; and therefore ... we




Cicero was one of the few synthetic steps that Reid himself would allow in his own,
as we shall see, largely critical philosophy, and it is safe to assume that Reid borrowed
this formula from Turnbull.
In the theses for 1726 on "the manifest evidences and signs of wisdom and good order
in the moral as well as the natural world",1 4 Turnbull employed Newtonian physics to
prove the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul and thereby brought
the engines of natural science to bear against irreligion. As this is the domain of
natural theology which is so important for understanding Turnbull's religious
orientation and jurisprudential teaching in this period, I shall devote a separate section
to this subject. Turnbull also criticized Socrates for "[discouragingjinquiries into the
structure of nature."14 Reid, for his part, would later pay Socrates the follow ing
rather backhanded compliment, which would appear to owe much to Turnbull's
censure of that philosopher: "Deservedly, therefore, is Socrates considered most wise
who wittily derided the physics of his own age and preferred to philosophize about
these matters not at all rather than factitiously and uselessly."15 The theses for 1726
also contained a recommendation for curriculum reform according to which natural
philosophy would be taught before moral philosophy. Given the obvious similarities
between Turnbull's views on educational reform and Reid's own proposals for
reforming the curriculum at King's, I shall consider this topic in more detail later.
Moreover, as Paul Wood has pointed out, the theses also show that Turnbull
acquainted his students with the doctrines of both "the 'ancient Atheists'"
Anaximander, Democritus and Leucippus and "their modern counterparts" Hobbes,
Spinoza and Toland. He also introduced them to the philosophies of Descartes, Locke
and (probably) Berkeley among the moderns.16 Hence we may suppose that Reid
was exposed to such major controversies in contemporary philosophy as materialism,
scepticism, and free will versus determinism. 1 shall consider Turnbull's teaching on
the last two topics in more detail in the following discussions of his natural theology
and natural jurisprudence.
1 ^Preface to Principles, vol. 1, p. [13];cf. Preface to vol. 2: 'The design of The Principles of Moral
Philosophy, &c. is, to reduce appearances or facts in the moral world to general laws, in the same
manner that appearances in the natural world are reduced to general laws by natural philosophers: and
by pointing out sev eral wise and gcxxi final causes of those general laws, to vindicate the ways of God
to man, and prove that order is kept in the moral as well as in the natural world."
14McCosh, Scottish Philosophy, p. 97.
15Philosophical Orations, pp. 938-939.
16See P.B. Wood, "Thomas Reid and the Scottish Enlightenment" [exhibition catalogue] (Toronto:
Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library , 1985), p. 2.
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It will be evident that on Turnbull's view natural philosophy was the best introduction
to moral philosophy, its methodology serving as a model for the study ofmoral
phenomena and its completion being natural theology. Turnbull took a twofold
approach to natural theology whereby the results of the analysis of physical and moral
phenomena, which revealed God's providence in both the natural world on the one
hand and the regularity of the mental and moral faculties on the other, was joined to a
rigorous comparison of Christ's doctrines with his works, his teaching with regard to
a future state "{being] subject to 'experimental proof" in this life, by those miracles
which were 'natural proper samples' of the power they confirmed".1" AsTurnbull
viewed the miracles of Christ as confirmation of his teaching, so in the same spirit his
project in the Principles was to find evidence of general moral laws and thus "to
vindicate the ways of God to man".18 Turnbuifs conviction that punishment and
reward were meted out in due proportion (if not in this life then in the next) provided
for him, as I shall demonstrate, the foundation for virtue, religion and political society.
It may be underlined here that Turnbull's theology, by emphasizing works and reason
as well as faith and revelation, had a marked affinity with the Arminian doctrines that
"there is an universal grace given to all men; {and) that man is always free, and at
liberty to reject or embrace grace &c."'9 In these emphases natural theology attempted
to mitigate the extremist interpretations of the WestiminsterConfession of Faith
professed by Calvinist orthodoxy, the principal tenets ofwhich were;
1st, That predestination and reprobation are prior to the prescience of
good or evil works. 2dly, That predestination and reprobation depend
on the mere will of God; without any regard to the merits or demerits
of mankind. 3d 1 y, That God gives to those whom he has
predestinated, a faith which they cannot lose; a necessitating grace,
which takes away the freedom of the will; and that he imputes no sin to
them. 4thly,That the reprobates cannot do any good work, by reason
of original sin, which cleaves to them. 5thly, That men are justified by
faith only.20
Turnbull's Moderate leanings were evident in the assertion contained in the 1726
theses that "without divine grace no man can be good, pious, and upright." It was
also apparent in his Philosophical Enquiry, w here he asserted "that the Scripture way
1 'Philosophical Enquiry, p. 14, cited in Stewart, "George Turnbull." p. 99.
18Preface to vol. 2.
1 °"Arminianism," Cyclopcedia, cd. by E. Chambers, 7th ed., vol. 1 (London, 1751).
20"Calvinism," Cyclopcedia.
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of talking about the Spirit of God and his operations means simply assistance to the
virtuous."
The pedagogical (and ultimately political) implications ofTurnbull's valorization of
reason over revelation and of works over faith are plain. Henceforth, the role of the
preacher would be to teach morals rather than articles of faith; thus liberal education
would replace "clerical authoritarianism" as a means to training youth in the ways of
righteousness.21
Turnbull's emphasis, implicit in this approach, on the importance of reason and works
to salvation and the formation ofmoral character is consistent with his extensive use in
the Principles of the sermons of another rationalist Christian, Samuel Clarke.
Especially significant is Turnbulfs use of Clarke's Sermon 119 on Galatians 6.7, "Be
not deceived, God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also
reap." Turnbull borrows Clarke's interpretation of this verse, i.e. that there is "as
close and regular a connexion in morals as in naturals" (i.e. natural phenomena).22
For Clarke and Turnbull the analogy between the natural and the moral realms lay in
the fact that fixed relationships of cause and effect could be ascribed to both. If the
harvest depends upon the sower's effort, so does our salvation depend upon our
diligence in this life. In contradistinction to the orthodox Calvinist view,
"consequences and connexions" in the moral realm are thus the fruits of freely willed
action, not the preordained outcome of election.23 The doctrine of predestination is
here replaced by a doctrine "of Rewards and Punishments finally proportionable to
men's Behaviour".24 The certainty that "whatsoever a man soweth, That shall he also
reap" provides the very foundation for virtue and allows the possibility of moral self-
improvement denied by the Calvinist understanding of the reprobate's original sin.
We are not moved about mechanically by divine decree, passive recipients of unearned
grace, but are as Turnbull puts it "active being[s]" who make moral choices w hich
have consequences for this life and the next.2-""
2 'Haakonssen, Introduction to Practical Ethics, p. 8.
22Vol. 2, p. 7; cf. The Works ofSamuel Clarke, 5th cd., vol. 2 (London, 1742), p. 27.
23Principles, loc. cite, cf. Clarke, Works, loc. cit. About Tumbull's use of the New tonian language
of natural consequences (the language of moral consequences was conceived as an analogue to this
language), which Reid would appropriate in his remarks on politics both at King's and at Glasgow
College, more at the end of this section.
24Clarkc, Works, vol. 2, p. 26.
--'Vol. 2, p. 40; cf. "Remarks", in Jo[hann] Gotftlieb] Heineccius, A Methodical System of Universal
Law, trans. George Turnbull, vol. 1 (London, 1763), p. 197: "intelligent activ e beings".
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According to Turnbull, "the assiduous study and practice of virtue", the object of a
liberal education, consists in "making the best use (we] can of all the seasons and
circumstances [we] may now be placed in" through the enlightened exercise of
reason.26 It builds up moral character, giving us "dominion over ourselves, and ...
inward liberty and power" and thereby affords the comforts of a clear conscience and
secures our passage into heaven 27 Consequently, "our present state is, with respect
to a future life, a probationary state; a state of education, trial, and discipline; a state in
which the foundation is laid for our after happiness or misery ; or, to keep to the
apostle's [St Paul's] excellent similitude, our seed-time, to which it is the harvest."28
Virtue as conceived by the rationalists is not the static grace of the strict Calvinists but
"is and must be a progress."29 Moreover, "as it is virtue alone that can make any
particular person truly happy; so it is virtue alone that can be called the basis and
cement of society , or that makes it happy."30 Thus for theological, moral and political
reasons, the practice of virtue "is our principal business in this our first state".31
Liberal education is on this model "the proper foundation of the virtues of citizenship
and, by extension, of a political system of liberty."32
It is clear, then, that under Turnbull's tutelage Reid was launched on a trajectory of
rational Christianity, one that would be confirmed by his training for the ministry and
demonstrated by his ow n moderate stance in the Church and in his teaching on natural
theology in Glasgow . Reid's basic orientation on the question of free will would
appear to owe much to Turnbull, and it is significant that it is the verse from Galatians,
which, as we have seen, was such a favourite with Turnbull (and Clarke), that in
many aspects sets the tone of Reid's inaugural lecture at Glasgow. Moreover, the
view that this life is a state of trial and improvement, which Reid would espouse to the
end of his days, is a formula he learned from Turnbull. The notion that we are active
26Vol. 2, p. 13.
27Vol. 1. p. 264.
28Vol. 2, pp. 9-10.
29Voi. 2, p. 311.
30Vol. 1, p. 344.
31Vol. 1, p. 264.
3 2Haakonssen, Introduclion to Practical Ethics, p. 8; of. Principles, vol. 2, p. 104: "Hence naturally
pullulate suspicion, jealousy, envy, fraud, revenge, and many other monstrous vices, which sadly
depress and sink men below the dignity they naturally rise to in a free state; where a spirit of liberty
and independency, a sense of one common interest and public spirilcdncss, desire of aggrandizing the
commonwealth, and of shining, gaining fame, honour, power, and dignity in it, by being eminently
useful to it, must naturally grow up, as generous plants in their proper soil and climate; for there
proper care of education, an essential point to free and happy government, cannot be w anting."
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beings and the emphasis on virtue in its theological, moral and political applications,
so much in evidence in Turnbull, would also inform Reid's own teaching.
In the Preface to the Principles Turnbull indicated that in his moral philosophy course
he read the pneumatological discourses (which he expanded in that work) as a
"preparative to a course of lectures, on the rights and duties ofmankind".33 It may be
noted that it was under this aspect that politics was handled. While Turnbull's lectures
have not survived, the topics for disputation at the end of his 1726 theses give us
something of an outline of his teaching.
Turnbull's jurisprudential orientation in 1724-1725 was, in Knud Haakonssen's
formula, "a providential naturalism" according to which the results of an empirical
investigation of human and non-human nature were taken to "show that there are
things that are inherently good and bad,... the supreme will disclosed by the
providential order of the world ... [putting] man undera moral obligation to follow the
laws of nature."34
Against the background sketched above, it is significant that in his 1723 theses
Turnbull asserted that "the state of nature is not completely lawless" and that in the
1726 theses he claimed that "man is created for society ". These theses w ere decidedly
anti-Hobbesian. In his Leviathan Hobbes declared that
the Laws of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) doing to others, as we would be done to,) of themselves
without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are
contrary to our natural Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride,
Revenge, and the like.3^
Accordingly it was his view (according to Barbeyrac's influential interpretation) that
"the Will of the Sovereign alone constitutes ... what we call Just and Unjust".36
1 said earlier on that Tumbull's rational Christianity involved a shift away from what
might be regarded as orthodox Calvinism's sceptical denial of the connection between
one's works and one's fate, in favour of a scientific affirmation ofmoral causes and
33Vol. 1, p. [13f
34lnlroduction to Practical Elhies, p. 7.
3^Leviathan (London, 1651), p. 85.
36Aw Historical and Critical Account of the Science ofMorality, prefaced lo S. Pufendorf, The Law
ofNature andNations, trans. Basil Kennell, 5th ed. (London, 1749), quoted in Richard Tuck, Hobbes
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 93. Barbeyrac's Historical and Critical Account w as first
published in French in 1706.
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effects. This ethico-theological orientation also informed Turnbulfs teaching on
natural jurisprudence. God must be presumed to have legislated even in the state of
nature, as a third thesis from 1726 shows: "the right to do or not to do something
derives as much from God as the similar obligation to do or not to do
something".Turnbull"s theocentric natural jurisprudence had important political
consequences: "no natural rights can be contractually alienated, and in cases of the
utmost necessity the individual has a right to the property of others".4^ Reid would
adopt similar principles in his own natural jurisprudence, as 1 shall show in due
course. I shall only say here that when Reid was teaching at Glasgow College he saw-
fit to separate politics from ethics, which included natural jurisprudence. This proved
to be extremely difficult for him to do, precisely because he had been taught to view
politics as an essential part of jurisprudence. What he ended up with was a political
jurisprudence w hich incorporated his science of politics.
With this discussion of Turnbull's theses we have exhausted the evidence that has
survived of what Reid learned about natural law from his regent at Marischal.48
Although 1 have disregarded Turnbull's Discourse upon ihe Nature andOrigine of
Moral andCivil Laws,*9 which he described as "an attempt to introduce the
experimental way of reasoning into morals, or to deduce human duties from internal
principles and dispositions in the human mind",40 and his translation of Heineccius'
Elementa juris naturae et gentium,41 I should point out that in the former he may be
regarded as having prepared the way for Reid and in the translation (.Methodical
System) he confirmed the orientation contained in the theses.42
It is also significant that, just as he had done in the Principles, Turnbull used the
Newtonian language of natural causes and consequences in the Methodical System,
but this time specifically with regard to "our excellent politician Mr. Harrington".44
While this discussion may not have formed part of Tumbull's course in 1724—1725,
the following remarks, closely related to these, in the Principles, probably did:
47Haakonssen. Introduction to PracticalEthics, pp. 7—8; cf. Methodical System, vol. 1, p. 9 and n.
4S1 have deliberately not opened up the problem of the modern natural law tradition, w hich had ever
been under pressure from the sceptics; I shall deal with this subject at length w hen 1 come to Reid's
ow n teaching career at Glasgow.
39London, 1740.
40Preface toMethodical System.
4'2 vols (London, 1741).
42See "Remarks", in Methodical System, vol. 1, pp. 62—63.
43"Remarks", vol. 1, pp. 200, 295, 296 ("property is the natural cause of government"); Preface to
vol. 2, pp. 82, 119; cf. Principles, vol. 2, p. 6.
Kilagawa 21
that the perfection and happiness of mankind must depend upon the
natural fitness of the form of government they live under, or of their
civil and religious constitution, in order to produce that end, is as
certain as that there are proper and improper means with relation to any
end; or that no end can be accomplished, but by the means fit to attain
it: an universal self-evident truth in moral as well as natural
mechanism, or with respect to moral ends as well as natural ones. In
consequence of which it is that the science of politics consists in
judging of the propriety and fitness, moral and political, of means to
bring about and promote the sole end of government, the happiness of
subjects. And hence it is accordingly that philosophers and politicians
have been able, in many instances, to form such true judgments of the
different forms of government, laws and policies, as (like Polybius,
with regard to the Roman republic) to foretel the revolutions and
changes of government which must happen, merely from the exact
knowledge of the necessary effects of moral causes. Here, as well as
in the natural world, effects may be with certainty inferred from their
causes; for in both cases, from a certain concurrence of circumstances
or causes, certain consequences necessarily result. To be satisfied of
this, one needs only look into the political reasonings of any good
writer on politics, Aristotle, Polybius, or our own Harrington.44
Reid would employ this same Newtonian language both in his philosophical orations
at King's4-'' and in his Glasgow lectures on politics46 when it came to be his turn to
teach. There can be no doubt that this was a language he had learned from Turnbull.
Harrington would also figure prominently in Reid's Glasgow lectures, as I will show.
In the 1726 theses Turnbull recommended a reversal of the order in which the main
parts of the philosophy course were dealt with. Traditionally in the Scottish
universities, moral philosophy was taught before natural philosophy. This was the
case at Marischal. For his part, Tumbull evidently regarded the study of natural
philosophy as a prerequisite and model for the study ofmoral philosophy. In a few of
his other writings published about the same time as the Principles, most notably A
Treatise onAncient Painting (1739) and Observations upon Liberal Education (1742),
Tumbull developed his view s on educational reform further. In these works he
dow nplayed the importance of language and logic, the subjects that dominated the first
two years of the arts course, and emphasized the value of early instruction in natural
and civil history (which he apparently regarded as related both to each other and to
natural religion in the same way that natural and moral philosophy were). If
44Vol. 1, pp. 200-201.
45See pp. 938. 955.
46See MSS. 4/111/1, fo. 2r; 4/111/2, to. 2r ("the various Forms of Political Government with their
Causes & Effects"); cf. 4/111/5, fo. lr.
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Turnbull's practice with his private students is any indication, it would appear that he
had these ideas in the back of his mind when he was teaching Reid.4
Be that as it may, Turnbull did not succeed in changing either the order or the content
of the arts curriculum at Marischal. Moral philosophy continued to be taught before
natural philosophy and independently of history until the 1750s. It is significant that it
was Reid himself who would be the driving force behind the eventual reforms at
King's and that these would be on the same lines as those suggested by Turnbull.
Thus far I have focussed on what is known about the structure of the education Reid
received at Marischal and highlighted what may reasonably be assumed were the
problems to which his attention had been drawn. It is to be regretted, however, that
nothing in Reid's hand survives from his first four years at Marischal. Reid's
Victorian biographer, A. Campbell Fraser, remarked somewhat plaintively that "A
commonplace book like Berkeley's, when Berkeley was an undergraduate in Dublin,
would have cast welcome light on this part of his mental history."48
In the event, all that we have relating to Reid's intellectual development in this
formative teenage period is a letter which he wrote many years later to his kinsman
William Gregory, then an undergraduate at Balliol College, Oxford. The letter, dated
13 January 1779, was written when Reid was in his 69th year and must, for that
reason, be viewed with caution. The danger is great that the older Reid gazed upon
his youth through an interpretative lens that was not part of his cognitive equipment as
a boy. Bearing this in mind, we may consider Reid's revelation to young Gregory
that when he was about fourteen (presumably Gregory's age) he was burdened by an
overactive imagination. He was haunted by recurring bad dreams in which he found
himself in a variety of perilous situations, and in the face of which he showed himself
to be a terrible coward. As well as distressing him at night these nightmares disturbed
him during the day. At about the same period, when the young Reid went for his
evening walk he would indulge in what he, like Steele in The Spectator''9 called
"castle-building", a species of day-dreaming, "and in these scenes of imagination [he]
performed many a gallant exploit." Anxious to reconcile these conflicting images of
47Turnbull's first act as tutor to a certain Master Udney in 1725 and to Andrew Wauchope of Niddty
in 1727 was to enroll them in the history classes at Groningen and Edinburgh respectively (see
Stewart. "George Turnbull." pp. 97-101).
^Thomas Reid. Famous Scots Scries (Edinburgh and London: Ohphant Anderson & Ferner. 1898).
p. 24.
49No. 167 (11 Sept 171 ]).
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himself, or at least to conquer his fears, Reid persevered in an exercise in mental
discipline in which he "strongly impressed" upon his mind as he went to sleep the
thought that he "never in [hisj lifetime was in any real danger, and that every fright
[hej had was a dream." Apparently, he hoped that this thought would intervene when
he was visited by a nightmare. The technique was successful, as it prompted him to
wake up "calm and intrepid", and subsequently Reid found that his "dreams were
never very uneasy". Within about a year or two, i.e. about the time he was
completing his studies with Tumbull, he seems to have believed that he had stopped
himself from having dreams altogether, a circumstance that remained true for more
than forty years. The only dream he could distinctly remember came more than ten
years even later and was occasioned by a fall.50 Unfortunately, Reid does not say
whether his tendency to day-dream was overcome when the dreams and nightmares
stopped.
This reminiscence is significant because it affords a glimpse into what appears to be
Reid's attempt at a very early age to distinguish proper from improper uses of the
imagination. This issue and the problem of characterizing the imagination adequately
are themes that w ould recur in Reid's later intellectual career, particularly in response
to the sceptical challenge of Hume, and which would prove to have a direct political
relevance, i.e. as an aid to the practice of virtue.-"'1 It is tempting to speculate that Reid
engaged in his y outhful exercises in mental discipline apropos of hearing Turnbull
lecture on Locke's notion of pow er, the act of will by which Reid stopped himself
from dreaming being an application of Locke's concept.-"'2
Promoted by Turnbull, Reid graduated M.A. on 14 April 1726. The follow ing
October, still at Marischal, he began his studies for the ministry, which he completed
in 1731 at the age of twenty or twenty-one. Reid was taught first by the Principal and
Professor of Divinity , Thomas Blackwell, and, after Blackwell *s death in 1728, by
James Chalmers, who succeeded Blackwell in the Divinity chair. In his published
writings, Blackwell, who was a Moderate Presbyterian, condemned atheism, deism
and the mysticism of Antoinette Bourignon, which was then popular among local
Episcopalians. Blackwell made use of both reason and revelation in putting forward
-"^Stewart, "Account." pp. 33b—34a.
-"''See Works, p. 3S6a.
-~'2CI. Turnbull, Principles, vol. 2, p. 73.
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his own brand of rational Christianity, which, as Paul Wood has shown, was
essentially in line with that advocated by Turnbull.55
Tradition has it that Reid was "master of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia at the age of
twenty."54 Reid was obviously delving into natural philosophy while he was
studying for the ministry, and, as I have already observed, Turnbull would have
regarded this as an ideal preparation for a proper natural theology. The
methodological model provided by Newton's Principia furnished Reid with the notion
of a cause and the language of necessary consequences that would later inform his
forays into the science of politics at both Aberdeen and Glasgow. It also gave him an
early demonstration of the fundamental importance of probable evidence to the affairs
of everyday life, from the most mundane to those of the greatest consequence,
including politics and religion.
On 22 September 1731 Reid was licensed to preach by the Presbytery of Kincardine
O'Neil and began a long career that would be divided between church and university,
fulfilling the promise of both sides of his family. Reid served as Clerk of the
Presbytery and preached occasionally from August 1732 to April 1733.
In July 1733. Reid left his church duties temporarily to become Librarian of Marischal
College, a post which he held until 1738, but which he in fact handed over to a
substitute in 1736 in order that he and his childhood friend, John Stewart, who was
by that time professor ofmathematics at Marischal, could sojourn in England for a
year among the scientific (broadly defined) literati of London, Oxford and Cambridge.
55P.B. Wood, "Thomas Reid," p. 3; see also M.A. Stewart, "George Turnbull," p. 99: P.J. Diamond.
'The Ideology of Improvement," p. 29.
5477/e Annua! Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Idlerattire, for the Year 1796, 2nd cd..
vol. 38 (London, 1807), p. 39. The same remark appeared in The Gentlemen's Magazine, orMonthly
Intelligencer, vol. 66 (1796). p. 883. There is a six-page manuscript among Reid's papers in
Aberdeen (7/111/15) headed on lo. lr "Cum Principia Mathemalica CI. New torn", and dated on the
same folio 6 Oct 1729 (i.e. in Reid's twentieth year).
Chapter 2
Connecting Power with Passion: An Early Encounter with Locke
Throughout the 1730s, Reid closely monitored the contemporary debates on liberty
and power and on the passions. These issues had been given particular urgency by
the resurgence of scepticism. Turnbull and Aberdeen philosophy had evidently
aw akened his interest in this side of things, for Reid seems to have spent his time
both while he was a librarian and a cleric in intensive study, not only of "the laws of
external perception, and of the other principles which form the groundwork of
human knowledge", as Dugald Stewart observed,1 but also of theologico-political
problems. 1 shall begin in this chapter with Reid's progress on these subjects while
he held the patronage appointment of librarian at Marischal. In the next chapter 1
will consider Reid's engagement during his years as a minister with these and other
philosophical matters which would have profound implications for his political
science.
The first extant manuscripts relating to this stage of Reid's intellectual career are
those surrounding his sojourn in England and were written while Reid was in his
mid-twenties. Only about half a dozen manuscripts pertinent to my discussion have
survived from 1736-1737, but these contain a wealth of material on the state of
Reid's knowledge at this time and on the nature of his engagement with theC CO
controversies that raged in moral philosophy in his day. Although none of the
reflections recorded in these documents are expressly political, in many ways they
point the way to the 1766 version of his introductory lecture on politics at Glasgow ,
and beyond to his philosophical correspondence with Lord Karnes and w ith his
kinsman, Dr James Gregory, from 1772 to 1793.
In the winter of 1736 Reid was active in a philosophical club at Aberdeen whose
membership probably included John Stewart, whom w e have mentioned before, and
David Fordyce, a student of Hutcheson who later taught philosophy at Marischal.
The Club met at frequent intervals to discuss the leading theological and
philosophical texts of the day. Reid's brief minutes record meetings in January on
the 12th, 19th and 26th and in February on the 4th and the 9th. The texts discussed
'"Account," in Works, p. 5b.
on those occasions included, it would seem, Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding and the publications of Francis Hutcheson, including his Essay on the
Nature and Conduct ofthe Passions and Affections,2 the Clarke-Leibniz
correspondence and William King's De Origine Mali3 The Club set for discussion
questions concerning God's active role in "the Course of Nature", the divine
government of moral agents through law, "Duration, Eternity, Succession of Ideas
&c", the principles of human nature, and self-love and benevolence. The Club's
discussion of Hutcheson's theory of the passions evidently impressed Reid, for he
would begin his own very informed exchange of "Sentiments about the frame of the
human Nature and the Origin of its Passions and Affections" with an unidentified
gentleman of sceptical views in London during his visit to that city, and would return
to the question of the passions a year or two later, after his return to Scotland, in his
correspondence with the same man.4 But for present purposes the single most
important topic dealt with by the Club (i.e. on the basis of the surviving minutes)
was the question proposed concerning the liberty of human actions.
This question, like that concerning the passions, had great currency among
philosophers of the day. In the debate on human liberty, two basic positions were
available: a belief in our own liberty and power or a retreat into fatalism. Thus in the
Philosophical Club Reid was anxious to combat the views of "The fatalists |who|
either Suppose that the Mind is Determined either by the greatest apparent Good or
by the Strongest present Desire or Uneasiness", and he agreed with Locke that "the
Strongest Desire |isj not always raised by the greatest apparent good". He also
contended that w e are not slaves of our desires but are in fact "perswaded that we are
the Authors of our Own Actions". We have a notion of "willing an Action", "a
Power of Deliberation" and indeed "a Power of Suspending action or acting
Contrary to Desire or Instinct". We have, in a word, "Liberty".-""
Hume and Karnes would declare our notions of liberty and power to be deceitful and
would resort to a form of fatalism in consequence. This would become a matter of
contention for Reid in his lectures on ethics during his tenure at Aberdeen, as 1 will
show in Chapter 5. Reid would again take up the question of human liberty when he
-Reid has "treatise on the Passions." For his notes from Hutcheson's book, see MS. 7/V/24, fos !r,
2r.
3See fos 1 v-2r for direct and indirect references to authors and/or texts.
4MS. 3/III/7, fo. 1 r.
5MS. 6/1/17, fos 1 v-2r.
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rewrote the opening lecture on politics for his class in Glasgow in 1766. This issue
would aiso occupy a crucial position in his Essays on 1he Active Powers published in
1788, where the nature of Reid's politics is only thinly disguised in the pedagogical
format of Essay 4, "Of the Liberty of Moral Agents." While 1 can make no claim
here that Reid had politics on his mind when he and his colleagues were conversing
on liberty in the Philosophical Club a full thirty years before, in his Glasgow lectures
Reid would draw upon a stock of knowledge he had begun to acquire under Turnbull
and to which he had added in the 1730s and beyond. Still, the difficulties implicit in
disposing of the same business first in an ethical context and then under the rubric of
politics are not to be underestimated.
Reid's strategy in allowing our persuasion of certain principles to be the starting-
point of his philosophy is striking, for it recalls Cicero's view that what is persuasive
can be a reason for action.6 This was consistent with the eminently practical nature
of Reid's philosophy. It would hardly be thoroughgoing enough, however, to satisfy
the consumate sceptic, Hume, who would subject persuasion or probability to his
Pyrrhonian scrutiny and challenge such persuasions as mere prejudice.
The claim made here that the discussion about liberty that was taking place in the
Philosophical Club was of central importance to Reid's intellectual activity at this
time is supported by other manuscript evidence. While the Club was meeting and in
the period immediately before and after that covered by Reid's minutes, Reid was
writing out "Definitions of some Words relating to our Active powers" and posing
the question "Willing what".8 These papers must be read in conjunction with a third
document headed "Queer. Whether Men in all their Actions are Determined
Necessarly or Not", which probably dates from the second week of January 17367
Reid begins this discussion with the assertion that our ideas of power and agency are
primary notions which can be explained only by the fact that "There are certain
Events or Effects of which we Imagine our Selves to be the Authors and that it was
in our Power that they Should not have been." By "Willing" one determines to
produce an effect "And the Sum of all the Effects which depend upon [one's] willing
them is the Measure of [one's] Power". Reid called this "Natural Power" and
6Cf. On Duties, ed. M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.
5 and n. 2. Of R and Cicero more later.
7MS. 6/1/34, w hich bears the dates 11 and 13 Jan 1736,
8MS. 6/1/35, w hich is dated 19 Feb 1736.
9MS. 3/III/1.
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claimed it "is the Same which Mr Locke in his excellent Chapter on Power )i.e.
Essay Book 2, Chapter 21J calls Liberty". Natural Power must, however, be
distinguished from "Mechanical" powers, which produce their effects not through
the mediation of will but by the operation of "Natural Instincts or ... acquired
Habits".10
It is this concept of natural power which turns out to be essential to a proper
understanding of Reid's politics. Some thirty years after the date of this piece, Reid
would in the general introduction to his moral philosophy course at Glasgow
characterize "Political Events" as "the grandest Effects of human Power ... |i.e.
those) that are produced by the concurrence of many joyned in Society."11
Moreover, it is significant that Reid should have been interested in legitimizing the
concept of power in 1736, i.e. three years before Hume had boldly shown that "We
never ... have any idea of power" in Book 1 of the Treatise ofHuman Mature,12 It is
almost as though Reid felt the tide of scepticism coming in and then immediately set
about shoring up the foundations of the human mind. He had certainly been
prepared for this, at least in a rudimentary fashion, by Turnbull. But, as I will show,
despite his continuing interest in the problems of liberty and power, Reid would not
spontaneously develop a systematic response to the sceptics. Rather, the demands of
teaching would concentrate his interest and call forth a disciplined reply
In the spring of 1736 Reid travelled with John Stewart to London, Oxford and
Cambridge to "See men and things". Sponsored by Dr Alexander Stuart, who was
presumably John Stewart's kinsman, Reid and Stewart witnessed some electrical
experiments demonstrated by J.T. Desaguliers at the Royal Society. While still in
London. Reid and Stewart were introduced to Martin Folkes. perhaps through Reid's
relation to Dr David Gregory. Dugald Stewart tells us that Folkes" "house
concentrated the most interesting objects which the metropolis had to offer to his
curiosity."13 At Cambridge Reid and Stewart conversed with the blind Lucasian
Professor of Mathematics, Dr Nicholas Saunderson.
The evidence that has survived shows us that at this period Reid was also following
with interest a debate concerning the passions, which involved Hutcheson,
10Fo. tr.
11MS. 7/V/4, p. 15.
1 ^-David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Mature, 2nd ed., ed. P.H. Niddi tch (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990; hereinafter Treatise ), p. 161.
'-^"Account," in Works, p. 5a.
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Mandeville and. latterly, Hume. It was at this time that Reid and his sceptical
London acquaintance began their exchange of opinions on this subject. By Reid's
summary, his friend took the view "that The Love of Sensible Pleasure is the Onely
Principle that is truly Natural & Original to us". It was of course a good sceptical
strategy to "mount higher." as Hume would later describe the process, and trace
every passion through its antecedents, which we have in common with the brutes, to
its earliest, untutored, appearance in the human mind. Children, and adults in their
savage condition, afford natural models for this task, and the results of the
investigation could then be generalized to explain the motivations of people in
advanced commercial society. On this view, accounting for the great variety of
animating principles in the human frame was merely an interpretative problem which
could be easily met in any given case by showing how different passions are excited
or extinguished through the modification or recombination of the first stirrings from
which they ultimately derive. Thus Reid noted his sceptical friend's admission
That there are several Other Principles in Grown Men such as the
Love of Honour. Riches, Virtue, Affection to the Good of our friends,
Of our Countrey or of Mankind. That we seek these things at first
onely as the Means of procuring Sensible Good to us but when by
long Experience we have found them Closely Connected with
sensible Good, the Ideas of them come at last to be so associated with
the Idea of Good that we acquire an esteem of them or an affection to
them as good in themselves.
Yet Reid's interlocutor seems to have been of the opinion that because the love of
honour, benevolent affection and all of the other affections are engendered by the
love of sensible pleasure, they "may be strengthned weakned or quite extinguished
by Custom Education or Discipline."
For his part, Reid was willing to allow that the love of sensible pleasure is probably
"the onely Principle that operates in infants for some time", but he was unhappy w ith
the suggestion that the other principles (the love of honour, benevolent affection, and
so on), which, admittedly, are not apparent in infancy, are merely assimilated to
sensible pleasure by the association of ideas in adulthood. Such a belief, he
considered, degraded human nature and gave too much credit to the reductionist
argument of the sceptics. Reid was rather of the view that these other principles are
equally natural and original to human beings, although nature is obviously quite
"'[frugalJ in bestowing them onely at that period of life when we come to have use
for them." The "Passion of Shame", for example, appears relatively late,
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presumably because it is not useful to us earlier on.14 But nature does not do
everything, in Reid's view; we must raise the passions properly through use and
exercise, the unstated assumption being that if nature has not planted the seed, there
would be nothing for us either to cultivate or to tread under foot. Thus Reid's
argument with his sceptical friend boils down to how one is to interpret nature's
apparent flexibility where the passions are concerned. The sceptics preferred to
account for it by regarding principles such as the love of honour as offshoots of a
single plant sprouted, as it were, by ratiocinative or calculating reason, whereas Reid
chose to characterize them as late bloomers in the richly varied garden of human
faculties.
In another contemporary note on this subject, Reid indicated the extent to which he
believed the passions to be absolutely necessary constituents of the mind. Indeed, he
seems to have regarded them as a kind of switching-box in the interface between
"the powers of Understanding & [of] Action". If the mind were "without any feeling
of Pleasure or Pain happiness or Misery," Reid supposed,
there could be no possible reason or motive to determine it to any one
course of Action more than another, it must forever be irresolute &
inconstant!;] if not wholly inactive incapable of moral Government &
Virtue or Vice as well as of Rew ard or Punishment.15
This characterization of the mind would prove to be fraught with difficulties, for it
was tantamount to an admission that the passions are the decisive factor in human
conduct. From this position it is, of course, fairly easy to slide into the view that
Hume would reach, i.e. that reason is perfectly inert. Reid does not seem to have
been cognizant of such dangers at this point, but it is clear that when he did
eventually become aware of them he back-pedalled vigorously, insisting that there
are in fact rational principles of action which are (or at least can be) quite compelling
in those who have had the proper training and discipline. Nonetheless, at no time
did Reid try to discount entirely the role of the passions in inciting us to action. On
the contrary, he seems to have persisted for the rest of his days in the view, outlined
in the next section, that the way to shape a man's behaviour is by operating on his
passions.
14MSS. 3/III/7, fo. Ir; 6/1/33, fo. lr. 3/III/7 is a draft of a letter from Reid to an unknow n
correspondent in London dating from 1737 or early 1738. In the letter Reid introduces his friend
David Fordyce to his London acquaintance. 6/1/33 appears to be a minute of Reid's conversation
with his London friend, or at least a sketch of his friend's position, together with a statement of his
own view.
'^MS. 6/1/29, fo. lr; cf. MS. 7/V/8, fo. 2r, e\ idently of a later date.
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Although Reid, as we have seen, was at some pains to point out the difference
between his own view of the principles of human action and the sceptical
association-of-ideas approach, in his reflections under the heading "Hope, Fear"
dated 22 Dec 1736 — i.e. after his return from London — it is possible to see how
these views may appear to converge.
Reid did not agree with his London correspondent that a single originating passion
— the love of sensible pleasure — gives rise by the association of ideas to all of the
other passions. In this view, one might reflect, every emotion would be a species of
either attraction or aversion, and human action would be motivated on the pleasure-
pain principle. Reid did allow, however, that an imaginative association of ideas can
figure in our deliberation, colouring our judgements as, for example, along the axis
of hope and fear:
Distant Objects may be made to affect our Hope and fear as much or
almost as much as those that are near by Cosideration & Reflection.
This Constitution a Great Relief to the Weakness of our Natures
which make us apt to be most moved by what we feel most for the
present.
Although it might strike one that hope and fear — "Sensations excited by the belief
or expectation of Some future Event Good or Bad" — stand in analogous relation to
pleasure and pain, Reid's formulation is saved from the binary reductivism of his
correspondent by a number of considerations. First, if hope and fear are not derived
from some other, originating, passion, neither do they seem to be by Reid's lights the
only primary passions. (Others, as I will show , are grief and anger.) Moreover, they
are mediated, as Reid suggests in this passage, by an act of reflection. Reid's point
is that our raw instincts are tempered by reason and experience. They form under
the governance of reason part of the apparatus of judgement. Hope and fear
constitute "[acts] of Judgment founded upon the apparent Proba[bi]lity whether the
Event be Good, Evil, or Indifferent." While hope and fear are "more apt to be
excited by Events that are near than Events that are at a great Distance," distant
events may at times concern us more than present circumstances. It may, in other
words, be quite possible for us to uncloud our judgement by means of a calm
consideration of the future and sober reflection on experience. In this way the road
to virtue may be more effectively pointed out and more safely travelled, for hope and
fear are ''great Ispursj to the persuit of Good & the avoiding of evil."16 Thus the
16MS. 7/V/6, fo. lr-v.
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passions of hope and fear are instrumental to right action, but only when their proper
objects have been identified by reason. It is their susceptibility to "consideration and
reflection" that, perhaps paradoxically, allows the passions to "relieve" us, that is, to
ease the burden of our brutish nature and make liberty — and, by extension, politics
— possible. The appeal to belief and probability which Reid makes here in response
to the sceptical view of the passions prefigures his reading of Butler, as I will show
in the next chapter.
Reid's reliance upon a mediating reasonableness that acts upon the passions is,
however, not unproblematic in view of the commandeering of reason at a parallel
point in the sceptics's argument, and on this point Reid might be said to be in danger
of giving up some ground. In the sceptical formulation, reason might be viewed as a
scout and spy, to use a Hobbesian phrase, of the passions. Reid would not take up
the task of pointing out what he believed to be the proper, i.e. unsceptical,
framework of the passions (that is, reason or common sense) until his teaching years.
But even then, as I shall demonstrate in due course, he made what could hardly be
described as insignificant concessions to the sceptics.
In a lecture note probably dating from the Aberdeen period, Reid wrote: "in man)
Cases where the cool (i.e. rational] Consideration of Interest or Duty might fail to
raise the Passions of Desire Hope or Fear may answer the End. The Passions
therefore are of great Use to give force to th(o)se principles of Action which of
themselves would act coolly" 1 As Reid would make clear in his Glasgow lectures
on politics some thirty years later, this is of great importance to the statesman or
legislator in that political judgement operates on the basis of such probabilities as
constitute the groundwork of the passions. A prudent statesman may encourage or
restrain the hopes and fears of the citizenry in order to promote virtue. A wise
legislator may also avail himself of another pair of passions, namely grief and joy.
"Grief [is] one of the best Medicines of the Mind (and) brings us into a state of Sober
thinking & recollection".18
Reid drew this connection between the passions and politics in an explicitly political
context in the Active Powers where he remarked in republican fashion that "The art
of government is the medicine of the mind, and the most useful part of it is that
which prevents crimes and bad habits, and trains men to virtue and good habits b)
i7MS. 7/V/23, p. [61.
,8MS. 7/V/6, lb. lv.
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proper education and discipline."19 The manipulation of the passions for political
purposes is of course a familiar recourse of the sceptic as well; here again may be
observed in broad outline the sceptical framework within which Reid would have to
operate as he tried to lay the foundations for a science of politics consistent w ith a
philosophy of common sense.
]9Worl:s\ p. 578a.
Chapter 3
Pondering Probability: Butler versus Hume
On 12 May 1737, soon after his return from England, Reid was ordained and
presented to the living of the nearby parish of New Machar by King's College,
Aberdeen, in whose gift it then was. He would retain this position for fifteen years.
Reid's settlement was opposed at first because of the parishioners" distaste for the
rule of patronage and their outright hostility towards Reid's predecessor, who had
been imposed upon the congregation by a so-called riding committee appointed by
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. But the parishioners eventually
rallied round Reid, ow ing, it seems, both to "the active spirit of his humanity" and to
the "good offices among the sick and necessitous" of his wife, Elizabeth, whom he
married on 12 August 1740. "We fought against Dr Reid when he came," remarked
some old members of the congregation, "and would have fought for him when he
went away."!
Reid apparently continued to serve his parishioners long after he stopped being their
pastor. He is reputed to have bestow ed, out of his own pocket, a pension on one man
who had been a member of the kirk session when Reid was a minister but who had
fallen on hard times in old age. "The pride of science had not from the mind of this
great man eradicated the amiable sympathies of humanity," wrote the anonymous
author of an article on Reid in the Encyclopaedia Brilannica, "nor had his
philosophic fame made him overlook the unaspiring duties of the Christian pastor."-
Be that as it may, by Reid's own account he failed to set such a shining example for
much of the time he served New Machar. Whether he was overly harsh in his self-
criticisms in the confession he committed to paper on 30 March 1746, when his w ife
was seriously ill, it may now be impossible to judge:
1 have been too negligent of my pastoral duty and my private
devotions, too much given to the pleasures and satisfactions of this
world, and too little influenced by the promises and the hope of a
future state. 1 have employed my studies, reading, and conversation
rather to please myself than to edify myself and others. 1 have sinned
'Stewart, "Account," in Works, p. 5a—b.
"3rd ed.. Supplement, vol. 2 (Edinburgh. 1801). p. 398.
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greatly in neglecting many opportunities of making private
applications to my flock and family in the affairs of their souls, and in
using too slight preparation for my public exercises. I have thrown
away too much of my time in sloth and sleep, and have not done so
much for the relief of the poor and destitute as I might have done.3
On the character of Reid's sermons there is also little evidence, as, unfortunately,
none of them lrav£ survived. If Ramsay of Oehtertyre is to be believed, Reid's "style
of preaching was far from being popular or alluring, being clear, plain, mathematical
reasoning, little indebted to voice or action."4 Slightly more relaxed was Reid's
practice, common at that time, of borrowing the sermons of others. According to
tradition, Reid preached in addition to his own compositions (the number of which
was, so Dugald Stewart tells us, "not inconsiderable") the sermons of Samuel
Clarke, John Tillotson and John Evans.-"1
It seems reasonable to suppose that Reid's ow n compositions partook of the
Moderate style. The clerics from whom he drew additional sermons ran the gamut
of Latitudinarian opinion, ranging from the rationalist views of Archbishop Tillotson
to those of the Dissenter, Evans, with the reconciling voice of Clarke's rational
Christianity to harmonize them.6 Moreover. Gerard, who often preached for Reid at
New Machar, was a Robertson Moderate, a party affiliation typical of northern
ministers of the day."
Tillotson w as a supreme rationalist who swore he would trust the dictates of his ow n
reason even against the authority of organized science and who discarded spiritual
dogma in favour of the evidence of his senses. Evans, for his part, boasted the
superior certainty of Christianity . "When we have made our estimate in worldly
matters," he wrote,
a thousand unforeseen accidents may baffle all our hopes, and spoil
the best concerted undertakings. Every design for time is subject to
such disappointments; and yet men consider and reckon upon
^Quoted in Campbell Fraser, Thomas Reid. p. 34.
4Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, vol. 1 (Edinburgh and London: William
Blackwood and Sons, 1888), p. 472.
-"'Stewart, "Account," in Works, p. 5b; Campbell Frascr, Thomas Reid, p. 33.
6Scc Gerald R. Cragg, The Church and the Age ofReason 1648-1789 (n.p.:Hoddcr & Stoughton,
1962), p. 158; Emest Campbell Mossner, Bishop Butter and the Age ofReason (New York:
Macmillan. 1936). p. 22.
'See G.D. Henderson, "A Member of the Wise Clubf Aberdeen University Review, vol. 24, no. 70
(Nov 1936), p. 6: Ramsay of Ochtertvre. quoted in P.B. Wood, "Thomas Reid." p. 5.
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probabilities. But in Christianity we have surer measures to proceed
by.8
Clarke took a slightly more philosophical path between Tillotson and Evans. He was
consumed by the question of the liberty of human actions and concluded that
The True liberty of a Rational and Moral Agent, consists in his being
able to follow right Reason only, without Hindrance or Restraint. It
consists in a clear unbiassed Judgment, and in a Power of acting
conformably thereunto. Man therefore is then Free, when his Reason
is not awed by base Fears, nor bribed by foolish and fantastick Hopes;
when it is not tumultuously hurried away by Lusts and Passions, nor
cheated and deluded by false Appearances of present Good; but
considers impartially, and judges wisely, and acts effectually and with
Resolution.
According to Clarke, right reason is the only "natural and proper Motive" to action,
although the will is often propelled by lesser motives. Clarke drew an analogy
between the government of the natural world and that of the moral world, discerning
in these different realms the same "close and regular ... Connexion" whereby
"whatsoever a man soweth, That shall he also reap". As we saw earlier, this was the
analogy that Turnbull drew in his Principles. Whatever else he may have been
doing at this point, Reid was clearly following in Turnbull's footsteps. Clarke
maintained that the certainty of the relationship between moral causes and effects "is
the Reason and End of all Laws; the Maintenance and Support of all Government,
the Foundation and Ground-work of all Religion". Clarke also argued "the
reasonableness of judging concerning mens Hearts from their Actions" and
characterized "men's final State of Happiness or Misery ... [as] the proper and
correspondent Effect of their present Actions."9 Reid evidently carried this with him
into the classroom at Glasgow, for on 10 October 1764, in his inaugural lecture, he
admonished his students,
from a deep conviction of the importance of [their] present behaviour
to [their] future happiness, from a conviction that as [they] now sow
[they] shall afterwards reap, ... [to] shake off sloth and indolence, and
apply [them] selves with vigour to the work which [God's]
providence calls |them[ to be employed in.10
8Sermons upon Various Subjects, Preach'd to Young People (London, 1725), p. 56.
977)c Sermons ofSamuel Clarke, 5th ed., vol. ! (London, 1742), p. 219; vol. 2 (London, 1742), pp.
25-27.
I0MS. 4/II/9, fo. 1 r.
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The emphasis on free will implicit in Reid's use of Clarke, detracting as it would
have done from the awesome God and double decrees contained in the strict
Calvinist doctrine of predestination, assured Reid a place among those Moderates
who taught a nonnecessitarian Calvinism, or, in Paul Wood's phrase, "a polite brand
of Arminianism."1' Moreover, Clarke's insistence on the essential knowability of
the human heart (or at least of the human character) by deeds, which was probably
appropriated by Reid at this time (he certainly adhered to it a short while later, as his
writings, both published and unpublished, abundantly show), was certainly at odds
with that Calvinist-derived scepticism with regard to the heart that is to be found in
Hutcheson and others.
1.
In 1726 the Anglican divine Joseph Butler published his Fifteen Sermons Preached
at the Rolls Chapel. While there is no evidence that Reid read Butler's Fifteen
Sermons in this period, his pupil, Dugald Stewart, reported that
the short Dissertation on Virtue which Butler has annexed to that
work, together with the Discourses on Human Nature published in his
volume of Sermons, he used always to recommend as the most
satisfactory account that has yet appeared of the fundamental
principles of Morals.12
Moreover, as the Fifteen Sermons provide some of the discursive background for the
sceptical questions which Butler addressed in his Analogy ofReligion (1736), a book
Reid is known to have read at this time, it is justifiable to consider the Sermons here.
With his publication of the Fifteen Sermons Butler entered the debate about the
passions lately reopened by Bernard Mandeville, a Dutch physician who had settled
in London, in the first edition of his Fable of the Bees (1714). The Presbyterian
minister Francis Hutcheson carried on the controversy with Mandeville in the pages
of the Dtndon Journal, where he provided, under the pseudonym Philanthropos, a
"Specimen" of his imminent Inquiry into the Original ofOur Ideas ofBeauty and
Virtue (1725). Another work. An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions
and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Sense, would appear in 1728.
' ''Thomas Rcid."p. 5.
'^"Account," p. 32b.
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Neither Mandeville nor Hutcheson nor Butler regarded the passions as inherently
bad. All three philosophers agreed that the passions direct us in the choice of ends
and motivate us to achieve them.13 As Mandeville put it,
Man never exerts himself but when he is rous'd by his Desires: While
they lie dormant, and there is nothing to raise them, his Excellence
and Abilities will be for ever undiscover'd, and the lumpish Machine,
without the Influence of his Passions, may be justly compar'd to a
huge Wind-mill without a breath of Air.14
Further, all believed that reason was not good in itself so much as instrumental, i.e.
concerned with pointing out the means to realize those goals determined by the
vftb' ft i
passions. Accordingly, none of them were-rationalists in the spirit of Clarke, who
regarded passional motivation as slavish and its rational counterpart as free. Butler
had clearly made an important concession to the sceptics.
Where these modern precursors of Hume in the study of man and of the passions
differed from one another was in their characterizations of fallen mankind.
Mandeville, following in the Augustinian tradition as expressed in orthodox
Calvinism, viewed human beings as essentially depraved, whereas Hutcheson and
Butler, proceeding on more hopeful premisses, regarded mankind as eminently
improvable. The moral sceptic, Mandeville, accordingly emphasized "self-liking" as
mankind's primary motivation, and focussed on the prudent manipulation of this
passion by self-serving legislators whose aim was to gratify individual selfishness
and produce social benefits without having to rely on the practice of virtue (which is
at any rate unattainable by most people). Here, the emphasis was on an effortless,
mechanistic, institutionalized solution. By contrast, Hutcheson and Butler, each with
his own set of specific emphases, stressed the importance of benevolence as an
actuating passion and concentrated on the naturalness of society and on the
encouragement of virtuous conduct.
Despite their disagreements on the subject of the passions, Mandeville, Hutcheson
and Butler were united in their largely empirical approach to morals, in which "the
content ofmorality, and ... the explanation of moral obligation" were to be found in
the study of human nature rather than in eternal reason or in the will of a superior.i:>
I take Butler's description as representative. His method began
13See Stewart, Opinion and Reform, pp. 67, 77-78, 98.
14Ed. F.B. Kaye, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 184.
'-"'Stewart. Opinion and Reform, pp. 66, 91; sec also pp. 59, 67, 73-74, 76-78, 81, 93-94, 97-99, 105.
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from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its
several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds
to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this
whole nature.16
This was the method that Hume approved; it was also the one that Reid had been
trained up to.
Reid was obviously much impressed by Butler's Analogy, he made extensive
reading notes on it in November 1738 and would add comments to these when he
was preparing his lectures for print forty-two years later, in 1781. One might
wonder if it was in response to Reid's endorsement of the work that two Glasgow
publishers, Foulis and Urie, brought out editions of the Analogy in 1764, the year
Reid took up the chair of moral philosophy at Glasgow College. In view of Reid's
training and what is known of his subsequent opinions, Butler's work was
undoubtedly important to Reid for a number of reasons.
First, it confirmed the natural theology teaching he had learned from Turnbull,
according to which the regularities observed in the moral and material worlds when
studied scientifically are taken to reveal God's providence. Butler began
polemically.
Let us then instead of forming Imaginary Models of a World and
Schemes of Governing it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to
be the Conduct of Nature with respect to intelligent Creatures which
may be resolved into General Laws or Rules of Argumentation in the
same way as many of the Laws of Nature respecting inanimate Nature
may be collected from Experiments.
It is clear from the context that Butler was formulating a direct reply not only to the
fatalists (Leibniz in particular, whose opinions Reid had considered in the 1736
Philosophical Club and whose views he would try to refute on at least four occasions
in the course of his teaching career) but also to the rationalists, whose methodology,
as 1 observed above, Butler took exception to in the Preface to the Fifteen Sermons.
Butler then made an observation which Reid paraphrases thus: "Necessity does not
exclude Deliberation Choice Preference and acting from certain Principles and to
certain Ends for these things we are conscious of in our Selves." This was followed
a few pages later by another which, again, 1 cite in Reid's version: "We find in our
,6Preface to Fifteen Sermons, in The Analogs ofReligion, ed. Joseph Angus (London: The Religious
Tract Society , f 1855]. p. 339.
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selves a Will and are Conscious of a Character."17 (The theologico-political
implications of this view are clear: the legislator and the politician, like the preacher
or the man of common sense, suppose that an appeal to moral character will be more
effective than the pull of natural desire in most men in most situations. Their
assumption in this regard is, moreover, a matter of probability, a subject 1 will
consider shortly.) These were opinions that Reid himself had advanced in the
Philosophical Club: Butler's matter-of-fact approach thus confirmed his suspicions
concerning the irreconcilability of determinism with the facts of human nature.
Moreover, for Butler and Reid the fact that some of the actions that according to
these lights are in our power give us pleasure and others cause us pain and that we
have been forewarned of this by revelation shows that we are under God's
government.
Having answered the fatalists up to this point, Butler sought next
to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts, and |to|
argue from such facts as are known, to others that are like them; from
that part of the Divine government over intelligent creatures which
comes under our view, to that larger and more general government
over them which is beyond it; and from what is present, to collect
what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.
From this analogy, based in observation, Butler apparently felt entitled to confirm
those doctrines which he never doubted, i.e.
that mankind is appointed to live in a future state; that there every one
shall be rewarded or punished; rewarded or punished respectively for
all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words,
virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil: that our present life is a
probation, a state of trial, and of discipline, for that future one;
notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they have,
from notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as
this at all.
Implied in the notion of a probationary state is of course a view of moral
accountability and improvability consistent with Reid's non-necessitarian
Calvinism.18
17AUL MS. 3061/10, fo. 3v; pp. 111]—12; cf. Analogy, pp. 115, 120.
18Inlroduclion to Analogy, pp. 8, 11-12; cf. p. 239 ("Temptations render our stale a more impro\ ing
state of discipline, than it would be otherwise: as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of
the virtuous principle which confirms and strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive exercise
of it could"); see also pp. 41, 57 ("mankind find themselves placed b\ [GodJ in such circumstances,
as that they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour").
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The Analogy was no doubt also important to Reid for another reason, for in it Butler
maintained that (and here 1 quote from Reid's abstract) "Probability is the very
Guide of Life." 19 Butler's point was that in everyday life we constantly reason from
analogy in our observations of physical occurrences and human conduct. We come
to believe that such and such an event will take place in certain circumstances
because we have seen like occurrences in similar circumstances in the past. Our
observation that this kind of reasoning holds true in a series of similar cases leads us
to conclude that there is a regularity in the material and moral world.20 When we
consider things beyond our immediate observation (e.g. a future state) we find
ourselves believing in a like regularity in these things, by analogy with the way in
which we form opinions or judgements about things fully within our view. It was of
course this kind of reasoning that Hume would subject to Pyrrhonian scrutiny,
thereby wreaking havoc on any unselfconscious understanding of belief.
Butler regarded it as beyond the scope of his book
to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and measure of
probability; or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that
presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is
formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in
every one; or to guard against the errors to which reasoning from
analogy is liable.21
Reid had of course appealed to belief and probability in his own contribution to the
debate on the passions, as I showed in the last chapter. Butler must have confirmed
Reid's estimation of the usefulness of probable reasoning in those septical times.
When Hume's Treatise appeared in the following year, Reid must therefore have
been unsettled by Hume's attack on belief and probability. This is a subject which 1
shall explore in detail later in this chapter, and in Part 2. Reid must have appreciated
the applicability of Butler's account of probable reasoning to politics in 1738 given
what we know of his training under Tumbull. But Reid did not commit to paper his
debt to Butler on this point until he reviewed the Analogy in 1781. I shall examine
Reid's remarks from 1781 when I come to analyze the Glasgow period.
,9AUL MS. 3061/10, fo. 3r; cf. Introduction to Analogy, p. 5
20Sce Analogs, pp. 4-5.
2'P. 6; see also pp. 3-5.
2.
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The archival record of the next decade of Reid's intellectual activity is unfortunately
very sparse. There do survive, however, a few drafts and one fair copy22 of Reid's
"Essay on Quantity," his only publication of the entire Aberdeen period, which was
read before the Royal Society of London on 3 November 1748 and appeared in their
Philosophical Transactions for that year.23 The "Essay" is important for two
reasons. First, it shows that Reid entered the lists as he meant to carry on, i.e. as a
critical thinker. Secondly, it shows that however interested Reid might have been to
consider the latest reply to the sceptics on the subject of the passions, i.e.
Hutcheson's Inquiry,24 he was unwilling to construct a fiction of mathematical (i.e.
demonstrative) certainty where none existed, were possible, or were necessary. This
required a reassertion of the legitimacy of probable reasoning.
Judging by handwriting and paper size, the earliest of the three surviving drafts of
the "Essay" appears to date from the 1730s, probably before lTSS.2-"' This version,
entitled "Concerning the Object of Mathematicks," contains a Butlerian passage.
Butler had in the Analogy distinguished between probable and demonstrative
evidence such that while demonstrative reasoning did not, unlike probable reasoning,
admit of degree, probable reasoning could in some instances yield a certainty equal
to that of demonstrative reasoning.26
There are several things capable of More or less & yet not capable of
being measured by number. Tastes Smells, heat cold beauty pleasure
pain all the affections and Appetites of the Mind, Probability,
Wisdom folly &c &c Altho attempts have been made to apply
mathematical reasoning to some of these Subjects and the Merit of
Actions has been Measured by Simple & compound ratios Yet 1 do
not think that ever any real knowledge can be struct out this way. It
may perhaps if discreetly used be a help to discourse on these
Subjects by pleasing the Imagination and illustrating what is already
known. As we use Metaphors & Similes taken from Sensible things to




24So the subtitle of the second draft (MS. 5/1/22) states.
2%ee Haakonssen, Introduction to Practical Ethics, p. 11.
26See p. 3. In the event Hulcheson expunged the offending mathematical argument from the 4lh cd.
of 1738, before Rcid published his "Essay."
27MS. 5/1/20, fo. lr-v.
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In the third and last of the extant drafts, Reid replaced the last sentence in the above
quotation with the following, which is preserved (with the exception of one word) in
the published version:
But Till our affections and appetites be themselves reduced to
Quantity and exact Measures of their Various degrees assigned, In
vain do we essay to measure Virtue and Merit by them. This is onely
to ring changes upon words, and to make a shew of Mathematical
Reasoning without advancing one step in real Knowledge.28
Reid probably put the finishing touches on this draft not long before he presented it
to the Royal Society. The passages cited here show that Reid did not see
mathematical reasoning, with all of the certainty that it claims, as offering a
respectable solution to the problems in the theory of the passions which had been
raised by the sceptics. The distinction Reid made in the "Essay" between
mathematical and probable reasoning was one that he would return to, with ever-
increasing attention, first in his King's College lectures on logic, then in his Glasgow
College lectures on politics, and again in the Intellectual Powers. Thus it appears to
be Butler who sustained Reid in his later encounters with, and responses to, moral
scepticism, which became particularly urgent indeed when Reid came to study
Hume.
3.
Within a year of Reid's enthusiastic reading of Butler, David Hume published Books
1 and 2 (on the understanding and on the passions, respectively) of his Treatise of
Human Nature. Book 3, on morals, appeared in 1740.29 The evidence shows that
Reid must have read Hume at least before 1743,30 probably in 1739-1740,31 and
28MS. 2/1/1, fo. 3v.
29It is interesting that Hume credited Butler with helping to put the science of man on an
experimental footing (see Introduction to Treatise, pp. 16-17; cf. An Abstract of ...A Treatise of
Human Nature, in Treatise, p. 646). The Abstract, which has been attributed to Hume, was first
published anonymously in London in 1740 (see P.H. Nidditch, Textual Notes to Treatise, p. 667).
30See Works, p. 283a: "1 once believed the doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole of
Berkeley's system in consequence of it; till, finding other consequences to follow from it, which gave
me more uneasiness than the w ant of a material world, it came into my mind, more than forty years
ago, to put the question, What evidence have 1 for this doctnne, that all the objects of my know ledge
arc ideas in my own mind?"; and also R to Dr James Gregory, 7 Apr 1783, in Works, p. 62a, where
some indication is given of when the portion of the Intellectual Powers in w hich this statement occurs
was compiled/composed.
31 Sec Dedication to Inquiry, in Works, p. (95]a: "1 never thought of calling in question the principles
commonly received w ilh regard to the human understanding, until the Treatise of Human Nature w as
published in the year 1739."
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thereby faced the greatest intellectual challenge of his career, one that would call
forth a response from him on all fronts, pneumatological, logical, ethical and
political.
In view of the enormous impact of Hume's philosophy on Reid, it might be
instructive to review the latter's usage of "ideas" in the few years prior to the
appearance of the Treatise, for Hume's redefinition of this concept would, as I shall
demonstrate, cause Reid to rethink the whole of moral philosophy. I tum to Reid's
reflections on his experience in the 1736 Philosophical Club:
1 find particularly that discoursing for some time on a Subject or on
different Subjects with Men of parts, debating points freely,
especially if at the Same time I am in Good health & good humor &
have a brisk Circulation in my Blood, does very much quicken My
Intellectual powers, and Stirrs my Ideas So that they rise more easily
in my Mind for some time after. [At such times,] Ideas & words
croud upon our minds and push themselves into our view, [whereas]
at other times we must pump and Squeeze & beat our brains and can
hardly find anything after all.32
Their biographical interest aside, these observations might strike one, in the
knowledge of what was soon to come, by virtue of their freedom from any Humean
anxiety surrounding the concept of Ideas. Reid's unfettered and indeed highly
metaphorical expression in this passage marks one of the last occasions when he
could take for granted the commonality of certain episteinological concepts within
philosophical discourse, and when his own choice of words was not constrained by
the existence of a field of Humean signifiers. Against this Humean language Reid
would have to shore up and contain his own, common-sense intentions, and try to
reclaim some discursive territory.
To stay with the pre-Humean period of Reid's thought for a moment, when Reid
spoke of "ideas" he was referring to "non-representational mental objects actively
created by the mind." Sensations, on the other hand, were "images of objects
passively received by the mind".33 Evidence for this may be found in the Lockean
bias of Reid's abstract of and commentary on Peter Browne's Procedure, Extern aiul
Limits of the Human Understanding,34 Written as they were on the eve of the
publication of the first two volumes of Hume's Treatise, these reading notes indicate
32MS. 6/1/17, fos 4r, 2v.
33Wood, "Thomas Rcid and the Scottish Enlightenment," p. 5.
■Haul ms. 3061/10, to. 2r-\.
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that even before Hume's book appeared Reid had become somewhat uncomfortable
with the Berkelian language of ideas, but had not anticipated the logical conclusion
to which it would be driven by Hume. Reid's notes emphasize that the mind is
active as well as acted upon, and that its activity is in many ways its defining
characteristic. Reid's prepossession in this regard would cause him to doubt Hume's
view, which was in some measure inconsistent with the notion of an active mind.
The central premiss of Hume's Treatise is the Pyrrhonian view that (to borrow
Reid's later formula) nothing exists but that which is, quite literally, in the mind of
the perceiver; that is, impressions, and the ideas which derive from those
impressions, of things the existence of which in the external world we cannot be sure
of. Unfortunately, nothing like a full set of reading notes relating to the Treatise in
which one might have expected Reid to gloss Hume's theory, is now extant among
Reid's papers in Aberdeen. What has survived is a paper in Reid's handwriting
dated 22 October 1748 concerning the nature of the self, and this relates
unmistakably to Hume's doctrine of impressions and ideas.
In the Treatise Hume had argued that the self is not some entity that we perceive,
and since we can have impressions only of things which we actually perceive, we
can have neither impressions nor ideas of the self. For Hume, the self is merely a
sequence of perceptions, connected together (in Reid's phrase) by "the associating
qualities of ideas",33 and is emphatically not a thing that perceives or, still less
perceives itself', or in whom the various perceptions that pass through the mind are
unified in an interpretative, and a self-interpretative, whole.
Reid rejected this line of reasoning. Just as he had done some years before in
connection with the concepts of liberty and power, he began by confirming the first
"constitutions" or cognitive structures of which we are all conscious (which Hume
rejected as being mere fictions), to which all thoughts and perceptions immediately
refer and on which all cogitation ultimately depends. Reid wrote:
Among the various objects of thought & Reflexion there is none that
is more familiar or seems at first view to be better understood by us
than Self. ... 1 seem to have no idea of it and yet am under an
invincible Necessity of believing there is some such thing. It seems
35Cf. Treatise, pp. 207 ("w hat we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different
perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, tho' falsely, to be endow ed w ith a
perfect simplicity and identity"), 252 ("mankind ... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and
movement"), 265 ("that succession of perceptions, which constitutes our self or person.")
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one of the most natural & original principles that we continue the
same individual unchanged in all the vicissitudes and varietys of
thought and perception.
That constitution which underpins even "Self-consciousness", i.e. our common
sense, and which was neither an impression nor an idea, was henceforth to become
the touchstone of Reid's epistemology, and his bulwark against Humean scepticism,
whether epistemological, moral or political, as 1 will demonstrate in due course.36
Later in the Aberdeen period, after Hume had published his Treatise, Reid would try
to restore the common meanings of the words "ideas" and "impressions", claiming
that Hume had given new meanings to old words and thereby undermined ordinary
language, which in its uncorrupted state provides an insight into the structure of the
mind and is therefore the clearest philosophical language we can hope for. Even so,
in the Glasgow period Reid Isityit necessary to replace the word "ideas" with
"notions" while revising certain of his lecture notes (including one on politics), no
doubt in order to escape the Humean connotation.
Moreover, Reid would in the course of his teaching career perceive (a little unfairly,
it must be said) certain moral and political consequences as proceeding from Hume's
epistemological scepticism, as he understood this in his manuscript on the self. This
scepticism, as he rightly believed, followed from the inexorable logic of Hume's
theory of ideas. Its consequences — though denied by Hume himself — were
evident to Reid at least by 1762, although he had established the line of argument
that would allow him to make these additional criticisms as early as 1759.3 The
crux of the matter might be described in the following manner. If mankind is nothing
but mind and mind a mere mass of perceptions, what then constitutes "a reality", and
how do we perceive such realities? Hume's answer involved the judgement which
distinguishes real ideas, whose impressions strike us more forcefully, from "mere
fictions", or "offspring of the imagination", which do not make such a strong
impression on us. This judgement enables us powerfully to "paint the universe in
[our| imagination". The ideas we thus form are distinct, therefore, from "the loose
reveries of a castle-builder."38 Reid was unhappy with Hume's characterization of
judgement (although he may have understood Hume imperfectly on this point) and
with his definition of ideas. He made the following lament in Oration 4:
36MS. 6/1/18, pp. 1-2.
37See Philosophical Orations, pp. 960-961.
38Treatise, pp. 97, 108; cf. pp. 85-86; 116; 117, n. 1; 122; 123; 135; 219.
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If [judgement] is only involved in [examining the agreement or
disagreement of ideas], woe is me, since neither my soul is an idea
nor my friends, associates, parents, kinfolk nor my fatherland are
ideas, nor are the world and the Founder and most wise Ruler of the
world ideas. About these objects, their existence, attributes,
relationships, there will be no judgment, nothing will be established,
nothing discovered, not even probability!39
In the Inquiry (1764) Reid would emphasize that our belief "that thought [supposes]
a thinker, ... love a lover, and treason a traitor" is founded on "judgments of nature
— judgments not got by comparing ideas, and perceiving agreements and
disagreements, but immediately inspired by our constitution."40 While there is no
evidence that these objections had occurred to Reid in 1748, it is clear that by this
time he had already begun to question the assumptions of Hume's philosophy from
which flowed (or so he feared) the more remote effects to which he would object.
On the other hand it could not have escaped Reid's notice that the whole force of
Hume's sceptical reasoning in the Treatise was directed against those very
probabilities (e.g. the existence of God, his government of the world, the immortality
of the human soul, man as a progressive being capable of improving himself) which
Reid had taken as read in Butler's Analogy. Butler had been quick to justify our
reliance in everyday conduct on probability (of whatever grade), observing "that the
slightest possible presumption ... often repeated, will amount even to moral
certainty."41 Hume, by contrast, was anxious to break the force of such ill-founded
opinions. Building on his Pyrrhonian assumptions about the weakness of reason and
the senses, he attempted to show that all so-called knowledge (whether in natural or
moral philosophy) is nothing more than opinion or probability, that the result of
examining even the highest probability tends to "reduce the mind to a total
uncertainty" and that such a state of uncertainty, far from sustaining our opinions
about heaven and earth, actually "[subverts] all belief and opinion", because
conviction is impossible where no one "opinion [is] ... more probable or likely than
another."42
39Philosophical Orations, pp. 984-985. In the early 1780s, Reid would take up this theme again: if
"[w]hat [we] call a father, a brother, or a friend, is only a parcel of ideas in [our minds]", he reasoned,
these people, being only bundles of impressions, cannot possibly stand "in the relation of father,
brother, friend, or fellow-citizen" to us, and, consequently, the very basis of morals, and in particular
of jurisprudence, would be at an end (Works, p. 285a).
^hVorks. pp. 109b, 110b.
41 The Analogy ofReligion, ed. Joseph Angus (London: The Religious Tract Society, [1855]), p. 3.
42Treatise, pp. 184, 268-269; cf. p. 183: "[requires) a continual diminution, and at last a total
extinction of belief and evidence."
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Troubling as Hume's sceptical conclusions must have been to Reid at a time when
he wholeheartedly endorsed Butler's teaching, the only extant records of his views
on this matter date from the 1760s. In this connection, I refer again to Reid's
incredulity at Hume's destruction of probability in the passage from Oration 4
(1762) quoted above. At least by the following year43 Reid had become aware of the
devastating consequences of Hume's assault on probability. "I am persuaded," he
wrote:
that absolute scepticism is not more destructive of the faith of a
Christian than of the science of a philosopher, and of the prudence of
a man of common understanding. I am persuaded, that the unjust live
by faith as well as the just; that, if all belief could be laid aside, piety,
patriotism, friendship, parental affection, and private virtue, would
appear as ridiculous as knight-errantry; and that the pursuits of
pleasure, of ambition, and of avarice, must be grounded upon belief,
as well as those that are honourable or virtuous.44
Evidently, Reid was not much impressed by Hume's last-moment disclaimers in the
Treatise about how nature intervenes to stop the progress of "total scepticism" by
making it difficult for the sceptic to persevere in "any subtile reasoning and
reflection" and forcing him to believe in those associations made by more "natural
and easy" chains of logic, or by his stated preference, in consequence, for "moderate
scepticism". Moreover, Hume's approval of the (uncomprehending though correct)
"sentiments of the vulgar" in this regard must have struck Reid as empty rhetoric.
He probably took more seriously Hume's open suspicion about "the uncertainty of
nature" and its consequences for probable reasoning, a subject which Reid would be
forced to address at Glasgow.45
While from Reid there is neither contemporary nor subsequent testimony to account
for his next intellectual move, i.e. a two-and-a-half page "Abstract of Epictetus [sic]
Morals" (i.e. the Enchiridion) dating from about 1750, it seems reasonable to
suppose that he was anxious to stay the erosion of belief that had been set in motion
by the publication of Hume's Treatise. In seeking the building materials with which
to buttress the foundations of opinion so shaken by Humean scepticism, Reid found
a ready source in Stoic philosophy, a doctrine not incompatible on a certain level
439 Nov 1763.
•^Dedication to Inquiry, in Works, p. f95]b; cf. Intellectual Powers, in Works., p. 285b; Active
Powers, in Works, p. 617a.
45Treatise, pp. 131, 183, 186, 223-224; cf. p. 268.
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with the rational Christianity espoused by Turnbull and Blackwell.46 Reid's
approval of the Stoics was not uncharacteristic of his time. Elizabeth Carter, one of
Epictetus' eighteenth-century translators, praised the Stoics as having been
of very important Use, in the Heathen World: and [the Stoics] are, on
many Accounts, to be considered in a very respectable Light. Their
Doctrine of Evidence and fixed Principles, was an excellent
Preservative from the Mischiefs, that might have arised from the
Scepticism of the Academics and Pyrrhonists, if unopposed: and their
zealous Defence of a particular Providence, a valuable Antidote to the
atheistical Scheme of Epicurus. To this may be added, that their strict
Notions of Virtue in most Points, ... and the Lives of several among
them, must contribute a good deal to preserve luxurious States from
an absolutely universal Dissoluteness; and the Subjects of arbitrary
Government, from a wretched and contemptible Pusilanimity.47
If ancient Stoicism had been so effective against ancient Pyrrhonism, why should it
not also be an adequate defence against its modern incarnation in David Hume?
Moreover, the central message of Epictetus' Morals, i.e. the "[disengagement of our
souls] from all those slavish Fears, and confounding Troubles, and other Corruptions
of human Nature, which are wont to subdue and tyrannize over them",48 was in
harmony with Reid's emphasis on the habits of self-command that are required in
order to make a proper use of liberty in this life, and thereby to assure a place in the
next. Epictetus' view that we should concentrate on obtaining or developing only
those things that are within the narrow compass of our power because that is all that
we are ultimately accountable for, was also consistent with Reid's overarching
concern with power and accountability.
If that were not enough, Reid would also have found in Epictetus a satisfying like-
mindedness in his appeal to common sense:
As that may be called a common Ear, which distinguishes only
Sounds; but that, which distinguishes Notes, an artificial one: so there
are some Things, which Men, not totally perverted, discern by their
common natural Powers; and such a Disposition is called common
Sense.49
"^'Reid would spell out his theological objection to Stoic philosophy in Glasgow.
47Introduction to Alt the Works ofEpictetus (Dublin, 1759), 21-22.
48George Stanhope, Introduction to his trans, of Epicteius His Morals, with Simplicius His Comment,
5th ed. (London, 1741), p. 2.
49Carler, trans., All the Works ofEpictetus (Dublin, 1759), p. 214; cf. Simplicius' commentary, in
Stanhope, trans., pp. 27, 76.
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It was at about this time, in 1753,50 that Reid made in the first of his Philosophical
Orations what appears to be his earliest appeal to common sensef!
In the event, many of the summaries and paraphrases in Reid's "Abstract" confirm
the affinity between his own views and Epictetus' on liberty and power. Take, for
example, Reid's summary of Chapters 1-7:
Your Actions Desires & Aversions Your opinions and Aversions are
the onely things in your Power. [Bjut your body Estate Reputation
preferments & all other things are not in your power. What is not in
your power should not be the object of your desire or aversion. Nor
ought you to look upon such things as pertaining to you and then
Nofbody will be able to hurt or disappoint you. You shall complain
of Nothing nor Accuse anybody.
Several other instances could be cited, but what emerges from a careful examination
of the passages Reid selected is his overriding concern with opinion, and this under
its moral aspect. Reid seems to have been deeply impressed by Epictetus' assertion
that our pain is a thing indifferent in itself, and that the grief we experience in
consequence of it is a mere state of mind, i.e. a matter of opinion, which it is in our
power to control, and which we are obliged to bring into line with our understanding
of the deeper reality that our happiness is not tied to the accidents that befall us.
According to Epictetus, letting our opinions float free makes us slaves, whether of
our own passions, of things in other people's hands, or of fortune in general. Yet
perfect self-mastery consists not so much in the essentially negative act of reining in
our opinions but in keeping our concern with reputation in its place. As Reid wrote
in his "Abstract": "Be not so much Concerned to be thought wise or virtuous as to be
really so".-"'2
This recalls Mandeville's judgement against English society on the grounds of its
rampant hypocrisy. As John B. Stewart explains, "most Englishmen, [Mandeville]
found, wished to enjoy the world and the flesh abundantly, all the while insisting that
England was, or rather ought to be, a Christian society. They loved the robust wines
of Babylon, but smuggled them home in Jerusalem water jugs."53 Mandeville's
sceptical solution, as I remarked earlier, had not been to further the Christian ideal
*°9 Apr.
51 P. 937
«MS. 3/11/4, fo. lr; cf. fo. lv ("Be content to be really what you would be thought. Bui if you must
needs be well thought of deserve your own good opinion & that will be Sufficient.")
33Opinion and Reform, p. 59.
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but to allow the mechanisms of private selfishness to serve the public good, people's
souls falling by the wayside as they may. In resurrecting Epictetus, Reid argued in
the opposite direction, affirming Christian moral teaching. Rather than the
indulgence of hypocrisy, Reid advocated a return to common honesty and the polite
virtue of modesty.
The antipolitical implications of Epictetus' disdain for the attractions of reputation
and power are clear. Unlike Mandeville, Epictetus doubted that private vices could
ever produce wider good. "Never part with your Integrity and Modesty under a
pretence of puting yourelf in a Capacity of Serving your Friends or your Country.
For you will be less capable of Serving them in a publick Station without these than
in a private one with them. If therefore you can get Riches power preferment
without losing your honesty; Do it, that by these advantages you may serve your
friends & Country. But dont part with your own real Good that you may procure to
others an imaginary one."
Moreover, the social valorization of property and station, a subject heavily glossed
by Grotius and Pufendorf and subsequently stripped down by Hume, received a like
treatment. In Reid's summary, we find: "Behave yourself in the Affairs of Life as at
an Entertainment!; | dont Snatch at what is sent to another but wait patiently till it
comes to your turn to be served; what is given you receive with Modestie & Refuse
& Distain Delicacies."54 Thus Epictetus emphasized the virtue of being satisfied
with our lot in life and making the best of our condition even though this may
require us to be under-achievers. The natural lawyers, by contrast, focussed on
aggrandizement with certain provisos, on the whole tending to elevate rather than
dismiss the importance ofmaterial advantage. When Hume tried to bring interest
and notions of the distribution of property closer together (i.e. excluding the
redistributive solutions of Christians and Levellers), he was a long way from the
minimalist ethics of Epictetus. In his Glasgow lectures on practical ethics, Reid, for
his part, would liken "the goods and Accommodations wherewith the Globe of this
Earth is stored by the bounty of heaven" to "an Entertainment provided by the
Author of Nature for his Creatures who are the Guests." Far from prescribing a
certain abstemiousness as Epictetus had done, Reid felt it safe to "[presume] that it is
the Will of the Entertainer that everyone of his Guests should be served according to
-^MS. 3/II/4, fo. Iv
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their taste and Choise: But that no one should incommode another."55 What Reid
would retain from his encounter with Epictetus, however, was an abiding faith in the
importance of self-command, that Stoic quality which lay at the heart of that "regard
for virtue, (which was for Reid] the highest prerogative of the human species".56
While Epictetus may have yielded a defence against Hume's attack on belief, he
could offer Reid no formulation of how private morality could be preserved in the
pursuit of political ambitions. It would appear that Reid continued to search for a
viable alternative to Hume among the ruins of Stoic philosophy, or at least in the
figure of Socrates, whom Reid, like so many others in the eighteenth century, linked
with ancient Stoicism. Reid's "Abstract of Epictetus Morals" is followed in MS.
3/II/4 by a few notes from Book 1, Chapter 1 of Xenophon's Memorabilia. These
notes relate to Xenophon's defence of Socrates' form of worship and his
recommendation of reason as the only true guide except "in things whose event is
uncertain" and concerning which "the Oracles" should be consulted. We also find
the following note, dated September 1750: "Read Xenophontes Memorabilium Lib
5". (This work is generally known as the Oecoriomicus.)57
Xenophon's Memorabilia, in addition to providing an account of agricultural
management, afforded a distinctive view of the political uses of moulding the
passions, and shaping opinion, through good husbandry .
First, the effects of moulding the passions. In the Oeconomicus Xenophon praised
agriculture or the science of husbandry as the means of getting a living most
consistent with friendship and national defence. It tends, he argued, to make people
"hardy and couragious, and able to defend their Country; because by the Fields lying
open and exposed to Invaders they have frequent Skirmishes, and therefore know the
better how to fight."58 The so-called mechanical or illiberal arts, by contrast, "seem
to spoil the body and unnerve the mind." The proof of this may be seen in the
following scenario: if we were to suppose their city attacked, the husbandmen, i.e.
"the men who have to do with the land would ... vote for defending it, the craftsmen
^Practical Ethics, p. [204],
^Works, p. 478b; of. p. 619b.
57Xenophon's Memorabilia was ob\ iously a fa\ourite with Reid, for he would return to it in the first
of his Philosophical Orations at King's College (p. 936), again in his lectures on oeconomical
jurisprudence at Glasgow College (MS. 7/VII/19, fo. 1 v.) and on at least two other occasions (MS.
2/1/10, fo. 3r; Works, p. 561a).
58R. Bradley, trans., The Science ofGood Husbandry, or, The Oeconomics ofXenophon (London,
1727). pp. 38-39.
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for not fighting, but sitting still, as they have been brought up to do, aloof from toil
and danger."59
Secondly, shaping opinion. According to Xenophon, husbandry also teaches the
importance of encouraging people and feeding them with hopes; this "breeds good
Men" and engenders in them a "Generosity of Spirit and Good Will towards | their]
Friends and Country ."60 Moreover, in Book 5 of the Memorabilia Xenophon
extolled the virtues of the "scientific leader" who is able to motivate people in such a
way that they actually "take pride in obedience".61
Given Reid's long-standing interest in the passions, and in particular in the tendency
of hope to "[exalt] the Spirits" and of fear and despair to "Sink" them and to "[stifle]
all good and Generous Principles",62 it is not surprising that he should value
Xenophon as providing a practical manual on how to raise the appropriate
sentiments. Xenophon's agricultural prescription is consistent with the medicine-of-
the-mind motif which had figured in Reid's intellectual discourse in the 1730s, and it
is thence entirely fitting that Reid should express a preference for the rural life in his
Glasgow lectures on politics, and bestow high praise on William Ogilvie's Essay on
the Right ofProperty in Land in 1789. Reid apparently took very seriously
Xenophon's claim that husbandry is "the Mother and Nurse of all other Sciences",
including that of government.63 It would be a fairly easy step for Reid, who was still
seeking a decisive alternative to Hume's political scepticism, from Xenophon's
account of the political uses of moulding the passions and opinions of people
through good husbandry to the more straightforwardly political view of the sources
of authority in Cicero's De Officiis, as 1 will show presently.
59Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, trans. E.C. Marchant (London: William Heinemann, 1923), p. 409.
^'Bradley, trans., p. 39.
61Marchant, trans., p. 523.
62MS. 7/V/6, to. Ir.
^Bradley, trans., p. 35; ct. p. 39.
Part 2
Reid as Professor: The Aberdeen Years
Until now I have been considering the evidence that has survived of Reid's intellectual
career before he began to teach. 1 have observed the extent to which his interests as a
student were quickened by his teachers. Turnbull and Blackwell, and subsequently
cultivated in his independent reading during his years as librarian and as minister of
the gospel. 1 have followed him in his repeated attempts to come to terms with the
sceptics, first in the debate about free will, then in the controversy over the passions
and finally in the Pyrrhonian crisis precipitated by Hume.
1 shall now chart the course of Reid's intellectual career as he re-entered the university
world, this time as a professor. Here we will observe the ways in which his activities
were, henceforth, shaped by the demands of teaching to a curriculum,jtne design of
w hich he himself was largely responsible^^. In particular, 1 will show how the
restructuring of priorities required by Reid's change of career caused him to tum his
attention to politics and called forth from him, for the first time, a systematic series of
reflections on that science. Reid's views were largely unformed on many of the still
topical problems he had addressed in the past and he returned to these issues in his
new role. It will also become clear that the specific contexts in which Reid raised
these questions are often just as interesting from the point of view of intellectual
history as his actual elaborations on the old themes.
In Part 2 I shall follow the development of Reid's political thought during his tenure at
King's College 1751-1764. It were to be wished that a more adequate record
survived of Reid's "tete-a-tetes" with his friend Dr Andrew Skene in this period, in
which they "(spoke] freely ofmen and things without reserve and without malignity "
and endeavoured thereby "to settle the important affairs of State & Church, Colleges &
Corporations".1 In the event, I must rely on a paper trail that is often poorly
signposted and look for stray clues of the agendas in play and Reid's responses to
those agendas.
114 Nov 1764, 30 Dec 1765, NCL MS. THO 2, fos lr, 7v respectively.
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In Chapter 4 I will examine Reid's "Scheme of a Course of Philosophy" and his
incomplete translation of Cicero's De Officiis, both of which were prepared at an early
stage of his encounter with Humean scepticism. Reid appropriated Hume's language
of opinion but, alive to the problems inherent in Hume's account of authority,
attempted to underwrite this account with the anti-Pyrrhonian analysis ofCicero. 1
will also consider Reid's use of Montesquieu in 1751-1752.
In Chapter 5 1 will discuss Reid's reading of recent works by Hume and Karnes and
his response to their necessitarianism. Further, I shall examine Reid's
institutionalization of Hume's agenda for the science ofman in the reformed
curriculum at King's 1753-1754.
In Chapter 61 will review Reid's methodologically informed response to Hume, and
his debts in this regard to Bacon, Cicero and Butler. In this Reid returned to the realm
of opinion and put forth an important thesis concerning rationality that would guide all
of his subsequent political thought.
Chapter 4
Beginning a New Science: Montesquieu
According to tradition, when Reid's kinsman Alexander Rait, the Regent and
Professor of Philosophy at King's College, died suddenly on 20 October 1751, Reid
was approached to fill the vacancy by his cousin, the professor ofmedicine John
Gregory. Reid was reluctant at first, because, he said, "it was his intention to live
retired in the country till he should complete some literary plans which then occupied
his thoughts."' Unfortunately, Reid's papers yield little evidence of what those plans
may have been. In any case, on 22 November Reid formally accepted the post. By
the report of Principal John Chalmers, Reid must have soon enjoyed some popularity,
for he had no difficulty in attracting students to his class against competition from
Gerard at Marischal. As Chalmers wrote to the newly appointed professor of Greek,
John Leslie, "I do not believe that Mr Reid will go the length of the Bridge of Dee to
look after a Bejan {first-year student] tho' our neighbours {at Marischal] are very alert
so that you must eyr [either] bring them with you or want."2
Reid launched his teaching career by beginning with Rait's second-year students
where the late regent had left off. The arts curriculum then in place would have
required him to teach ethics in the 1751-1752 session and natural philosophy in 1752-
1753. In the absence of any evidence, direct or otherwise, that he proceeded in any
other way, I must assume that he followed this curriculum in his first two years of
teaching. This was, moreover, the view of the anonymous author of an article on
Reid in the EncyclopaediaBritannica, published not long after Reid's death, who
suggested that Reid "must have been qualified, without much previous preparation, to
read lectures on Logic, Ontology, Pneumatics, Morals, Politics, Mathematics, and
Natural Philosophy ... ."3 There had, in other words, been no change in the order of
1 Ramsay of Ochtertyre, Scotland and Scotsmen, vol. 1, p. 472.
2In the same letter, however, the Principal reveals another side of Reid: "Mr Reid sits & bums [hums
and haws] at Tonser [the hay-cutting] & studies Mustek: 1 scarce think that he will cut his Hay."
Reid and Chalmers had interviewed Leslie before his appointment (C to L, 8 Jul 1755, quoted in J.G.
Burnett, "An Aberdeen Professor of the Eighteenth Century ," The Scottish Historical Review, vol.
13, no. 49 (Oct 1915), pp. 35, 42; see also C to L, 30 Apr 1754, p. 34). I am indebted to Mrs
Dareau of the Dictionary of the Older Scottish Tongue for her help in interpreting this passage.
33rd ed., Supplement, vol. 2, p. 398.
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instruction from Reid's student days to the time when he himself was called upon to
teach the course.
Unfortunately, not one scrap ofmaterial in the way of lecture or student notes has
survived to underline what Reid actually taught in his first couple of years at King's.
Instead, the content of his reflections on ethics, which comprised ontology,
pneumatics, morals and politics, must be pieced together from other contemporary
material. Of such material, there exists only a four-page manuscript headed "Scheme
of a Course of Philosophy", which Reid probably prepared within a few months of
his arrival at King's,4 his philosophical oration of 9 April 1753, and six pages of his
own translation of Cicero's De Officiis,5 although undated, appears to date from
1752.
The conclusion that the portion of Reid's 1752 "Scheme" dealing with ethics in the
broad sense outlined above relates to what he taught on the subject in his first session,
as well as the dating of the Cicero translation, is supported by the evidence of Reid's
philosophical oration.6 According to tradition, in his orations, which he delivered
triennially in Latin at graduation ceremonies at King's College from 1753 to 1762,
Reid summarized his philosophical position and drew together the elements of his
three-year course in a kind of concluding statement, or "public rounding-off of fhis]
course", as the modern-day editor of Reid's orations, Walter Robson Humphries, put
it.7 It may be recalled that graduation theses such as Turnbull's clearly did embody at
least part of the substance ofwhat the regent taught. To them were appended a list of
questions for disputation. A vestige of this practice seems to have survived in Reid's
orations in so far as he called upon the candidates to "produce some sample of (their j
ability in the presence of [the] ... assembly."8 To judge by the schematic, books-and-
authors character of the middle section of the 1753 oration,9 it may reasonably be
supposed that Reid was indeed drawing together the different parts of his course in a
concluding statement.
The 1753 oration shows that Reid was familiar with the major works, both ancient and
modern, on "life and morals," politics, physics and "the art of presenting an
4MS. 8/V/l.
5MS. 2/II/8.
6The appearance of Reid's handwriting also supports this dating.
Introduction to Philosophical Orations, p. 7.
8Philosophical Orations, p. 944.
9Pp. 935-942.
Kitagawa 58
argument." Reid listed the great names in morals and politics, and accorded to each
what he considered to be his rightful place in the development of knowledge. Morals,
which Reid deemed to be the "most useful" part of philosophy, inquired into "the
causes, origin, and nature of virtue", and was best exemplified in the Socratic writings
of, among others, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle, as well as in Cicero and Bishop
Butler. Politics, the "most noble" part of philosophy, and handled admirably by the
leading members of the Socratic school referred to above, found its modern exponents
in Machiavelli, Harrington, Hume and, above all, Montesquieu. The treatment of
physics, which involved an examination into "the laws and principles of natural
phenomena" was woefully inadequate in ancient times, but advances had been made in
this part of philosophy in modem times by Bacon and, most notably. Newton.
Finally, the growth of logic, cultivated though it was by Aristotle, was stunted until
Bacon took it in hand.10
I have already considered Reid's reading of Butler, Xenophon and, to some extent,
Hume. The "Scheme" of 1752 shows us that there had been still more of Hume in
Reid's preparation for teaching, to say nothing of Cicero. Montesquieu must also
have been an important component of Reid's intellectual diet at this time, but the
evidence for this comes from the 1753 philosophical oration, not the 1752 "Scheme."
Accordingly, I will look first at the "Scheme," and then consider Reid's translation of
Cicero, returning to Montesquieu immediately after that. It will become clear that as
he planned and taught his course, Reid would be forced at every turn to engage the
sceptics largely on their own terms.
1.
In broad outline, Reid's "Scheme of a Course of Philosophy" embodied Turnbull's
recommendations for educational reform, but the details are of a decidedly Reidian
character. I shall review here the different parts of Reid's "Scheme" in the order in
which they are presented, paying particular attention to the heads relating to
pneumatology, ethics and politics.
The course was to begin with "The Elements of Geography so far as they can be
delivered in a Historical or Narrative Way Containing", among other things,
1 ()Pp. 935-939.
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A very few of the Most remarkable Things belonging to each Country
or City Such as their being the Seat of such an Empire the birth place of
Such a Great Man the Scene of Such a Battle or famous for the
Invention of Such an Art. Some Character of this kind ought to be
annexed to every Remarkable place which helps the memory and at the
Same time conveys the knowledge of many of the Most Remarkable
facts. Which Stick best in the Memory when annexed to the place that
is related to them. The Books must be mentioned that give the best
account either of the Ancient or Modern state of these Countrys &
Some Idea of the books given & the same is to be understood with
respect to all the Other parts of Learning Contained in this Course.
This introductory geography-cum-civil history was to be followed by natural history,
including "The History of things Under Ground" and of soils, plants and animals.
Natural philosophy, comprising, among other things, mechanics and the "Laws of
Motion & Machinery", hydrostatics, pneumatics, magnetism, electricity and optics,
was to be taught next, interspersed with, among other things, "Phonicks & the
Philosophical Principles ofMusick" and geometry, branches of mathematics, "the
Projections of the Sphere & if there is time the Principles of Perspective" and
astronomy. This section was to be rounded off with an account "Of the Defects of
Natural Knowledge & how far these may be Supplyedj.] Of the Method of Pursuing
Natural Enquiries by Experiments and Observations Illustrated by several Examples!.]
The Danger & Mischief of Hypotheses."
Reid proposed in the next part of his course to begin his consideration of "The Other
Grand Branch of human Knowledge!,] ... the Mind". The first part of this subject
would be comprised of "the History of the Human Mind and its Operations &
Powers". Reid's list of lecture heads for this section, lean as they necessarily are, are
of crucial importance in the glimpse they afford us of his attempt to come to grips with
the spectre of scepticism at an early stage of his encounter with Hume. 1 therefore
quote the passage in full:
The Avenues of Sensation, simple Perception Ideas of Sensible Things
how distinguished from their Objects!.] Beauty & Harmony!.]
Imagination its Laws[.] Memory. Internal feelings first More Simple or
primary Pain Pleasure Passions Good & bad Humor. Secondary. Of
Approbation and Dislike Volition Principles of Action Instincts
Appetites Passions Habits Moral Sense Imitation Sense of Honour
Self-love Affections!.] (Stories) Knowledge belief opinion. Avenues
of Knowledge Sense Memory Consciousness Secondary perceptions
of Beauty Harmony Virtue. Our Knowledge of Causes and Effects and
of the Constancy of Nature the Analogy of things of Design & final
Causes!.] Language & Criticism!.] The Effects of Different original
Characters of Education of Habits. The powers of our bodies Minds
fitted to our State the Effect of Body & Mind upon each otherf.]
Painting Poetry[.] Action and Pronunciation!.] Behaviour!.] Air
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Exercise Inebriating and Narcotic things. Phisiognomy. Dreams.
Judicial Astrology Omens. Divination.
From these heads it is entirely possible that Reid had already gone some distance in his
criticism of Hume's theory of ideas, for he distinguishes here between ideas and their
objects, as Hume did not. It is also possible that Reid constructed his menu in such a
way that he would be able to discuss the manner in which the mind had been treated
before Hume and after Locke.
Reid had no doubt also grasped the connection between Hume's theory of ideas and
his (Hume's) account of opinion and belief, as we anticipated in an earlier chapter.
For Hume, opinion could be reduced to impressions and ideas which did not refer to
any real object and whose stability was therefore dependent on the constancy and
concurrence of people's imaginations. Reid must have considered this to be an
unreliable epistemological foundation on which to rest opinion.
Reid seems to have turned to Cicero for a more satisfactory account of opinion. He
used Cicero extensively in mapping out the section of his course on ethics and, as I
will reveal presently, translated the important opening pages ofDe Officiis. It is
surprising that in the "Scheme" Reid made no reference to rational principles of action
in relation to the question of opinion — a concept that would figure importantly in his
later thought — as the Ciceronian translation could have afforded him the notion of a
common rationality as the guarantor of opinion.
But while Reid was apparently still a long way from the stance he would finally take
on Hume on this point, other hints — the emphasis on our knowledge of causes and
effects rather than on our mere opinion of their connectedness and the belief in final
causes — in the above outline of pneumatology suggest that Reid was at least working
up a reply to Hume on the causality front.
The reference to design in the above passage is strongly reminiscent of Butler and
Turnbull, as are the heads in Reid's plan for his lectures on "The Knowledge of God
and of his Natural Government", which I now quote in full:
The Laws by which he Governs Inanimate Matter Brutes & Men. Our
Capacity of Moral Government. The Indications of our being Under it
and of our State here being a State of Discipline & Improvement in
order to another
The Natural Immortality of the Soul.
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Reid's criticism of Humean scepticism thus was sustained by the rational Christianity
he had learned from Turnbull and found confirmation of in Butler.
The last major part of Reid's ''Scheme," dealing with "Ethicks CEconomicks
Politicks",11 has the character of an elaborate gloss on a few central passages in
Books 1-2 of Cicero's De Offtciis. As 1 have already hinted, Reid's policy seems to
have been: if one cannot stop the penetration of scepticism into morals and politics via
opinion, one must at least underwrite it with an epistemology that is a little more sure¬
footed.
After setting out the parameters of this part of the course, i.e. "Ethicks CEconomicks
Politicks", Reid proposed to consider "The Grand Instruments ofGovernment)". He
begins in the "Scheme" with the assertion that authority is "acquired by the Opinion Of
Wisdom of Goodness of Right Courage & Military Skill Eloquence". This is a
Xenophontian/Ciceronian formula which Reid would repeat in the Active Powers
(1788) in a passage that may in fact have been written in the summer of 1786.12 But
while the view that all authority rests on opinion is implicit throughout Xenophon's
Oeconomicus and Cicero's De Officiis,]?l Reid's idiom in this passage becomes almost
Humean, as I will show presently. In what is apparently a gloss on his remarks on
authority Reid considered the Ciceronian theme of "The Prerogatives of human Nature
or the Chief Excellencies of one Man above another."14 Under this heading Reid
declared: "Authority ... takes its Rise 1 from Opinion of Merit[.] 2 from opinion of
Right. 3 from Opinion of Divine Commission or Authority or of Divine Favour that
attends and prospers a Man. Or of Interest & Favour with the Great orMany[.] There
is also some degree of Authority that arises from high Birth or beauty."
Hume had of course identified interest as the true source of allegiance to government
in Book 3 of the Treatise.!;> He also developed his ideas on opinion as the basis of
authority in the following essays: "Of the First Principles of Government" (1741) and
its reiteration in his "Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute
Monarchy, or to a Republic" (also 1741), and the frequently cited "OfNational
1 'Fos lr-2r.
12See R to Dr James Gregory, [Mar 1786], in Works, pp. 67b-68a; cf. R to G, 14 Mar 1784, in
Works, p. 63a. In the Active Powers R characterized opinion as that "[instrument] of government"
which is "the sweetest, and most agreeable to the nature of man" (Works, p. 577b; cf. p. 554b).
13Sce On Duties, pp. 42, 45, 70-71, 76-81, 88-89.
,4Epictetus had also employed the language of prerogative that featured in this passage (see Stanhope,
trans., p. 6; cf. pp. 42, 91 (Simplicius' use of "prerogative")).
13Sce pp. 53 IT.
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Characters" (1748).16 Hume spoke in these places of "the opinion of right" and the
dependency of courage (and indeed of human affairs generally) on opinion, and also
of the "opinion of interest".
It is hard to believe that even with his as yet underdeveloped notion of rational
principles Reid would have been pleased to endorse a view that would put political
obligation on the shaky foundation of interest calculation, much less before an
audience of fourteen-year-olds. Such scepticism was morally and politically very
dangerous, with or without the additional Humean assumption that reason is merely
the handmaid of the passions and is therefore eminently subject to the free play of the
imagination with its "endless mutable fantasies" and liable thence to the intoxications
of superstition and enthusiasm.17 As far as Hume was concerned, experience teaches
us to mistrust such flights as politically destabilizing and the potent enemies of
interest. For Reid, a fascination with interest was no less troublesome, because it
distracted us from a firm attention to our duties. Hume, of course, never denied "that
men are often govern'd by their duties, and are deter'd from some actions by the
opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation."18 But once the
solvent of scepticism had laid bare the singular principle of interest, or at least opinion
of interest, what was to stop narrowly self-interested behaviours from supplanting
ordinary duties? Reid apparently found a solution to this problem in Cicero's notion
of duty calculation, which I will consider in more detail. (Reid would refine the
Ciceronian solution in his notion of "taking upon oneself a character" in Glasgow.)
Interest, or, more properly, our opinion of what constitutes our best interests, could in
Reid's view effectively be channelled by instructing people in the duties that pertain to
their station in life, thus giving them a stable basis for calculation and deflecting their
attention from more individualistic forms of reckoning. Thus, in an obvious
paraphrase of Cicero, Reid headed up the next section of the proposed lectures on
ethics, economics and politics with "The Scale of Human Life".19 Reid envisaged a
threefold classification of duties on the criteria of how easily they may be attained and
the degree of honour that attaches to them as a result. "Some things are attainable by
all Men & make up the Duties of Low Life", e.g. "To live virtuously keep a Good
' ('Scc David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis:
LibcrtyC/assirs, 1987; hereinaf ter Essays), pp. 32-36, 51, 212.
1 "^Nicholas Phillipson, Hutne (London: Weidenfcld & Nicholson, 1989), p. 39; sec also Treatise, pp.
414-415, 457-458.
18Treatise, p. 457.
19See On Duties, p. 62 and also pp. 22-24.
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Conscience towards God and Man to provide for ones family by some honest
Employment Such as Husbandry Manual Arts Traffick." This again clearly derives
from Book 1 of De Officiis.20 "Those who exercise these Employments honestly &
make profit by them are usefull Members of Society", Reid continued. In another
remark very much in a Ciceronian spirit, Reid suggested that "those who Improve
them [i.e. husbandry, manual arts, traffic] by new Inventions deserve Honour &
Publick Reward."21 Pufendorf had also taken this point from Cicero in Book 1,
Chapter 8 of his On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According toNatural Law.22
Reid then turned from these humble duties to the "professions that belong to Middle
life & are more Honourable)", e.g. "Publick Instructors in Religion or in the Liberal
Arts Physicians Lawiers Judges".23 Finally, Reid moved from the professions of
middle life to "Things still of a Higher Degree", e.g. "the Government of Large bodies
of Men by means of Political orMilitary Skill orEloquence". This classical triad of
politics, arms and rhetoric was eminently suited to the abilities of that class of men to
whom Cicero addressed himself in De Officiis.
It was of course by eloquence that "human beings, who had been scattered originally
over mountain and forest, were ... snared" and gathered together, as Cicero related in
Book 1 of DeOratore.24 This is undoubtedly what Reid had in mind here, and it is a
subject to which he would return in his 1766 lectures on eloquence.25 Here Reid was
trespassing (or perhaps poaching) on sceptical territory. In The Fable of the Bees
Mandeville had argued that eloquence in the debased form of flattery was the
"bewitching Engine" by which men were rallied into civil society and the ambitious
enabled to "reap the more Benefit from, and govern vast Numbers of them with the
greater Ease and Security."26 It is unlikely that Reid meant to open such "a vast Inlet
20See pp. 57-59.
21 See On Duties, pp. 66-70.
22See ed. James Tully and trans. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991; hereinafter Duty ofMan and Citizen), p. 64. James Tully has observed other Ciceronian
passages in Pufendorf (see Introduction to Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. 27, 30).
23These professions must, however, be distinguished from what Cicero called "middle duties
(emphasis added; On Duties, p. 105; cf. p. 5).
24Trans. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1942), p. 27.
25See MS. 8/1/2, fo. 5r: "Without this Power men could never have associated in Political Society.
They never could have had Laws or Government. They must have remained Savages to all
Generations.
265lh ed., [pi. 1] (London, 1728), pp. 29, 33; cf. pp. 153, 200, 230-231.
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to Hypocrisy".27 Nevertheless, it is clear that he was obliged to draw upon Cicero,
among others, in order to combat the scepticism of Hume.
The remainder of Reid's remarks in the final section of his 1752 "Scheme" are devoted
to virtue and power and their relationship to each other. Reid's analysis of these
topics is characteristically Ciceronian:
The things which ought to be the objects of Ambition which claim
Honour & Respect from others and make a Man great & usefull & raise
him above the herd of mankind may 1 think be reduced to these two
Classes Power & Virtue. Virtue is the principle of all real Excellence
[and] Power its instrument!.] Virtue is the Soul & Spirit[,] & Power
the Organ by which Virtue accomplishes its Ends And Purposes!.]
Virtue without power would be onely of use to its ownerl.] Power
without Virtue is equally apt to produce good or Evil, to be dreadfull &
detestable or amiable & honourable.
After thus defining power in terms of virtue, Reid proceeded to suggest that:
Power has various principles that deserve to be particularly
Enumerated!:] 1 Riches which is in itself among the lowest & most
despicable Species of power 2 Authority ... 3 Strength of Body &
Hardiness of Constitution [4] Science Memory Judgment Wit. Good
Manners if Proportion to the Reality or Importance gives a Man Power
[5] Prudence by which I mean the Habit of Judging right of times and
opportunities of Men & their principles and Capacities of knowing
when to conceal & when to shew ones own Designs the Arts of
Popularity of the proper means & Instruments of bring them to Effect.
This as a thing very different from mere knowledge [6] Operative
Habits and Skill in Arts [7] Many Virtues Such as Courage
Temperance Meekness Industry are likewise kinds of Power [8]
Eloquence.28
In his 1766 lectures on eloquence, Reid describes eloquence "when possessed in the
highest degree" as "the Noblest and the greatest" kind of power "because it commands
the passions the Affections the Judgments the purposes the Resolutions of other
Men."29 While on the evidence at my disposal I am not entitled to conclude that this
was Reid's view fourteen years earlier in 1752, it seems reasonable to suppose that he
had at least some sense of the power of eloquence to influence opinion, and perhaps
even opinion of interest, when he wrote the "Scheme".
27Pt. 2 (London, 1729), p. 106; cf. p. \\i; |pt.] 1, pp. 401-402.
2XThe material on authority has already been quoted above.
29MS. 8/1/2, to. 5v
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While Reid thus forthrightly located prudence at the heart of politics, he was
noticeably silent about the proper means of harnessing prudence to virtue. Be that as it
may, Reid concluded his "Scheme" with a promise of "A View of the Different
Stations in Life & the Qualities of Body & Mind & Fortune necessary to the proper
Duties of them." This was, again, highly Ciceronian, which confirms the view that
Reid sought to underwrite his account of authority with its Humean overtones with the
anti-Pyrrhonian analysis provided by Cicero.
2.
Having now considered the significance ofReid's appeal to Cicero, it would be
fruitful to examine closely Reid's translation of De Officiis Book 1, Chapters 1-15 of
that work.30 In turning to Cicero, Reid was not, of course, escaping entirely from
scepticism, but merely mining a more profitable vein within that discourse, one less
apt to yield the moral and political consequences Reid perceived (however
uncharitably) to follow from Hume's unmitigated epistemological scepticism. De
Officiis is among Cicero's dogmatic discourses, De Finibus being its more sceptical
counterpart in the field of ethics. Cicero was concerned in De Finibus with
establishing the rule whereby that which is honourable is necessarily beneficial,
whereas in De Officiis he merely assumed the validity of that rule as he went about
giving practical advice on moral decision-making.
Nonetheless, a certain amount of scepticism still permeates De Officiis on at least two
levels. Firstly, Cicero's approach mitigates its own dogmatism by "using sweet
reason to cajole an independent person, entitled to his own views ... , rather than
putting pressure on a rather ordinary, but docile, young man |his son Marcus] whom
his older cousin regarded as bullied".31 Thus doubt is allowed at least some free play,
and is not dismissed out of hand. "[Y]ou may freely follow your own Judgment in
things," as Reid translated one such passage in which Cicero offered his counsel to
Marcus, "& I give you leave to do so". Be that as it may, it was surely a very
important part ofCicero's intention in De Officiis to give his son a wisely measured
taste of the "(Art] ... of Judging."
3(>Ihc translation ends abruptly in the middle of a word in Ch. 15.
3 'M.T. Griffin, Introduction to On Duties, p. 16.
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Secondly, the narrative is informed by a relatively benign epistemological scepticism
(not unlike that encountered in Butler) which Cicero evidently learned from his
teacher, Philo of Larissa, and according to which "one could not seek certain
knowledge, but should provisionally accept the view that, after examining the
arguments, seems the most persuasive."32 A probable reason, as Reid translated ratio
probabilis, "can serve as a basis for action",33 and must do so in the case of many,
and perhaps all, moral choices. Cicero seems to have had in mind here not only the
so-called imperfect duties, but those as well, "whose obligation is clear & perfect".
(Reid's translation again, apparently, at this juncture was informed by the
Pufendorfian systematics he undoubtedly learned from Turnbull. Reid would rely
heavily upon Pufendorf in his Glasgow lectures on jurisprudence. I will consider the
issue of perfect and imperfect duties and rights in a later chapter.) However, perfect
duties are to some extent immune from this sort of scepticism because, presumably, it
requires a less strenuous effort of probable reasoning in order to perceive their
obligation rightly. In any case, it is incumbent on us to "become good calculators of
our duties" through "experience and practice". This is of course a subject to which we
alluded in our discusion of the "Scheme."
Cicero's teaching in De Officiis largely consists in devising a framework for
evaluating one's options, and in providing a casuistical formula for resolving apparent
conflicts between what appears to be beneficial and what is honourable, or for coping
with other uncertainties such as whether, in what way, and to what degree something
is honourable, dishonourable, or beneficial "when (one is] deciding upon a plan of
action."34
In conclusion, it may be noted that this entire discussion of duty calculation is
expressly polemical. "(T]he opinions of Aristo Pyrrho & Herillus [i.e. Erillusj are
long since exploded," as Reid translated Cicero, because they left no cognitive basis
for "choice or preference in things, by which we might be led to the discovery of our
Duty", or in other words that which is honourable. Indeed, Cicero believed that these
men did not deserve the name of "philosopher", for real philosophers maintain on a
theoretical plane that what is honourable, or, to speak in Reid's terms, virtuous, "is
either solely or chiefly to be chosen for its own Sake" and then proceed to the practical
business of advising us on the means of pursuing it. Such an indictment, especially of
32Introduction to On Duties, p. xxxvi.
33Oh Duties, p. 5, n. 2.
3,41hut., pp. 5, 24-25.
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Pyrrhonian scepticism, which had lately resurfaced with a vengeance in Hume, must
indeed have been welcome to Reid.
Reid's translation is revealing in other ways. His rendering of scierUia as "principles"
is a choice that hints at his view of science, starting with the philosophical orations of
1753-1762. Reid also translated utilitas as "Utility" and honestas as "Virtue"; the
latter is of course quite striking when viewed in the context of the agenda of utility set
by Hume and the virtue-centered response that would come from Reid and Beattie.
Reid's rendering signals a conflation of the language of rights and duties with the
language of virtue. This goes a long way towards explaining his later, and more
explicit, synthesis of a particular type of jurisprudential reasoning with the republican
form of argumentation which he learned from Turnbull. This is a subject which 1 shall
deal with in due course.
Finally, I turn to Reid's rendering of a passage on the essential difference between
human beings and animals which would have offered a bridge to the rational principles
of action as a reply to Hume, although, as 1 have pointed out, the available evidence
does not suggest that he realized this in 1752. The passage is as follows:
[Brutes] concern themselves onely about things present & so far as
they affect their senses, having little or no conception of the past or
future Whereas Man, because he is endued with reason, by which he
traces out the causes of things and discovers their consequences
discovers their mutual ties and connexions, compares things that are
similar, and joyns the future to the present is thereby enabled to plan
out the whole course of life & to provide things necessary for it.
Suggestive as this passage must have been, Reid does not seem to have developed his
notion of the rational principles of action until a later stage of his encounter with
Hume. When he restated these views in the Active Powers in 1788, however, it was
Cicero's De Officiis that provided him with the supporting arguments he needed.
3.
The "Scheme" and Reid's translation of the opening chapters of Cicero's De Officiis
do not exhaust the evidence that has survived of what Reid taught in the way of
politics in 1751-1752; more importantly, they do not exhaust the sceptical avenues he
explored, for the first of his philosophical orations is filled with high praise of
Montesquieu, who had to a large extent downplayed reason and emphasized physical
determinants of behaviour.
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Reid opened his brief remarks on politics in Oration 1 by observing that Socrates'
followers, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle "treated in a distinguished fashion politics,"
which, as I have shown, Reid characterized as "the most noble part of philosophy"'.
He went on to suggest that in politics as in morals Plato "corrupted" Socrates' "pure
and genuine doctrine ... with the witty contrivances of his playful genius." I have
shown how Reid followed the Socratic line of descent from Xenophon to Cicero, who
"set forth most elegantly the teaching of the Stoics in the three books of the De
Officiis." (And, as I will show presently, it was through a complex combination of
Ciceronian, Baconian and Newtonian lenses that Reid viewed the teachings of
subsequent political writers, including Montesquieu.)
Turning from the ancients to the moderns, Reid then identified Machiavelli,
Harrington and Hume as philosophers "who have been taught by the experience of
past ages and the fate of the governments of both ancient and modern peoples" and
who accordingly "made strong progress" in politics. But Reid reserved the highest
accolade for Montesquieu,
The most illustrious leader, ... [who] is seen to outstrip all
philosophers by a long distance; he is by nationality a Frenchman, by
his character and zeal, a Briton. This man, instructed by the learning
of the whole of history, with the keenest judgment, with Attic wit, and
with Laconic brevity and weight of diction, has set forth most lucidly
the causes, principles, and effects of laws, morals and politics, from
the first beginnings in human nature. From the British race in
particular he has well deserved the name Briton because he has taught
us, who are blessed with a form of government surpassing all the
governments which either history has shown forth or imagination has
contrived and who are exceedingly fortunate, to recognize our own
blessings and to value them highly.35
From this brief statement it is evident that Reid regarded The Spirit of Laws as a kind
of sourcebook for the scientific study of politics, and there is at least a suggestion here
of the view that politics is eminently concerned with the causes and effects of different
political constitutions and the principles of action among men, although the first really
detailed evidence of this comes from Reid's Glasgow lectures on politics. It would
^^Philosophical Orations, pp. 936-938. It is interesting that Beattie's high praise of Montesquieu
both in the classroom in the early 1760s and in Volume 2 of his Elements ofMora! Science in 1792
echo those uttered by Rcid a decade earlier. Thas Beattie described Montesquieu as '"the greatest
politician that ever the world produced"' and "'the greatest political genius that ever lived'" (quoted in
J. Lough, Esprit des Lois in a Scottish University in the Eighteenth Century ," Comparative
Literature Studies, vol. 13 (1944), pp. 14—15; cf. F.T.H. Fletcher, Montesquieu and English Politics
(1750-1800) (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1980), p. 50 (see also John Dalrymple, An Essay
towards a General History ofEeudal Property in GreatBritain (London, 1757), pp. [iii]-iv, where
Montesquieu is described as "the greatest genius of our age").
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also appear that Montesquieu provided Reid with a defence of the British constitution
which was perfectly consistent with the kind of high Whig doctrine espoused by
Hume. While there is no solid discursive evidence of Reid's allegiance in this period,
one can detect a sceptical bias in the Introduction to his Inquiry, where he wrote that
"innovations in ... government, are always suspected and disliked by the many, til use
hath made them familiar, and prescription hath given them a title.*'36
For a man of his time, Reid was not doing anything unusual in reading Montesquieu.
Esprit des Lois, first published in 1748 and translated into English by Thomas Nugent
in 1750, proved enormously popular in Scotland. The Edinburgh publisher Hamilton
and Balfour produced a new French edition in 1750 and also made available a
pamphlet containing Two Chapters ofa Celebrated French Work, Intitled, "De
L'Esprit des Loix", which 1 believe was edited by Hume.37 At least four other
Edinburgh editions of Montesquieu's book,38 one Dumfries edition39 and one
Glasgow edition40 were also published in this period. Another edition was brought
out by Douglass and Murray of Aberdeen in 1756, almost certainly to fill a need
created by Reid at King's and by Reid's counterpart at Marischal, Alexander Gerard
(1728-1795)41
^^Works, p. 99a. It should be pointed out that in this passage Reid was using Hume's own passage
against him in the area of innovations in language.
37Montesquieu had favoured Hume with a presentation copy, to which he replied with a detailed set of
remarks. (See H to M, 10 Apr 1749. in J.Y.T. Greig, ed.. The Letters ofDavid Hume, vol. 1
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), pp. 133—138.) An unsigned footnote attached to a passage
in Book 11, Chapter 6 relating to the origins of the British constitution, which sounds suspiciously
Humean in its sceptical Whig overtones, imputed an esoteric motive to Montesquieu. The author of
the note suggested that w hen Montesquieu w rote that his reading of Tacitus' De Moribus
Genrianonmi gave him the idea that 'This fine system hath been found in the woods" he thereby
"couched ... an opinion a Frenchman dare scarce avow , that this happy establishment was secured at
the revolution of 1688, concerted by the lovers of British liberty, and the Prince of Orange, at his
house of the Wood, and afterwards completed by the accession of the praesent German family" (p. 18).
It is known that Hume had been instrumental "in some unknow n manner" in getting this pamphlet
into print (Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life ofDavid Hume, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford Universitv
Press, 1980), p. 229; cf. p. 232).
384th ed., 1768; 10th ed., 1773; 7th ed., 1778 and the Thomas Ruddiman edition of 1793.
393rd ed., 1762.
401793.
41 Indeed The Spirit of Imws seems to have been a staple of the philosophy course at King's and
Marischal Colleges from the 1750s to the 1790s. Robert Morgan's notes from Alexander Gerard's
lectures on pneumatics, ethics and logic, 1758-1759, for example, contain sev eral characteristically
Montesquicuan passages. All of these passages come under the general heading of natural
jurisprudence in Morgan's notes, but are scattered throughout the different parts of that subject, i.e.
private jurisprudence, economics and politics (see EUL MS. Dc.5.117, pp. 244, 376-377, 442^173,
481). Here also we find absolutely standard references to the influence of soil and climate and the
rev olutionary account of forms of gov ernment.
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To read the Advertisement to the Douglass and Murray edition one would almost think
that the publisher had undertaken to prepare a new translation ofDeL'Esprit des
Loix.42 In fact the Aberdeen edition appears to have been simply an amended Nugent
translation, corrected against the text of the new French edition of 1750.43 Slightly
more adventurous was the decision to cut the translator's preface, which spoke to the
charges of irreligion that had been made against Montesquieu: "To us it appears a most
absurd practice to load works of character with trifling or malignant criticisms", the
Advertisement ran, "and we hope our readers will approve of our conduct in omitting
the silly objections made to the Spirit of Laws, and the answers."44
Montesquieu's materialism in The Spirit ofLaws was at best thinly disguised. For
him, the laws of matter and motion, not God's will and grace, were primary. God
governed the world by fixed rules and "invariable laws", but the world itself was
"formed by the motion of matter" and without the laws ofmatter and motion "it could
not subsist." God, who rules the universe "as creator and preserver", is paradoxically
constrained by rules of his own making, though not of his own design. The laws by
which he acts are merely "relative to his wisdom and power", not commanded by him
in his omnipotence.4-"'
Gerard would go on to publish an unfinished paper by Montesquieu on taste as an appendix to his
own Essay on Taste (Edinburgh, 1764). Montesquieu's "Essay on Taste" occupies pp. |245]-298.
Gerard also proposed the following Humean/Montesquieuan question in the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society, or "Wise Club," of which he and Reid were members: "Whether national characters depend
upon physical or moral causes, or whether they are influenced by both." This item was handled on 26
Feb 1771, i.e. some years after Reid's departure (see the list of questions printed in James McCosh,
The Scottish Philosophy, p. 472).
Three other Wise Club members w ho turned Montesquieu's doctrines to account w ere James Beattie
(1735-1803), James Dunbar (1719-1798) and George Campbell (1719-1796). Beattie, w ho studied
under Gerard in 1753 and succeeded him seven years later, appropriated Montesquieu's account of the
origins of slavery in Book 15, Chapters 2-5 of the Spirit of Laws and latched on to Montesquieu's
discussion of the English constitution in Book 11, Chapter 6. Moreover, Beattie's review of the
v arious forms of government, like Gerard's before him, was thoroughly Montesquieuan. Campbell,
for his part, adopted Montesquieu's account of the origins of slavery in his book The Philosophy of
Rhetoric w hich appeared in 1776. And, last but certainly not least, Dunbar, w ho had been a student at
King's during Reid's tenure there and was himself appointed regent and professor of philosophy at
King's the year after Reid left in 1765, published his Montcsquieuan Essays on the History of
Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages in 1780.
42The final paragraph of the Advertisement reads in part as follows: "The peculiarity of the author's
stile makes a good translation no easy task. We hope no material fault w ill be found in this edition.
By comparing this with the former English edition the reader will observe several inaccuracies
corrected, and some palpable mistakes rectified" (pp. [iiij—fiv]).
44Judging from a comparison with the second edition of Nugent's translation (London, 1752) and the
French of the {Edinburgh edition of 1750.
44P. liiij.
452nd ed., trans. [Thomas] Nugent, vol. 1 (London, 1752), p. 2.
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Still, such views w ould not have been entirely repugnant to a good Newtonian like
Reid and it is tempting to suggest that it was Reid himself who inspired the
Advertisement to Douglass and Murray's edition of The Spirit ofLaws.46 Reid had.
after all, been teaching The Spirit of Laws for a few years by the time the Aberdeen
edition of that work appeared. The hypothesis that Reid would have been well known
to the bookseller-publishers of a small centre like Aberdeen and could have been
consulted on the publication of the book is certainly possible. (It is interesting that
Douglass would later become active in the Gordon's Mill Farming Club, of which
Reid was a member.)
While there is no direct evidence that Reid was the author of the Advertisement cited
above, it is known that when he lectured on ethics in the Aberdeen period he averred
that "The Deity himself acts by Laws or Rules".47 And when he was teaching at
Glasgow seven years after Douglass and Murray's edition appeared, Reid would
ruefully remark that "Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Loix was burnt in France & he as
well as the other best political writers of that Nation do not chuse to own what they
write" 48 a sentiment in some sympathy with the Advertisement.
But while Reid did not dismiss the notion of a law-abiding God, he was less prepared
to accept Montesquieu's view of the relative lawlessness of the mundane realm as
expressed in the latter's assertion that
the intelligent world is far from being so well governed as the physical.
For tho' the former has also its laws which of their own nature are
invariable, yet it does not conform to them so exactly as the physical
world. This is because on the one hand particular intelligent beings are
of a finite nature and consequently liable to error; and on the other,
their nature requires them to be free agents. Hence they do not steadily
conform to their primitive laws; and even those of their own instituting
they frequently infringe.49
In his Aberdeen lectures Reid recoiled from such suggestions, protesting that "It
cannot be imagined by any Reasonable Man that the Deity who himself acts always
according to the best & wisest Rules or Laws it cannot 1 say be imagined that the Deity
46Cf. John Lough, 'The Relations of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (1758-73) with France,"
Aberdeen University Review, vol. 30, no. 89 (Summer 1943), p. 147: "perhaps the anonymous
preface to this edition was the w ork of one of the future members of the Philosophical Society."
47MS. 7/V/l, fo. lr.
48MS. 4/III/8, fo. Ir.
492nd ed., vol. 1, p. 3.
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has left human Actions without any Rule without any Law to be guided by chance or
Caprice." After all, "All Nature is subject to Laws".50
Similarly, in Oration 1 Reid attempted to uphold Montesquieu's position without
opening the door to lawlessness. Arguing against the potential atheism of Grotius,
Montesquieu reasoned that the "laws by which [God] created all things ... [and] by
which he preserves them" were principles of action for him because he "knows them".
He knew these rules because he "made them ... and he made them because they are
relative to his wisdom and power."51 This formula, which underwrote Montesquieu's
deism, was echoed by Reid:
the supreme Poet, the Maker of all things and the all-powerful Ruler,
while he was establishing the first beginnings of the Universe,
proposed laws for himself that were in keeping with his wisdom and
goodness. And he continues to rule both the material and rational
world by the wisest and most favourable laws and the investigation of
these laws comprises the principal and most noble part of
philosophy.52
Any imposition theory which was going to be acceptable to Reid would have to be
premised upon the existence of a God who was really in command and who had
equipped us to obey him.
I have not yet dealt with Montesquieu's well-known historicism and relativism. These
are of course familiar retreats of the sceptic and need not be reviewed here. What
concerns us is Reid's response to these themes and his position in this period on
Montesquieu's materialism. While Reid was, as we have shown, sympathetic to
certain elements ofMontesquieu's mechanistic theory , and, as we shall see, hardly
opposed to historicism and relativism as such, he was quite critical of the subversion
of moral causes that it entailed.
In his lectures on ethics in this period, Reid suggested that "The Characters [of men
are] owing to the different Strength orWeakness of the Principles of Action in
different persons." These strengths and weaknesses, in turn, are attributable "Chiefly
to Education Example & Custom" but also "To Natural Temperament... difference of
Fortune & Condition ... Difference ofAge ... Unaccountable Distempers of the Mind
such as Melancholy ... Enthusiasm, and Hypocondriac." Reid apparently also
50MS. 7/V/l, fo. lr-v.
-'Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 2nd cd., vol. 1, p. 3.
^-Philosophical Orations, p. 933.
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speculated as to "How far Differences of Climate Influence Mens Characters.
Opinions of D. Hume & Montesquieu".53 Unfortunately, Reid did not record his
thoughts on this subject here.
But in a related paper, apparently dating from the Aberdeen period and headed "Q. To
What Causes are the Differences in Character among Men Owing?", he began
somewhat sceptically, suggesting that "How far Mens Character which they bring into
the World with them is influenced by that of their immediate or Remote Parents, by the
Conduct and Regimen ofMothers in Conception & Gestation, by Climate & Air is
perhaps a Matter that we have not sufficient Data to Determine". But a couple of pages
later he conceded
that warm Climates indispose more to labour & render it less necessary
& furnish more the means of Luxury & effeminacy. That both Men &
Women ripen sooner in warm Climates especially the latter. The
passions of Love & Jealousy and all the train they bring along with
them may be more furious in such Climates & be less ballanced by
Reason & Experience^] And as the period of Old Age when the
Passions give way to caution & Reflexion comes sooner & lasts longer
so more of cunning may be expected as the affect of a Warm
Climate.54
Reid's remarks on this occasion would appear to owe much to Book 5, Chapter 15 of
The Spirit ofLaws,55 and to Hume's essay "Of National Characters."56 But they are
Humean overall, allocating the absolute minimum efficacy to the influence of climate.
Moreover, Reid left behind an abstract of a discussion he led in the Wise Club on 12
June 1759 on the question of "Whether Mankind with regard to Morals always was
and is the same" in which he opposed different varieties of scepticism and scarcely
cloaked a criticism ofMontesquieu that would probably have found favour even with
Hume himself. While it is not known for certain whether, or to what extent, echoes of
this conversation were heard in Reid's lectures at King's, the abstract at least gives us
some insight into Reid's thoughts. In any case, as it is the only evidence that we have
to go on in this particular, it would therefore seem appropriate to review this material
here.
"IfThis Question is determined in the Affirmative," Reid began,
53MS. 7/V/23, p. [8],
54MS. 6/IV/2, fos lv, 2v.
552nd ed., vol. 1, p. 90.
56Essays, p. 213.
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all Attempts to make men better must be as vain and fantastical as an
Attempt to teach them to fly or to make them ten cubits high. Neither
Legislators nor Magistrates nor Publick teachers nor private Instructors
nor Parents nor Masters ought ever to think of bettering the Morals of
those under their Care. Yet it is very common for those who value
themselves upon what they call the knowledge of Mankind to sneer at
any project for the reformation of Morals in a Nation or among
mankind in general.
In the face of these disastrous consequences and with the firm conviction that this
opinion "does not appear to be supported by any evident or probable Arguments,"
whether "By the fairest conjectures we can form", or by reason, experience or
analogy, Reid endeavoured to attack the very assumptions of sceptics and fatalists
alike. For Reid, reason, experience and analogy conspire to show "that mens
Characters depend greatly upon their Opinions, the Examples that are dayly before
them, the Habits they acquire", while the most probable conjectures we can form are
sufficient to disqualify such vain imaginings and improper analogies as the following:
"that the increase of Virtue and Morals in one Place can either be a cause or an Effect
of its decrease in another", "that the whole course of human Affairs and Charaters [is]
ruled by the Stars", or that "the Miracles of J Christ progress and Establishment of
Christianity the rise & progress of Opinions and Philosophies [are owing] to the
Conjunctions & Oppositions of the Planets." The full-blown doctrines of
Montesquieu are likewise excluded as untenable, for here "The Climate Soil & Air
have [merely] been Substituted in place of the Planets and Astrological Houses."
I shall have occasion to say more about the strategy Reid employed to combat
Montesquieu's materialism later. What is significant at this point is the particular
brand of moral and political scepticism which Reid himself employed to chase out
materialism and bad science in his abstract. Apparently harkening back to his 1748
"Essay on Quanitity," but quickly going beyond anything he said in that piece, Reid
confessed "We have not data to compute the Quantity or Sum of virtue that hath been
in the World in different periods of time. By the fairest conjections we can form it
hath been very different at different times in the same family, at the same Court, in the
same Nation, nay in many neighbouring Nations."57 Here Reid would have found
himself an ally of Hume against Montesquieu, for in his "Of National Characters"
(1748) Hume downplayed the influence of physical causes and emphasized that of
moral causes.-"'8 So, just as he had given some ground to the sceptics in proposing
57MS. 4/1/22, fo. lr-v.
58See Essays, pp. 200, 203-204, 207-208, 213.
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Cicero as an alternative to Hume and Mandeville on the question of opinion and
interest, Reid now effectively allied himself with Hume against Montesquieu on the
issue ofmaterialism. It is interesting to note that what both of these cases show is just
how far Reid had to enter into the discourse of his opponents in order to distance
himself from those views of which he disapproved. This is a recurring pattern in the
development of Reid's political thought and reveals one of the ways in which scientific
advance is mediated by encounters with scepticism.
Chapter 5
Institutionalizing Hume's Agenda for the Science of Man
In May 1752, i.e. soon after the 1751-1752 term ended, Reid was busy reading
Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals and Lord Karnes' Essays on the
Principles ofMorality andNatural Religion, both of which had been published in the
previous year. Reid therefore seems to have delayed little in subjecting both to his
scrutiny. There exists in Reid's hand a four-page abstract and a page of
''Observations" relating to Hume's new work and a further page of notes on Karnes'
latest effort.1 I shall begin with Reid's notes on Hume.
Hume had recast the unashamedly Pyrrhonian elements of the Treatise (a book which
he formally disowned in 1777) in his more accessible Enquiry Concerning Human
Enderslanding (1748), and in some ways he toned down his sceptical agenda even
further in the second Enquiry. This recasting evidently appealed to Reid. for he
copied the following from Hume in the first few lines of his abstract:
Those who refuse the Reality of Moral Distinctions may be reckoned
Disingenuous Disputants. The Difference which Nature has placed
betwixt one Man and Another is So wide that where the Opposite
Extremes come at once under our Apprehension there is no Scepticism
so Scrupulous and scarce any Assurance so determined as absolutely to
deny all Distinction betwixt them.
Although Reid's notes consist largely of paraphrase and his accompanying
"Observations," while highly suggestive, amount to little more than a series of
methodological precautions, they do help to indicate the kinds of things that may have
informed his thinking about politics at this time, whether or not they ever found their
way into the classroom. Most important for my purposes are his notes from Sections
3-4 of Hume's second Enquiry.
Reid followed Hume very closely through Section 3, Part 1, on the origin of justice,
and quoted w ithout comment Hume's conclusion that "History, Experience, Reason
Sufficiently instruct us in (the] Natural Progress of human Sentiments, & the Gradual
Encrease of our Regards to Property & Justice, in Proportion as we become
acquainted with the extensive Utility of that Virtue." Reid took less copious notes
'MS. 3/1/23, Cos lr-3v.
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from Part 2, on the rules of justice, but recorded, again without remark, Hume's
challenge to "Examine theWriters on the Laws ofNature you will find that whatever
Principle they set out with, they are sure to terminate at last in the Convenience &
Necessity of Mankind as the Ultimate Reason for every Rule they establish."
These are of course extremely sceptical statements and a record of Reid's reaction to
them would add greatly to our knowledge of his political thought in this period. It is
known that a few years later, on 22 November 1758, the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society , led by Reid, spoke to the question "Is Justice a Natural or an Artificial
Virtue?", which, as Reid acknowledged, "respects Mr Hume Notions of Justice". On
this occasion Reid observed "that Gratitude and Resentment are natural Ingredients in
the Frame of a Human Mind no less than the Appetites of Hunger and Thirst. And that
those affections are as naturally excited by their proper Objects & Occasions as those
Appetites". He suggested, moreover, that "in every state of Mankind in w hich there is
either Gratitude for good Offices or Resentment of Injuries there must be notions of
Justice."2 Thus at this juncture Reid managed to head Hume off at the pass, meeting
his sceptical challenge without even directly addressing himself to the question of
public utility. He would discourse at length on this subject, but not until he was
preparing the Active Powers for the press decades later.
Reid was silent, too, on Hume's criticism of Montesquieu's relativism in Part 2 of the
Enquiry. Montesquieu "supposes all Right to be founded on certain Rapports or
Relations; which is a System," Hume said, "that, in my Opinion, never will reconcile
with true Philosophy."3 However, this is a criticism with which Reid would have had
sympathy, if not at the time, then at least from 1766 onwards, as I will demonstrate.
Reid's apparent lack of engagement on this point is somewhat surprising given his
interest in Montesquieu at the time.
Unfortunately, Reid wrote down almost nothing with regard to Section 4, on the
advantage of political society. What he did write amounts to little more than a
summary of the contents of the section: "Submission to Laws Allegiance. Law of
Nations. Reason of State Chastity Unlawfullness of Incest, Laws of Good Manners,
Gallantry, Roads Duels &c founded on Utility". He made no comment on Hume's
claim that "All Politicians will allow, and most Philosophers, that reasons of state
2MS. 6/1/9, Cos lr, 2r.
3An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals (London, 1751), p. 55, n.; cf. Enquiries
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles ofMorals, 3rd. ed., ed. P.H.
Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; hereinaf ter Enquiries), p. 197, n. 1.
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may, in particular Emergencies, dispence with the Rules of Justice".4 His views on
this question, like his other views on the subject ofjustice, were not articulated until
much later. Like his other ideas on the subject ofjustice, Reid's opinion on this
question was that the rules of justice are inviolable; reasons of state must conform to
these rules or they are not true reasons of state.
Karnes' book was conceived as a reply to Hume, but its highly mechanistic and
necessitarian overtones were no doubt anathema to Reid and apparently spurred him
on to work out his own reply. Reid's notes show that he was concerned with the
scope of the principle of benevolence in human nature, which is not surprising given
his long-standing interest in the debate on the passions. "There is no such Principle in
human Nature as General Benevolence", Reid wrote. "Our Nature leads us to love
our Relations, Friends, Neighbours; Our Benevolence is farther Extended by Means
of General Names that signifie some Relation of others to us Such as sameness of
Religion Government Name, &c." More significantly, at least for our present
purposes, they also reveal that Reid was thinking about issues clearly related to the
question of liberty versus necessity, although there is nothing like a sustained
discussion here of the extent to which human actions are free or necessary. This
deficiency is regrettable, but later in this period Reid would make references to and
lecture on the subject in a way that clearly demonstrates that he had a familiarity with
both Hume and Karnes on this question.
This was unavoidable: in the mid-1750s there was much controversy surrounding the
issue. The sceptical writings of the atheistic Hume, and the necessitarian doctrines of
his kinsman Henry Home, the future Lord Karnes, brought them into conflict with the
high-flying clergy. Hume was accused of heresy, and Kames, apparently being tarred
with the same brush, was under threat of censure as well. The Minister of Perth, John
Bonar (an evangelical who had a bone to pick with the Moderate clergymen whom he
held responsible for deposing his friend and fellow evangelical Thomas Gillespie in
1752 and blocking his reinstatement in 1753)5 published An Analysis ofthe Moral and
Religious Sentiments Contained in the Writings ofSopho [i.e. Kames] and David
Humef which he addressed to the members of the General Assembly of the Church
of Scotland for their consideration. Hume's friend, the Moderate Hugh Blair, replied
4A// Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals, p. 65.
^See Richard B. Shcr, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1985), p. 67.
^Edinburgh, 1755.
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with his critical Observations upon this pamphlet7 and Blair, assisted by fellow
Moderates Robert Wallace, George Wishart and Robert Hamilton, then came to
Karnes' defence in a third pamphlet, Objections Against the Essays onMorality and
NaturalReligion Examined.8
Against this background, I now examine briefly the views of Hume and Karnes on
liberty and necessity. "There is a general course of nature in human actions," Hume
wrote in Book 2 of the Treatise,
as well as in the operations of the sun and climate. There are also
characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well
as common to mankind. The knowledge of these characters is founded
on the observation of an uniformity in these actions, that flow from
them; and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity.
"[A]nd whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform;" Hume continued,
"as the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never
free ourselves from the bonds of necessity." By necessity Hume meant motives, and
he endeavoured to prove "that reason alone can never be a motive to ... action".9
On Karnes' view, "no mortal ever came to a determination, without the influence of
some motive or other." But since "motives are not under our power or direction, ...
we can, at bottom, have no liberty. We are so constituted," Kames went on to say,
that we cannot exert a single action, but with some view, aim or
purpose. At the same time, when two opposite motives present
themselves, we have not the power of an arbitary choice. We are
directed, by a necessary determination of our nature, to prefer the
strongest motive.
Thus Kames dismissed our "feeling" of liberty as a mere self-deception inherent in our
nature.10
In lecture notes which appear to date from his time at King's, Reid replied directly to
this sceptical reasoning. Hume and Kames had argued that in their actions people are
necessarily determined by the strongest motive; this is what gives authority to our
reasoning from their motives to their actions. They felt that the alternative to this view
1Observations upon a Pamphlet, Intitled, "An Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments
Contained in the Writings ofSopho, and David Hume" (Edinburgh, 1755).
^Edinburgh, 1756.
9Pp. 402-403, 408, 413.
1 ®Essays on the Principles ofMorality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751), pp. 162, 167-169.
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would be that people's actions are utterly capricious, which of course would mean that
we could not possibly predict their actions or reason about their behaviour. Hume, at
least, was obliged to fall back on necessity to underwrite probable reasoning (and
reasoning from people's motives to their actions is a species of probable reasoning)
because he had undercut the foundation of opinion in the Trealise. His recourse to
determinism was apparently in the same spirit as his reliance on necessity in the form
of the passions to break the force of his Pyrrhonian scepticism. Reid, who as I have
shown never doubted the authority of probable reasoning, countered Hume's (and
Karnes's) argument by pointing out that (unaccountable) caprice is not the only logical
alternative to determinism, for freedom does not necessarily entail caprice. He
suggested that it would be possible to reason from people's characters to their actions.
In other words, "the Supposition of freedom (does not take] away all Wisdom
Prudence & all Distinction ofCharacters".11 Reid formally addressed himself to the
problem of liberty on at least two other occasions in the Aberdeen period. He wrote a
piece which seems to have been apropos of Dr David Skene's question "How far
human actions are free or necessary?", discussed by the Aberdeen Philosophical
Society on 24 May and 14 June 1758, and took up the matter again in a slightly
different form in the abstract that survives of his own question "Does Moral Character
consist in Affections and Dispositions which are involuntary; or in fixed Purposes &
Determinations of the Will which influence the Conduct?", dealt with by the Wise
Club on 15 April 1761.
In the first of these papers, Reid criticized "two modern Advocates of fatalism",
probably Hume and Karnes, for assuming without proof "that a mans Character in
morals is a thing altogether involuntary and that the Will is onely exercised in transient
acts, but not in anything that can be called Character." Reid, for his part, was
convinced that character consists in "permanent Acts of the Will", such as the virtue of
justice, "a constant & perpetual Will or purpose, to give every man his due." He
believed, moreover, that far from beingdetermined by the strongest motive in
any given action, we very often exercise our prerogative of "self-denial," which
implies "a painfull struggle against a strong inclination".12 Reid reiterated these
opinions a few years later in the second paper under review:
Moral character depends not indeed upon transient and momentary
Volitions but in fixed and habitual determinations of the Will which are
1 }MS. 7/V/23.
12MS. 6/1/16, fos lv-2r.
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far a more Stable and firm basis for Character to rest upon than the
involuntary impulses of Passion & Affection which are in a perpetual
flux and never almost the same for two days of Life.13
On this occasion, and no doubt on the previous one as well, Skene took Hume's part.
He argued on the system of necessity reviewed above that human conduct "may be
explained in a satisfactory way from the influence of Passions Affections &
Inclinations, variously modified & combin'd".14 Clearly, Humean scepticism was
alive among Reid's acquaintance at Aberdeen. Gerard seems to have accepted Hume's
theory of ideas without quibble and to have taught it in the classroom in 1757-1758,
as can be seen from a set of student notes from his lectures on metaphysics,15 adding
an uncritical dimension to the entrenchment of scepticism with its consequences for
opinion and its necessitarian implications; this must have troubled Reid just as much as
Skene's more considered allegiance.
Thus far I have been reviewing the intellectual development of a man who found
himself caught up in a floodtide of scepticism and who made the most of his training
and erudition in order to hold back some ground from the erosive currents of the age.
And while his interest in contemporary moral and political issues up to this point can
hardly be described as casual, it is nevertheless true that his engagement with these
questions was largely reactive. The demands of teaching were beginning to change
that. 1 have already shown how Reid tried to reconcile Hume with Cicero in the hope
of generating a flexible account of duties, one able to withstand the pressures of
modern scepticism precisely because it was firmly rooted in sceptical soil. I have also
shown how he turned to Montesquieu, another sceptic, but with a less problematic
agenda than that coolly laid out by the intrepid Hume, for his account of law and
politics. But Reid's use of Cicero and Montesquieu was much more than a kind of
deferral to scepticism; it was, rather, part of a new and decidedly scientific direction in
Reid's thought. Reid was now becoming more pro-active in his battle with the
sceptics and making ready to examine the mind afresh and to write systematically on
pneumatology, ethics and politics in a way that he had never done before.
Reid's first step was a big one: to restructure the arts curriculum according to his new
conception of the science ofmind, and to remodel the institution itself in order to
13xMS. 2/11/13, fo. 4v.
,4AUL MS. 475/11, p. 130.
1 ''See N.T. Philiipson, "James Beattie and the Defence of Common Sense," in Bernhard Fabian,
Festschrift furRainerGruenter (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1978), p. 149.
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facilitate this task.16 As I pointed out at the outset, the curriculum under which Reid
taught in 1751-1752, his first year as a professor, was in its scholastic framework
essentially the same as the one in which he himself had been schooled: Greek in the
first year; logic in the second; ontology, pneumatics, morals and politics in the third;
and natural philosophy in the fourth.17
Marischal College introduced reforms into their antiquated curriculum early in 1753.
While no changes were made to the first-year syllabus, the philosophy course, i.e. the
syllabus for years 2-4. was dramatically restructured and its content broadened.
Logic, the main second-year subject under the old curriculum, was moved to the
fourth year. The second year was now to be taken up with lectures on natural and
civil history, geography, chronology and mathematics (which was henceforth to be
continued in years 3-^4 as well). The order of natural and experimental philosophy on
the one hand and moral philosophy on the other was reversed, natural and
experimental philosophy now being introduced in the third year and moral philosophy
in the fourth. Tertians (third-year students) were henceforth also to be taught criticism
and belles-letTres. The new Professor of Moral Philosophy, Alexander Gerard, who
was undoubtedly the principal architect of these reforms, gave the rationale for these
changes in his Plan ofEducation in the Marischal College and University of
Aberdeen.'8 He stressed the "great inconveniencies" attending the old system
whereby
The student must make a transition at once from words and languages
to Philosophy, without being previously introduced to the knowledge
of facts, the sole foundation of, and preparation for it; he must be
hurried, at the first, into the most abstruse, difficult and subtle parts of
it; he must be put upon examining the nature, foundation and different
kinds of evidence and reasoning, before he is acquainted with any
specimens of these kinds, by which they may be illustrated.
According to the order of instruction embodied in the new curriculum, by contrast,
"the sciences ... followjed] one another, according to the natural connexion of the
subjects, and the gradual openings of the human mind" and were therefore better
16l.e. by extending the length of the academic term, consolidating some of the smaller bursaries, etc.
17This was the curriculum at King's prior to 1753; that at Marischal in the same period w as slightly
more involved, and included, among other subjects, arithmetic in the first year and geometry in the
second (see Paul Wood, 'Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher," p. 59).
'^Aberdeen, 1755.
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adapted for transmitting "more real knowledge, and that more useful for the various
purposes of human life".19
King's College soon followed suit in this restructuring bid, and Reid was appointed to
a committee struck on 23 March 1753 to consider "proposals for the better Regulating
the Discipline of the College & Improving the plan of Education".20 The committee
made a number of recommendations.21 One regulation of interest here related to
discipline. The committee recommended the enforcement of an old regulation, which
had fallen into disuse but had not been officially rescinded, requiring all students to
live in college rather than in private accommodation. Writing to a somewhat anxious
parent a couple of years after this regulation started to be enforced again, Reid
reassured him of the panoptic character of supervision at Kings:
While the students were scattered over the town in private quarters, and
might dispose of themselves as they pleased but at school hours, we
found it impossible to keep them from low or bad company, if they
were so disposed. But they are on a very different footing since they
lived within the college: we need not but look out at our windows to
see when they rise and when they go to bed, They are seen nine or ten
times throughout the day statedly by one or other of the masters — at
publick prayers, school hours, meals, and in their rooms; besides
occasional visits, which we can make with little trouble to ourselves.
They are shut up within walls at nine at night. We charge those that are
known to be trusty and diligent with the oversight of such as we
suspect to be otherwise; and verily 1 believe there are few boys so
narrowly lookt after, or so little exposed to temptations to vice, at home
as with us at present.22
This concern with discipline reminds us of the typically Moderate view of this life
being one of discipline and improvement that Reid learned from Turnbull. The public
instructor, like the parent, the magistrate and the preacher were therefore concerned to
inculcate morals and encourage the practice of virtue.
A second regulation of interest here related to the retention of the system of regenting
in preference to the adoption of the professorial system. The purpose of this rule was
again to safeguard the morals of the students. "Every Professor of Philosophy in this
University is also Tutor to those who study under him, has the whole Direction of
19Pp. 5-7.
20Quoted in Wood, 'Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher," p. 61.
2 'See "Notes by Dr. [William] Knight" (Professor of Natural Philosophy at Martschal College and
University; 1786-2844) enclosed in Alexander Thomson of Banchorv to Sir William Hamilton, 16
May 1837, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 71r-v.
22R to Archibald Dunbar, 4 Sept 1755, in Alina Mater, vol. 20, no. 1 (Oct 1902), p. 62.
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their studies, the Training of their Minds, and the Oversight of their Manners; and it
seems to be generally agreed that it must be detrimental to a Student to change his
Tutor every Session."23 It is not hard to see the connection between the obsessive
concern with manners and morals we find in these regulations and the erosive pressure
exerted on these things by the increasingly anonymous commercial society whose
mingling of ranks and moral outlooks demanded prudent role-playing and expressed
the moral relativism so elegantly "methodized and corrected" (to recontextualize a
phrase of Hume's) along Ciceronian lines in The Spectator.24
But the most important proposal that came out of Reid's committee concerned the
restructuring of the curriculum. Greek was still to be studied in the first year but its
study was to be continued in the second year, which was otherwise taken up with
mathematics (continued in the third year) and natural history. In the third year natural
and experimental philosophy would also be taught. Finally, the fourth year was "to be
employed in the Philosophy of the Human mind and the Sciences that Depend Upon
it." Copies of an "Abstract" containing this regulation (which is thought to have been
written by Reid) were duly "Printed and ... Distributed among the Alumni &
Wellwishers of the College." In the following year the College responded to their
inquiries by offering "Some Eclaircissement Upon the Business of the third Year of
the Philosophy Course". The minutes of 6April 1754 record that clarification, no
doubt also written by Reid:
By the Philosophy of the Mind is Understood, An Account of the
constitution of the Human mind, and of All its powers and Faculties,
whether Sensitive, Intellectual or Moral; The Improvements they are
capable off [sic], and the Means of their Improvement, of the Mutual
Influences of Body & mind on each Other; and of the knowledge we
may Acquire of Other Minds, And Particularly of the Supreme mind.
And the Sciences depending on the Philosophy of the mind, Are
Understood to be Logic, Rhetorick The Laws of Nature and Nations,
Politicks, Oeconomicks, the fine Arts and Natural Religion.25
The new curriculum follows Reid's "Scheme" almost to the letter, thus giving
credence to the traditional view that he was the driving force behind it.26 Still, the
omission of ethics is rather curious, although I suspect that ethics was for Reid
23Ouoted in Robert Sangster Rait, The Universities ofAberdeen (Aberdeen: James Gordon Bissct,
1895), p. 201.
24See Phillipson, Hume, p. 27.
25Minutes of Meetings of Principal, Masters and Members of King's College, AUL MS. K 43, pp.
366, 373, 395.
26See Rait, pp. 202-203.
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included under the catch-all of the laws of nature and nations. This in itself is
interesting, however, for it underlines the natural-law inheritance that 1 observed in
Reid's translation of Cicero. On the other hand, the term "ethics" did appear in Reid's
"Scheme," as I pointed out above. All of this might perhaps lead us to the conclusion
that in institutional terms at least, the tradition of the modern natural lawyers was more
immediate than, or at least preferred to, that of the schoolmen. King's also gave its
regents a certain leeway in the organization of their lectures,27 and Reid apparently
took advantage of this by taking a more comprehensive view of the law of nature and
nations.
To return to the regulations, they were, like the "Scheme" itself, drafted at an early
stage of Reid's encounter with Humean scepticism. It is clear that Reid was much
indebted to Hume, not only for the language of opinion discussed earlier but also for
his conception of "the science ofMan". Obviously, stemming the tide of scepticism
could not be accomplished without deferring to Hume; for one thing, Hume was too
good a scientist to be ignored. "'Tis evident," Hume wrote in the Introduction to the
Treatise,
that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature;
and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still
return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural
Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on
the science ofMan; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are
judged of by their powers and faculties. ...
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and
Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man,
what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with
human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to
explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the
nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and
sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and
dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals,
Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost every thing, which it
can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either
to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.28
Unfortunately, no evidence has survived to show whether at the time Reid
acknowledged his debt to Hume in institutionalizing the latter's agenda for the science
ofman in the reformed Aberdeen curriculum; however, in the introductory lecture that
27Sce Abstract ofSome Statutes and Orders ofKing's College in Old Aberdeen (Aberdeen, 1754), p.
19.
28Vol. 1 (London, 1739), pp. 4-5.
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Reid prefixed to his course as a whole every year at Glasgow, he explicitly credited
Hume with this formulation. But he was quick to point out that "as Mr Humes
sceptical System is all built upon a wrong & mistaken Account of the intellectual
Powers ofMan, so it can onely be refuted by giving a true Account of them."29 And
while the evidence for the genesis of this opinion is incomplete, it does show that Reid
would have been fully capable ofmaking a remark like this possibly as early as 1752,
when he wrote the "Scheme," and certainly by July30 1758, when the Aberdeen
Philosophical Society discussed his question "Are the Objects of the human Mind
properly divided into impressions and Ideas? and must every Idea be a Copy of a
preceeding Impression."31 More than this I cannot say, but there is absolutely no
evidence that Reid ever was a committed Humean.
29See MS. 7/V/4, p. 4.
3013 and 26.
3'MS. 6/1/11, to. lr.
Chapter 6
Returning to First Principles: Bacon and Cicero
With the exception of two manuscripts which I will consider shortly, 1 have exhausted
the clear evidence ofwhat Reid was teaching in the classroom during his tenure at
Aberdeen. As I move on in this period there is a considerable amount of manuscript
material relating to the development ofReid's moral and political thought, in the
Philosophical Orations and in surviving abstracts and discourses deriving from Reid's
participation in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (Wise Club). This material may or
may not have been used in the classroom, but it is hard to believe that the evolution in
Reid's thought revealed in successive orations would not have informed his teaching.
There is every indication that Reid's curriculum reform had been readily accepted, and
as these reforms were entirely consistent with his own philosophical views, it would
seem that there would have been no advantage for him to teach one thing while he
believed another. In the Glasgow period Reid appears to have made use of certain
Wise Club abstracts in his lectures. It would not seem unreasonable to suppose that
he made use of them in his Aberdeen lectures as well.
As 1 observed in the last chapter. Reid effectively implemented Turnbull's long-
overdue educational reforms, taking into account the agenda for the science of man set
out by Hume. I now turn to Reid's methodological thinking in this period, the
orientation of which clearly owes much in its influences to Turnbull.
At least by 1758-1759 Reid was trying to give his own account of the science of man,
one that would not disturb the place Hume had made for it at the center of the sciences
but which would nevertheless overturn the system on which it was built. The
elements involved in Reid's methodological synthesis were Baconian and Ciceronian,
and these were situated in a frame that would accommodate his Butlerian biases.
The Baconian element, long familiar to commentators on Reid's published writings
who have regarded Reid (much as he conceived himself) as someone who applied and
refined Bacon's methods in the philosophy of mind just as Newton had done in
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natural philosophy,1 comes to sight in two places in Reid's writings from this period.2
These are, first, his lectures on the "Elements of Natural History" and, second, his
first two philosophical orations.3 I will focus on the evidence from the lectures here
and reserve consideration of the relevant material in the orations for a later stage in the
argument.
It will be recalled that Reid's curriculum reform committee advised the study of "all the
Branches of Natural History"4 in the second year of the arts course, or first year of
philosophy, presumably on the basis of its centrality to the whole of philosophy,
whether natural philosophy, the philosophy ofmind, logic, rhetoric, the laws of
nature and nations, politics, economics, the fine arts or natural religion. In his
Aberdeen lectures, Reid underlined the pivotal role of natural history:
[The] Physician will find all his Materia Medica described in Natural
History the Limnermost of his Colours, his Dyes, the Merchant a great
part of his Commodities; the Farmer his Soils & Manures. And in a
Word every Artist the Materials he Works upon. He will not onely find
the Materials of his Art Described, but so Classed with other bodies
that are allied to them in their Nature & Properties as may give him a
More enlarged & Comprehensive View of his Art & very probably lead
to Improvements in it
All Genuine Natural philosophy must be built on Natural History as its
foundation. It is Natural History that collects & Exhibits the
Phenomena which it is the Bussiness of Natural Philosophy to digest
Compare & reduce to General Rules and Principles.5
The relevance of natural history to the philosophy of the human mind and the sciences
that depend upon it was explained in Reid's Inquiry, which was first published in
1764 and forms a natural coda to the Aberdeen period. While it is a book and not a set
of lecture notes, the Inquiry has the virtue of having originated in prelections and may
therefore still be useful in unravelling the mystery of what Reid actually taught in the
classroom at King's.6 "The painter, the poet, the actor, the orator, the moralist, and
the statesman," he wrote in the Inquiry, "attempt to operate upon the mind in different
ways, and for different ends; and they succeed according as they touch properly the
1 See for example, Stewart, "Account," s. 2 passim.
2The Baconian influence is very prominent in the published and unpublished Gerard as well (see
Robert Morgan's Notes from Gerard's Lectures on Pneumatics, Ethics and Logic, 1758-1759, EUL
MSS. Dc.5.116, pp. 1, 8; Dc.5.137, pp. 174, 584, 591; Plan, pp. 11, 18, 22, 26, 34.
39 Apr 1753 and 28 Apr 1756.
4Abstract, p. 13.
5MS. 6/IV/l, fos lr-2r.
6See Dedication to Inquiry, in Works, p. 96b.
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strings of the human frame.*'7 So far he established the dependency of the fine arts,
ethics and politics on the philosophy of mind. So far too can Reid's praise of
Montesquieu for "[setting] forth most lucidly the causes, principles, and effects of
laws, morals and politics, from the first beginnings of human nature" be understood.8
He then drew the connection between all of this and natural history:
Could we obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath past in the
mind of a child, from the beginning of life and sensation, till it grows
up to the use of reason — how its infant faculties began to work, and
how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions,
and sentiments which we find in ourselves when we come to be
capable of reflection — this would be a treasure of natural history,
which would probably give more light into the human faculties, than all
the systems of philosophers about them since the beginning of the
world.
Reid was sceptical about the possibility of achieving such a goal: "Reflection," he
said, "the only instrument by which we can discern the powers of the mind, comes too
late to observe the progress of nature, in raising them from their infancy to
perfection."9 This sense of the limitations of our understanding was his common
border with Hume. But. while Hume's scepticism with regard to reason and the
senses threw him back upon opinion as the primary object of scientific observation,
Reid w as not vexed that science should remain within the narrow compass of our
reason, secure in his conviction that God had given us faculties commensurate with
our station and rank within Creation. Via the notion of common sense, Reid strove to
re-empower reason. For Hume, the apprehension of reason's inadequacy was a
melancholic affliction that could be relieved only by the irresistible ministrations of the
passions, which recalled the solitary philosopher to the pleasures of society and
reconciled him to reckoning on probabilities where certainty had been removed.
Each philosophermust have regarded the other as playing on prejudice. Hume on our
susceptibility to accepting authority on the basis of antiquity or slight analogy, Reid on
our basic suggestibility where God and final causes are concerned. In order to ensure
that deference was paid to the correct source of authority, Hume sought to attach
people to their interests. Reid, for his part, had to inculcate in them a rational form of
Christianity in order to avoid the extremes of enthusiasm and superstition. Zealotry
was of course problematical for Hume as well, for it often coincided with crazy
1Works, p. [971a.
8Philosophical Orations, p. 938.
9Works, p. 99a.
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notions of property and society and was to that extent inconsistent with polite morals
on the one hand and interest-driven politics on the other. Reid was also concerned to
preserve our hopes of eternity, for where these are carelessly dashed our wills are
sapped and we are therefore disqualified from the pursuit of virtue to which our active
natures have been assigned. He must have taken cold comfort in Hume's
Machiavellian appreciation of the doctrine of an afterlife in his essay "Of a Particular
Providence and of a Future State": "Whether this Reasoning of [the Christians! be just
or not is no Matter. Its Influence on their Life and Conduct must still be the same.
And those, who attempt to disabuse them of such Prejudices, may, for aught I know,
be good Reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good Citizens and Politicians; since
they free Men from one Restraint upon their Passions, and make the Infringement of
the Laws of Equity and Society, in one Respect, more easy and secure."10 Be that as
it may, both men, to repeat, seem to have agreed that the battlefield on which this
conflict is decisively played out is that of common life, which is governed by
probability.
I have already adverted to the Baconian emphasis on natural history and induction
present in Reid's lectures.11 It now remains to consider Reid's retailing of the
Baconian inheritance in his own "general laws of practising philosophy",12 of which
he reckoned there were five and which he set forth in Orations 1 and 2. Philosophers
had been plying their trade and sharpening their tools for a good long time and Reid
seems to have thought it was high time that their work was formally reduced to
method and their activities properly regulated: "In every art and, to be sure in every
activity destined by design and reason for a certain end, it is necessary that there be
laws both of the art and of the activity; these laws are sought from the nature and
purpose of the art or activity itself and beyond or short of them right, truth, and
usefulness cannot exist in that art or activity." Mathematics had from antiquity been
prosecuted "according to law" and Reid hoped that philosophy could henceforth be
carried on self-consciously, as it were, by its own rules.
^Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd ed. (London, 1750), p. 231. It is
known that Reid read this essay in this period and regarded it as subversive of natural religion. (See
Fred S. Michael and Emily Michael, "Reid's Hume: Remarks on Hume in Some Early Logic Lectures
of Reid," The Monist, vol. 70, no. 4 (Oct 1987), p. 514).
1 'The same emphasis is present in the orations (see p. 938).
12Reid seems also to have contemplated the enumeration of certain "particular laws", i.e. those
"appropriate to each section of philosophy", which would obviously include politics, but he did not,
unfortunately, give details of any political laws in the orations. Still, one might infer these on the
basis of a chance reference in Oration 2 and other Reid material that has survived and I shall do so after
reviewing the general laws.
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Reid's first law of the practice of philosophy, i.e. that "all inutile questions and
disputes must be removed from philosophy on the grounds that they are unworthy of
of the name of this art", was derived from the clearly Baconian suggestion that the
whole purpose of philosophy is "to improve the human lot and to increase the master)
of man over matter". Bacon also provided the inspiration for the second law, i.e. that
"The philosopher will think that no knowledge, wisdom, or art that is useful to the
human race is alien to himself', although it is a maxim of Cicero that lies behind this:
philosophy is "not only ... the mother and parent ... of all praiseworthy arts, but also
the nurse and nourisher of them." Bacon is, again, the source for Reid's third law,
which forbids the philosopher from "[inventing] tales from his own mind about the
nature of things, however probable and consistent these may be, since philosophy is
not an offspring of the human mind, but a just and lawful interpretation of the works
of nature itself or ofGod." Reid singled out Newton as the only one of "the saner
philosophers" who "has obeyed" this law.
Cicero was also the inspiration of the fourth and fifth laws. According to the fourth
law, the philosopher should not "busy himself in overthrowing common notions"
while, by the fifth, philosophy should be "erected and built upon" common notions.
In addition to these injunctions against idle reasoning was the imperative to discover
first principles. "|I]f the first principles are given," Cicero once said with respect to
geometry, "all the others must follow." In the modern age Newton had determined the
first principles of physics. By analogy Reid's enterprise was to infer the existence of
"axioms and phenomena in ethics and politics ... on which all right reasoning in these
sciences depends." These remarks date from the end of the 1755-1756 session, but
Reid appears to have deployed this strategy in the 1751-1752 academic year, as the
passage from Montesquieu about the first beginnings of human nature, quoted earlier,
shows. In Oration 1 in 1753 Reid also evokes the classical linkage of rhetoric, arms
and politics: "Rhetoricians have propounded laws of rhetoric, have been the authors of
laws of the art of generalship and of political administration."13
These Baconian and Ciceronian methodological maneuverings furthered the critique of
Humean scepticism that Reid had begun while he was a minister reading Epictetus and
Xenophon. As he put it in Oration 3 in 1759: "Formerly I suspected, but now I know
for certain, that the philosophy of the human intellect, even though it has been
subjected to study by excellent minds in this generation and in the previous century,
^^PhilosophicalOrations, p. 933.
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has yet right up to the present time been enveloped in darkness and based on
hypotheses and fancies of the human mind rather than on an accurate analysis of the
intellect." It is Hume whom Reid had principally in mind here, and the works to
which he refers are the Treatise and the Philosophical Essays. He likened the theory
of ideas to "a will-o'-the-wisp" that "[leads us] astray into the sterile and disagreeable
wilderness of scepticism." Hume's scepticism offended against "the common sense
of men". Reid maintained this critique through Oration 4 in 1762 as well.14 Only
when Hume's sceptical hypotheses were replaced by true first principles could ethics
and politics be put on a firm footing.
Once again Reid is back in the realm of opinion, the familiar retreat of the Ciceronian
sceptic. Thus in his logic lectures from this period Reid took up again the discussion
of probability that he had encountered in Butler's Analogy (1736) in the 1730s,
although the work he recommended to his students at King's had preceded Butler, i.e.
Humphry Ditton's Discourse Concerning the Resurrection ofJesus Christ (1712).
"Affection, Inclination, Temper, Endow ments, Interest, external Circumstances, and
Condition in the World are general Motives which fail not to influence Mankind to act,
in their several Places, after this or that Manner, upon proper Occasions, as they have
Power and Opportunity."15 This kind of reasoning, which 1 underlined in my account
of Reid's study of Butler, is very much in evidence in what appear to be Reid's own
lecture notes on logic from this period, a distinctive portion ofwhich begins: "Various
kinds of Evidence; the Observing & distinguishing of these is one of the Most
important parts of that Logic which is really usefull in Life."16
The Butlerian influence is, moreover, strongly indicated in the one set of student notes
that has survived, and which probably dates from the last session in which Reid
delivered lectures on logic at King's.17 In these notes he is reported to have said:
It has been disputed whether demonstrative Evidence can be applied to
any oyr subject than Mathematics. For my part I don't think it can, for
tho' yre is hardly any common man, who is not firmly persuaded of yc
truth of many things as if he had Demonstration for it; yet we shall
14Pp. 932-934, 941, 945-946, 948-949, 954-957; cf. pp. 951, 953, 975; see also pp. 958, 960,
986.
153rd ed. (London, 1722), p. 103; cf. p. 107.
16MS. 6/111/3, fo. 2r.
17Thc notes arc dated 1763, but this is clearly impossible. According to the new curriculum, Rcid
would have given lectures on logic three times, first in 1755-1756, then in 1758-1759 and finailv in
1761-1762.
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find, y1 his Belief is build upon a foundation far diff1. from yc
Reasoning in Mathematics.18
"[A] first principle we daily act upon," Reid is reported to have said, is ''[t]he
necessity of a cause to any new production",
which philosophers reason upon, and which had never been called in
question by any except Mr. Hume who, among other odd notions,
gives it against this also. ... We not only from the constitution of our
nature, reason that a cause is necessary to produce a new effect, but we
also reason from the nature of the effect to that of the cause. ...
Without this evidence, we could pursue no design, nor could we
pretend to distinguish any character, for it is by the effect of a
benevolent disposition that we reckon a man benevolent: the
disposition in his mind which is the cause of these effects cannot be
known to us. If a King finds his neighboring Prince raising a
powerful army, he immediately concludes that he is going to carry on
war somewhere and therefore he puts himself in readiness, and must
be on his guard, and this is reasoning from the nature of the effect to
that of the cause.19
A related passage in Reid's own hand which undoubtedly formed part of his lecture
notes on logic is useful not only for the gloss it provides on the above discussion, but
also for the insight it affords into his conception of politics in this period. Against
Hume's scepticism with regard to the evidence of testimony Reid maintained that it is
possible to make inferences from effects to causes on evidence that we have only on
report, even where we have no previous experience in the subjects in which we
reason.20 "[W]e who never governed Kingdoms nor fought battles never had any
Experience to shew that great Actions must proceed from a great Mind or that the
Preservation and Provision and Discipline of an Army depends upon the Wisdom of
the General. That their Success in Battle depends upon his Skill and Conduct", and yet
we never doubt the legitimacy of our reasonings in these matters.21 And, Reid
implied, nor should we, for the basis of such probabilities is not so much historical
testimony or our experience of the veracity of such evidence as the determination of
18John Campbell's Notes from Reid's Lectures on Logic, EUL MS. Dk.3.2, pp. 82-83; see also p.
84.
19Quoted in Michael and Michael, "Reid's Hume," pp. 521-522.
20ln the essay on miracles appended to his Philosophical Essays Concerning Human
Understanding .2nd ed. (London, 1750), pp. 173-207; see also Campbell's Notes from Reid's
Lectures, EUL MS. Dk.3.2, p. 58, where Reid is reported to have mentioned "two Essays subjoined
to ye last Edition of [Hume's] Philosophical works." This work was renamed An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding when it w as included in a new edition of Hume's Essays and
Treatises on Several Subjects published in London in 1758, and this is what we know it by today.
2 'MS. 6/111/3, fo. lr; cf. the corresponding material in Campbell's Notes quoted in Michael and
Michael, "Rcid's Hume," p. 524.
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our make and frame, i.e. our disposition to believe that, for example, great actions
must proceed from a great mind. Such is the nature of our rationality. That the
inferences we make in such cases are not the effect of a Humean association of ideas is
indicated by the fact that we believe, for example, in the existence of a great mind
when we witness great actions and not only in the connection between the actions and
the mind from which they proceed. What Reid is apparently saying is that we cannot
believe in the connection without also believing in its antecedent. Our rationality is
such that it extends our opinion beyond what Hume would allow to be justified on his
sceptical principles. But, to repeat, Reid was not inclined to denigrate reason; he was
reconciled to its limitations, as he did not feel that these held us back from true
knowledge.22
To sum up: when faced with the rigorous scepticism of Hume on pneumatological,
moral and political fronts, Reid's immediate strategy was to engage him on his own
terms, i.e. on the battlefield of opinion. His next manoeuvre consisted in uncovering
in the structure of the human mind a foundation for the different kinds of inductive,
i.e. probable, reasoning. In the case of that probable knowledge which relates to
natural signs and thus which leads us to first principles in politics, Reid was sceptical
in the sense that he did not believe this knowledge could be reduced to rules. But even
though he regarded it as prior to reasoning and experience, it was still apparently
within the realm of rationality; therefore he did not resort to the Humean doctrine of
necessity.
22See Works, p. 199b; MS. 7/V/23, p. 3; Philosophical Orations, pp. 940-941.
PART 3
REID AS PROFESSOR: THE GLASGOW YEARS
In 1764 Reid moved to Glasgow to take up his new responsibilities as professor of
moral philosophy. The change of university brought with it a new set of pressures,
for Reid would be lecturing to a classroom audience thoroughly versed in the doctrines
of Reid's predecessor in the Glasgow chair, Adam Smith. As Smith's teaching owed
much to the views of Hume, addressing Smith's former pupils required Reid to return
to his critique of Hume.
At Glasgow Reid was expected to teach jurisprudence and politics. The options
available to him were the modern natural law tradition ofGrotius and Pufendorf and
the Scottish alternatives to that tradition — namely Carmichael and Hutcheson, Hume
and Smith. I shall examine these options in Section 1, examining the failed tradition
of natural law in Chapter 7 and the Scottish alternatives in Chapter 8.
It is clear that Reid found these options unsatisfactory and therefore took it upon
himself to develop his own science of politics and work towards the creation of a new
political jurisprudence. Reid developed his science largely as a response to Hume and
Smith. Thus in Section 2 I shall follow Reid through his first course of lectures at
Glasgow in 1764—1765 as he philosophizes about power (Chapter 9), copes with
custom and habit (Chapter 10), underwrites the enforcement ofmorals and the
restriction of property (Chapter 11) and encourages the pursuit of virtue (Chapter 12).
In Section 3 I follow Reid through subsequent revisions of his lectures on politics and
jurisprudence from the 1765-1766 to the 1779-1780 sessions in which he sharpens
his criticism of Hume and Smith and launches a new political jurisprudence. Thus in
Chapter 13 I will show how in 1765-1766 Reid tried to put the science of politics on
the foundation of liberty ratherthan of necessity; in Chapter 14how, largely in 1768-
1769, Reid built his account of framing governments and reforming constitutions on
the assumption of common sense; and in Chapter 15 how, in 1779-1780, Reid
developed his criticism of Hume on the subject of contracts into a neo-Ciceronian
doctrine of taking upon oneself a character resonant with the Lockean theme of trust
deserved or betrayed in order to shore up the foundations of prudence and therefore of
politics, which Reid conceived as a science of the highest prudence.
Section 1
Teaching Jurisprudence and Politics: The Available Options
Chapter 7
The Tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf
Reid was elected to the moral philosophy chair at Glasgow on 22 May 1764. His
appointment could only be described as controversial. Eighteen days were allowed for
the choice of a successor to Adam Smith, during which time a good deal of politicking
went on behind the scenes. But the business of promoting Reid had begun a few
months earlier.1 Reid's appointment was opposed by Joseph Black and John Millar
but supported, both at Court and in the College, by James Ogilvy, Lord Deskford
(later 6th Earl of Findlater and 3rd Earl of Seafield; 71714—1770).2 Deskford wrote to
the professor ofmedicine and chemistry at Edinburgh, William Cullen (1710-1790),2
as soon as he got wind of Smith's departure for France (and imminent demission) in
January 1764, recommending Reid as "the fittest Man in the Kingdom for that
Profession" and hoping to mobilize Cullen's Glasgow connections. Deskford
suggested to Cuilen: "If you are of the same Opinion, it will be doing a Service to the
Publick to let your Friends who have Interest in the University of Glasgow know your
Opinion."4 Deskford may also have approached his brother-in-law Lord Hopetoun
(2nd Earl; 1704—1781) on Reid's behalf. One wonders if it was with some calculation
that Reid dedicated his Inquiry, published on 8 MarchC to Deskford,6 and one might
also speculate, given that Reid's acceptance of the chair is dated Edinburgh 26 May,7
that he had been actively trying to consolidate his Court support.8 If this is in fact the
1 See Glasgow Journal, 17/24 May 1764; minute of University meeting for 22 May 1764, in Minutes
of University Meetings, 1763-1768, GUA MS. 26643, p. 28.
-An earlier Ear) of Findlater "acknow ledged as a friend and relation of his family" Reid's ancestor
David Anderson of Finzaugh (R. "Some Farther Particulars of the Family of the Gregorys and
Andersons. Communicated by Dr. Thomas Reid. Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of
Glasgow, a Nephew of the Late Dr. David Gregory Savilian Professor at Oxford," in Charles Hutton,
A Mathematical and Philosophical Dictionary, vol. 1 (London, 1796), p. 556).
-^Formerly professor of medicine at Glasgow.
4Deskford to Cullen, 22 Jan 1764, GUL MS. Cullen 78, fo. 2r. See also City of Edinburgh District
Council Archives, Council Record, vol. 81, pp. 404-407; vol. 82, p. 150. See further [R] to Dr
David Skene, 18 Apr (1766j, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 25r.
6Glasgow Journal, 1/8 Mar 1764.
6Reid admitted later in life that he was not above currying favour by means of such dedications (sec
Reid to Dr James Gregory, 30 Jul 1789, in Works, p. 73a-b.
'Reid to Sir Thomas Miller (Lord Advocate and Rector; 1717-1789), GUA MS. 34687, fo. lr; cf.
Miller to William Leechman, Edinburgh, 29 May 1764, GUA MS. 34559, fo. Ir.
8Although Deskford says to Cullcn: "M1 Rcid is quite ignorant of my writing, and 1 suppose has no
Thoughts of the Thing" (GUL MS. Cullen 78, fo. 2r).
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case, it belies Dugald Stewart's portrayal of Reid as a man "remote from the pursuits
of ambition,"9 itself an echo of Reid's demurring representation of himself in the
Dedication to his Inquiry as one "disengaged from the pursuits of interest and
ambition".10 Reid's appointment was also supported by an Aberdeen crony, Robert
Traill (1720-1775), who was, like Reid, an original member of the Wise Club, and
who had been appointed professor of divinity at Glasgow in 1761 with Deskford's
help.11 Lord Karnes (1696-1782), with whom Reid had corresponded on
philosophical subjects since at least 1762,12 was another who supported the
philosopher's appointment at Court. Karnes' support for Reid is ironic given the fact
that the latter, as we have seen, considered Karnes to be, like Hume, a determinist or
fatalist, and hence antipathetic to his own philosophy. Lord Queensberry (3rd Duke,
and 2nd Duke of Dover; 1698-1778) may also have added his voice at Court to those
of Deskford, Hopetoun and Karnes. Gaining the Court interest was especially
important when the College recommendation was divided, since the presentation of the
chair lay with the Crown.
Dr William Wight (d. 1782),13 who had been appointed professor of church history at
Glasgow in 1762, and the professor of humanity George Muirhead (d. 1773) had also
been considered within the College as successors to Smith. Hume's friend Baron
Mure (1718-1776)14 probably favoured Wight.1-"* Black and Millarwould have
preferred Thomas Young, who had carried on Smith's classes in the latter's absence.
The eligibility of a certain MrBaillie16 was being urged by the Lord Privy Seal. James
Stuart Mackenzie (71719-1800), who seemed anxious to carry on in the footsteps of
9"Life of Reid," in Works, p. [3]a.
' ^Works. p. 96b.
1 'Traill was distantly related to Deskford. Deskford bad also been instrumental in getting another of
his kinsmen, namely William Ogilvie (1736-1819), appointed successor as regent and professor of
philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen in 1764 (see D.C. MacDonald, Biographical Notes to
Ogilvie, Birthright in Land (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibncr, 1891), pp. 157, 159, 160).
12See, e.g., Reid to Kames, 29 Dec 1762, in lan Ross, ed., "Unpublished Letters of Thomas Reid to
Lord Karnes, 1762-1782," Texas Snuiies in Lileraiure and Language 7 (1965-1966) (New York and
London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971), in which Reid mentions his "Enquiry into the five
Senses" (p. 24).
13Hugh Blair to [Hume], 6 Apr 1764, NLS MS. 23153 (Hume Correspondence), no. 52, fo. Iv.
14Himself elected Rector of Glasgow University in 1764 (see minute of University meeting for 20
Nov 1764, in Minutes of University Meetings, 1763-1768, GUA MS. 26643, p. 32 and R to Dr
Andrew Skene, 14 Nov 1764, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 2r).
)3See Hume to Mure, 27 Oct 1775, NLS MS. 21352 (Hume Correspondence), no. 15, fo. Ir-v.
'^Undoubtedly Dr James Baillie (d. 1778), who would fail in this contest but be appointed professor
of divinity after Traill's death in 1775.
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his late uncle, the 3rd Duke ofArgyll, in exerting influence in college appointments.17
Black and Miliar, however, feared that Mackenzie would be swayed by Karnes' and
Deskford's support of Reid; Black wrote to Smith praising Young's performance, and
Miliar urged Smith to prevail upon Mackenzie to block Reid's candidacy.58 Smith
was evidently not uninterested in the prospects for his successor; it seems that in the
previous summer Henry Herbert (1741-1811 )19 was in Aberdeen sizing up Reid and
the principal ofMarischal College, George Campbell (1719-1796) on Smith's behalf
as potential candidates (i.e. about the time when Smith was making arrangements to
leave his post to become tutor to the Duke of Buccleuch).20 Smith's interest in the
matter was intellectual as well as pragmatic — after all, the immediate fate of his
philosophical system lay in the balance. It is not clear whom Smith eventually
supported, although he did assure Mackenzie that he had promised Young only a
temporary post. Whether Mackenzie abandoned Baillie, his original choice, is not
known; eventually, of course, Karnes' and Deskford's candidate won the day. This
account is made even more complicated by the surprising claim in a much later source
that a sixth candidate, Samuel Charters of Luscar (1742-1825),21 was offered but
declined the chair.22
Reid himself reports on none of these machinations to Dr Andrew Skene, with whom
he was corresponding at the time, but we may suppose it provides the background to
his report that he has been received with "perfect civility" by the masters of the
College, who "manage their political differences with outward decency and good
manners although with a good deal of Intrigue and secret caballing".2-7
Reid himself engaged in electioneering and patronage politics throughout the Glasgow
period. Getting wind of Black's intention to quit Glasgow and take up a post at
Edinburgh in 1766, he attempted to engineer Dr David Skene's appointment to the
professorship of the theory and practice ofmedicine, and in 1796, the last year of his
life, he lobbied hard to get "the Court Interest" on side to exclude a certain "ministerial
17Indeed Mackenzie complains about the impropriety of his not being consulted early on in the
selection process (see Mackenzie to Mure, 2 Feb 1764, 15 Feb 176[4], 6 Mar 1764, in Caldwell
Papers, pt 2, vol. 1 (Glasgow: Maitland Club, 1854), pp. 232, 171-172, 241.
'8See Black to Smith, 23 Jan 1764; Millar to Smith, 2 Feb 1764, in W.R. Scott, Adam Smith as
Student and Professor (Glasgow : Jackson, 1937). pp. 256-257.
1 yLater Baron Porchester.
20See Herbert to Smith, 11 Sept 1763, GUL MS. Gen. 1035/147, fo. lr.
2 'Later minister of Kincardine-in-Menteith.
22See Hew Scott, ed., Fasti Ecclesice Scoticance, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1917), p. 143.
27R to AS, 14 Nov 1764, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 1 v.
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candidate" (presumably the one supported by Henry Dundas (later 1st Viscount
Melville; 1742-1811) whose ''influence was much dreaded") from the professorship
of natural philosophy.24
Once the fierce politicking concerning his appointment was concluded, Reid's new
responsibilities proved to be strenuous. His teaching day at Glasgow began at 7:30
a.m. with a public "prelection" on moral philosophy — which for him comprised three
branches; pneumatology, ethics and politics — followed by an "hour ofExamination"
at eleven. During part of the term he gave a second, private, prelection at noon on "the
culture of the human mind," which included eloquence and the fine arts. Moreover,
during his tenure at Glasgow Reid held a range of administrative posts, including
Vice-Rector (to Edmund Burke), Quaestor (i.e. Librarian) and Clerk of the Senate,
and to Andrew Skene he complains of the onerous duty of attending four or five
College meetings a week.25 He was also expected to intervene in the inevitable
conflicts between students and professors, being called in to assist in the aftermath of
one riot and playing a role in restoring law and order in the wake of a couple of other
disturbances, in one case taking the part of the excitable professor of natural
philosophy, John Anderson, who assaulted a student who had disrupted his class.26
Reid was also involved in policing the College garden, where he liked to stroll, and
which was being vandalized by students.27
When Reid came to Glasgow, he knew that he would have to teach jurisprudence and
politics. There had been a long tradition on the Continent connected with the names of
24[R] to DS, 18 Apr [ 1766], NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 25r; R to James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, 14
Apr 1796, in Appendix to Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts
(London: HMSO. 1874), p. 519; see also E.L. Cloyd, James Burnett, ljordMonboddo (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 158.
25R to Dr Andrew Skene, 14 Nov 1764. NCL MS. THO 2, lo. lr.
26See minute of University meeting for 11 Jun 1768, in Minutes of University Meetings, 1763-
1768, GUA MS. 26643, pp. 313-316; minutes of University meetings for 4 Apr 1769 and 4 May
1769 (including the 3 o'clock meeting for 4 May), in Minutes of Rector's Meeting and University
Meeting, 1768-1770, GUA MS. 26644, pp. 53, 72, 74-75; minute of College meeting for 26 Apr
1773, in GUA MS. 26690, Minutes of Meetings of Faculty, 1771-1776, pp. 141-146; cf. R to Dr
Andrew Skene, 8 May 1766, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 11 v ("We have been remarkably free from riots
and disorders among the Students, & 1 did not indeed expect that 350 young fellows could have been
kept quiet for so many Months with so little trouble].] They commonly attend so many Classes of
different Professors from an hour alter seven in the Morning till eight at Night that the}' hav(e) little
time to do mischief'); minute of College meeting for 26 Jan 1770, in Minutes of Meetings of
Faculty, 1753-1755 1761-1770, p. 152 ("'from half an hour past seven o'clock in the morning till
nine at night there are lectures given except from two till three o'clock [in the] afternoon'").
27GUA MS. 43370, cited by A.D. Boney, The Lost Gardens of Glasgow University (London:
Christopher Helm, 1988), p. 175.
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Grotius and Pufendorf of trying to produce a jurisprudence and politics impervious to
scepticism. Carmichael and Hutcheson in Glasgow carried on the project, followed
by Hume and Smith. It is therefore worth examining the agendas both of the
Continental natural lawyers and of their Scottish successors. Reid could not have
been unaware of the tradition and its Scottish incarnations and would have had to
scrutinize the different agendas in order to develop his own jurisprudence and politics.
I shall begin with the so-called modem tradition of natural law and proceed in the next
chapter to the Scottish alternatives. It is my thesis that Reid would take his place in the
ongoing attempt to generate a jurisprudence and politics resilient against scepticism
while incorporating key elements of the Continental strategy and making important
concessions to Hume. Reid nevertheless developed a unique political jurisprudence
largely calculated as a criticism of the jurisprudence and politics of Hume, which he
regarded as near cousins of Hume's sceptical metaphysics.
1.
Like every other student of natural jurisprudence, Reid looked to the Dutch theorist
Hugo Grotius as the founder of the discipline. In his masterpiece, DeJure Belli ac
Paris (1625), Grotius made a sharp distinction between natural jurisprudence and the
"Art of Politicks". He declared:
I have forborn meddling with those Things that are of a quite different
Subject, as the giving Rules about what it may be profitable or
advantageous for us to do: For they properly belong to the Art of
Politicks, which Aristotle rightly so handled by itself, that he mixed
nothing foreign with it. Bodin on the contrary has confounded it with
that which is the Subject of this Treatise. Yet in some Places I have
made mention of the useful, but by the by, and to distinguish it more
clearly from a Question of the just.28
For Grotius, politics was concerned with that which is utile, whereas jurisprudence
related to that which is honestunv, thus a Ciceronian distinction was invoked. By
characterizing politics as an art, Grotius was already making a sceptical admission in
line with the humanist classification of ethics and politics as practical subjects as
opposed to theoretical and scientific ones.29 Thus in Book 1, Chapter 3 of The Rights
28Hugo Grotius, The Rights ofWar and Peace, ed. J|ean] Barbeyrac, trans. [Basil Kennet j (London,
1738), p. \\w.
29Cf. Richard Tuck, "The 'Modern' Theory of Natural Law," in The languages ofPolitical Theory in
Early-ModernEurope, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987). pp.
116—117, who takes a different view .
Kitagawa 102
ofWar and Peace, Grotius reduced Aristotle's politicalscience to the "Art of
Government."30 Politics could not be treated as a science in view of the diversity of
beliefs and customs evident in the world: "[T]here are many ways of living, one being
no better than another, and out of so many ways of living each is free to select that
which he prefers". And just as individuals are free to choose their own manner of
living, so too "a people can select the form of government which it wishes". Contrary
to Aristotle's teaching in the Politics, Grotius considered that the "legal right" of the
form of government a people might happen to settle upon is "not to be measured by
the superior excellence of this or that form of government, in regard to which different
men hold different views, but by its free choice."31
While Grotius introduced natural-law thinking into Protestant Europe, he was also,
paradoxically, the first to loosen the stranglehold of Aristotelian dogma upon
jurisprudential thinking, as the Swiss Protestant Jean Barbeyrac pointed out in his
Historical andCritical Account ofthe Science ofMorality (1729).32 In his
Nicoinachean Ethics, Aristotle called naturaljustice that which "bears the same Force
in all places, and doth not depend on particular Sentiments", while in his Rhetoric, he
asserted the existence of "a General Right and Wrong, or Just and Unjust, believ'd
and profess'd by all Men; altho' no Society should be instituted amongst them, and no
Covenants be transacted."33 In doing so Grotius owed something to the challenge
issued to Aristotle's faith in the universality of conventional Athenian morality by the
French sceptical humanist Michel de Montaigne apropos of the discovery of
indigenous peoples hitherto unknown to European society. As Montaigne wrote in his
Essais (1580): "Philosophers can hardly be serious when they try to introduce
certainty into Law by asserting that there are so-called Natural Laws, perpetual and
immutable, whose essential characteristic consists in their being imprinted upon the
human race. How unlucky they are — (for what else should 1 call it but bad luck,
seeing that out of laws so infinite in number, |philosophers! cannot find even one
30Grotius, Rights ofWar and Peace, p. 63.
3'Grotius, Law ofWar and Peace, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925),
p. 104.
32[Jcan] Barbeyrac, An Historical and Critical Account of the Science ofMorality, trans. Care v.
(London, 1729), in [Samuel] Pufendorf, Ofthe Law ofNature and Nations, ed. [Jean] Barbeyrac, trans.
[Basil] Kennett, 4th ed. (London, 1729), p. 79.
33[SamueI] Pufendorf, Of the Law ofNature and Nations, trans. Basil Kennelt and William Percivale
(Oxford, 1703), p. 97.
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which luck or accidental chance has allowed to be universally accepted by the
agreement of all peoples)."34
Yet Montaigne did acknowledge a lowest common denominator — although not a
moral one — in the prudential principle of self-preservation, which required an ascetic-
detachment from a morally divided, and therefore dangerous, world. Public-
spiritedness and patriotism were to be avoided, for in a climate characterized by
localism any expression of loyalty exposed one to danger. On a practical level,
Montaigne's moral relativism issued in a recommendation of quietism: having a set of
beliefs with which to console oneself was ultimately more important than the truth or,
more to the point, authority of those beliefs.35
As Richard Tuck has cogently shown, Grotius's great work must be viewed as a reply
both to sceptical humanists such as Montaigne and to Aristotelians. Grotius' response
to Aristotelianism was sharp and unequivocal: the Stagirite's moral principles were
hopelessly parochial; consequently, no scope could be given to an account of the
classical virtues within the compass of a universal moral science.36 His reply to
Montaigne was hardly less emphatic but involved crucial concessions on the principle
of self-preservation and the practical recommendation to endure present evils.
Grotius articulated his position in the course of answering the sceptical charges laid
against natural law by the second-century B.C. sceptic Carneades in the latter's "brief
against justice". According to Grotius' account in the Prolegomena to his DeJure
Belli acPads, Carneades held that
Laws ... were instituted by Men for the sake of Interest; and hence it is
that they are different, not only in different Countries, but according to
the Times. As to that which is called Natural Right, it is a mere
Chimera. Nature prompts all Men, and in general all Animals, to seek
their own Advantage: So that either there is no Justice at all, or if there
is any, it is extreme Folly, because it engages us to procure the Good
of others, to our own Prejudice.37
34Michel de Montaigne, An Apology for Raymond Sebotid, in The Essays ofMichel de Montaigne.
trans, and ed. M.A. Screech (London: Allen Lane, 1991), pp. 653-654.
35See Tuck, Hohhes, pp. 8, 51, 81. 91, 93, 115; and Richard Tuck, Introduction to Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan, ed. Rjchard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. xiii.
36See Tuck, '"Modern Theory'," in languages, pp. Ill, 116-117.
3 Hugo Grotius, On the Imw ofWar and Peace, trans. Kelsey, p. 10; Grotius, Rights of War and
Peace, pp. xiv—xv.
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Carneades' claim that human laws originated in expediency and have their roots in the
customs of the place whence they are enacted and are variable among the same people
at different times reduced natural jurisprudence to politics, making the former out to be
a cover for bare interest and at the same time denying its entitlement to the character of
a science for the same reason that politics had to be regarded as a mere art: that which
ismerely expedient relates to particular historical circumstances and cannot claim to be
universal and eternal. It also told against the practice of searching for universal
principles of jurisprudence in positive law. Carneades' insinuation that there is no law
of nature because human beings no less than beasts are instinctively driven to pursue
ends which are of advantage only to themselves raised the suspicion that reason could
play no part in shaping our ideas of justice and made it possible to question whether
justice had any necessity at all. This led inexorably to the suspicion that justice is a
form of folly; one might describe it as a zero-sum game, i.e. a contest in which one
person's gain is another's loss, but one which nevertheless encourages the players to
believe that by deferring to the advantage of others they serve their own interests.
Carneades' brief against justice was therefore a devastating attack on the Stoic doctrine
that promoting the happiness of one's neighbour could only add to one's own share of
happiness.
Here Grotius rebutted Carneades on his own ground. Notwithstanding the variety of
human customs and laws, he averred, there are certain features of the human condition
common to every being regardless of time and place. In order to demonstrate this,
Grotius proposed to strip away the layers of conventionality so much insisted on by
Carneades by means of a thought experiment in which the naked core of human
motivation might be exposed. The result would be the discovery of a state of nature
whose features constituted a sort of minimum content of natural law about which no
reasonable person could disagree. Such a project might deftly avoid the need — made
inadmissible by Carneades — to search for universal principles ofjurisprudence in
positive law, thus leaving the field open for debate about ends of a higher nature.38
The two features Grotius uncovered in this exercise were an ever-active (i.e. primary)
instinctive desire for self-preservation and a reluctance to injure those who merely seek
to preserve themselves. These features derived from our "impelling desire for
society," a secondary principle of our nature, which is quickened by rational reflection
on the necessities of our condition. Here Grotius took the opportunity to affirm that in
38See James Tully, Introduction to Samuel Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. xviii-xix.
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addition to being naturally concerned with our own self-preservation and having an
equally natural love of society, we were also equipped with a rational "faculty of
knowing and acting in accordance with general principles." He held that these rational
powers restrained the passions and defined the true nature of man, which he equated
with the law of nature.39 Far from reducing us to the level of brutes animated by blind
impulse alone, as Carneades had done, Grotius offered a self-sustaining ethic of self-
preservation which could account for the moral foundations of a simple society.
Indeed, Grotius suggested that such principles and such a society actually existed in
the comity of nations.40
It is important to emphasize that this ethic was built on a rather limited teleology, one
which held no hope ofperfectibility. Grotius never claimed that self-preservation and
natural sociability would be harmonious principles in all cases. He did insist,
however, that in the event of a conflict we were duty-bound to bear up patiently,
sacrificing self-interest to sociability as much as possible. Grotius everywhere
emphasized the dangerous uncertainty and confusion that inevitably accompanied the
breakdown of law and order. Where our natural sociability was not engaged by the
application of right reason, we tended to degenerate into a "non-social horde," falling
prey to those phantoms generated by the self-preservation instinct, "avarice, ... lust,
... anger ... ill-advised compassion ... [and] ... an overmastering desire to achieve
eminence."41 For Grotius, reason and society were not so much the means of
achieving the summum barium as they were the instruments by which we might
ensure a more peaceful form of survival.
The obligation to preserve ourselves by all — or almost all — means and the
corresponding duty to abstain from harming others gratuitously was therefore imposed
on us by our rational and social nature. This obligation was supported by the rewards
and punishments of conscience. It had the incontrovertibility of a mathematical law
and would bind us even ifGod did not exist or had not commanded it or backed it up
with eternal sanctions. Grotius' God was himself bound by the moral algebra of the
universe, or, rather, he w as "nature itself." Unlike Cameades, who held that justice
originated in expediency and that its obligation therefore derived from mere prudence,
Grotius believed that justice was a function of ourmoral nature, although its obligation
was reinforced by expediency, i.e. by the necessity of social co-operation under
39Grotius, ljaw ofWar andPeace, pp. 11, 12; see also pp. 13, 51, 53, 468.
40See Tuck, Hobbes, p. 21.
41Grotius, Imw ofWar and Peace, pp. 25, 111, 139; sec also pp. 17, 53.
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conditions of relative scarcity. Unlike Carneades, who doubted that reason could play
any part in shaping our ideas of justice, Grotius believed that the rules of justice were
self-evident to all human beings, whether by virtue of our perception of their
agreement with our common rational and social make-up or as a result of the influence
of a universal feeling, which he called the '"common sense of mankind."
So anxious was Grotius to combat Carneades' reduction of natural jurisprudence to
expediency that he asserted that even if we were entirely self-sufficient as individuals
or states we would still be led by our very nature into the "mutual relations of society".
Against Carneades' suggestion that ifjustice exists at all it is a form of folly Grotius
declared it would be a sign not of folly but of wisdom to "allow ourselves to be drawn
towards that to which we feel our nature leads." For even if this required us to
sacrifice the occasional short-term advantage, individuals or states would invariably
gain in the long run by retaining their good name and therewith the benefits of alliance,
whether in the state or in the society of states.
Grotius was also at pains to oppose the much more worrisome notion — also implicit
in Carneades' reduction of natural jurisprudence to expediency — that to a "king or
imperial city nothing is unjust which is expedient." He referred to Book 1, Chapter 45
of Cicero's De Officiis, where the Roman oratormaintained that "there are some
Things so shameful and criminal, that a wise Man will not do them even for the
Preservation of his Country"; Cicero afterwards observed "that by good luck it can
never happen that the Interest of the State should require such Things to be done".
Had Grotius accepted this unreservedly he would have been committed to the view
that, in principle, justice takes precedence over expediency and that, as a matter of
fact, the demands of expediency never collide with the true interests of the state. In
the event, however, a deep ambivalence about these claims emerged in his remarks on
a passage from Book 3 of the De Republica. where he complained that "Cicero ...
spoke too sweepingly when he said ... that where an unjust man is king, or where the
aristocracy or the people itself is unjust, there is not a wicked state, but none at all." A
more correct formulation, in his view, was that of St Augustine, who in Book 19,
Chapter 24 of his City ofGod suggested that even where there is injustice
(presumably stemming from expediency) the state may be said to exist provided that
there is still '"some sort of union in a reasoning populace, associated through
harmonious participation in the things which it chooses.'" According to this view,
occasional or perhaps even widespread acts of injustice do not cancel out the justice
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embodied in the institutions of the State.42 It is clear, then, that for Grotius the
requirements of the law of nature could be fulfilled even in a state which pursued a
policy that had more to do with expediency than with justice.
Grotius' juristic bias and his separation of politics and jurisprudence was never more
evident than in his reflections on resistance. Picking up his Cicero again, Grotius
regarded it as "A difficult Question in Politicks, whether when our Country is opprest
with Tyranny, we may endeavour to rescue it, tho' with the extreme Hazard of the
State." His inclination was to decide the question in the negative, warning that
individuals should not presume to take in hand matters involving the interest of the
whole populace and rejecting the opinion that sovereignty resided in the people, even
where power had been vested in a monarch on the condition that the people retained
the right to "restrain and punish" their rulers who abused their power. As always,
Grotius stressed the dangerous consequences of resistance. This recalled Cicero's
view that '"peace on any terms between citizens seems more advantageous than civil
war."'
But he also emphasized that the task of jurisprudence was not to criticize regimes on
the basis of whom they serve. Some governments are designed to benefit only the
prince but are not on that account to be regarded as tyrannical, "since ... tyranny ...
connotes injustice." The notion of justice, in other words, could not arbitrate against
legally constituted authority. Just as there are "some men [who] are by nature slaves,
that is,... suited to slavery, so [too] there are some peoples so constituted that they
understand better how to be ruled than to rule." Moreover, Grotius could imagine
"not a few causes which may impel a people wholly to renounce the right to govern
itself and to vest this in another, as, for example, if a people threatened with
destruction cannot induce any one to defend it on any other condition; again, if a
people pinched by want can in no other way obtain the supplies needed to sustain
life." Not surprisingly did he gain notoriety as an apologist for slavery and
absolutism. Yet he steadfastly refused to mix political with jurisprudential reasoning.
As Richard Tuck observed, Grotius "never became an absolutist of the Bodinian type,
but was always prepared to accept a high degree of variety in constitutional norms."
42Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, p. xxii, sec. 24, n. 3; Grotius, Law ofWar and Peace., pp. 9, 15,
16, 42. 178, 631-632; see also pp. 13, 17. 23, 43, 199—200 ('"God did not bestow all products upon
all parts of the earth, but distributed His gifts over different regions, to the end that men might
cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another"'), 468. 557, 860.
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Grotius' natural jurisprudence therefore issued in a practical recommendation broadly
similar to that advanced by the sceptical humanists: endure rather than resist the
injustice of rulers and pray for better ones rather than risk destroying rational society.
For Grotius as for the Stoics, endurance was the very fulfilment of our nature.
Rebellion could be justified on Grotian principles only in cases where the prince
sought to destroy rather than govern a people; resistance was legitimate only when
non-resistance would put a people in ''extreme and imminent peril." Even then,
Grotius supposed that if those men who "associate(d] themselves together in the first
place to form a civil society" were to be
asked whether they purposed to impose upon all persons the obligation
to prefer death rather than under any circumstances to take up arms in
order to ward off the violence of those having superior authority, I do
not know whether they would answer in the affirmative, unless,
perhaps, with this qualification, in case resistance could not be made
without a very great disturbance in the state, and without the
destruction of a great many innocent people.
In all but the most extraordinary circumstances, then, the people were required to
suffer the injustices of their rulers, although they might passively resist if they were
ordered to break the law of nature or the commandments ofGod.
It is also significant that Grotius invoked the same principle of preserving society as
much as possible to defend common property in extremis, a doctrine that would be
revived by Locke and Reid in their radical attitudes to property, as will be discussed in
Chapter 11,43
Our understanding of Grotius' relation to Hobbes has been transformed by Richard
Tuck, who has shown that the sceptical ethico-political teaching contained in Hobbes's
De Cive (1642), Elements ofLaw (1650) and Leviathan (1651) was conceived as a
direct attack on the natural jurisprudence tradition launched by Grotius. Hobbes's
"philosophy of ethics", Tuck wrote, "was intended to underwrite the traditional
sceptic's moral relativism." It will be recalled that Montaigne underlined the diversity
of human beliefs and customs, despaired of discovering a common moral denominator
and conseqently held up self-preservation as a prudential beacon. Grotius raised that
practical recommendation to the status of a natural right "upon which all known
43Grotius, Rights ofWar and Peace, p. 124; Grotius, lxtw ofWar andPeace, pp. 103, 104, 105, 109,
148, 149, 161, 162; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), p. 64; see also pp. 80, 171; Grotius, Law ofWar and Peace, pp. 310, 138, 158, 199. 208.
225, 797 ("a civil government, which, even when regal, is not despotic"), 857.
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moralities and codes of behaviour must have been constructed." He also emphasized
that we have a corresponding natural duty "to abstain from harming other people
except where our own preservation is at stake"; this duty was a basic law consistent
with our fundamental moral right.44 Moreover, in making these claims Grotius relied
on the assumption that morality was implicit in our rational and social nature and
antedated the imposition of law, whether human or divine. Through right reason,
which all people share, could be discovered the moral obligations that balance
instinctive rights. Natural jurisprudence was the science built upon this ethical
foundation.
The art of politics was erected upon a different foundation, that of prudence or
expediency. Political constitutions were the product of human choices made against
the background of necessity and became part of the natural fabric with which natural
jurisprudence dealt. As such they were not subject to extrinsic forms of criticism.
They were all equally legal: injustice consisted in breaking the letter of the law, not in
sinning against a higher code.45 Questions of resistance were prudential matters that
had to be resolved with a view to the common good embodied in the juristic
arrangements of a given regime.46
No part of Grotius's jurisprudence and politics was exempt from Hobbes's sceptical
attack. Our moral evaluations, Hobbes thought, were entirely subjective, being
nothing more than illusions generated by the passions. What was good was always
good in relation to someone. Such goods either had a survival value or were such as
answered to our insatiable desires. They were functions of our customs and opinions
and could be influenced by religious or other ideological considerations. They could
also vary within the same individual over time, in response to changing circumstances.
There was no question of reason controlling our passions. Right reason did not exist:
44Tuck, Hobbes, p. 51.
45See Grotius, Law ofWar and Peace, pp. 39, 189, 278.
4"Cf. Grotius, Rights ofWar and Peace, p. xxxv, sec. 58, n. 1: "Good Policy ought not to authorize
nothing against the invariable Rules of Justice; and that of the Machiavellians, which makes the
Advantage of the State, or of those who rule it, the only Principle, is false and abominable.
However, the Just and the Useful arc really two different Things, even in Politicks; as will be easily
comprehended by one single Example taken from the Matter of the Work before us. Before engaging
in War, it is abov e all Things necessary, that a just Cause should appear for so doing. But how
goodsoev er the Reasons for such a Step may be, if Circumstances so not allow of taking Arms,
without acting tothe Prejudice of the Publick Good, if there is Danger of losing as much as, or ev en
more than will be gained, it would then be contrary to good Policy" (Barbcyrac's note).
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what people called "right reason" was merely their own private reason.47 It is clear
that in such a state of affairs only the untrammelled right of self-preservation was
operative: there were no common moral foundations; men did not "'by nature seek
society for its own sake'" 48 The state of nature, as Hobbes pointed out, was actually
a state of war, a clash of boundless wills, the outcome of which was misery and
carnage. It was a condition in which the individual was constantly afraid of violent
death, because getting one's way in the state of nature often meant killing others with
whom one competed for the same good. And, as Hobbes put it in Chapter 13 of the
Leviathan,
The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no
place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no
Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall
vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the
Body nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone
in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities,
that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude.49
If the rudiments of law could not be deduced from nature and if mankind had neither
the resources of right reason nor a natural sociability with which to apprehend and feel
its moral obligation,morality had to be legislated and obligation induced through
threats and bribes aimed at the self-interested passions. In other words, natural law
had to be created and sustained by mere prudence. And while the law of nature
embodied the highest prudence, it did not in principle stand above prudence. Thus
Hobbes reduced natural law to a prudential calculation.
Prudence came to sight with the advent of civil society. It was therefore coeval with
politics. Our irreconcilable differences of opinion could be settled by authorizing and
empowering a superior to legislate and enforce a moral consensus. This decision
would be taken on the basis of calculations of self-interest made against a background
of continual fear. Hobbes characterized such pragmatic expedients as the substance of
natural law .50 The object of this law was not to suppress the passions as such but to
create an environment in which individuals could maximize gratification whilst
minimizing fear: the whole dynamic of this exercise was geared to the passions. The
47See Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Imw, 1.7.3, II. 10.8, quoted in Tuck, Hobbes, pp. 52-53, 57-58;
see also Thomas Hobbes, E>e Cive, 111.31, quoted in Tuck, Hobbes, p. 56.
48Thomas Hobbes, Of the Citizen, p. 42, quoted in Tully, Introduction to Puf'endorf, Duty ofMan
and Citizen, p. xxviii.
49Hobbes. leviathan, p. 90; see also p. 104.
50Sec Tuck, Hobbes, pp. 56, 62.
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laws of our superior or Leviathan would equip us all with the same sense of right and
wrong. Justice would henceforth be defined as that which accorded with positive law.
The Leviathan would be in charge of any furthermanipulation of opinion and therefore
of any consequent alteration of our perceptions of right and justice.-"15
Accordingly, as Tuck has pointed out, Hobbesian ethico-political practice "issued in
the conclusion that one must obediently follow the laws and customs of one's
country;" moreover, "one should internalize the laws and customs, and really believe
them, or at least accept them as intellectually authoritative."52 All jurisprudential
criticism had to be extinguished to ensure the effectiveness of the State. No private
standard must be used to evaluate the laws. As Hobbes put it in Chapter 30 of his
Leviathan,
no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Sovereign Power, and
all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one
of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say
is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of
Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of
them.
The duty of the sovereign was not to make just laws in some private sense of the
word; it was rather to make good laws where good is defined in terms of "that which
is Needfull, for the Good of the People, and withall Perspicuous." Thus the reduction
of justice to expediency was complete; Hobbes's "Science of Naturall Justice,... the
onely Science necessary for Sovereigns, and their principall Ministers" was exactly
equivalent to his "Politicall Prudence", for the essential task of Hobbes's political
prudence was to engender an effective standard of justice based on the recognition that
natural justice is a logical consequence of the self-interested passions, which alone can
bear the title of natural right.53
It is important to realize that Hobbes, like Grotius, may have regarded himself as
replying to Carneadean scepticism. Carneades, it will be recalled, had asserted that
either justice does not exist or, if it does, it is a form of folly because it requires us to
compromise our own interests. This is a position which Hobbes had attacked in the
Leviathan, as the following passage from Chapter 15 shows;
51 See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 124, 233.
52Tuck, Hobbes, p. 91.
53Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 230, 239. 254; sec also p. 223; James Moore, "Locke and the Scottish
Jurists" (Conference for the Study of Political Thought, March, 1980, mimeographed), pp. 21-22.
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The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice; and
sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought
conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or
not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to
ones benefit.54
Hobbes's reply to Carneades differed from Grotius', of course, because of the very
different valuations these two thinkers applied to reason: Grotius appealed to the
inward principle of right reason, while Hobbes sceptically reduced reason to self-
interest. Hobbes may therefore be regarded as having formally rebutted Cameades
without departing substantially from the traditional concerns of the sceptic.
2.
Samuel Pufendorf responded to Hobbes in his massive De lure Naturae et Gentium
(1672) and his shorter work De Officio Hominis et Civis (1673). His response,
however, betrays just how deeply he drank of the sceptical spirits distilled by Hobbes.
As Tuck and James Tully have demonstrated, Pufendorf began as Hobbes had done
by denying that moral qualities were inherent in nature and asserting that morality had
to be imposed on the world legislatively. Like Hobbes, too, Pufendorf denied that we
have any instinctive predispositions toward the moral and political codes embodied in
the different forms of society. Pufendorf s work, like that of Hobbes, was thus built
upon a fundamental criticism of the basic theory advanced by Grotius.
Like Grotius, Pufendorf and Hobbes made use of the fiction of a state of nature as a
starting-point in their attempt to generate a science of natural jurisprudence and
confirmed the Stoic belief that self-preservation is our first concern. But Pufendorf s
account of our natural condition was much more closely textured than Grotius's or
Hobbes's. Like his formidable predecessors, Pufendorf acknowledged our basic
inability to preserve ourselves in isolation from some form of society and therefore the
necessity to join with others in a social life. But whereas Grotius emphasized that this
necessity originated in the unequal distribution of resources and could be overcome by
our natural sociability, and Hobbes stressed that it arose from the compulsion
introduced by fatal competition but could be tempered by the rituals of society,
54Hobbes, leviathan, p 101; see also Tuck, "'Modem' Theory," in languages ofPolitical Theory.
p. 114.
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Pufendorf sought to refract Grotius' vision through a Hobbesian lens.55 As Istvan
Honl has pointed out, "to put natural jurisprudence on a secure foundation, it was not
enough just to re-emphasise sociability as an observed fact of human existence.
Rather, this fact had to be re-expressed within the framework of a Hobbesian analysis
of the 'state of nature'."56
Far from possessing the rational and social faculties of Grotius's natural man,
Fhifendorfs man was a '"mute and ignoble Animal, Master of no Powers or
Capacities', displaying nothing else but 'exceeding Weakness', a 'wonderful
Impotency' and 'natural Indigence'." To complete his Hobbesian portrait of human
nature, Pufendorf added that our desires were highly sophisticated, frequently
insatiable and endlessly variable. Opinion transformed our simple needs into
extravagant desires. "'There is', he said, 'no more Diversity of living, than there are
Opinions and ways of living; each of which is cry'd up, with wonderful Perverseness,
by the several Patrons of them.'"57 It is the opinion engendered by the imposition of
law, moreover, that gives one a conscience. As Tully has shown, in Pufendorf not
only are moral distinctions created by law but "Even one's basic sense of right and
wrong is said to be acquired by being under the obligation of a law". The "mild stings
of conscience" (Tully's phrase) were apparently inadequate as a guide for action. And
our "love of humanity", which Pufendorf characterized as a "natural sympathy for
others" was no match for self-love.58 Opinion was therefore the wild card of human
nature. On the basis of opinion, as Hont has underlined, man was on the one hand
"subject to 'prodigious Corruption and Degeneracy'; on the other hand, however, he
was perfectible, 'more capable of fruitful Culture and of useful Improvement' than any
other creature."59 The forces that could manipulate opinion were therefore crucial for
Fhifendorf.
Lest it be thought that his natural man lacked a capacity for knowledge or the faculty of
reason, it would be well to underline that Pufendorf understood the law of nature to be
the "Dictate of right Reason"; by this he meant that the "Understanding of Man is
55See Tuck, "'Modern' Theoryp," in Languages ofPolitical Theory, pp. 102, 105, 115; Tully,
Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. xvii-xix.
56Istvan Hont, "The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pi|fendorf and the Theoretical
Foundations of the 'Four-Stages Theory'," in Languages ofPolitical Theory , p. 262.
57Pufendorf, Law ofNature and Nations, trans. B. Kennel, 4th ed. (London, 1729), 2.1.6, quoted in
Hont, "Language of Sociability and Commerce," in Languages ofPolitical Theory, p. 263.
58Tu!ly, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, p. xxv; sec also pp. xxviii, xxix.
59Pufcndorf, quoted in Hont, "Language of Sociability and Commerce," in Languages ofPolitical
Theory, p. 263; cf. p. 265.
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endued with such a Power, as to be able from the Contemplation of the human
Condition, to discover a Necessity of living agreeably to this Law; as likewise to find
out some Principle by which the Precepts of it may be clearly and solidly
demonstrated." He conceded, however, that in our contemplation of the human
condition we must have a "regard ... to some Things which are extrinsical to a Man,
and chiefly to those which are likely to promote his Interest, or to procure his Damage
and Inconvenience."'60 Indeed, Pufendorf derided "those Masters of false Politicks
[who] cheated the heedless Vulgar with the ambiguous Term of Profit; which is of tw o
Kinds," i.e. rational or long-term and depraved or short-term.61
For Pufendorf, the law of nature which provided the very ground of moral obligation
and the basic expression of our good was the law of sociability: "Every Man ought, as
far as in him lies, to promote and preserve a peaceful Sociableness with others,
agreeable to the main End and Disposition of human Race in general."62 Thus far,
Pufendorf s prescription differed little from those of Grotius and Hobbes. But
Pufendorf s formula compensated for what Tully has described as the "anti-social
friction" that accompanied the move to join in society from purely selfish motives
(Hobbes) or from that strange amalgam of instinctive sociableness and stand-
offishness, i.e. the obligation to perform only negative duties (not harming one's
neighbour), that we found in Grotius. Pufendorf argued that to avoid the state of war
overlooked by Grotius and so much insisted upon by Hobbes we would have to
accept that the law of nature required a much broader complement of duties and a more
rigorous discipline of the passions than was hitherto agreed. We must associate in a
"strategically other-regarding manner", i.e. perform "strategically other-regarding
social duties", ifwe are to establish a society and fulfil our obligations under natural
law.63 As Pufendorf put it,
by Sociableness we do not here mean a bare Readiness or Propension
to join in particular Societies, which may possibly be form'd on ill
Designs, and in an ill Manner; as the Confederacies of Thieves and
Robbers, as if it were sufficient only to join ourselves with others, let
60[Samuel] Pufendorf, Of the Imw ofNature and Nations, cd. [Jean) Barbeyrac, trans. Basil Kennett,
4th ed. (London, 1728). pp. 133, 135; see also Tuck, "'Modern' Theory." in languages ofPolitical
Theory, p. 105; Tully, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, p. xxvii.
61 [Samuel] Pufendorf, Of the Imw ofNature and Nations, ed. [Jean) Barbeyrac, trans. Basil Kennett,
4th ed. (London. 1729), p. 128; cf. Pufendorf, Law ofNature andNations, 1728, p. 133; see also
Tully, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, p. xxvii.
62Pufendorf, Imw ofNature and Nations, 1728, p. 137.
63Tulty, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty of Man and Citizen, pp. xxvi, xxvii, xxviii: cf. p. xxix; see
also p. xxv.
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our Intentions be what they will. But by this Term of Sociableness,
we would imply such a Disposition of one Man towards all others, as
shall suppose him united to them by Benevolence, by Peace, by
Charity, and so, as it were, by a silent and secret Obligation.64
It is clear that Pufendorf thought that the personality could be transformed by
genuinely social interaction; no mere consultation of right reason (Grotius) or of self-
interest (Hobbes) would do. But to accomplish this transformation, i.e. to make the
obligations of natural law effective, it was not enough to rely on the love of humanity
(which was too weak to be useful), or on the threats and bribes of a tyrannical God, or
on the pangs of conscience; the rewards and punishments of the positive law of the
state had to be brought to bear on recalcitrant individuals.65 Here. Pufendorf was
beginning to sound like Hobbes again.
Although, as Tully has shown, PufendorTs view that our social duties under the law
of nature "frequently over-ride actions dictated by considerations of one's own
immediate utility or expediency, and even involve a readiness to risk one's life for the
sake of sociality" underlines his disagreement with Carneades, it is important to
emphasize that Pufendorf nevertheless made an important concession to Carneadean
scepticism. For he resurrected Carneades' view that in a shipwreck a person hanging
onto a plank would be justified in pushing another off of it in order to save himself.66
All that Pufendorf urged against unmitigated Carneadean scepticism on this point was
that "Actions done upon extreme Necessity, and out of Consternation of Mind arising
from imminent Danger, and which do therefore meet rather with Excuse, than with
Approbation; ought by no Means to be establish'd for common Rules of
Proceeding".67 Pufendorf s sceptical concession therefore underlined the extent of his
emphasis on society as an expedient hit upon for our protection rather than as a forum
struck for the fulfilment of our nature.68
64Pufendorf, Ixiw ofNature and Nations, 1728, p. 137.
65See Tully, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. xxviii-xxix; James Moore,
"The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment," in Studies
in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M.A. Stew art (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990), p. 48.
66Tully, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, p. xxvii; see also Pufendorf, Duty of
Man and Citizen, p. 54; Pufendorf, Law ofNature and Nations, 1729, p. 131; Tuck, Hobbes, p. 9.
67Pufcndorf, Imw ofNature and Nations, 1728, p. 132.
68Cf. Pufendorf, Law ofNature and Nations, 1728, p. 135, where Pufendorf prudentl)'reserved
judgement on this question.
Kilagawa 116
Pufendorf, like Grotius and Hobbes, conceived of politics as an art rather than as a
science. In his On the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law, he
described politics in terms of the "arts of ruling" and emphasized that these required
him to associate with "judicious men skilled in practical (italics mine] affairs".
Accordingly, he also believed that politics belonged not to the realm ofjustice, but to
that of expediency, i.e. of practical choices made by weighing consequences.
Pufendorf did not thereby attempt to sever natural jurisprudence from political
prudence; indeed, he suggested that both sovereigns and subjects must subordinate
their private good to, and actually identify that good with, the good of the state, as
Cicero recommended. Thus, just as a good citizen "in fact ... believes nothing to be
good for him unless it is also good for the state" so too a good prince "must believe
that nothing is good for [him] privately which is not good for the state." For
Pufendorf, it takes two contracts (the contract of society and that of government) and
one decree (stipulating the resulting form of government the political society is to
have) to constitute a state. The contract of government imposes a reciprocal obligation
on the sovereign-to-be and his subjects whereby the citizens agree to obey and the
sovereign to rule according to the decree and "for the common security and safety".
But while the obligation is reciprocal, sovereignty and subjection are unequal: the
sovereign is by the contract of government sovereign over his subjects, whereas these
citizens are subject to him. The consequence for Pufendorf, as for Grotius, was that
supreme authority is not accountable. This, of course, opened the door to absolutism.
On the question of resistance, Pufendorf, like Grotius, showed the gap that had
opened up between the modern natural law tradition and the Ciceronian position that
the state cannot be ruled without the highest justice. (This was a gap that Reid would
seek to bridge with his own political jurisprudence.) Not only did Pufendorf allow
that the good of the state may override justice, but he also prescribed that citizens must
not resist a ruler who is unjust. Pufendorf used his concept of a state of nature to
stifle political criticism. Thus he wrote:
There cannot be a more effectual way found out to silence the
Complaints and murmurs of the Common People, when they pretend
to find fault with the Miscarriages and the Impositions of the
Government than if we would lay before them a true Prospect of the
Misery and Confusion which attends a Natural State.69




Since such is the Condition of human Life, that it cannot be exempt
from all Inconveniences, and since 'tis not easy to find a Man in the
whole World, who is so nicely exact in his Behaviour, as to give a
compleat and universal Satisfaction; 'twould be equal Folly and
Impudence to oppose a Prince for every Fault; especially since we our
selves on the other hand are not so very punctual in the Discharge of
our Duty towards him; and since even in private Persons the Laws are
wont to pass over slight Miscarriages. Therefore how much more just
and reasonable must it be to overlook the pardonable Failings of a
Prince, on whose Care the Tranquillity of the whole Nation, and the
Security of every Man's Life and Fortune depends? And so much the
rather, since Experience informs us, with how fatal a Destruction of the
People, and how miserable a Convulsion of the State, the very worst
of Princes have been dethron'd... .
We ought to bear, says Tacitus, with the Tempers of Princes; since
frequent Alterations can never turn to the Advantage of a State... . As
you would endure, says he, the barrenness of a Soil, the immoderate
Force of Rain, and the other Inconveniences of Nature, so endure the
Luxury or the Avarice of your Rulers. There will be Vices in the
World so long as there are Men; but then these are not perpetual, and
are amply recompensed by the Intermixture of better Qualities.70
This exhortation to endure cloaked a criticism of Aristotelian political science. In his
Duty ofMan and Citizen Pufendorf suggested that when people apply the Aristotelian
category of disease to forms of government — e.g. when they say the corruption of a
monarchy is a tyranny — they are usually not "describing a disease of the form of
government" but rather "expressing their own favour or disfavour towards the current
form of government or its rulers. For often an opponent of a king or of the institution
ofmonarchy tends to call even a legitimate and good prince a tyrant or despot,
particularly when he enforces the laws strictly."71 The entire force of Pufendorf s
theory of politics, like that of Grotius and Hobbes, was directed against the
development of a critical jurisprudence. Like Grotius, however, Pufendorfmade the
exception that a people may overthrow a tyrant on the grounds of self-preservation.
Here he relied on Grotius' argument that it is unreasonable to assume that the founding
citizens of a state wished to oblige all future generations to choose annihilation rather
than to take up arms against a despot.72
7 "Pufendorf, Ijiw ofNature and Nations, 1729, p. 718.
7 'Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, p. 144.
' 2Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. 133, 137, 143, 151; cf. p. 144; see also p. 77; Tully.
Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. x\\, \\\i\ -\\\\.
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At least part of Pufendorf s unwillingness to prepare the way for revolutionary
criticism lay, as Hont has shown, in his view of the salutary value of political society,
which engendered a new relationship between self-love and sociability by which these
are no longer opposed but form instead "a distinctive combination."73 Our conscious
purpose in establishing a state is to further the objectives of self-preservation, which
derive from self-love. But the unintended consequence of the establishment of a state
is the spontaneous evolution of a "social system ofmutually beneficial duties in which
the participants are, willy-nilly, progressively civilized and socialized". In the
process, a commercial system is generated whereby a general commodiousness
evolves as a by-product of an ethic based on mere survival. Sociability — the law of
nature — is an artificial, not a natural, production, which engenders a sense of right
and wrong once that natural law becomes embodied in a sanction-backed positive law.
It is not difficult to trace in this the line that leads to Mandeville and Hume. Resistance
had the effect of interrupting the progress of sociability — i.e. the realization of the
law of nature — and blocked the channel to commodious self-preservation. It was
therefore contrary to jurisprudence and its political credibility had to be challenged. So
in addition to defending absolutism, Pufendorf s jurisprudence had the effect of laying
the ethico-metaphysical foundation for commercial society."4
It was possible to criticize Pufendorf on various grounds. Leibniz was critical of
Pufendorf s separation of natural law morality from practical ethics, whether Classical
or Christian, because the effect of this disjunction was to derail the pursuit of those
virtues which were beyond the scope of sociality.7-""
Further criticisms of Pufendorf were made by his own editor, Jean Barbeyrac, in the
latter's French translation of De lure Naturae el Gentium published at Amsterdam in
1706. One of Barbeyrac's criticisms contained a very damaging, and for him a highly
uncharacteristic, concession to the sceptics, one which would be seized upon by
Mandeville. Barbeyrac denied that there was any such thing as a contract of society
(i.e. the first agreement in Pufendorfs double contract theory), emphasizing the
"rudeness and violence which attended the formation of the first societies" and
73Hont, "Language of Sociability and Commerce," in Languages ofPolitical Theory, p. 267; cf.
Pufendorf- Imw ofNature and Nations, 1728, p. 139.
74Tu!ly, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, p. xxxi; sec also Hont, "Language of
Sociability and Commerce," in Languages ofPolitical Theory, pp. 274-276.
73See fully. Introduction to Pufendorf, Dutv ofMan and Citizen, pp. xxiii- xxiv.
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insisting with the sceptics on the "role of crafty and ambitious men who, supported by
force, brought mankind into the first societies."76
Barbeyrac was also critical of Pufendorf s separation of jurisprudence from natural
theology and revived the Stoics' argument from design, according to which an
examination of our ideas of an omnipotent, all-wise and benevolent God and of
ourselves as rational and social beings would make manifest the law of nature and give
us reasons to obey it.77
Barbeyrac also criticized the absolutist tendencies implicit in Pufendorf s contract of
government (i.e. the second agreement in his double contract theory), arguing that the
subject had the right to defend his life, liberty, property and religious beliefs against
encroachments made by the sovereign. He cited Locke, Sidney and Hoadly in support
of his views.78 In the following quotation, Barbeyrac stressed the need to correctly
identify a tyrant rather than the need to reckon on the disastrous consequences of
overthrowing him:
When we speak of a tyrant that may lawfully be dethroned by a people,
we do not mean by the word people the vile populace or rabble of the
country, nor the cabal of a small number of factious persons, but the
greater and more judicious part of the subjects of all ranks in the
kingdom. Besides the tyranny must be so notorious and evidently
clear as to leave nobody any room to doubt of it.79
Barbeyrac's application of Locke, Sidney and Hoadly as a brake on the absolutism of
Grotius and Pufendorf was approved by, among others, Reid's teacher Turnbull. It
also reflected Barbeyrac's view that the judgement of when one's rights have been
violated and the right to rebel, i.e. to defend oneself against and to punish the ruler
who invaded one's rights, "must be left to the conscience ... of ... every judicious
man" rather than to a mere "moral Discipline, ... which considers what is Right, and
76Moore, "Locke and the Scottish Jurists," p. 21; cf. p. 24; James Moore, "Natural Law and the
Pyrrhonian Controversy," in Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment. ed. Peter Jones
(Edinburgh: John Donald. 1986). p. 33.
77See Peter J. Diamond, "Reid, Natural Law and the Science of Man," in Jennifer J. Carter and Joan
H. Pittock, eds. Aberdeen and the Enlightenment (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987). p.
116.
78See Moore, "Locke and the Scottish Junsts," p. 22; see alsoTully, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty
ofMan and Citizen, p. xxxv.
9Jcan Barbeyrac, in his notes on Pufendorf, Law ofNature andNations, 1729, p. 720, sec. 6, n. 1,
quoted in Moore, "Locke and the Scottish Junsts," p. 22.
Kitagawa 120
what Wrong in human Actions" on the basis of a rationally or prudentially binding law
of nature as Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf had done, each in his own way.80
As Moore has shown, Barbeyrac's influential strategy involved a misconstruction of
Locke's theory of consent as a theory of allegiance. Locke's theory was a theory of
trust, according to which subjects were duty-bound to obey a government provided
that it ruled in accordance with the law of nature and did not interfere with the right of
subjects to preserve themselves. The only consent which Locke contemplated was
that of individuals to live in society. Moreover, this consent was not even equivalent
to Pufendorf s contract of society, for it was a rational consent, i.e. not one that had to
be refracted through the lenses of experience and history but one based instead on the
objective fulfilment of the law of nature / right of self-preservation conditions
described above. According to the theory of allegiance which Barbeyrac and the
others attributed to Locke, the sovereign for his part promised to provide good
government, while his subjects for their part promised to obey him: i.e. an actual
contract was made between the sovereign and his subjects.81
Finally, it is important for our purposes to underline Barbeyrac's attempt to re¬
establish politics as a science after its eclipse by the Pyrrhonian sceptical humanists,
who degraded politics to the level of an art. Barbeyrac subsumed under the rubric of
the "Practical Science ofMoral Actions" ormorality "not only what is commonly so
call'd; but also The Law of Nature, and Politicks: In a word, all that it is necessary' for
the Conduct of a Man's Self, according to his Estate and Condition."82 In
Barbeyrac's view, although most of the "Principles and Maxims" of "true Politicks"
are based on probabilities, they are almost as certain as truths founded on
demonstration. Barbeyrac maintained that the "Boasting" of sceptics like Bayle in his
Reply to the Question ofa Province, where the latter suggested that it was "certain,
that Politicks, as well as Physick, is a conjectural Science," was grounded on the
"Observation of the Behaviour of bad Politicians, and ambitious Sovereigns, and not
... [on] the Principles and Maxims [of true politics] which arise from the natural
Design of civil Government, and the publick Good, separate from the private Interest
of some Persons."83 As Moore has shown, in politics Hume was both a sceptic and a
80Pufendorf, Law ofNature and Nations, 1729, p. 16; see also Moore, "Natural Law and the
Pyrrhonian Controversy," in Philosophy and Science, p. 25.
8'See Moore, "Locke and the Scottish Jurists," pp. 18, 19.
82Barbeyrac, Historical and Critical Account, in Pufendorf, Imw ofNature and Nations, 1729, p. |1]
and n. b.
83Barbcyrac, in his notes on Pufendorf, Imw ofNature and Nations, 1729, p. 16, sec. 4, n. 3.
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natural lawyer in Barbeyrac's sense.84 As 1 shall demonstrate, Reid was a type of
natural lawyer, but found himself rebuilding the science into a political jurisprudence
that was based on a rehabilitation of the real Locke on trust and that addressed the
necessitarian agenda that lay behind Hume's reduction of politics to a science.
Thus it is evident that the natural jurisprudence / political prudence tradition from
Grotius to Pufendorf had continually to realign itself as it came under increasing
pressure from Pyrrhonian scepticism. These realignments resulted in a
reconceptualization of our faculties, moving from the notion that these are native
capacities to the view that they are engendered by history and experience. Thus,
Grotius's rationalistic assertion of a social faculty with its attendant moral obligations
became replaced by Hobbes's fear-driven model of a prudential obligation to society,
which was a mere ratiocinative construct based on self-interest. This model was
substantially adapted by Pufendorf, for whom the moral obligation to preserve society
had to be produced by enlisting prudential motivations to engender correct moral
sentiments.
Through these changes, political prudence remained fairly constantly a function of
expediency; the real anxiety was that justice, too, could be reduced to expediency.
This identification of ethics and politics with expediency was a principal theme of
Hobbes's writings. By emphasizing the strictly juristic side of political obligation —
i.e. our fundamental subjection to law — Grotius and Pufendorf tended to overlook
the problem of how the natural law obligations of sovereigns could be enforced,
preferring to stress the obligation of subjects to obey. Accordingly, they provided
very little critical leverage against existing absolutist constitutional arrangements.
Their admission that these were matters of expediency tended to divest justice of its
critical content. The natural law tradition had become a friend of repression as a direct
result of coming under intense pressure from the sceptics and was therefore to be
regarded as a failure.
At this point some apology may be in order for my having presented what may appear
on the face of it to be a modern deconstruction of the history of natural jurisprudence /
political prudence and scepticism from Grotius to Pufendorf. Yet this reading, which
is my own — but which owes much to Hont, Moore, Tuck and Tully, who are
themselves indebted to Barbeyrac — may be supported by certain evidence derived
84Sec Moore, "Natural Law ," in Philosophy and Science, p. 31.
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from Reid himself and from his most famous disciple, Dugald Stewart. It is known,
for example, that in his list of'"Eminent Authors" on natural jurisprudence, Reid
included Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, "Barbyrack upon Grotius & Puffendorf',
Locke and Hoadly. We also know that of these he acknowledged as having the
"greatest Reputation" Grotius, Pufendorf and Barbeyrac.85 When these data are
combined with the observation that Reid was in the habit of constructing histories of
scepticism (a notable example being his Inquiry) and with the fact that Tumbull (who
subscribed to Barbeyrac's practice of linking Pufendorfwith Locke, Sidney and
Hoadly) it may reasonably be supposed that Reid's view would have been at least
close to the position I have been advancing that the natural jurisprudence tradition was
shaped by the responses made by different natural lawyers to the pressures imposed
by the sceptics.
Turning to the writing of Reid's pupil, Dugald Stewart, it is immediately evident that
the latter — and by inference Reid himself — envisaged a very different relationship
between natural jurisprudence and politics from the one evolved by the natural
lawyers. Stewart's models were Cicero and Bacon, who conceived of the relationship
between expediency and justice in hierarchical terms, by which political exigencies
were always regulated by the dictates of natural justice. The doctrines of Pufendorf,
Stewart intimated, had been deeply penetrated by the sceptical teachings of Hobbes.86
This is, of course, the line that Tuck has done so much to trace and that 1 have
followed in my reading of the history with which we are concerned here. Stewart
found support for his plan to ground natural jurisprudence on what he called the
"moral constitution of human nature" in the efforts of the sceptical humanist and
clerical disciple of Montaigne, Pierre de Charron, to reconcile our moral nature with
the "apparent discordancy in the judgments of different nations concerning right and
wrong."87 This is, again, Tuck's line.
Stewart also found it answered his purpose to underline the following classic
characterization of the faculty of reason from Book 3 of Cicero's De Republica, which
was in essence the same as those passages from Aristotle quoted earlier:
85PracticalEthics, pp. 197, 202.
86See Dugald Stewart, Dissertation: Exhibiting the Progress ofMetaphysical, Ethical, and Political
Philosophy, in The Collected Works ofDugald Stewart, eel. William Hamilton, vol. 1 (Edinburgh.
Thomas Constable and Co., 1854), p. 172.
87Ste\vart, Dissertation, in Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 106; cf. pp. 102, 104; see also Screech's
notes on Montaigne, Apology for Raymond Sebond, p. 654, n. 396; Screech, Introduction to
Montaigne, Essays, p. xxxii; Tully, Introduction to Pufendorf, Duty ofMan and Citizen, pp. xviii-
xix.
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right reason is itself a law; congenial to the feelings of nature; diffused
among all men; uniform; eternal; calling us imperiously to our duty,
and peremptorily prohibiting every violation of it. Nor does it speak
... one language at Rome and another at Athens, varying from place to
place, or time to time; but it addresses itself to all nations, and to all
ages; deriving its authority from the common sovereign of the
universe, and carrying home its sanctions to every breast, by the
inevitable punishment which it inflicts on transgressors.88
In Glasgow Reid would rely heavily on Cicero's view of politics, as I shall
demonstrate. Stewart also cited two passages from Bacon to point out the proper
relationship that should exist between natural jurisprudence and politics. Bacon had of
course been Reid's guiding star in Aberdeen. The first quotation outlined the primary
and secondary ends of every rightly constituted political society;
The ultimate object which legislators ought to have in view, and to
which all their enactments and sanctions ought to be subservient, is,
that the citizens may live happily. For this purpose, it is necessary that
they should receive a religious and pious education; that they should be
trained to good morals; that they should be secured from foreign
enemies by proper military arrangements; that they should be guarded
by an effectual police against seditious and private injuries; that they
should be loyal to government, and obedient to magistrates; and
finally, that they should abound in wealth, and in other natural
resources.89
Such objectives, pointing as they did to a summum bonum, were obviously a far cry
from the survivalist ethic and negative service duties advocated by Grotius. The
second quotation from Bacon contained what was in effect an elaborate gloss on the
word ought in the previous quotation:
The science of such matters certainly belongs more particularly to the
province of men who, by habits of public business, have been led to
take a comprehensive survey of the social order; of the interests of the
community at large; of the rules of natural equity; of the manners of
nations; of the different forms of government; and who are thus
prepared to reason according to the wisdom of laws, both from
considerations of justice and of policy. The great desideratum,
accordingly, is, by investigating the principles of natural justice, and
those of political expediency, to exhibit a theoretical model of
legislation, which, while it serves as a standard for establishing the
comparative excellence of municipal codes, may suggest hints for their
88Cicero, Frag. lib. iii. De Republica. quoted in Stewart. Dissertation, vol. 1, pp. 174-175.
89Bacon, Exemption Tractatus de Fontibus Juris, Aphor. 5, quoted in Stewart, Dissertation, in
Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 71.
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correction and improvement, to such as have at heart the welfare of
mankind.90
This formulation was invoked to balance the "dark and infernal policy" of
"Machiavellian politicians," for whom the "sovereign has no other object in governing
but his own advantage; the very circumstance which, in the judgment of Aristotle,
constitutes the essence of the worst species of tyranny" and the related views of
"Hobbists," or near Hobbesians like Pufendorf, according to whom the "will of the
magistrate ... is to be regarded as the ultimate standard of right and wrong, and his
voice to be listened to by every citizen as the voice of conscience."91 By contrast,
Stewart regarded it as the "most important branch of political science ... to ascertain
the philosophical principles of jurisprudence", which, according to Smith, "'ought to
run through and be the foundation of the laws of all nations.*"92 Stewart was
therefore committed to the view, at which Reid had eventually arrived (as I will
show), that
Although the obligations of Justice are by no means resolvable into
considerations of Utility, yet in every political association they are so
blended together in the institutions of men, that it is impossible for us
to separate them completely in our reasonings... . It seems, therefore,
to be proper, instead of treating of jurisprudence merely as a system of
natural justice, to unite it with Politics, and to illustrate the general
principles of justice and of expediency, as they are actually combined
in the constitution of society.93
Undoubtedly, Stewart also introduced the above formula in order to underline the
perfectibilist agenda underlying the subordination of political expediency to natural
justice.94 This is a theme that 1 shall explore with reference to Reid.
90Bacon, De Augmenris Scientiarum, lib. viii, cap. iii, quoted in Stewart, Dissertation, in Collected
Works, vol. 1, pp. 71-72; cf. pp. 183, 187.
91Stewart, Dissertation, in Collected Works, vol. 1, pp. 41, 42, 44, 82; cf. pp. 85, 488.
92Stewart, Account of the life and Writings ofAdam Smith, in Collected Works, vol. 10, p. 55,
quoted in Knud Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political Economy: The Contribution of
Dugald Stew art," in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. V. Hope (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1984), p. 219.
"Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers ofMan, in Collected Works, vol. 7, p.
259, quoted in Haakonssen, "From Moral Philosophy to Political Economy," in Philosophers of the
Scottish Enlightenment, p. 230.
94See Stewart, Dissertation, in Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 494, n. 1.
Chapter 8
The Scottish Alternatives
In response to the failure of theorists in the modem natural law tradition to generate a
natural jurisprudence / politics impervious to scepticism, the Scots undertook to
redraw the psychological map on which these disciplines were located in the hope of
avoiding the mistakes of their Continental forebears. This redrawing began with the
first professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University, Gerschom Carmichael,
who also, apparently independently, deconstructed Locke's theory of consent,
construing it as a theory of allegiance, much as Barbeyrac had done.1 As Moore and
Michael Silverthorne have shown, Carmichael rejected the psychological foundations
of both Grotius' and Pufendorf s natural jurisprudence, largely on the basis that they
rested on unsatisfactory conceptions of God. Grotius, it will be recalled, relied so
heavily on the concept of our self-regulating rational and social nature that he was led
to the conclusion that the natural moral order deriving from our basic suum rights
would exist even if God did not exist to sustain it or did not care what we did. If his
governance was regular, that was only because nature itself — including human nature
— was intrinsically regular. But this spontaneous moral order nevertheless remained
fundamentally egoistical and its minimal requirements as regards self-abnegation left it
open to the sceptical charge that its conditions could be met even by a society of
atheists. If Pufendorf chronicled the genesis of our other-regarding dispositions from
self-regarding instincts via a process of rational enlightenment, Carmichael located the
source of those other-regarding dispositions in our actual passional nature.
Pufendorf s God was a tyrant who inscribed his will on our consciences, bribed and
threatened us with rewards and punishments and sanctioned absolute political
authority as means of making us comply with his wishes.
Natural rights had to be recognized, Carmichael thought, but, contrary to Grotius, not
as a result of border disputes. And social duties had to be performed, he reasoned,
but, contrary to Pufendorf. out of love, not fear. Our sociability was not merely a
gregarious quality placed in us to balance our self-love, as it was in Grotius. Nor was
it a moral obligation dictated by enlightened prudence, as it was in Pufendorf. For
Carmichael, our sociability was the result of our natural "longing for beatitude or
1 See Moore, "Locke and the Scottish Jurists," pp. 4—5.
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lasting happiness", which ensured that our "'strongest convictions and aspirations
directjed] us to respect the rights of every man to seek happiness of this kind."
Carmichael's solution therefore avoided the problem of absolutism and was premised
upon the existence of a benevolent God.2
Carmichael also rejected Barbeyrac's concession to the sceptics regarding our lack of
rationality and sociability in the state of nature:
1 really do not see why ... Barbeyrac found it necessary to deny what
Pufendorf had proposed as the most important cause of civil society;
certainly he puts nothing equally probable in its place. I do not doubt
that crafty and ambitious men used their arts to promote the institution
of new societies, no doubt promising themselves leading positions in
it; but 1 ask what arts they could have used and with what success if
they were not able to give reasons [italics mine] for their plan which
seemed persuasive to the people.3
1.
As Moore, Nicholas Phillipson and Richard Teichgraeber have shown, Francis
Hutcheson, Carmichael's successor in the Glasgow chair, carried on with the attack
on Pufendorf s conception of natural law and of God and made refinements to
Carmichael's redrawing of the psychological map that would be used by subsequent
I
Scots, including Hume and Smith. Hutcheson argued his case in letters to fhe
London Journal (1724) and Dublin Weekly Journal (1725).
In the London Journal, Hutcheson dismissed the teachings of moralists like
Carmichael because they "'flew so high, immediately to the Beatific Vision and
Fruition and so lightly passed over, with some trite common-place Remarks, all
ordinary human Affairs'".4 They ignored, in other words, the work of education both
intellectual and sentimental, i.e. the historical process whereby our views were
enlarged beyond ourselves and our sentiments attached to more extensive objects.
Such an education could not fail to "'engage an unprejudiced Mind"" to love God
2James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, "Natural Sociability and Natural Rights in the Moral
Philosophy of Gerschom Carmichael," in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 6; sec also
pp. 4-5, 7.
3Gershom Carmichael, in his notes on Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis el Civis, ed. Gerschom
Carmichael (Edinburgh, 1724), pp. 365-6, quoted in Moore. "Locke and the Scottish Jurists," p. 24.
4Hutcheson, lx>ndon Journal, no. 278, quoted in Moore, "Two Systems," in Studies in the
Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 48.
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rather than merely to fear him.-'' Hutcheson was therefore critical not only of
Carmichael, then, but of Pufendorf, who viewed God as a "tyrant[,] who alternately
bribes and threatens us to secure obedience to his laws."6
Contrary to Pufendorf, Hutcheson held that it was not "'Terror'", whether of God or
of the civil magistrate, but our very nature itself that secured our obedience to the law
of sociability. Again, the element of education was implicit in Hutcheson's
formulation: "'Were Men once possess'd with just Notions of Humane Nature; had
they lively Sentiments of the natural Affections and kind Passions ... did Men
understand the Distress, the Dejection of Spirit, the Diffidence in all kinds Attempts,
and the Uncertainty of every Possession under a Tyrant; these Thoughts wou'd soon
rouse Men into another kind of Love to their Country and Resolution in its
Defence"".7
Pufendorf, like Hobbes, had reduced human motivation to fear and self-love, but he
deduced from these principles of action a law of sociability. In the Dublin Weekly
Journal, Hutcheson argued that by rejecting our natural social affections, our '"kind
Instincts, the Sensus communis, the Decorum and Honestum,... innate Ideas'" and
emphasizing instead self-love and self-interest Pufendorf had robbed the law of
sociability of its effectiveness and had therefore not progressed beyond the doctrine of
Hobbes.8 This formulation contained clear references to the psychological theories of
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury^and of John Locke.
Hutcheson's allusions were presumably to Shaftesbury's Sensus Communis; An
Essay on the Freedom ofWit and Humour (1709) and the first official edition of his
Inquiry Concerning Virtue, orMerit (1711). In the former work, Shaftesbury had
introduced the term "moral Sense", signifying our "natural and just Sense of Right and
Wrong", or "Conscience," which was itself based on standards of justice and injustice
and of right and wrong that exist antecedently to the imposition of law by God.
Shaftesbury's tone in these passages was polemical: he was arguing against
-^Huteheson, London Journal, no. 277, quoted in Moore, "Two Systems," in Studies in the
Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. p. 48.
6Moore, "Tw o Systems," in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 48.
7Hutcheson, London Journal, no. 278, quoted in Moore, "Two Systems," in Studies in the
Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 48.
8Hutcheson. Dublin Weekly Journal, no. 10, quoted in Moore, "Tw o Systems," in Studies in the
Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, p. 48.
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Pufendorf, whose imposition theory also prompted a reply from Leibniz. As
Shaftesbury wrote,
whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he
is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing
as Justice and Injustice, Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong:
according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true.
If the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be said absolutely to
constitute [italics mine] Right and Wrong, then are these latter words of
no significancy at all.
Shaftesbury did, however, take Pufendorf s point that the State had a role to play in
making God's law effective, for he acknowledged that a "virtuous Administration, and
an equal and just Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, is of the highest service;
not only by restraining the Vitious, and forcing them to act usefully to Society; but by
making Virtue to be apparently the Interest of every-one, so as to remove all
Prejudices against it, create a fair reception of it, and lead Men into that path which
afterwards they cannot easily quit." But it must be underlined that, contrary to
Pufendorf, Shaftesbury held that the imposition of rewards and punishments by the
civil magistrate did not so much create a sense of right and wrong as awaken it: law
for Shaftesbury was more an educative than a corrective device.
In his Inquiry. Shaftesbury also invoked the term "natural and kind Affection", which
was undoubtedly the antecedent for Hutcheson's concept of natural social affections
and kind instincts to which I referred above. Shaftesbury also appealed in the Inquiry
to the "just Reverence of Mankind". The concepts of "friendly and natural affections"
and of "love for mankind" were, of course, recurring themes in Shaftesbury's Sensus
Communis, whence Hutcheson also derived the third and fourth terms, sensus
communis and decorum and honestum — in the above formulation.9
In his Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury defined common sense as a "sense of public
weal, and of the common interest; love of the community or society, natural affection,
humanity, obligingness, or that sort of civility which rises from a just sense of the
common rights of mankind, and the natural equality there is among those of the same
species." It was the "social or natural affection" of common sense, not the fear of
punishment, Shaftesbury argued, that underpinned our moral judgements. For
9Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, cd. David Walford (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1977), pp. 24, 28, 30, 38, 43. 76; Shaftesbury, Sensus Communis; An Essay on
the Freedom of Wit and Humour, in Shaftesbury, Characteristics oj Men, Manners, Opinions. Times
ed. John M. Robertson, 2 vols. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), Vol. 1, pp.
64, 78; cf. pp. 76 ("lover of mankind"), 92; Shaftesbury, Inquiry, pp. 26, 27, 74, 78.
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without common sense, there could be no society. As Shaftesbury put it, "'Twas
difficult to apprehend ... what public jsubsisted] between an absolute prince and his
slave-subjects. And for real society, there could be none between such as had no
other sense than that of private good." It was clear that Shaftesbury's target in this
passage was Hobbes, who, as we have seen, had reduced justice and conscience, or
our sense of right and wrong, to the will of the civil magistrate. Shaftesbury
maintained, contrary to Hobbes, that "The civil union, or confederacy, could never
make right or wrong, if they subsisted not before." Shaftesbury took heart in the fact
that our inclination to "sociableness" had a stronger influence than calculations based
on selfishness. For Shaftesbury, "Relations, friends, countrymen, laws, politic
constitutions, the beauty of order and government, and the interest of society and
mankind, were objects which ... would naturally raise a stronger affection than any
which was grounded upon the narrow bottom of mere self." The measure of right and
wrong was not the will of the civil magistrate but the heart of the "common honest
man," which could articulate the uncorrupted will of God. Shaftesbury had grounded
sociability not on the necessity imposed on us by the state of nature, as Pufendorf had
done, but on human nature itself.10
These were the principles that Hutcheson endeavoured to explain in his Inquiry into
the Original ofOur Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue (1725) and his Essay on the Nature and
Conduct of the Passions andAffections, With Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728),
which also contained direct criticisms of Locke, who had rejected innate ideas and
tried to "'deduce all Ideas of Good and Evil ... from Relation to a Law and its
Sanctions'", as well as in his Short Introduction toMoral Philosophy (1747) and
System ofMoral Philosophy (1755). Hutcheson contended that we "'have Ideas of
Virtue and Vice, abstractly from any Law, Human or Divine'"'.11 He argued against
Hobbes, Pufendorf and Grotius, who succeeded in accounting only for prudential
obligation; they had overlooked the sensitive part of our nature, i.e. our God-given
moral sense, which approved of benevolent actions and disapproved of selfish ones
and thereby created a properly moral obligation to perform the former and avoid the
latter. By ignoring the moral sense they had made reason do what was properly the
work of the passions.
1 ^Shaftesbury, Senses Communis, in Shaftesbury, Characteristics, Vol. 1, pp. 70-71, 73-74, 77,
78. 87; see also p. 62; cf. pp. 72 ("common affection"), 81 ("natural affection, friendship, or
sociableness"), 84 ("common honesty"); Stewart, Opinion and Reform, p. 85.
1 'Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original ofOur Ideas ofBeauts and Virtue, pp. 247, 249,
quoted in Moore. "Tw o Systems," p. 49; see also Stewart. Opinion and Reform. p. 76.
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To be sure, these passions could be "distorted] by false education, bad customs, or
wrong theories" (which produce "confused imaginations" in us) and would in such
cases be subject to legislative correction, or correction by prudence. Nonetheless, the
purpose of rewards and punishments was not to subjugate the passions to an
imperious reason but simply to free them from distortion that they might function
virtuously and effectively. As Teichgraeber has observed, for Hutcheson "virtue
flowed directly from instincts and sentiments" and consisted in "appropriately ordering
the sentiments and instincts". It was this insight that "when men happen to pursue
virtue and goodness, they do so because of the prompting of instinctive
predispositions" that would turn out to be so important for Hume, as 1 shall
demonstrate. Moreover, Hutcheson did not thereby eliminate the role of reason; he
allowed that reason was the "faculty by which we seek truth, that is, true propositions
about reality", which was admittedly rational. But, for Hutcheson, reason was not a
"reflective capacity"; this was reserved for the passions. According to Hutcheson,
wisdom lay in the moral sense; reason was only an instrument of prudence:
the Understanding, or the power of reflecting, comparing, judging,
makes us capable of discerning the tendencies of the several senses,
appetites, actions, gratifications, either to our own happiness, or to that
of others, and the comparative values of every object, every
gratification. This power judges about the means or the subordinate
ends: but about the ultimate ends there is no reasoning. We prosecute
them by some immediate disposition or determination of soul [i.e. the
will], which in the order of action is always prior to all reasoning; as
no opinion or judgment can move to action, where there is no prior
desire of some end.
Hutcheson did not deny that there could be errors of judgement, whose practical
effects were indirect; he was concerned rather to ensure that such mistakes were not
confounded with distortions of out sensibilities, whose consequences were
immediately felt. The only trouble was that the former sort of error frequently gave
rise to the latter:
almost all our diversities in moral sentiments, and opposite
approbations, and condemnations, arise from opposite conclusions of
reason about the effects of actions upon the publick, or the affections
from which they flowed. The moral sense seems ever to approve and
condemn uniformly the same immediate objects, the same affections
and dispositions; tho" we reason very differently about the actions
which evidence certain dispositions or their contraries.
For this reason, Hutcheson suggested that not reason but the "moral sense from its
very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all our powers."
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It was the moral sense that provided the content of the law of nature, not the
circumstance of its having been commanded by God or by the civil magistrate. It was
also the moral sense that demonstrated our truly natural sociability, i.e. a principle of
sociableness that was prior to necessity. Moreover, it was the moral sense that lay
behind what Phillipson has described as our "innate love of perfection which
encouraged us to improve ourselves and our society and was capable of bringing us a
richer understanding of the Creator." Hutcheson's moral sense psychology was
therefore wedded to a form of Christian belief that was detached from the notion of a
tyrannical God, and to a perfectibilist politics founded on the basic fact of sociability.
The requirement to keep the law of nature had ceased being an onerous duty and had
become an overflowing desire.12
In order to ensure that the channel of our moral desires remained open, Hutcheson
envisaged a "censorial power" whereby the "manners of a people may be regulated ...
and ... luxury, voluptuous debauchery, and other private vices prevented or made
infamous, which otherways would destroy all publick virtues, and all faithful regard
to the general good, and lead men to ruin the best contrived polity." Such a power,
Hutcheson believed, was essential to a government dedicated to performing its duty of
securing the "general good and happiness of a people ... by all just and effectual
methods," whether merely persuasive or legal.
Hutcheson's belief derived from his view that the general good and happiness of a
people "chiefly depends on their virtue", in which case it was incumbent on the State
to instil "true principles of virtue, such as shall lead men to piety to God, and all just,
peaceable, and kind dispositions towards their fellows; that they may be inclined to
every good office, and faithful in every trust committed to them in their several
stations." The means to effect this posturing to true justice and "eminent virtue" (and
thereby to the performance of our duties of humanity) were moral and religious
education, strong inducements to industry and sobriety, the setting of a good example
by those in supreme power, preferring of the virtuous and degrading of the vicious
!2Francis Hutcheson, A System ofMoraI Philosophy, 2 vols. (London, 1755), Vol. 1, pp. 38, 61,
81, 93; Nicholas Phillipson. Hume, pp. 27-28; Stewart, Opinion andReform, pp. 78, 91, 92, 97;
Richard F. Teichgraeber 111, "Free trade " andMoral Philosophy (Durham: Duke University Press,
1986), pp. 27, 33, 83; cf. T.D. Campbell, "Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish
Enlightenment," in R. Campbell and A. Skinner, eds., The Origins and Nature of the Scottish
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), pp. 175, 178, 181; Hutcheson, Svstetn, Vol. 1, pp.
9-10, 11, 16, 25, 34,35,41,57, 58,71,77,97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 111, 112, 121, 133, 137, 166,
221, 223-224, 232-233, 237, 245, 252, 254, 306; Vol. 2, pp. 4, 19; Phiilipson, Hume. pp. 41-^42,
48-49; Stew art, Opinion and Reform, pp. 83, 84, 93, 95; Teichgraeber, "FreeTrade", pp. 49, 82;
David Walford, Introduction to Shaftesbury, Inquiry, p. xviii ("reflective affection").
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and in the last resort the legal measure of punishment. Moreover, Hutcheson was
convinced that in general "wise laws will civilize the manners and even improve the
tempers of a people to virtue." But under no circumstance, he believed, could a
magistrate have a "right to extort mens sentiments, or to inflict penalties upon their not
agreeing to the opinions he thinks just; as such penalties are no evidences to convince
the judgment, and can only produce hypocrisy; and are monstrous usurpations on the
most sacred rights of all rational beings."
It must be underlined, as Haakonssen has done, that Hutcheson regarded the State's
motivational task of inculcating virtue as a "duty ... morally on a par with the
enforcement of justice." "Political prudence to exercise the rights vested in magistrates
wisely according to the several exigencies of publick affairs," or, as Hutcheson
elsewhere put it, "justice prudently administred", was therefore an aid to natural
jurisprudence and properly subservient to it, although it must be emphasized that
political prudence refracted the requirements ofjustice. Political prudence did not
thereby degenerate into the prerogative ofmere superior power: a "ruler's tittle to the
subjection of the people ... in oppressive and absurd plans [of government! ... is no
better than that of a robber's to any money he had by force compelled one to promise
him." Thus, Hutcheson observed that "some publick interests of societies may justify
such Agrarian Laws as put a stop to the immoderate acquisitions of private citizens
which may prove dangerous to the state, tho' they be made without any particular
injury". Moreover, when hereditary honours are bestowed as "political rewards, they
must not be employed in exact proportion to the degrees of moral goodness, but as
they shall most encourage the virtues most necessary to the state." Political prudence
also had a role to play in punishments, since the
end of punishment is the general safety; the precise measure of human
punishment is the necessity of preventing certain crimes for the publick
safety, and not always the moral turpitude of the actions; tho' this often
is proportioned to the detriment arising from crimes. But as it is not
always so, some of the worst vices must go unpunished ... and some
actions very dangerous to the community, and yet flowing from no
great depravity of heart, must be restrained by great severity.
Finally, it may be pointed out that the right of resistance, though grounded on the most
solid title of natural jurisprudence, i.e. that of the moral sense, of which every
individual is a judge, must sometimes be restrained with a view to avoiding greater
injustice. By the same token, for Hutcheson the right of resistance applied not only
against legal violations on the part of governors but also against excessive prudence.
The arbiter of pleas for prudential leeway remained the moral sense of an honest
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person, which was also the standard of the law of nature and of the rights and duties
deriving from it. If this seems paradoxical, it would be well to consider that
Hutcheson conceived of our summum bonum as a single, self-regulating system in
which conflicts were merely apparent and therefore never insuperable. The object of
the political prudence was to mirror the virtuous desires of the soul in a body of wise
and just laws.13
Thus far, I have argued that Hutcheson conceived his own psychological teaching as
an explication of Shaftesbury's ethical theory and in response to the moral scepticism
of Locke. But I shall now show that Hutcheson's natural jurisprudence / political
prudence was also formulated as a reply to the moral and political scepticism of
Bernard Mandeville, who had been critical of Shaftesbury and with whom Hutcheson
carried on a debate in print. I have deferred my consideration ofMandeville until the
present moment because it was the combination of Hutcheson's psychology with
Mandeville's scepticism — as much as anything — that produced the ethical and
political teaching of Hume.
Like Hobbes, Mandeville denied the existence of the summum bonum which was so
important to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.14 Mandeville denounced the "hunting" after
Shaftesbury's "Pulchrum & Honestun2" as "not much better than a Wild-Goose-Chace
that is but little to be depended upon" not only because the "excellency and real worth
of things are most commonly precarious and alterable as Modes and Customs vary"
(which underlined, as M.M. Goldsmith has pointed out, the sceptical point that reason
could not "establish a true standard of virtue") but also because "generous Notions
concerning the natural Goodness of Man are hurtful". As Mandeville put it, explicitly-
mocking Shaftesbury: "imaginary Notions that Men may be Virtuous without Self-
denial are a vast Inlet to Hypocrisy, which being once made habitual, we must not
only deceive others, but likewise become altogether unknown to our selves".
Mandeville later elaborated on this point, introducing a further sceptical twist when he
observed that Shaftesbury's doctrine "furnish[edj Men with a more obvious Handle,
and a greaterOpportunity of counterfeiting the Love of Society and Regard to the
13Hutcheson, System, Vol. 1, pp. 323, 327; Vol. 2, pp. 217, 253, 265, 277, 310, 311, 331, 333,
347; Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral PJiilosoph\ (Glasgow, 1747), in Collected
Works ofFrancis Hulcheson, facsimile ed. prepared by Barnhard Fabian, 7 vols. (Hildescheim: Georg
Olms, 1969), Vol. 4, p. 120, quoted in Haakonssen, "Hugo Grotius," Political Theory 13, no. 2
(May 1985), pp. 258-259; cf. Hutcheson, System, Vol. 1, pp. 222, 223-224; Vol. 2, pp. 35, 40—4],
112,' 126, 187, 226, 227, 232, 247, 248, 259, 273, 274, 275, 317, 330, 344, 345.
14See F.B. Kaye, Introduction to Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick
Benefits, ed. F.B. Kaye, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), Vol. 1, pp. hi, cix.
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Publick, than ever they could have receiv'd from the contrary Doctrine, viz. That there
is no Merit but in the Conquest of the Passions, nor any Virtue without apparenl
[italics mine] Self-denial."
The self-denial which Mandeville urged was more apparent than real, underlined his
scepticism that reason was incapable of conquering the passions, for (as Goldsmith
has pointed out) according to Mandeville this required "another, stronger passion".
As Mandeville wrote in his Enquiry into the Origin ofHonour, and The Usefulness of
Christianity in War (1732),
All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their
Passions, whatever fine Notions we may flatter our Selves with; even
those who act suitably to their Knowledge, and strictly follow the
Dictates of their Reason, are not less compelfd so to do by some
Passion or other, that sets them to Work, than others, who bid
Defiance and act contrary to Both, and whom we call Slaves to their
Passions.
The crucial passion in politics was pride. By the "'skilful Management of wary
Politicians'" who flattered us by "extoll {ing] the Excellency of our Nature above other
Animals ... and ... bestow[ing] a thousand Encomiums on the Rationality of our
Souls, by the Help of which we were capable of performing the most noble
Achievements", Mandeville argued, we were persuaded to control our insatiable
appetites and resist our selfish inclinations. These "Lawgivers and other wise Men,
that have laboured for the Establishment of Society," or, as Mandeville put it
elsewhere, to "civilize Man, and establish them into a Body Politick," have, above all,
"endeavour'd ... to make the People they were to govern ... believe [italicsmine] ...
that it was more beneficial for every Body to conquer than indulge his Appetites, and
much better to mind the Publick than what seem'd his private Interest." Having thus
"insinuated themselves into the Hearts of Men, they began to instruct them in the
Notions of Honour and Shame; representing the one as the worst of all Evils, and the
other as the highest Good to which Mortals could aspire". By a similar ruse, these
"skilful Politicians" duped us into "swallow[ing] ... for Truth" the suggestion that
they had true courage, which would make them "valuable of their kind," when in fact
they were only puffed up with pride and merely "imagine[d] that they felt [italics mine]
it heaving in their Breasts". Accordingly, these so-called moral virtues were therefore
the "'Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride'." The phantom "Self-
denial" that constituted our virtue was evident: "By flattering our Pride and still
increasing the good Opinion we have of ourselves on the one hand, and inspiring us
on the other with a superlative Dread and mortal Aversion against Shame, the Artful
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Moralists have taught us chearfully to encounter our selves, and if not subdue, at least
so to conceal and disguise our darling Passion, Lust, that we scarce know it when we
meet with it in our own Breasts". Such an active self-deception was necessary to
make the laws palatable to fallen creatures who had insatiable appetites and whose
selfish inclinations made it impossible for them to "act with any other View but to
please [themselves] while [they had] the Use of [their] Organs".
Hutcheson seems to have accepted that Mandeville had got the better of the argument.
His own task was to try recover some of the ground Shaftesbury had lost,
particularly the notion that our love of a moral virtue such as honour presupposed that
we had an antecedent moral sense which approved of that virtue.
Mandeville's skilful politicians and artful moralists next hit upon the real secret of the
"Art ofGoverning" (it is hardly surprising to find Mandeville employing the sceptical
term art to politics; I shall have more to say about this aspect ofMandeville's political
scepticism), the "true Use of the Passions," i.e. the "happy Contrivance of playing our
Passions against one another" on every level: i.e. theirs against those of the governed,
those of different individuals among the governed against each other, and within each
person — whether governor or governed — against each other. Thus Mandeville
maintained that the "first Rudiments ofMorality, broach'd by skilful Politicians, to
render Men useful to each other as well as tractable, were chiefly contrived that the
Ambitious might reap the more Benefit from, and govern vast Numbers of them with
the greater Ease and Security." By this arrangement, the skilful politicians fulfilled
their ambition, whilst the governed had their pride flattered. By such "cunning
Management" each achieved his "own Ends in Labouring for others". Here "every
Frailty of the Members addfed] Strength to the whole Body ... and by dextrous
Management... [their] private Vices [were turned] into publick Benefits." The key to
society lay not in natural sociability but in what Mandeville called self-liking, i.e.
vanity.
One final point must be emphasized. Although in this discussion I have referred to the
prudence of skilful politicians and artful moralists, these terms, as Goldsmith has
pointed out, must be understood as a kind of shorthand for Mandeville's considered
view of the art of politics: the "device of a personified manipulator of human beings",
Goldsmith has written, "stands for the long, gradual development of social
institutions." F.A. Hayek has done much to emphasize this side ofMandeville's
thought. Thus with regard to laws, Mandeville said:
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there are very few, that are the Work of one Man, or of one
Generation; the greatest part of them are the Product, the joynt Labour
of several Ages The Wisdom I speak of, is not the Offspring of a
fine Understanding, or intense Thinking, but of sound and deliberate
Judgment, acquired from a long Experience in Business, and a
Multiplicity of Observations. By this sort of Wisdom, and Length of
Time, it may be brought about, that there shall be no greater Difficulty
in governing a large City, than (pardon the Lowness of the Simile)
there is in weaving of Stockings.
Having underlined the role of experience in shaping laws, Mandeville observed that
once the laws were ''brought to as much Perfection, as Art and human Wisdom can
carry them, the whole Machine may be made to play of itself, with as little Skill, as is
required to wind up a Clock; and the Government of a large City, once put into good
Order, the Magistrates only following their Noses, will continue to go right for a great
while, tho* there was not a wise Man in it". For Mandeville, politics was therefore an
eminently practicalmatter having to do with checking and curbing inventive and
evasive passions by indirect means rather than with the rational planning and
prediction of political behaviour. As Mandeville wrote, "The wisest Laws of human
Invention are generally owing to the Evasions of bad Men, whose Cunning had eluded
the Force of former Ordinances, that had been made with less Caution." But, sceptical
to the last, Mandeville also stressed the intractability of certain passions, which was
clearly at odds with the ethic which lay at the heart of Baconian — and therefore of
Reidian — science. Since lust, our "darling Passion," was evidently "too violent to be
curb'd by any Law or Precept", it was a mark of "Wisdom in all Governments to bear
with [its] lesser Inconveniences to prevent greater."15
2.
It was against the background of a natural law tradition perennially under pressure
from the sceptics and most recently devastated by Mandeville that Hume burst onto the
scene. Hume welcomed the shift of emphasis from reason to the passions in
]5MandeviUe, Fable, Vol. 1, pp. 42, 43, 47, 95, 145, 208, 209, 331, 343, 347, 348; Vol. 2, pp.
109, 318, 319, 322, 323; Mandeville, Fable, Vol. 1, p. 51, quoted in M.M. Goldsmith, Private
Vices, Public Benefits: BernardMandeville's Social and Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), p. 52; Mandeville, An Enquiry into the Origin ofHonour, and The
Usefulness of Christianity in War, p. 31, quoted in Kaye, Introduction to Mandeville, Fable, Vol. 1,
p. Ixxix; Mandeville, Fable, Vol. 2, p. 322, quoted in F.A. Hayek, "Dr Bernard Mandeville," in F.A.
Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (London and
Henley: Routledgc & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 261; Goldsmith, Private Vices, pp. 64, 155; cf.
Mandcville, Fable, Vol. 1, p. 95; Goldsmith, Private Vices, pp. 53, 71; Stewart, Opinion and
Reform, pp. 66-67.
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Hutcheson and also embraced the sceptical principles ofMandeville. As Phillipson
has shown, Hume in a flawless Pyrrhonian reductio let reason mortify itself and
whittle down its own claims to rule, demonstrating in the process that only the
passions could save us from the fatal conceits of overweening reason. Moreover, by
calling our rationality into question Hume cast doubt on the suggestion that we could
infer the nature of our rights and duties from a rational law of nature. Indeed, he
argued that the laws of nature were only natural in the sense of that which was
"common to any species, or ... what is inseparable from the species", which was not
saying much, for Hume later said that a "certain degree of selfishness ... (was also]
inseparable from human nature". Moreover, the laws of nature were emphatically not
to be understood as rationally compelling for all time, for human nature itself could
change, in which case these laws would no longer apply to us. On the other hand,
these laws, precisely because they were laws, were themselves artificial, by which he
meant not only that they were invented by the passions (the phrase "invention of the
law of nature" summed up this position), but also that they "arfose] from the
circumstances and necessities of mankind." By this Hume understood the
concurrence of our "selfishness and limited generosity" with the "easy change" of
external objects (i.e. the state of things prior to the advent of property) in conjunction
with their "scarcity in comparison [to] the wants and desires of men." He observed
that reason could exert an "influence on our conduct only ... when it excite[d] a
passion by informing (italics mine) us of the existence of something which is a proper
object of it ... or when it discovered] the connexion of causes and effects ... so as to
afford us means of exerting any passion."
Hume's use of the term artificial in this characterization of the law of nature posed
certain problems for his scepticism w ith regard to reason, for he conceded that
artificial, when used in this sense, presupposed the "intervention of thought or
reflexion." Yet he confessed that it was inconceivable that we could have grasped the
advantageousness of society and given ourselves laws of nature "by study and
reflexion alone" in our natural, i.e. "wild and uncultivated" state. We had, he said,
only to be "sensible (italics mine] of its advantages", which of course threw us back
on the passions as providing the inventive impetus for forming society and
conventionally establishing the "rules of justice" (as he otherwise called the
"fundamental laws of nature"). Hume maintained that even in our natural condition,
after some experience of the precariousness of all things that results from our
unregulated acquisitiveness, we would become "sensible of lour] interest" in mutually
abstaining from the possessions of others (although they were not yet properly
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possessions). Our sense of interest in this case was therefore already artificial, for it
was based on our experience that our most basic passions, selfishness and confined
generosity, '"acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate I us] for society", whilst "society
is necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions". This common sense of
interest was the first in a series of artificial senses that we developed gradually in the
course of our socialization and civilization whereby we "follow [ed] the natural course
of our passions and inclinations," but in a "manner [that was] oblique and artificial."
Thus, we developed our sense of interest when our experience recommended to us
that it would be in our best interests to settle upon a "more artful and more refm'd way
of satisfying [our passions]", which was of course the "convention or agreement" to
impose certain rules ofjustice on ourselves, that is on the unbridled exercise of our
passions. Hume's slide from the language of contract, which implied a deliberate act
at a fixed moment in time, to that of convention, with its connotations of accident and
evolution, was of course entirely consistent with his insistence upon the artificial and
unplanned character of our moral and political virtues.
After these rules were established we acquired a second sense, i.e. our "sense of
justice and injustice", which although not "deriv'd from nature," may nevertheless be
said to have "arise[n] artificially, tho' necessarily from education, and human
conventions." Moreover, although we initially observed the rules of justice with a
view only to our own self-interest, a public interest became associated with their
observance after they had been artificially established as a matter of convention. On
the basis of this public interest, we acquired a third sense, i.e. our "sense of moral
good and evil", for we "naturally sympathize^] with others in the sentiments [of
justice and injustice] they entertain] ed] of us", or more precisely with the "pleasure or
pain ... which result]ed] fom the view of [their] sentiment[s]," and thereby developed
a "sympathy with [the] public interest," whence derived the "moral approbation ...
which attends [justice]". This accounts for Hume's view that our "sentiments of
morality ... were ... built entirely on public interest and convenience." As Hume put it
at the beginning of Book 3 of the Treatise, "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never
be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals." In this way
justice and morality, which comprised an entire "system of conduct and behaviour",
were the unintended (i.e. artificial) consequences of (perfectly natural) individual self-
interested human actions. The public good was therefore the "natural tendency" of the
fundamental laws of justice, although their "real origin" lay in self-love. As Hume put
it: "This system, ... comprehending the interest of each individual, is of course
advantageous to the public; tho' it be not intended [italics mine] for that purpose by the
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inventors." Hume substantially repeated this Mandevillian theme in the following
passage:
bridges are built; harbours open'd; ramparts rais'd; canals form'd;
fleets equip'd; and armies disciplin'd; every where, by the care of
government, which, tho' compos'd of men subject to all human
infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions
imaginable, a composition, that is, in some measure, exempted from all
these infirmities.
A more faithful rendering of Mandeville's private vices / public benefits could scarcely
be found anywhere. In a direct crib from Mandeville, Hume suggested that governors
no less than governed were guilty of selfish motives in this regard, for "politicians, ...
in order to govern men more easily ... and preserve peace in human society,...
endeavour'd to produce an esteem for justice ... and an abhorrence of injustice."
Hume also traced our acquisition of three other, related, artificial senses. The first of
these was our "sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with
regard to the properties of others." This sense, which supported that ofmorality, was
shaped by the "public instructions of politicians ... and the private education of
parents". The combination of "Education ... and the artifice of politicians" also added
authority to our sense of allegiance to the civil magistrate, amplifying the "morality
[we naturally bestowed] on loyalty ... and branding all rebellion with a greater degree
of guilty and infamy." Finally, Hume suggested that politicians stoked our "natural
sentiment of approbation and blame".
Hume also argued that the much vaunted sociable affections were grossly overrated.
Our natural benevolence was so restricted that it could not possibly have been the
principle that drove us into society; it was far more likely that this affection and the
morality it entailed would destroy rather than generate society. As Hume expressed it,
although this "generosity must be acknowledg'd to the honour of human nature, we
may at the same time remark ... that so noble an affection, instead of fitting men for
large societies, is almost as contrary to them ... as the most narrow selfishness", for
the ethic that it engendered encouraged a preference for oneself and one's own, which
tended to "produce an opposition of passions and a consequent opposition of
actions],] which [could not] but be dangerous to the new-establish* d union."
Hume categorically denied that by calling the laws of nature artificial he had imported a
notion of arbitrariness, but by the same token he was compelled to admit that an
"alteration ... in the temper and circumstances of mankind ... wou'd entirely alter our
duties and obligations." This implied that natural law was potentially alterable by the
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intervention of "omnipotence, which is ... able to new-mould the human mind, and
change its character in ... fundamental articles." Moreover, Hume acknowledged that
these "rules ... by which property, right, and obligation are determin'd" (i.e. a
considerable portion of what, before Hume, had been called natural jurisprudence)
were "changeable by human laws". That is why Hume dropped the adjective natural
before jurisprudence and explains his remark that "jurisprudence is ... different from
all the sciences ... fin] that in many of its nicer questions, there cannot be said to be
truth or falsehood on either side." By the same token, it must be emphasized that
because Hume regarded as in practice invariable our basic interest in themaintenance
of society, with which the fundamental rules of justice were coeval, he could insist,
practically in the same breath, that the laws of nature (or justice) were "universal and
perfectly inflexible". As Haakonssen has pointed out, for Hume the "natural
principles in the human mind [upon which our interests were based] have conventional
expressions ... [which] can vary from time to time and from place to place." This
enabled Hume to "reconcile the idea of a basically uniform human nature with the facts
of historical and geographical differences", Haakonssen continues, and to maintain
that any changeability in the content of our rules ofjustice — their form would likely
remain unchanged — would have to result from our being, as Hume put it, an
"inventive species", i.e. liable to ever new passions, in which case "ever new kinds of
behaviour [would have] to be tested for their justice." Haakonssen regards Hume as
having made a clear break with modern natural law theoreticians!in letting the given
system of values in society play an important role in these tests." Hume had thereby
radically historicized the so-called science of natural jurisprudence, turning it into a
kind of natural history of moral and political artifice in a way that opened the door to
Adam Smith and John Millar.16
By underwriting the Pufendorfian principle of interest with a philosophical account of
the passions, Hume had laid an alternative foundation for allegiance to government
that replaced the contract doctrine upon which rested the "fashionable system of
16David Hume, Treatise, pp. 458, 459, [477], 480, 483, 484, 494, 486, 487, 496, 498, 499-500,
519, 520, 521, 525, 526, 528, 529, 532, 533-534, 539, 546, 547 n., 578, 579, 583, 619, 620;
David Hume, 498, Enquiry concerning llie Principles ofMorals, in David Hume, Enquiries, p. 308;
Knud Haakonssen, The Science ofa Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence ofDavid Hume and Adam
Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 32,43, 44; cf. Hume, Treatise, pp. 457,
465, 474, 488, 493, 495, 497, 501, 517, 519, 522, 523, 533, 545, 586, 589; Haakonssen, Science of
a Legislator, pp. 20, 38; Phillipson, Hume, pp. 45-46; see also Hume, Treatise, pp. 463 ("eternal
immutable fitnesses and unfitnesses of things cannot be defended by sound philosophy"), 491-492,
502 ("Justice ... never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons, but conducts
herself by more extensive views").
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politics," i.e. that of the Whigs. According to the theory then in vogue, our obligation
to obey a government derived from a promise, an original contract between prince and
people, whereby the prince vowed to defend the people and secure their rights and the
people undertook to obey the prince. The people obeyed because they promised to
obey and would be entitled to resist if ever the prince broke his word.
Hume, proceeding according to the theory of the passions that lay at the heart of his
natural jurisprudence, proposed a very different system of politics, one in which our
obligations derived not from a contract, a pact in which we indicated our intention
immediately, but from a convention, i.e. a practice whose advantages revealed
themselves gradually to individuals, who communicated amongst themselves their
sense of them and recognized the interest of their neighbours even as they
apprehended their own. According to this doctrine, the obligation to obey a
government arose at the moment the government was first instituted, just as the
obligation to follow the rules of justice arose precisely when society was formed. The
effectiveness of this obligation did not rest on the force of a promise — for the force
of promises derived from their utility, which related to the advent of society — but
rather on the strength of our natural interest and accompanying artificial moral sense.
This obligation could be removed only if the existence of society itselfwas threatened,
i.e. if there were a widespread belief that social union was no longer advantageous,
for it was after all a sense of common interest that produced society in the first place.
Anything short of a genuinely public interest would be insufficient to justify
resistance. Given the myriad beliefs or opinions with which our endlessly mutable
imagination underwrote our ever-inventive passions, it was highly unlikely that such a
consensus could ever be articulated. In the meantime, there was a "moral obligation to
submit to government ... because every one thinks so". The "study of history
confirm[ed] the reasonings of true philosophy" in this matter, for it was "bigotry and
superstition", not reason, as the Whigs suggested, that gave to most governments their
"titles ... [of] original contract, long possession, present possession, succession, and
positive laws". Since these titles were in turn grounded on our basic interest in
preserving society that we might be able to preserve ourselves, we were bound to
regard political disputes regarding the "rights of princes" as "incapable of any decision
in most cases and ... entirely subordinate to the interests of peace and liberty."
Moreover, as this interest was, in its turn, the product of time and accident (or of
artifice), these titles were equally time-bound and artificial. It followed that only
experience could engender an opinion sufficient to defeat them. In the meantime,
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prudence dictated (or rather, we naturally believed) that these titles had to be
respected.17
Given Hume's rigorously prudential psychological starting-point, it is not surprising
that his politics emerged as a full-blown science of prudence. 1 have just outlined the
prudential aspect of our allegiance to government. Hume also applied his prudential
analysis to the duties of princes towards each other. He freely endorsed the
Machiavellian thesis that there is a "system of morals calculated for princes, much
more free than that which ought to govern private persons", which he interpreted as
meaning that although the "morality of princes has the same extent, yet it has not the
same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully [italics mine] be transgress'd
from a more trivial motive." Here lawfully refers to the law of nature, which, as we
have seen, Hume regarded as artificially generated, though based on natural interest
and necessarily supported by a certain sentiment of morality. Because relations
between princes were neither so "necessary nor [so] advantageous as that among
individuals," it followed that not only was the "natural obligation to justice ... among
different states ... not so strong as among individuals," but the moral obligation which
derived from it was also weaker.18
The universal standard of prudence — i.e. interest — applied not only to the conduct
of the governed towards their governors and to behaviour among princes but also to
the duties of princes to their subjects. Hume explored this subject in his History of
England, which, as Phillipson has pointed out, "showed [Hume] how seldom power
had been exercised with wisdom or prudence and how often political opinion had been
corrupted by ignorance, superstition and zealotry." The bigotry and superstition that
underpinned the British people's allegiance to their government was precisely what
their constitution had to be protected against if civilization in England — which was,
after all, the very stuff of which the British public's interests were made — was to be
preserved. Political prudence therefore consisted in the ability of the prince to protect
the constitution from the forces that had sustained it.
In the factious climate that then prevailed in Britain, this required that public opinion
be placed on a properly philosophical footing, for only if the British people were
recalled to their belief that their interests were bound up with the preservation of their
own civilization could their liberty be secured in the face of their own "ignorance and
17Hume, Treatise, pp. 542, 547, 562; cf. p. 569; Haakonssen, Science ofa Legislator, p. 39.
18Humc, Treatise, pp. 568, 569; cf. Haakonssen, Science ofa legislator, p. 40.
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folly", which manifested itself in terms of "tribal party loyalties". These loyalties were
merely the political expression of a confined generosity, which was itself a self-
interested passion and therefore a fixed feature of the human constitution. As such,
they were ineradicable. The remedy for this problem, like the solution to the problem
of limited benevolence, lay in the infirmity itself: the party system, which was the only
effective indicator of the people's interests, had to be preserved, but preserved in such
a way that it achieved its objectives obliquely. Attention had to be shifted away from
reforming the constitution as such to reforming the political culture that supported it.
The declension from the language of contract to that of convention would have to be
mirrored in the mutation of the language ofpolitics into that ofpoliteness. The British
people were called upon, as Phillipson has observed, to "reflect on their opinions and
discuss them with their friends" in the belief that there were no eternal political truths
beyond that of their common interest in preserving society and that to imagine the
situation to be otherwise was to succumb to illusions spawned by superstition. Hume
evidently subscribed to the Addisonian view that "conversation was the best way of
purging one's ideas of eccentricity and enthusiasm." Sociable reflection and civilizing
conversation via the governing influence of belief would attach people more strongly
to their real interests and promote stability in the government. According to this
programme, the form interest would take would be the morality contained in Cicero's
Offices, which had "presented morality as skills which could be learned in the course
of ordinary life and taught men to value the honest citizen who was temperate, fair and
prudent in his dealings with others and was respected in consequence." Prudence
consisted in "exercisfing one's] natural instinct to submit quietly to established
authority", but not so much out of a motive of immediate self-protection, as the
sceptical humanists suggested, as out of a sensitivity to the precariousness of
civilization.
The "techniques of prudence" available to a sovereign related to the same standard and
were, as Phillipson has underlined, utterly "dependent] upon the peculiarities of the
constitution and the age in which the ruler found himself." Thus, a
prudent ruler was one who attempted to maintain the authority of
government. In the hands of a Walpole, that might involve corruption.
In the hands of an Edward I, the utmost severity. In the hands of
Elizabeth, deceit, imperiousness and bluff.
If they were to become properly socialized and civilized, modern Britons would have
to "stop judging statesmen by impossible standards, and to realize that they could only
be judged as human beings who had to take the political world as they found it and
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maintain their power as best they could. All that could be hoped was that in time, and
with luck, government would become more regular and less prone to faction." In
other words, they would have to become good Machiavellians, "setting statesmen and
politicians in their contexts and judging their conduct accordingly." Deference was
due to princes who preserved property, the protection of which was the foundation of
society and government; all that was to be disapproved was the "folly of Christians or
Levellers, [who] ... called for a redistribution of property for the sake of imaginary
visions of a more perfect society", or ruthless tyranny, which subverted all society and
government. In this particular also, Hume's account invites a comparison with
Machiavelli. In his Prince (1513), the latter had blamed Agathocles the Sicilian for
using cruelty ill:
if Agathocles his valour bee well weighd, in his venturing upon, and
comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse of his courage, in
supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he
should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest Captaines.
Notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable
wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most
excellent men.
The very same formulation occurs in Hume, who suggested that whereas the
'"absolute, uncontrouled authority' (of Henry VIII1 entitled him to the appellation of a
great prince, 'his tyranny and barbarity exclude[d] him from the character of a good
one'."19
When it came time for him to teach jurisprudence and politics at Glasgow, Reid had
clear options: he could return to Grotius and Pufendorf, or follow Hume, or devise his
own jurisprudence and politics. Given the silence with regard to ultimate ends in
Grotius and Pufendorf and their subsequent neglect of virtue (to say nothing of the
absolutist implications of their politics) it would not have been open to Reid to return
to the Continental natural law tradition, although he would have had sympathy for the
place the natural lawyers accorded to reason and conscience. Given Hume's
scepticism with regard to reason (and therefore to ultimate ends) and his view that
morality, far from preserving, actually destroyed human society with the consequence
that moral considerations could not guide our political judgements (not to mention his
' 9David Hume, The History ofEnglandfrom the Invasion ofJulius Caesar to the Revolution in
1688, 6 vols., ed. W.B. Todd (Liberty Classics, New York, 1983), Vol. 3, pp. 321-2, quoted in
Phillipson, Hume, pp. 117-118; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Edward Dacrcs, Intro, by
W.E.C. Baynes (London: Alexander Monng Limited, 1929), p. 38; Phillipson, Hume, pp. 12, 18,
23, 27, 51,*74, 77; cf. pp. 34, 47, 52, 54, 60, 61, 62-63, 70, 75, 83, 84, 89, 91-92, 97-98, 107,
108, 123, 131, 134, 139, 140.
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atheism) it would clearly not have been open to Reid to follow Hume. He would have
to develop a new, Christian political jurisprudence that avoided the absolutist and
atheistical tendencies of Grotius and Pufendorf and answer Hume in the cause of
virtue and a just reverence for our rational and social nature.
Section 2




In this and the following three chapters I will discuss the science of politics that Reid
began to develop in 1764-1765. In the present chapter I will examine the concept of
power which Reid introduced in his inaugural lecture at Glasgow College and which
would prove to be a pervasive theme in every section of his course. Reid developed
his account of power in response to Hume's sceptical view that our concept of power
is a secondary construct. At the same time, Reid made an important concession to the
sceptics by downplaying the role of reason in shaping political events.
1.
Not least among the challenges faced by Reid in the task of addressing his new class at
Glasgow was the fact that many of the students sitting before him had begun their
training in moral philosophy under Adam Smith and would be measuring Reid's
performance against the standard set by his predecessor. As he confided to his friend
Andrew Skene, "Many attend the Moral Philosophy Class for four or five years. So
that I have many Preachers & Students of Divinity and Law of considerable standing,
before whom I stand in awe to speak without more preparation than I have leisure
for."1
Reid's deferential remarks concerning his predecessor in his inaugural lecture on 10
October 1764 are no doubt an attempt to disarm any potential critics by admitting his
own weakness:
1 doubt not but you are all sensible of the loss which this University &
you in particular sustain by the resignation of the learned and ingenious
Gentleman who lately filled this Chair. Those who knew him most
and had most access to attend his Prelections, & especially those who
profited most by them, will be most sensible of their loss. I had not
the happiness of his personal acquaintance for want of opportunity,
though I wished for it, and now wish for it more than ever. But 1
could not be a stranger to his fame and Reputation, nor to the Respect
'R to Skene, 14 Nov 1764, NCL MS. THO 2, to. Ir.
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with which his lectures from this chair were heard by a very crouded
Audience.
I am likewise much a stranger to his System unless so far as he hath
published it to the world. But a man of so great Genius and
penetration must have struck new light into the Subjects which he
treated, as well as have handled them in an excellent and instructive
manner, I shall be much obliged to any of you Gentlemen or to any
other, who can furnish me with Notes of his Prelections whether in
Morals Jurisprudence, Police, or in Rhetorick.
As I will show, Reid may well have been obliged in this request during his first year
of teaching at Glasgow and evidently made use of notes from Smith's lectures on
jurisprudence at least by 1768-1769.
Reid's next remarks, which must be read as an attempt to save face, were also a
prudent attempt to induce in his students a commonsensical receptivity to sensible
arguments even where these might challenge their own prejudices:
1 shall always be desirous to borrow light from every quarter, and to
adopt what appears to be sound & solid in every System, and ready to
change my opinions upon conviction and to change my Metho{d)s or
my Materials when I can do it with advantage. 1 desire to live no
longer than this Candor and Ingenuity, this openness of Mind to
conviction and to information live with me. In the meantime I must for
this Session at least proceed in my Prelections in that Method & and
with those Materials which my own thoughts & studies and my former
Experience in the Profession have suggested
... If I shall at any time differ from [Hutcheson and Smith] ... it shall
always be from a regard to Truth and with the respect due to men of so
great worth and ability from whose writings I have learned and am
always willing to learn. I am very sensible of the honour which this
chair derives from them, and when I consider myself as their
Successor I cannot but be filled with confusion.
As an expression of Reid's character, these are poignant remarks. If Reid knows
himself not to be the architect of new systems, not the singular genius, not the man of
the hour, like Hume or Smith, his sense of his own worth is nonetheless unshaken,
and to this may be attributed his conviction of his calling as a speaker of plain truth in
an age of intellectual seductions. Again and again Reid would show himself to be a
man possessed of eminently critical abilities, whose presentation may justly be
characterized as two thirds refutation and one third new formulation. In Glasgow as
in Aberdeen Reid would borrow from men of genius with the ultimate aim of damage
limitation. His conviction of the path of righteousness as the path of common sense
— a term that he had not yet publicly defined, but which he never missed an
opportunity to use polemically in this period (especially in its Ciceronian formulation,
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as I will show presently) — is of a piece with his character and ability; if he seems
suspicious of genius, it is because his moral convictions keep philosophical
experimentation in check. By broaching the subject of confusion Reid was showing
his sympathy with his pupils, who could not help but be confused by the change that
had been made by his own appointment and by the new system that he would soon be
laying out before them.
The nature of Reid's "own thoughts & studies and ... former Experience" is evident
even in the opening prayer with which he prefaced his first remarks to his Glasgow-
students. In this invocation are compressed the themes that predominated in his
Aberdeen lectures and would inform his teaching at Glasgow: the importance of
works, reason and charity; an insistence on liberty, power and virtue; a mistrust of
luxury and an emphasis on duty. Indeed, Reid could scarcely hide his ideological
commitments. In the background of his remarks were the familiar spectres of
Calvinist orthodoxy on the one hand and Humean scepticism on the other. The
orthodox Calvinist parexcellence, Jonathan Edwards, had emphasized justification by
faith and predestination, denying the existence of human power and the efficacy of
works. His views on power, at least, found an atheistic analogue in Hume. And
Mandeville, confirmed Augustinian that he was, had insisted on human depravity and
implied that virtue was a vain conceit. In such a climate Reid had to declare his
position with extreme care.
It would be possible to amplify from his public prayer Reid's view of his duty as a
teacher (i.e. a shaper of mind and morals), of the possibility of human improvement,
and of politics conceived as a science of prudence properly understood. It might also
be argued that all of the Aberdeen period is summed up — or implied — in the prayer,
for in it Reid reaffirms his commitment to the rational Christianity in which he had
been indoctrinated by Turnbull and to which he had given expression as minister of
New Machar and professor at Aberdeen. The Latitudinarianism of Clarke and Butler,
the Stoicism ofCicero and Epictetus, and the linkage ofModerate morals with
republican politics are all evident:
Do thou o God, who gives wisdom to them that ask it of thee,
enlighten our Understandings and purify our hearts, May we partake
dayly more of thy divine image, by the uprightness and integrity of our
hearts, the innocence of our lives, by a fervent charity towards all men
and by the love ofTruth and of Virtue. ... [F]rom a deep conviction of
the importance of our present behaviour to our future happiness, from
a conviction that as we sow we shall afterwards reap, may we shake
off sloth and indolence, and apply ourselves with vigor to the work
which thy providence calls us to be employed in. Teach us a due
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contempt of the pleasures of Sense, and of the pomp and Luxury and
vain amusements of this Life, And give us a just relish of those
intellectual and moral Enjoyments which are suited to the dignity of our
Natures, and which lead to true felicity and Glory.
... Inspire (the youth] with the love of truth with the desire of
improvement, with reverence to thee their Creator and due Respect to
all to whom they stand related.
Lord bless this city. May the Magistrats be always endowed with that
Wisdom and publick Spirit which becomes their Station may they be
zealous for promoting the good of the place Justice, Industry Virtue
and true religion and for discouraging vice profanness Idleness fraud
of every kind. May they be wise to discern the proper means of
answering these good purposes.2
The philosophical biases encapsulated in this prayer are worth some explication here.
It is striking that Reid begins his petitions in the certainty that wisdom is given to us
by God; it is not simply engendered by experience.3 We need only consult our God-
given faculties to get wisdom and tell the difference between right and wrong; wisdom
is in this sense innate, not evolved, but requires that we strengthen it by exercise and
confirm it by good habits. From this I conjecture that Reid encountered Hume as Job
encountered Satan. Reid's response, like Job's, was to bear up patiently, although
not without protest. In the face of the temptations represented by Hume's scepticism,
Reid was reassured by revelation and reason that God gave us understanding or
judgement, and seated this both in the head and in the heart. This was the virtue of
Solomon, who asked for a "[wise and) understanding heart to judge [his] people, that
[he might] discern between good and bad".4 Our understanding must be enlightened
and our hearts purified before we can live by God's wisdom. As I will show, the line
Reid would take on this point owed much to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and
constituted a concession to Hume. Reid indicated that happiness in this life and
salvation in the life to come lies in "imitating [God's] Perfections", i.e. in our capacity
for improvement or perfectibility. Imitating God's perfections entailed preserving the
uprightness and integrity of our hearts, living justly, performing duties of humanity
and loving truth and virtue.
2MS. 4/11/9, fo. lr-v.
3The epigrams Reid put on the title-pages of his books are revealing. Prefixed to the Inquiry is Job
32.8: "(there is a spirit in man: and t]hc inspiration of the Almighty givcth (him] understanding." To
the Intellectual Powers, Job 38.36: "Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts? (or who hath given
understanding to the heart?]" And to the Active Powers, Micah 6.8: "He hath shewed thee. O Man.
w hat is good; (and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to dojustly, and to love mercy, and to w alk
humbly w ith thy God?]"
41 Kings 3.9.
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The enlightenment of our understanding required that we be taught to hold in contempt
sensual pleasures and luxury; the purification of our hearts, that we be inspired with a
just relish for intellectual and moral enjoyments which alone were suited to the dignity
of our natures and led to true happiness and glory which, again, were in the gift of
God, who was the "foundation of true Honour". Reid was convinced that his prayers
would not fall on deaf ears, for "Reason and Revelation concur in representing fGod|
to us as a faithfull Guardian ready to afford divine Aid to every soul that makes any
virtuous Effort and pants after true Glory & Honour."5
Reid asked that his pupils be inspired with the love of truth and of virtue (the latter is
also expressed as a desire of improvement), with a just reverence for God (he
describes this elsewhere as the "strongest Support of every other Virtue & the onely
rational Foundation of tranquility & peace of Mind, of hope and Comfort and
Magnanimity of Fortitude in all the adverse Circumstances of Life"), and with a due
respect for all to whom we stand related.6 Their faith would then sustain in them the
conviction of the virtue of industry and the application to dedicate themselves to their
duties.
Reid also asked that the civil magistrates be endowed with the wisdom and public
spirit necessary to carry out their duties, to promote, through benevolence as well as
justice, the common good, industry, virtue, and "rational Piety and Devotion" and to
discourage vice, idleness, fraud and profaneness.7 Politics was thus intimately
connected with morals. Finally, Reid prayed that these same magistrates be inspired
with the prudence to discover the proper means of prosecuting their wise ends. These
last two points encapsulate Reid's conception of politics as a science of the highest
prudence. I shall expand greatly upon this subject in the following chapters.
I now return to Reid's inaugural lecture, and the matter of his making some
rapprochement with his predecessor, Smith. Reid evidently regarded him as one of
those philosophers who, like Hume, took with one hand what they gave with the
other, ultimately darkening subjects on which they shed new light. While Reid did
apparently borrow light from Smith, as I will show, he did not see fit to change his
method and materials to repay his modest debt. Heavier were Reid's borrowings from
the other occupant of the Glasgow Chair to whom he politely deferred, namely
^PracticalEthics, p. 119.
6PracticalEthics, p. 108.
Practical Ethics, p. 124.
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Smith's predecessor. Francis Hutcheson, although it seems to have been Reid's
opinion that Hutcheson, too, had darkened a subject which he had tried to illuminate.
Reid's name appears on the subscriber's list to Hutcheson's System ofMoral
Philosophy (1755).8 He drew upon Hutcheson's System and his Short Introduction
toMoral Philosophy9 at various points through his entire course of lectures at
Glasgow, but especially in those sections devoted to private and oeconomical
jurisprudence, where he explicitly confessed to following Hutcheson's method. The
student notes 1 discovered make many references to Hutcheson, and are corroborated
in this regard by other sources.10
Naturally, one must also view Reid's inaugural lecture as an attempt to set the tone for
his entire course at Glasgow, for in it he endeavoured in classical moralist fashion to
kindle in his young audience a "manly Ambition", i.e. one befitting their rational
nature,11 "to excell in knowledge and in every quality that may make a man truly
happy in himself and usefull to mankind ... [and] ... to excell in the station whatever it
be wherein Gods providence shall place him." In a passage reminiscent of the
Ciceronian humanist 1752 "Scheme," with which he had launched the Aberdeen phase
of his teaching career, Reid characterized this life as a race for honour and glory (a
formula also found in Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments), and reduced the proper
objects of ambition to power and virtue: "Power to execute what Virtue desires. &
Virtue to direct the Exertion of Power". As he asserted. "Virtue is nothing else but the
right Exercise of Power"; that is, in contradistinction to prudence narrowly defined,
which has regard to means only, virtue is a species of wisdom. "Power separated
from virtue is an Object of Terror not of Love or Respect", Reid continued, "But
Power directed by Virtue is true Greatness and therefore the true object of laudable
Ambition."
Reid was doing more here than setting the tone: he was giving his students a glimpse
of the central, pervasive theme of his course, namely, power. Hence he further
underlined the Ciceronian relationship between power and virtue, giving it an added
8His signed copy is in Glasgow University Library .
92nd ed. (Glasgow, 1753).
10John Monteath's Notes from Rcid's Moral Philosophy Lectures, 1768-1769, NLS MS. Box 32.3,
p. 151; see also pp. 35-36, 41, 118-119, 121-122, 132, 159, 166 ("Mr Reid is reding Hutcheson
just now"), 173 ("he is reading rules & laws on nature about marriage out of Hutcheson"); cf. Notes
from Rcid's Lectures on Natural Jurisprudence, 1765, loose, uncatalogued booklet in ML MS.
891086, fo. 3v: "We follow Hutcheson's Order".
1 'MS. 4/11/9, pp. 1-2; see also Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981), p. 40.
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historical dimension. "In Barbarous and Savage States", Reid observed, "Strength of
Body Swiftness of foot robustness ... of Constitution ... joyned with Courage and
Stratagem are almost all the species of Power that are regardedl .J But in proportion as
Nations are civilized, Knowledge and Wisdom & Eloquence and Adress Industry &
self command are the personal qualities which chiefly give a man Power and
superiority". As the extent of property increased over time, so notions of virtue were
enlarged; moral and intellectual qualities were increasingly held in regard as goods of
fortune such as strength, swiftness and robustness were gradually displaced. But
Reid was making no suggestion here that our sense of justice evolved along with the
enlarging of our views of and scope for virtue. Justice was immutable, whereas virtue
was conditioned by contexts, and by history. Reid had emphatically not joined ranks
with Hume, Smith and Millar on this question.
The reading of Cicero was indeed a staple of the "undergraduate" diet in moral
philosophy at this time, for the minutes of a University meeting relating to Reid's class
in this period state that "every usual Exercise which might indicate the Attention of a
Student to his Teacher" included "reading Cicero, writing Themes, and giving an
Oration which is usual in that Class".12 Good Ciceronian that he was, Reid argued
that riches and high rank "may add greatly to a mans power if he is possessed of them
and knows how to use them", i.e. if he has "personal Abilitys", or. in other words,
virtue.
A Load of Gold or of Jewels upon the back of an Ass adds little to the
happiness or Credit of the poor beast because it knows not how to use
it. In like manner Rank and Place without personal Qualifications do
not make a man great.13
But while undeserved rank may make a man ridiculous, the man who does not ascend
to the station that he merits may yet take consolation in his virtue. Reid invokes this
second piece of Stoic wisdom early in 1769 in his lectures on natural theology: "Mans
happiness depends upon his own mind not upon his place in the world".14
Reid's Ciceronian account of power and virtue was sustained by a Baconian notion of
power and knowledge which was also reminiscent of his Aberdeen period. Thus, in
12Minutc for the 3 o'clock sitting of the 4 May 1769 University meeting, in Minutes of Rector's
Meeting and University Meeting, 1768-1770, GUA MS. 26644, p. 74.
13MS. 4/11/9, pp. 2^4; cf. Adam Smith, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and
A.L. Maefie (Indianapolis: LibertyClassics, 1979). p. 83.
14Monteath's Notes, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 88.
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his inaugural lecture, Reid suggested that getting wisdom, realizing virtue and
excelling in the work to which Providence calls us, whether carpentry or farming,
seafaring or soldiering, attending to the sick or preaching the word of God, requires
us "in the spring of Life [to] sow the seed of Usefull knowledge". This is not only '"a
delightful entertainment to a Rational Mind but one of the highest Species of power,
and ... a qualification necessary to the exercise of every human power." As if this
were not inspiration enough, Reid promised his students that "By a Superiority of
Knowledge and of Eloquence and Virtue one Man may be enabled to guide the Spirit
of a Nation and to give direction to the united force & Power of Millions." Useful
knowledge comprised the study "ofNaturef] Natural Hist[ory] of Man in his various
progressive States, of Nations, of the Works ofMen[, i. e.] Government, Policef]
Arts and Commerce." According to Reid's view, therefore, "a man of Knowledge"
was one who "knows many facts, relating ... to Men Nations and things".1:1
Thus, by its identification of knowledge with power, Reid's formulation of the
problem of power and virtue embodied a familiar Baconianism.16 What is more, by
its humanist Ciceronian character, it excluded a Machiavellianism to which Reid would
later pay lip service.17 And, in its insistence on the existence of human power it was
decidedly anti-Humean, for in the Treatise Hume had denied that we have any idea of
power. From the 1730s onwards, Reid had made much of our conviction that we
have the power to produce events, and when he was called upon to teach in the 1750s.
his affirmation of the validity of that belief proved to be central to his entire system of
moral philosophy.
2.
Reid began his critique of Hume's politics immediately on taking up his new duties at
Glasgow College. His full reply to Hume and to the natural jurisprudence / politics
tradition — a new political jurisprudence — was not something that sprang from his
head entire but evolved over the years at Glasgow. The first stage of this critique was
15MS. 4/II/9, pp. 4-5, 11.
i6Cf. pp. 4 ("It is evident that in an Active and industrious animal such as man is, knowledge creates
pow er and the more our know ledge of the Nature of Things is inlarged the more our Dominion and
Empire over nature is extended"), 11 (learning or erudition, knowledge and science "[have their] Merit
in proportion as [they tend] to promote the happiness of human Society, to enlarge the mind and
elevate it above low pursuits, & give exercise to its noblest faculties.")
17See Skmner, Machiavelli, pp. 25, 30-31, 36-37, 40, 43-^17, 54.
Kitagawa 155
his development of an account of the concept of power. Reid articulated this concept
throughout his entire course; arising in the lectures on psychology and natural
theology, it ran through the lectures on ethics and found its fullest expression in the
politics lectures. 1 shall now retrace the steps by which this climax was reached.
Reid began with the Ciceronian-cum-Baconian view that man is an "Active and
industrious animal", that is, one whose "Dignity ... Glory and Perfection ... consists
in doing his duty and acting the Part that is Proper for him." Cicero had suggested
that the '"whole glory of virtue is in activity'" and, as Peter J. Diamond has pointed
out, Reid framed his own action-centered concept of virtue or duty along Ciceronian
lines. To Reid it was "evident that Nature intended us for action and that we can
neither answer the end of our being nor enjoy any degree of happiness in a lazy
inactive slouthfull life."18 Reid's next step was to argue that activity (i.e. doing our
duty and acting our part) is relative to our active powers and moral and intellectual
faculties. As Reid put it: "The duty of a Man must be grounded upon the human
Constitution. If we had not the powers and faculties of Man, the duty of a Man would
not be incumbent upon us." Moreover, the exertion of his active powers brings
honour and glory to a man to the extent that he "intends by his honest Industry to
provide for his family!,] to educate his children to virtue and Industry, to be injurious
or burdensome to no man[,] to be just to all and usefull to his country according to his
power" and actually succeeds in carrying out these intentions.19 In this formula, such
intentions suppose that we have a moral faculty that points out where our duties lie.
Reid's assumption that we have the ability to execute our plans derived from his belief
that our moral faculty — i.e. active power — was not given to us in vain but in order
that we might use it to guide our conduct. Our moral faculty or conscience approves
our honourable intentions and directs us to exert ourselves only for the worthiest ends.
The judgements of conscience are meaningful only because we are equipped with the
ability to act on them. Virtue consists in realizing those purposes that most befit our
nature according to the valuations provided by our moral faculty, i.e. those that bring
us the highest honour and glory. Doing our duty and acting our part, in turn, consists
in achieving that degree of virtue which is consonant with the fullest exertion of our
active powers and the best use of our opportunities.
1 Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), p. 21,
quoted in Peter J. Diamond, "Reid, Natural Lav and the Science of Man," in Jennifer J. Carter and
Joan H. Pittock, eds, Aberdeen and the Enlightenment (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 3987).
p. 112; PracticalEthics, pp. 130, 1127]; see also Diamond, "Reid," p. 113.
19PracticalEthics, pp. Ill, 129.
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The attainment of this active virtue is by no means automatic; it requires much struggle
and discipline, for it exists only by being exercised. It may be strengthened greatly by
the acquisition of good habits or totally undermined by the formation of bad ones.
Reid observed that our passions and appetites are "of quicker Growth" than reason
and conscience and "ripen more early." What is more, they are "strengthened by
habits of Indulgence before the Governing powers can exercise theirAuthority."
These bad habits themselves may be reinforced by the "influence of bad example and
bad education". Nevertheless, Reid asserted that the "restraint of our passions [is] in
our power." Where we do manage to bridle them, power is properly said to reside in
us; but where we succumb to bad habits, these may be said to "retain ... power." But
neither our rationality nor our enjoyment may be regarded as indices of virtue, for
reason may be made to serve the passions, e.g. where we are in the power of bad
habits; as Reid sceptically confessed, "perhaps any kind of Exercise may by habit be
made agreable."20
God, from whom we derive "every degree of power we are possessed of', has given
us power that we might perform our duties. Virtue consists in the performance of our
duties. According to Reid all of our virtues are "properly seated in the Heart; yet it
necessarly supposes some Degree of Understanding and cannot possibly exist without
it." Thus prudence signifies the "Habit of determining properly what ends we ought
to pursue and by what means they are to be pursued." Reid characterized the virtue of
temperance as the "bridle of the Mind" by which our appetites and passions are
"indulge[d] or restrain[ed] ... according to the Rules which Reason prescribes".
Fortitude "enables us to face dangers and strugle with difficulties that occur in the way
of our Duty with a Noble Ardour of Soul." It supposes that we have the "free Use of
our Reason" and "determines [us] to pursue the paths of Wisdom and Virtue". (Reid
thereby broached the subject of free will, but did not elaborate; he would do that in
1765-1766, as I will show.) He suggested that "True Wisdom" lay in the pursuit of
those virtues which compassed the "best and the Noblest Ends", i.e. the "Approbation
ofAlmighty God, to be usefull to Mankind & to behave suitable to the Dignity of our
Nature." He believed that precisely because these ends are the best and noblest ones
they are "most in our Power." He also suggested that to be happy a man need only be
"carefull to do his duty and to act properly", secure in the assurance that God rewards
those who do their duty.21
^PracticalEthics, pp. 120, 128, 134.
21PracticalEthics, pp. 118, 122, 129, 134, 136, 179, (184], 185, 186.
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All of this constituted a fundamental critique of Hume, who reduced all knowledge to
probability and doubted that we could know our ultimate end. For Hume, all
"knowledge" was belief and could be accounted for only in terms of custom and habit.
In theory at least, one result of this was that people could legitimately entertain a doubt
that their obligations (including their political ones) were morally binding, as they
were founded on mere opinion. Hume also denied that we have any idea of power.
Reid argued in the reverse direction, elevating habits and the moral obligations on
which they were built to the status of knowledge, and referring them back to human
power.
The evidence that has survived from the Glasgow period dramatically reveals the
centrality of the concept of power to Reid's course as a whole. Monteath's notes from
the 1768-1769 session provide a particularly rich source ofmaterial in this regard. In
his lectures on psychology (the first half of pneumatology, which was the first part of
the course) Reid showed "y1 men have always be strongly impresd with a belief of
action" and therewith a belief of "active power" in themselves, or of that "wc [is]
capable of moving itself and moving oyr Bodies."22 Reid spelled out the implication
of the belief that people have active power in themselves in his lectures on natural
theology (the second half of pneumatology): "if God has given to every one a certain
sphere of power, mens immoral actions then are not the workes of God, but the works
of men." Reid therefore grounded his understanding of our moral power on
immediate beliefs in the human mind which pointed to our accountability or
responsibility for our actions, i.e. to our moral liberty or free will.
He underlined this point in his lectures on ethics (the second part of his course):
Ethicks are those Rules or Laws by wc we direct our Actions. The
object of ethicks is human Actions. ... we are conciouse of directing
our thought & producing some motion in our body, and as it depends
on our will is calld human Actions. Human Actions then must be as
extensive as human power wc is very extensive.23
22NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 36. For an indication of just how close Monlcath's notes are in the
passage from w hich these quotations were taken to w hat Reid published in the Active Powers (1788),
and therefore for some support of their authority, compare p. 35 ("every Child yl know what it is to
strick means & what it is to be stricken know what action and passion is") with Works, p. 515a-b
("Even child that understands the distinction betw een striking and being struk, must have the
conception of action and passion").
23NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp. 88-89, 96-97.
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Reid compared a life in which our passions and appetites were "indulged without
restraint" to a ship that "drives before theWind" without a helmsman, in constant
danger of being "over set or dashed to pieces upon Rocks or Shouls". Our passions
and appetites, like the wind to an experienced helmsman, may be very useful in
carrying us "in a Right Course" if only we supply appropriate direction. Making the
characteristic additional assumption that God would not have intended us to "go to
wreck", Reid was convinced that there "must be some Gouverning Principle in the
Mind" and observed that we are "conscious that we have power to restrain our
Appetites ... to bridle our passions, or we can give them the Rein and be carried away
wherever they lead us."24
For Reid's view of the crucial importance of human power to politics (the third and
last part of his course), we have evidence from what is undoubtedly a fragment of an
early version of Reid's introductory lecture to his course as a whole at Glasgow.25 In
this passage, which almost certainly dates from 1764, Reid emphasized the collective
effects of human power:
although every individual of the human kind has a certain Sphere of
Power and may produce effects that are not inconsiderable, yet the
grand Effects of human Power [are] these which must be produced by
the joint Council and force of a Number of men united in Society.
Such are Laws, Government, Police, Arts and Sciences, {one word
illegible) Trade, Manufactures War, Conquest, Colonies. These we
may call the grand Effects of human Society. And indeed they are of
things that concern the present life the grandest & most interesting
Objects to the human Mind because the happiness and the improvement
of Mankind or theirmisery and degeneracy depend upon them. We see
these great Effects produced improved impaired destroyed revived
variously in various parts of the Globe. We see Nations some
barbarous and some civilized who for ages, nay for thousands of years
have been always the same and can neither be said to have improved
nor declined. Who retain the same Government the same manners the
same police the same Character. We see other Nations in a perpetual
Motion & change from worse to better or from better to worse. From
indolence to industry from poverty to riches from ignorance &
barbarity to knowledge and politeness from simplicity to Luxury and
avarice from one System of Laws and Government to another So that
(a) People may be said to be changed every century.
^PracticalEthics, p. 131.
25The introductory lecture immediately followed a revised form of the inaugural lecture in 1765-1766
and beyond.
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Although Reid spoke in this passage ofjoint counsel (which with its deliberative
connotations would seem to imply rationality), he went on to insist that "These grand
Events whether good or evil proceed from human operation they are the effects of
human passions and Affections operating variously in different circumstances and
cooperating in multitudes often without any design, to produce one great Effect."26
Reid's exclusion of reason as a cause of action and his change of emphasis from joint
counsel to multitudes co-operating without design would tend to indicate a certain
scepticism with regard to reason. Indeed, Reid's idiom in this crucial passage
expresses a Mandevillian "anti-rationalism" according to which "reason),] ... whether
it find truth or not, ... does so entirely at the bidding and under the sway of some sub-
rational desire."27 By the same token, it also exhibits a certain Hutchesonian influence
in so far as it emphasizes the prompting of "immediate dispositions[s] or
determination)s] of soul, which in the order of action [are] always prior to all
reasoning; as no opinion or judgment can move to action, where there is no prior
desire to some end."28 Such a view of reason, however, would have been
irreconcilable with Reid's classical humanist identification of knowledge (or reason)
with virtue, implicit in his notion of the intellectual habit (or power) of self-command.
The sceptical view of reason contained in this passage is also at odds with what Reid
has already told us about power and leads one to ask what the connection between
power and the passions and affections really is. Reid's suggestion in the passage we
have been considering is that the exercise of power in politics does not necessarily
involve moral liberty or free will; great numbers of men may be said to have power
and produce events though they be entirely lacking in those virtues or habits which
Reid has already taught us to regard as the very form in which our power is
expressed. His position therefore seems at this time to have been that political events
are the effects of human power, even where the individuals concerned should more
properly be characterized as being in the power of their passions and affections than as
possessed of power themselves. This apparent contradiction may perhaps be
explained by observing how infrequently men act freely (i.e. as they ought) in politics
notwithstanding the fact that it is eminently within their power to do so. This is,
again, a subject to which 1 shall return presently.
26MS. 6/1/31, fo. lr.
27F.B. Kaye, Introduction to The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, ed. F.B. Kaye,
vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), pp. 78—79.
28Francis Hutcheson, A System ofMoral Philosophy, vol. 1 (London, 1755), p. 38; cf. Works, p.
615b: "as reason w ithout activ e power can do nothing, so activ e pow er w ithout reason has no guide to
direct it to any end.".
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In the 1768-1769 session Reid addressed himself to the sceptical objection that "No
Government [is] framed or changed by Art".29 This objection was very Humean in
character, for in his essay "Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences" (1742)
Hume had written that
To balance a large state or society, whether monarchical or republican,
on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius,
however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and
reflection, to effect it. The judgments ofmany must unite in this work:
Experience must guide their labour: Time must bring it to perfection:
And the feeling of inconveniencies must correct the mistakes, which
they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments.30
Hume's political scepticism as expressed in the above passage may well have derived
from Mandeville, whose anti-rationalism entailed the exposure as myth the classical
image of the wise legislator.
By downplaying the potential of "Art and human Wisdom" to generate perfection in
the laws of a State and emphasizing instead accidental circumstances, i.e. "length of
time, and the experience ofmany generations,"31 Mandeville puts one in mind of
Cicero,32 who, reporting Cato's view, suggested that the superiority of the
constitution of the Roman commonwealth
was based upon the genius, not of one man, but of many; it was
founded, not in one generation, but in a long period of several
29MS. 4/111/3, fo. Jr.
3®Essays, p. 124. Although Hume had in his History ofEngland suggested that the Saxon King
Alfred "deserv edly attained the appellation of Alfred the Great, and the title of Founder of the English
monarchy", and w hile Hume clearly believed in the possibility of a true "know ledge of public affairs,
or the arts of civil government" and of a real "science of government", he also emphasized the role of
"accident" or of "the general course of ev ents" in political affairs and of consequences that cannot be
"foreseen by human w isdom". Indeed, Hume w as deeply critical of "Those w ho, from a pretended
respect to antiquity, appeal at every turn to an original plan of the constitution, [for they] only cover
their turbulent spirit and their priv ate ambition under the appearance of v enerable forms". He
sceptically observed that "An acquaintance w ith the history of the antient periods of their government
is chiefly useful by instructing them to cherish their present constitution from a comparison or
contrast w ith the condition of those distant times. And it is also curious, by showing them the
remote, and commonly faint and disfigured originals of the most finished and most noble institutions,
and by instructing them in the great mixture of accident which commonly concurs with a small
ingredient of w isdom and foresight, in erecting the complicated fabric of the most perfect government"
(new ed., (London, 1762), v ol. 1 pp. 63, 234, 265; vol. 2, pp. 443, 446; Dav id Hume, The History
ofEngland, under the House of Tudor, 2 vols (London, 1759), vol. 1, pp. 66-67; cf. p. 85; vol. 2, p.
518).
3' Vol. 2, p. 142, quoted in F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the
History ofIdeas (London and Henley: Routledgc & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 260.
32Hayek suggests a possible linkage between Mandevillc and Cicero on this point; unfortunately, he
does not specify a text-based line of transmission (see New Studies, pp. 255-256); Studies in
Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1978), p. 98).
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centuries and many ages of men. For, said he, there never has lived a
man possessed of so great genius that nothing could escape him, nor
could the combined powers of all the men living at one time possibly
make all provisions for the future without the aid of actual experience
and the test of time.33
For his part, Reid, although apparently impressed by the political scepticism of which
I have been speaking,34 nevertheless still clutched at the notion of the wise legislator
in the 1764-1765 session. Thus, in his lectures on political jurisprudence he observed
that legislators are "so highly revered" because "a good plan of Government... is ...
the greatest Good that can be bestowed upon a Nation."33 I shall have occasion to
underline Reid's faith in the possibility of wise legislators when I consider his lectures
on politics.
33Z> Re Publico, in De Re Publico, De I^gibus, ed. Clinton Walker Keyes (London: William
Heinemann. 1928), p. 113. It must be pointed out that the De Re Publico was unknown in the
eighteenth century except through scattered quotations in, for example, St Augustine's De Civitate
Dei, Lactantius' Divine Institutions, and Bayle's GeneralDictionary and Middleton's Life of Cicero,
Bayle quoting St Augustine and Middleton quoting Lactantius and the grammarian Nonius (see e.g.
Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Ciceron, vol. 1 (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1958), p. 195 and
n. 1; R.M. Ogilvie, The Library ofLactantius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 9, 63;
[Pierre] Bayle, "Carneades," A Genera!Dictionary, Historical and Critical, trans. J. P. Bernard et al.,
vol. 4 (London, 1736), p. 130, remark I, cit. 87; Conyers Middleton, The Life of M. Tullius Cicero,
vol. 2, p. 430, n. *). It should be f urther remarked that none of these sources contain a reference to
De Re Publico, bk 2, sec. 1, i.e. the source of the above quotation from Cicero. If Mandeville
borrowed from Cicero on this count, therefore, he made use of a different line of transmission from
that afforded by St Augustine, Lactantius and Bayle (Middleton, whose Life of Cicero was first
published in 1741, not being available to him).
34The sceptical thesis I have been considering achieved legendary exposition in Adam Ferguson's
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767): "Every step and every mov ement of the multitude, ev en
in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble
upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any
human design. If Cromwell said, That a man never mounts higher, than when he knows not w hither
he is going; it may with more reason be affirmed of communities, that they admit of the greatest
revolutions where no change is intended, and that the most refined politicians do not always know
whither they are leading the state by their projects" (ed. Louis Schneider (New Brunswick (USA) and
London (UK): Transaction Books, 1980), p. 122). Ferguson (1723-1816) had been appointed to the
Edinburgh moral philosophy chair in 1764, the same year Reid had been appointed to the equivalent
chair at Glasgow, and was, like Reid, a Christian philosopher teaching and w riting in the sceptical
shadow cast largely by Hume. It is extremely interesting, then, to find Reid espousing the same
doctrine three years before Ferguson's Essay appeared in print. As tempting as it is to think that Reid
may have read Ferguson's Essay in manuscript, this appears to be disproven by certain remarks in
Reid's private correspondence relating to Ferguson and his literary plans. (See R to Dr David Skene,
20-30 Dec 1765, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 6r: "Ferguson is indeed as far as I can Judge a man of a
Noble Spirit, of very elegant manners, & has a very uncommon flow of Eloquence. I hear he is about
to publish, I dont know under w hat title, a Natural History of Man: exhibiting a view of him in the
Savage State and in the several Successive States of Pasturage, Agriculture, & Commerce.") It is
more likely that both philosophers hit upon this formula independently of each other while addressing
themselves to the sceptical agendas of the day.
37MS. 8/IV/10, fo. 2v; cf. PracticalEthics, p. 128: "one is fit onely to forge hob nails while another
is fit to fabricate or to govern a Commonwealth."
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It is also interesting that in subsequent revisions of his introductory' lecture Reid would
mitigate his scepticism with regard to reason by including reason as a contributory
cause of political events. No doubt, this adjustment reflected his progress toward the
notion of rational principles of action. In an early version Reid wrote:
These grand Events whether they be good or Evil proceed from human
operation!. TJhey are the Effects of human Reason or of human
passions and affections operating variously according to the characters
of the agents and the circumstances in which they are placed, and & by
their cooperation in multitudes, producing, very often without design,
one great Effect.36
Probably by 1770 or 1771, Reid's formula, "of human Reason or of human passions
and affections", was altered to the less equivocal "of human Reason and human
Passions", again apparently reflecting his progress toward a concept of rational
principles of action and their applicability to political phenomena:
These great Events whether they be good or Evil proceed from human
Operation, they are the Effects of human Reason and human Passions
operating variously according to the Characters of the Agents and the
Circumstances in which they are placed, and by their cooperation in
multitudes producing, very often without Design, one great Event.37
It is perhaps worth noting that the word event replaces effect at the end of this
passage. On one level, Reid was probably only streamlining his use of terms — he
began by talking about events, not effects. But, on another level, his intention may
have been to de-emphasize the passivity implied in "effect" in favour of the notion of
human agency which is perhaps more clearly implied in "event", effect importing
connotations of determinism. In this connection one thinks ofMontesquieu's account
of how a despot "alone, without law and without rule, draws everything along by his
will and his caprices" and thereby produces unfailing obedience as "infallibly as does
one ball thrown against another".38
In 1779-1780 Reid continued to speak of political events which were produced not by
"great men" — as Baird initially wrote and then cancelled — but by the "joint effects
of a great Number joined in Society." Reid was therefore still making an important
concession to the sceptics. Yet he now emphasized that political events, whether good
36MS. 4/11/1, p. 3. Reid's mind was so modelled on Cicero's that he may have come up with or
latched on to a Ciceronian formulation whether he read it in Cicero or not.
37MS. 7/V/4, p. 16.
38Montesquieu, Spirit of the Imws, trans, and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold
Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 10, 29.
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or bad, were the "effects of human power and human reason & passion, operating
according to the Character & circumstances of the agents"; gone was the sceptical
suggestion of a population acting together to produce "very often without Design, one
great Event".39
But, to repeat, in 1764—1765 Reid was still extremely sceptical about the priority of
reason in shaping human conduct, for as he said later in the same session, "Man is a
being compounded of Reason and Passion, and in most men the last principle is often
prevalent over the first."40
39MS. 7/V/4, pp. 15-17; Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104929,
Lecture 109, vol. 7, fos 67r-68r.
40MS. 4/III/9, fo. lr. The uneasy admixture of faith in reason and deference to passion would remain
the hallmark of Reid's political scepticism for the rest of his life, for even in the 1779-1780 session,
at the end of his teaching career, he insisted on both reason and passion as producing ev ents and on the
unintended effects of legislative policies (which presupposes the unpredictable, passion-driven side of
man). This does not mean that Rcid considered legislative policy to be futile. Thus he is reported to
have told his students that: "It is foolish to say that rewards & punishments hav e no force because
they do not allways produce the intended effect of the Legislator. They punish theft, but if these laws
necessarily determined people not to steal then, the laws never would be executed. If we suppose
motives to determine necessarily!,] then vvhe(ie) laws dont produce the intended effect the Conclusion
would be that the fault was in the Legislator who had not applied the proper motive" (Baird's Notes
from Reid's Lectures, ML MS. A 104935, vol. 4, lect. 69 (unpaginated); cf. Lecture 110, 11 Apr
1780, vol. 7, fos 75v-77r. It is interesting that Hume applied a Mandev illian style of reasoning in
stressing the unintended effects of self-love in giving rise to "the laws of justice", or "Those rules, by
which property, right, and obligation are determin'd". These law s "[are] ... advantageous to the
public; tho' ... not intended for that purpose by the inventors" (Treatise, pp. 528-529)). In the
corresponding passage in the Active Powers (1788), Reid dropped all talk of unintended consequences
(see Works, pp. 612a-613a), although the notion is more or less implicit in a couple of related
passages (see Works, pp. 614b, 626a). However, in Reid's last discourse on politics, "Thoughts on
the Utopian System" (28 November 1794), the problem of unintended consequences appears again:
"so limited is the Wisdom of Man, so short his Foresight, that new Laws, even w hen made with the
best intention, do not always produce the Effect intended and expected from them, or they bring
unforseen inconveniencies that do more than counterballance their good Effects (AUL MS. 3061/6, p.
4).
Chapter 10
Toward a Political Jurisprudence
In this chapter I shall examine Reid's first efforts at Glasgow to develop a political
jurisprudence which would include both the art and the science of politics as well as a
formula for evaluating the predisposition of given political constitutions to promote
justice. This involved Reid in a serious study of Montesquieu on the denaturing
effects of custom and habit.
1.
Impressed as he had been in Aberdeen by Montesquieu, it is not surprising that Reid
began his 1765 lectures on politics with the highly Montesquieuian view that "Political
is the Art ofModelling & Governing Societys of Men so as to answer the End
proposed by them".' It is worth remarking that Reid originally wrote "Political is the
Art of Forming & Governing Political Societys" [italics mine].2 It is possible that
Reid regarded the word forming as carrying the wrong connotation, suggesting as it
does a deliberate act of founding a regime, rather than the art of re-forming an existing
political constitution on the basis of the best available model. The modelling and
governing formula may be regarded as embodying a concession to political sceptics
like Mandeville and Hume, in so far as it conceived laws and constitutions to be the
work of many hands over many ages.3 Yet the notion of modelling implied
'MS. 4/1II /1, fo. lr. The contemporary Chambers Cyclopa'dia defined political as "something that
relates to policy, or civil government" ("Political, politike"), Cyclopa'dia, ed. by E. Chambers, 7th
ed., vol. 2 (London, 1752)).
2MS. 4/111/1, fo. lr.
3Reid's use of the language of modelling so as to answer an intention also recalled Cicero's advocacy
of the use of models in eloquence, which Reid defined as speaking so as to answer the end of the
speaker, just as he defines politics here as modelling so as to answer the end of the government in
question.See MS. 8/1/2, p. 7 (w hich belongs to a numbered sequence which begins following fo. 5v,
is interrupted after p. 2 by fo. 7r-v and contains 22 blank pages before p. 7): "the Ancients framed to
themselves a Notion or Conception of a Perfect Orator, as a Model w hich even, Orator should Strive
to imitate though no Man ever came up to it. One of Cicero's Books w hich he Calls Orator is wrote
expressly with a view to delineate this Perfect Orator, who he confesses never existed. Yet such a
Model is of great Use, berth as an Object w hich even one w ho would attain any considerable degree of
Eloquence ought to pursue, & as a Standarl by which we may judge of our own Defects &
Excellencies & those of others."
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deliberation.4 In Montesquieu's terms, the most perfect specimen of a given political
constitution would be the one that ismost successful at encouraging ormotivating
those subject to it to act according to the principles of human nature that will sustain it,
however wise or wicked its aims may be. As Montesquieu himself put it: "[political
and civil laws] should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are
made, as to render it very unlikely for those of one nation to be proper for another."
But despite his apparent separation of ethics and politics, it was not Montesquieu's
intention to justify unjust regimes. He regarded natural law and the obligation that
attached to it as deriving from "human reason, inasmuch as it govern[ed] all the
inhabitants of the earth". For Montesquieu, this body of law comprised "relations of
possible justice." Possible was here opposed to positive, as in positive laws. "To say
that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive
laws," Montesquieu suggested (obviously taking sides with Grotius against Hobbes),
was the "same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not
equal." Montesquieu therefore insisted that we "acknowledge relations ofjustice
antecedent to the positive law by which they are established".
According to Montesquieu's logic, then, the "political and civil laws of each nation
ought to be only the particular cases in which this human reason is applied." The fact
that the laws of individual regimes diverged from the law of nature could not,
therefore, be attributed to the absence of fixed laws of nature. Rather, this divergence
derived from the "finite nature" of the men of which the regimes were composed,
notwithstanding their being equipped with a "faculty of knowing"; from "nature
[which] require[d them] to be free agents"; from their basic forgetfulness where their
duties were concerned; and from their corresponding tendency to be "hurried away by
a thousand impetuous passions". From our finite nature, free will, and forgetfulness
sprang our flexibility. As Montesquieu put it: "Man, that flexible being, conforming
in society to the thoughts and impressions of others, is equally capable of knowing his
own nature whenever it is laid open to his view, and of losing the very sense of it
when this idea is banished from his mind." The source of both our forgetfulness and
our flexibility was, for Montesquieu, prejudice, by which he did not mean that which
"renders men ignorant of some particular things, but whatever renders them ignorant
of themselves." Montesquieu held out the hope that by education, i.e. by disabusing
4The suggestion that politicians model and govern deliberately tells against the view contained in
Reid's introductory lecture that political events are largely unplanned.
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ourselves of our damaging prejudices, we could achieve enlightenment, that is, just
notions of our natural rights and liberties.-"' Such an education or process of
enlightenment might properly be characterized as a recovery of prudence or the
attainment of self-knowledge. Reid apparently followed Montesquieu on this point,
arguing that
Self Government in a State, relates either 1 to the Constitution which it
ought to preserve & improve or 2 To the Subject whom it ought to
train and Govern, to provide for and to protect. For these Ends a State
ought to know itself, its advantages & to know its neighbour States.
Such prudence, moreover, could be summed up in the highly Ciceronian counsel "To
attend carefully to the Glory of the Nation" just as one would to the state of one's soul
and to the honourableness of one's conduct.6 Implicit in this formulation was Reid's
insistence that political prudence is subject to a higher wisdom or ethical standard.
Thus in his opening lecture on politics, Reid also saw fit to explain "How the
Politician differs from the Man of Address & Sagacity. & from the Cunning Man"."
Unfortunately, Reid's explanation of this distinction (at this point in his discussion)
has not survived. But it is possible to infer his meaning from other evidence. In the
Active Powers (1788) Reid characterized the man of sagacity as one "who has had
occasion to deal in interesting matters, with a great variety of persons of different age,
sex, rank, and profession, [and who therefore] learns to judge what may be expected
-sOn the subject of principles Montesquieu continued: "They should be relative to the nature and
principle of the actual, or intended government; w hether they form it, as in the case of political law s.
or whether they support it, as may be said of civil institutions. They should be relative to the climate
of each country, to the quality of the soil, to its situation and extent, to the manner of living of the
natives, whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have a relation to the degree of
liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations,
riches, number, commerce, manners, and customs. In fine they have relations amongst themselves,
as also to their origin, to the intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are
established; in all v hich different lights they ought to be considered." This entire cluster of relations
formed what Montesquieu called the "Spirit of laws." It was on the basis of his understanding of the
spirit of laws that Montesquieu was able to say that the "government most conformable to nature ...
is that w hose particular disposition best agrees with the humour and disposition of the people in
whose favour it is established." It was in this spirit, too, that Montesquieu said in the Preface to his
Spirit of the Imws that he had not written in order to "censure anything established in any country
whatsoever"; on the contrary , he w as confident that "Every nation will here find the reasons on w hich
its maxims are founded". (Montesquieu, Spirit of Imws, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3, 4, 5, 8-9; Montesquieu,
The Spirit of the Imws, trans. Thomas Nugent; ed. Franz Neumann (New York: Hafner Press, 1975),
pp. lxviii, lxix; cf. MS. 4/111/14, fo. lr ("There is a certain Character and Temper in the Subjects that
suits every Government This has been observed by Montesquieu and it is w hat he calls the principle
of the Several Governments by w hich he seems to mean onely that the stability and duration of such a
Plan of Government requires that the Subjects Should be chiefly actuated by such a Principle");
Montesquieu, Spirit of Imws, Vol. 1, p. 6.)
6MS. 7/VII/23, fo. 1\.
7MS. 4/111/1, fo. lr.
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from men in given circumstances; and how they may be most effectually induced to act
the part which he desires."8 Such a man will be prudent, i.e. adept in selecting the
means to chosen ends, although he has not necessarily been instructed in how he
should choose his ends.9 A cunning man is precisely one who tries to achieve his
own ends by deception. Thus Reid distinguished "cunning and Deceits" from
"political Wisdom" and ridiculed those "Minute Politicians" who advocated a "dark
and crooked Politicks".10 By this reckoning, a true politician would be one who, like
the man of sagacity, "[knew] human nature";11 but also one who, unlike the cunning
man, used fair means to achieve a public purpose. Thus the real politician was for
Reid eminently moral — in spite of the materials he had to work with.
2.
The prudence of which 1 have been speaking formed the basis of Reid's political
science, which, in 1764—1765, Reid described as the "discovery of] the causes of
those great Events in the Characters and tempers of such Societies and in the
circumstances in which they are placed, and as a consequence of this to shew how-
such events may probably be produced by the application of proper Causes." In the
translation of political prudence to political science, however, a problematic gap was
opened up between politics and the ethics that underwrote it; "It is not... the bussiness
of politicks to shew how men ought to act, that belongs to Morals, but to shew how
they will act when placed in such circumstances and under such Government."12
8Works, p. 543b.
9See Hume, Essays, p. 161.
^PracticalEthics, p. [182]; cf. p. 255; Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS.
A104935, vol. 4, lect. 70, 7 Jan 1780 (unpaginated): "the most cunning politician".
1 1 Works, p. 543b.
12MS. 6/1/31, fo. lr; cf. MS. 4/III/9, fo. lr ("The primary Object of the Science of Politicks is the
Constitution of a State, and the natural Effects and consequences of that Constitution and this capital
part of the Political Science may be reduced to these two Problems. First a Constitution or form of
Government being given to point out the Natural Effects and Consequences of that Constitution
Whether for Instance it w ill be lasting or of short duration, whether powerfull against forreign
Enemies or w cak and Easy to be conquered, w hether internally quiet and peccable or turbulent and
Seditious, w hether the Subjects w ill be oppressed or enjoy the common Rights and Liberties which
mankind are entitled to. The second Problem is[,] having given the End for w hich a Constitution of
Government is intended!,] to point out that Constitution or Model of Government w hich w ill most
effectually promote and secure this end. It is very obvious that the End of Government ought to be
the good and happiness of the Governed. And therefore every Form or Model of Government if we
judge of it by the moral Standart is to be more or less approved of according as it tends more or less
to promote this end"). This characterization was analogous to Reid's description of natural
philosophy. See MS. 4/11/9, p. 11: "the Man w ho has an extensive knowledge of conclusions of
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Such knowledge constituted "The Principles of Political Reasoning" or, in other
words, "the Active Principles (of) Human Nature".
In his efforts to reduce politics to a science, Reid may well have been endorsing
Montesquieu's response to those sceptics who endeavoured to account for the
seemingly endless variety of political constitutions by reducing them to socio-historical
contingencies — custom and habit — or the whims of individual princes;
Montesquieu's reply was to trace observed diversities back to the original principles of
human nature. As Montesquieu put it,
I have first of all considered mankind, and the result of my thoughts
has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and manners,
they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.
I have laid down first principles, and have found that the particular
cases follow naturally from them; that the histories of all nations are
only consequences of them; and that every particular law is connected
with another law, or depends on some other of a more general extent.
I now reproduce Reid's list of the first principles of political reasoning:
The General Principles of Action Among Men are Such as these
1 Men will generally be just honest & true where they have no
Temptation to be otherwise
2 Men have always a Strong Resentment of Injuries and will resist
them where it is in their Power & have commonly some Gratitude for
good Offices^
3 Tho a cool Desire of Happiness & a Regard to duty have some
Influense on the Actions of All men yet it does not appear that either of
these are the Prevailing Principles in Most Men
4 It may be therefore expected of the Generality of Men that they will
do things contrary either to their real Interest or their Duty when they
have Strong temptations, either knowingly or by imposing upon
themsel(ve)s
5 Few Men will do the most Atrocious Acts of Wickedness even upon
a Strong Temptation till they have been long hardned by Vicious habits
6 Men always esteem Virtue Wisdom & Power in others where they
are not objects of Envy and desire to be possessed of them or to be
thought to be possessed of them themselves
7 Mens private Affections are commonly Stronger than their publick
ones
8. Mens Characters are formed mostly by Education Custom &
Example
Science 2nd C2n trace them to the principles on which they 2re founded, 2nd on the other h2nd is
skillfull in deducing conclusions from first principles is w hat we call a Man of Science."
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9. In a Great Number of Men taken without Distinction there will
always be found a few that are far Superior to the Rest in Wisdom or
Virtue Power or all these
10. People will not long receive Laws from Governors unless they
have an opinion that the Governors have superior Power Superior
Wisdom & Virtue or Right to Govern
11 Like Effects may be expected from like Causes, and similar
Conduct from persons of like Characters in like Circumstances.
12 In all great Bodies of Men who either meet together or can easily
communicate their Sentiments to each other, the Many will be led by a
few, of Superior Parts, Superior Eloquence or Superior Character, &
will imbibe their Sentiments Passions and Opinions.13
In elaborating the first principle, Reid emphasized that "The bulk of Men are neither so
good as they ought to be nor so bad as they might be." If we were to suppose that the
"generality of Men of any Nation were so abandoned as to have no degree of regard to
Justice Honesty and truth," it would be impossible for them to be "kept together under
any kind of Government but that of absolute Slavery. They behoved to be chained as
wild beasts and have the dread of punishment constantly hanging over their heads to
keep them from doing mischief." In making this point Reid may well have been
correcting Hume's assumption about the "natural depravity of mankind". On the other
hand, he reasoned, "Ifmen were perfectly virtuous & proof against all temptations
there would be no Need of Civil Government. Men would do their duty without being
compelled by Laws and punishments." This point may have been suggested by Hume
as well, who had denied that all men were "possessed of so inflexible a regard to
justice, that, of themselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of others".
These things being so, Reid allowed that the precise degree of virtue required in order
that a people might, to use Monteath's report, "hang together in a political
government, [or] form one" is very variable. Thus in "rude Nations" where only
"Small Property" is known "the generality of men may live very innocently with a
small degree of Virtue." On the other hand, in other "States of Society" where a
"Difference of Ranks great Trust [and] Refinements of high living" are exhibited
"there will be both greater exertions of Virtue in some individuals and greater
corruption in otherfs]." Here Reid was evidently making a concession to Smith, who
had demonstrated how the progress of virtue followed the evolution of property. But
he back-pedalled vigorously (evidently appealing to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson) by
insisting, in Monteath's report, that "there are none so wicked but yl they have some
publick Affections love to their Children acquaintances & friend[s] to their King &
13MS. 4/111 /1, fo. Ir.
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Country. There have been Heros in every age & we hope will be." Thus for Reid a
basic moral impulse was inherent in man and though it may become enlarged with
improvements in society the moral spark was not kindled or generated by society in
the first instance.14
Principles 3-4 clearly embody an important concession to the Mandevillian sceptic. A
cool desire of happiness and a regard to duty were principles that Reid would later
identify as rational principles of action. By conceding that they are not the prevailing
principles in most men, he was admitting the relative impotence of reason. Reid had
thereby also undercut his estimate of the extent of human power, or at least the most
noble forms of it. Reid underlined this sceptical concession in principles 5 and 8,
where he emphasized the role of education, custom and habit, and example in shaping
the characters of men. As he put it, men are "much disposed to take the Rules of
Conduct from Fashion rather than from the Dictates of Reason". Moreover,
conducting ourselves by these inferior rules, he implied in another place, "may by
habit be made agreable" in such a way that we really end up pursuing a counterfeit of
happiness according to spurious principles.15
In a second important concession to Mandeville (i.e. in principle 6), Reid suggested
that even when men are strongly tempted and consequently act "contrary to their dewty
& real happiness ... they have always a regard to virtue & ... cloak their guilt under a
shew of virtue." To the same effect was Reid's observation in his lectures on our
duties to God that in order to preserve his character, a man will often "cultivate some
good Quality which may cover all his faults". What is more such qualities must be
endorsed by the good opinion of others, and "dignified with the sacred Names of
Virtue, Honour or Religion." Thus military glory "in the Estimation ofmost Men
covers a multitude of imperfections and even of great Vices."16
14Hume. Essays, pp. 24, 474; AUL MSS. 4/111/1, fo. lr; 4/1II/3, fo. 5r-v; Monleath's Notes, 1768-
1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp. 205-207; cf. Hume, Treatise, p. 411; Baud's Notes, 1779-1780, ML
MS. A104935, Lectures 109-110, i.e. 6 Apr, 11 Apr 1780, fos 73v-75v.
^PracticalEthics, pp. Ill, 128; cf. p. 120. Principle 8 echoes Reid's highly sceptical observation
in the Inquiry (1764) that "Most men continue all their days to be just what Nature and human
education made them. Their manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their vices, are all got by
habit, imitation, and instruction; and reason has little or no share in forming them" {Works, p. 201a).
In this connection one thinks of James Boswell's very Humean description of how an "ill-regulated
mind fhis own] assembled scattered ideas and composed from them a principle for action" (B to
Rousseau, 3 Oct 1765, from Boswell on the Grand Tour (1953), quoted in The Age of the Grand
Tour, comp. Paul and Elizabeth Elek and Moira Johnston (London: Paul Elek Productions Ltd, 1967),
p. 96).
1 (>PracticalEthics, pp. 123-124, 132.
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Principle 10 codified Reid's Ciceronian-cum-Humean account of sources of
authority. To this Reid added a Montesquieuian and a Humean-cum-Smithian
dimension to his lectures on political jurisprudence.17 "There are certain Instincts that
lead men to submission". These were: "Respect to Age and Wisdom and Valour ... to
the Rich & powerfull & especially to those who have had riches and power transmitted
to them through a long Race ofAncestors." "These instincts", Reid continued,
"ground a Natural Subordination and men more easily submit to the Government of
Such".18 It is instinct, then, not reason, that underpins opinion or belief as a source
of authority. Hence Reid's remark in his abstract ofWise Club Question 35 on
instilling principles in children (handled on 1 April 1760): "The Variety of Opinions in
Matters ofReligion [and] Philosophy! ,] in Politicksf,] in particular Questions of Right
and wrong[,] arises more from [the influence of passions, appetites and affections]
than from any difference ofmens intellectual powers[.] Leaders in Philosophy &
Religion often acted by pride. Followers by Undue affection to their leaders".19
Reid's indebtedness to Hume on this point cannot be emphasized enough, for it shows
that as Reid went along with Hume in the scientific enterprise of tracing political
phenomena back to their sources in the human mind, he found himself making
sceptical concession after sceptical concession to Hume in his characterization of
human nature. Moreover, the sceptical principle of which I have been speaking must
be regarded as an oblique criticism of Harrington, who conceived of the "Ballance of
property as the onely Sourse of Dominion". Tracing authority back to principles in the
human mind, Reid observed that "Such a Ballance of Property as he prescribes is not
sufficient for the Establishment or Continuance of a Republick." Only opinion was
adequate to these purposes.
With principle 11 Reid translated his strong Newtonian bias into the language of
character that would become such an important vehicle for his political
jurisprudence.20 While he had made an important concession to theorists ofmanners
17See Haakonssen, Commentary on PracticalEthics, p. 368, n. [3].
18MS. 8/1V/10, fo. 2v.
19MS. 2/11/1, fo. 2r. In his abstract of Question 44 on moral character (discussed on 15 April 1761)
Reid elaborated on this sceptical concession: "The longer a principle has been entertained it strikes the
deeper root and is the more immoveable altho the evidence upon which it was first received is perhaps
forgot and it is not in our power to recall it. It is this that makes conversions either from religious or
political Principles so rare & so difficult).] It is by knowing a mans Principles rather than by the size
of his understanding that we can make a shrewd conjecture what his opinion will be on any point that
is proposed to him" (MS. 2/11/13, fos 3v-4r).
20The Newtonian influence, one also compatible with Butler, may be detected in Reid's lecture notes
on natural philosophy and in a set of student notes from the lectures on this subject which he
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such as Hume in speaking in principle 8 of character as the product of such things as
custom and habit, he did not conceive that there was any necessity involved in the
formation of the character of a particular individual. Theoretically, at least, control
over this was within the individual's power, although as a matter of practice his
passions might get the better of his reason and ensure that prejudice took hold so
thoroughly that reason could not afterwards break through.
Finally, in principle 12 Reid paraphrased the following sceptical remark from Hume's
essay "Of the First Principles of Government" (1741):
Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs
with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are
governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men
resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers.
When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall
find, that, as Force is always on the side of the governed, the
governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore,
on opinion only that government is founded.21
There is no mention of judgement or reason or knowledge in Reid's paraphrase, only
of sentiment and passion and opinion. At a later stage of his encounter with Hume,
Reid moved from the discourse of "Sentiments Passions and Opinions" to that of
"Judgement", thus signalling a retreat from his earlier sympathy with Hume's
scepticism with regard to reason. Reid's new paraphrase was as follows:
When we consider the Nature of Political Government, there is
something in it that may seem at first view strange and difficult to be
accounted for. In all Governments a few govern the Manyf. T]he
greater part are led & there is perhaps not above one hundred part of
delivered in the 1757-1758 session. Thus items 2-A on Reid's list from the Aberdeen period "Of the
Order in Which Natural Philosophy ought to be taught" were the "Laws of Philosophizing from Sr Is
Newton Princ Lib 3 ... Def from the same Lib 1 ... 3 Laws of Nature from the Same with their
Corolaries" (MS. 6/V/10, fo. Ir). In the Inquiry Reid described Newton's regulcephilosophandi as
"maxims of common sense ... [which] are practised every day in common life" (Works, p. [97]b). In
a third reference from the Aberdeen period, Reid explicitly drew the connection betw een Newton's
regulre and induction: the "Rules of Philosophizing" were the rules for "reasoning by Induction"
(Notes from Reid's Lectures on Natural Philosophy, 1757-1758, p. 7), which consisted of
observation of facts and experimentation, the reduction of these facts to general rules or laws and the
application of these rules, in turn, "to account for other effects, or to direct us in the production of
them" (Works, p. [97]b). In the student notes rule 2 reads as follows: "Like effects have the same or
like Causes" (AUL MS. K160, pp. 7-8). Reid observed in his 1757-1758 lectures on natural
philosophy "that all Prudence, Skill & fore-sight in Life depends on this, that we have observ ed
things to have happened in the course of Nature according to certain rules or Laws, & expect like
Events in like circumstances in the time to come" (MS. K.160, p. 4; cf. p. 5).
21 Essays, p. [32 j.
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whole that can be said to direct and govern in matters that concern the
whole Body, the Multitude are swayed by the Judgement of a few.22
It is interesting that in this account Reid characterizes opinion as deference to the
judgement of the few — in other words, to the neo-Ciceronian personal qualifications
of which I have spoken, not to an irrelevant regard for the past, i.e. the "Attachment of
the People to ... Old Forms".23
3.
Reid's highly Montesquieuian account of the nature of a despotic government provides
an illuminating gloss on the sceptical concessions he made in his list of first principles.
Hume had criticized Montesquieu for "suppos[ing] all right to be founded on certain
rapports or relations"; in his opinion, this was a "system ... that ... never will be
reconciled with true philosophy."24 Reid was rather more sympathetic in his reading
ofMontesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, for he evidently regarded this work as a probing
analysis of the denaturing effects of custom and habit on a people's sense of natural
right and liberty and on their prince's concept of glory — in other words, on their very
capacity for law and justice. Indeed, the critical phase ofReid's political jurisprudence
may be regarded as a realistic appraisal of our ability to overcome the prejudice of
convention; its role was to detect prejudice and remind people of themselves, to hold
the mirror up to debased nature in the hope that it might produce a shock of
recognition.
Despotism was a form of government founded not on understanding but on ignorance,
not on law but on caprice. It was a species of regime erected on prejudice and
sustained by fear. Its constitution required that "Subjects be trained by Education and
Instruction of their Priests to absolute & unlimited submission to the will of [their]
Superiors as to the will of Heaven."23 Everything depended on the humour of the
army or on the ability of the women and eunuchs to constantly invent new ways to
gratify the despot, to whom the business of government was of no consequence. The
despot has no ho virtue, yet he must be esteemed a god. He rules not to make his
people happier, but from a "delight in dominating other souls":
22MS. 4/111/3, fo. 6v; cf. MS. 4/111/1, fo. Ir.
23MS. 4/11J/6, fo. Ir; cf. Hume, Essays, p. 464, for example.
24David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals, in Enquiries, p. 197, n. 1.
25MS. 4/111/1, fo. lv; cf. MS. 8/1V/10, fos lv-2r.
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He is neither endowed with that Knowledge that enlarges and elevates
a human Mind, nor with those habits of Prudence Selfcommand
temperance fortitude Justice and goodness which constitute real Worth
and Merit. Yet with all this worthlessness & real Meanness he
conceives himself a God, or something of a nature far superior to other
Men. And every thing that is said or done to him every thing about him
conspires to fix this vain conceit of his own Superiority.26
If the despot artificially elevates himself, so too the people must be in the habit of
effacing themselves, for "Every man that is eminent in Riches in Authority or in Parts
and in Knowledge becomes a mark to the avarice or envy or jeaulosy of those who
have him absolutely in their power."27
Despotism eliminates the possibility of active virtue and therewith of "true Glory &
Honour" and happiness, engendering instead only the passive virtues of "Patience
Contentment Resignation Contempt of Riches & a Contemplative Devotion Caution
Secrecy & fair Dealing". Pusillanimity therefore comes to replace fortitude, as the
"Polish of Life ... enervates the Mind" of the despot. The fear he inspires "depresses
the Mind[s] of the people ... & deprives [them] of [their] Reason". True, such
passive virtues may bring a measure of "tranquility & peace ofMind" to their
possessors but the tranquillity to which the regime as a whole aspires is not a form of
"peace[;] it is the silence of towns that the enemy is ready to occupy." Nor can "true
Wisdom" be attained, for "manly prudence" can have no place where there is no
opportunity to acquire self-knowledge or practise self-command.28 Indeed, the very
road to moral and intellectual virtue is closed, for under despotic government
"Learning will commonly be discouragd".29 Moreover, because of the general
opinion those subject to despotism have of the insecurity of their property and fortunes
(engendered by the constant threat of confiscation), industry is discouraged and
"Commerce can never flourish".
Not surprisingly, therefore, if commerce were ever to take hold in a despotic country,
the effects of the regime would be reversed, for commerce "cures destructive
prejudices". The freeing of the will implicit in education and enlightenment would
interrupt the infallible connection between cause (the despot's capricious will) and
26MS. 4/111/5, fo. lr-v.
27MS. 4/111/5, to. Iv.
28Montcsquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler el aI., p. 60; PracticalEthics, pp. 108, 119,
129, 130, 135, 136, 179; cf. pp. 121, [127], 136, [140]; cf. Works, p. 636a.
29MS. 4/111/1, fo. lv.
Kitagawa 175
effect (his subjects' fearful obedience). As Montesquieu put it: "Knowledge makes
men gentle, and reason inclines toward humanity; only prejudices cause these to be
renounced."30
In all of this Reid was not simply describing phenomena seen in history, but putting
forward a layered account of human nature, one that posited at base a natural
predisposition to prefer freedom to slavery and a natural "sense of the Rights and
priviledges of human Nature". This predisposition was at the same time overlaid with
custom and habituation, which shaped our responses to physical circumstances
(climate) and to moral ones (i.e. political constitutions).31 It should also be underlined
that although Reid, in Montesquieuian fashion, regarded our responses to moral and
physical circumstances as parallel mechanisms, he nevertheless pulled back from
Montesquieu's determinism (just as he had done in Aberdeen) and emphasized his
own commitment to free will. Even so, while in his early days at Glasgow Reid was
willing to entertain the occasional argument from physical causes, on balance he
inclined more towards explanations from moral ones.32
30Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Imws, trans, and ed. Cohler, eta!., pp. 249, 283; cf. pp. 18, 21,
27, 34, 58, 59, 75, 128, 189, 211, 214, 235, 236, 245, 246, 248, 251, 252, 258, 265, 269, 270,
278, 284, 294, 308-309, 310, 311, 467, 618.
3'MS. 8/1V/10, fo. 2r. It is worth emphasizing that at this point Reid was undoubtedly taking a
polite, Ciceronian, line for he seems to have followed Shaftesbury in translating the sensus
communis of the Roman poets Juvenal and Horace by "Humanity, Natural Affection, or a just Sense
of the common Rights of Men." Although Reid would later define common sense not so much in
terms of such "qualities of the heart" as in terms of the "natural powers of the Understanding" (as 1
will show), his tendency here is to regard our natural sense of the rights and privileges of human
nature as part of common sense. When read in this light, Reid's political jurisprudence can be
understood as a criticism of regimes on the basis of their faithfulness to a standard which common
sense gives us to expect. (MS. 2/III/7, pp. 2-3; cf. p. 13 ("the natural Rights of all men"); Anthony
Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, "An Essay on the Freedom ofWit and Humour," in
Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. John H. Robertson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Mcrrill, 1964), vol. 1, p. 70 ("sense of public weal, and of the common interest; love of the
community or society, natural affection, humanity, obligingness, or that sort of civility which rises
from a just sense of the common rights of mankind, and the natural equality there is among those of
the same species"); see also p. 71, n. [1]; MSS. 2/III/8, p. 6 ("Principles of Common Sense Cicero
calls them Natura? Judicia, & Judicia communibus hominum sensibus infixa"); 6/1/15, fo. lv
("[common sense] is used in the plural by Cicero").)
32Thus , as he wrote to Andrew Skene in Aberdeen, "The common people here have a gloom in their
countenance which I am at a loss whether to ascribe to their religion or to the Air and Climate. There
is certainly more of religion amon(g) the common people in this town than in Aberdeen and although
it has a gloomy Ent(h)usiastical Cast, yet I think it makes them tame & sober." (R to Dr Andrew
Skene, 14 Nov 1764, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 2r; cf. R to Dr David Skene, 13 Jul 1765, NLS MS.
THO 2, fo. 3v: "I think the comm(on) people here and in the neighbourhood greatly inferior to the
common people with you. They are Boeotian in their Understandings, fanatical in their Religion, and
clownish in their dress and Manners. The Clergy encourage this fanaticism too much and find it the
onely w ay to popularity.") Reid's counterpart at Edinburgh College, Adam Ferguson, though a good
Christian like Reid, also felt obliged to make certain concessions to Montesquieu in the matter of
physical causes. As he wrote in his syllabus from this period, "Some diversities of the race appear to
be connected with situation and climate." ([Adam Ferguson], Analysis ofPneumatics andMoral
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For Reid, the plasticity of human nature — to whatever cause we ascribe it — is more
apparent than real, for beneath (perhaps far beneath) the outward expression of
compliance lies an inward capacity for freedom. Even so, the danger is great that
those subject to despotism may through deprivation "become incapable of Liberty."33
What is more, once a sense of liberty is lost so too is the capacity for virtue. A sense
of liberty is a necessary precondition for virtue: if one believed that everything were
predetermined, one would not be moved to exert oneself in the cause of virtue.34
Moreover, if a capacity for liberty and virtue are prerequisities for fulfilling one's
moral and intellectual potential and thereby for imitating the perfections of God and
securing one's salvation, it must be true that one naturally loves liberty and virtue. As
Reid explained, "There is nothing which men desire more earnestly than independance
and it is not to be supposed that any man will subject himself to the will of others and
submit his actions to their controul without some urgent cause."35 As Reid observed:
This state to men who are trained up with a sense of Liberty would be
intolerable, they would rather in habit the wilds of America with the
Hurons or Eskimaux than be the slaves of the Great Mogul. But man
is a very tractable Animal and can be trained to bear the extremities of
want poverty pain hunger cold and even Slavery itself with patience
and resignation. ...Lord Molesworth in his Account of Denmark
observes very justly that Slavery like a sickly constitution becomes in
time habitual so as to be thought no burthen. It mortifies ambition
Emulation and other troublesome as well as active qualities which the
sense of Liberty produces. And the Slave banishing all thought of the
future and reflexion upon the past, sings in his chains like a bird
confined to a Cage And makes the best of the present Moment.
Losing the sense of liberty and virtue therefore means losing one's hope of bettering
oneself. It also means losing one's ability to think about the future and reflect upon
the past. Once accustomed to a lack of liberty it becomes possible for one to believe
Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1766), p. 10, n. *. Ferguson had also made certain sceptical concessions to
Hume, as we see on p. 16: "The principal articles of relation are those of similitude, contiguity, cause
and effect.")
33MS. 8/1V/10, fo. 2r; cf. Works, p. 601a
34Hence Montesquieu's observation that "When religion establishes the dogma of the necessity of
human actions, the penalties of the laws should be more severe and the police more vigilant so that
men, who without them would let themselves go, will base their decisions on these other motives;
but if the religion establishes the dogma of liberty, it is something else again. From laziness of the
soul arises the Mohammedan dogma of predestination, and from this dogma of predestination is born
laziness of the soul. One has said, it is decreed by god, so one must rest. In such a case, the laws
should arouse men made drowsy by the religion. (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Lmws, trans, and ed.
Cohler elal., p. 468.)
35MS. 4/111/10, fo. lr.
Kitagawa 177
that, far from being a grievous burden, slavery actually makes one happy and that
patience and resignation are the highest virtues.36
Summing up, Reid observed:
There is not a more mortifying view of human Nature than we are
presented with when we reflect that so great a part of the human Race
have been for thousands of years held in this dreadfull Slavery of
Despotick Government. But it would be still more Mortifying to
conceive as the Ingenious Montesquieu does that those Climates which
Nature has favoured most by a variety of natural Productions for the
use of the human Species should by a kind of fatality be necessarly
subjected to this kind of Government.37
Despotism mortifies our active qualities. Its persistence presents a mortifying view of
human nature. Montesquieu's determinism is still more mortifying. Evidently, Reid
could not quite believe that man was as tractable as he appeared to be under despotic
rule when he considered the fierce sense of freedom man exhibits in his savage state
(from which Reid seems to have taken his bearings in these matters). Be that as it
may, the outlook for improvement was not very promising. As Reid put it:
Under such Governments people come in some Generations to lose all
sense of the Rights and priviledges of human Nature & become
incapable of Liberty. The ignorance in which they are kept & the
slavish doctrines of their Religion prevent any sentiments of liberty
from entring into their minds or if they can enter fear and Superstition
and that pusilanimity which are their natural Effect immediately stiffle
every desire of asserting their Liberty.38
It must be emphasized that while Reid made an important concession to the sceptics in
making this point, he would not allow that our moral sense itselfwas merely the effect
of custom and habit, a belief, that is, like any other.
On the other hand, Reid's scepticism did not stop with his concession that it is
possible to lose one's sense of proper rights and privileges. As he observed in his
lectures, because despotism is "the most simple and inartificial" form of government it
"has prevailed among the least enlightened Nations and must always keep those
36Practical Ethics, p. 121. Once again the conjunction of rational-theological ethics with republican
politics is evident, for Molesworth was an eminent republican, in whose circle Reid's teacher
Turnbull had moved.
37MS. 4/111/5, fos 1 v-2r.
38MS. 8/IV/10, fo. 2r.In this one can detect an echo of Shaftesbury, who allowed only that w here a
people are "totally oppress'd, the scatter'd Seeds of Virtue will ... remain alive ... to a second
Generation", after which they would be reduced to the "abject and compliant State of long-accustom'd
Slaves" (Shaftesbury, Inquiry, pp. 38-39).
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Nations in Ignorance of the Rights ofMankind And the principles of policy." Even if
those subject to despotic governments could be brought to "believe that they have both
the Power and Right in their hands" they might very well continue to submit to their
government "1 From Ignorance of the Evils it tends to produce & want of Experience
2 In order to redress greater Evils 3 From the want of a Sense of Liberty 4 From
ignorance of any other form ofGovernment."39 Reid's remarks echo a very sceptical
sentiment expressed by Montesquieu. If we are so fond of liberty and hate violence so
much, the latter asked, how is it that we do not "rise up incessantly against despotic
government"? The answer was simple:
In order to form a moderate government, one must combine powers,
regulate them, temper them, make them act; one must give one power a
ballast, so to speak, to put it in a position to resist another; this is a
masterpiece of legislation that chance rarely produces and prudence is
rarely allowed to produce. By contrast, a despotic government leaps to
view, so to speak; it is uniform throughout; as only passions are
needed to establish it, everyone is good enough for that.40
Habits of opinion therefore in a decisive respect change human nature, for they disable
the active powers that would spur men on to real virtue, and dull the intellectual
powers that are necessary to the formation of true opinions.41 Reid even used the
term secondnature to describe our condition after we have been formed by custom and
habit in society 42 In other words, such is the force of bad habits, bad examples and
bad education that the revitalization of our sense of rights is not necessarily sufficient
to reawaken our sense of right and wrong or of good and evil and therefore to
rejuvenate our sense of liberty. The light of reason having once been dimmed by the
overlay of custom and habit, human nature having once been shaped by opinion, it is
39MSS. 4/111/5, fo. 2r; 4/111/6, fo. lr.
40For this reason Montesquieu suspected that true "Politics is a dull rasp which by slowly grinding
away gains its end" (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, ed. Cohler el at., pp. 63, 243; cf. Max Weber,
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans, and ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1970), p. 128: "Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It
takes both passion and perspective").
4 'in his lectures Reid wrote: "So wonderfull Effects does Education and Custom produse in the minds
of men a Tyger and a Lamb are not more contrary in their natures than a Canadian and an Asiatick.
You would think it impossible that they could be of the same Species ... So flexible is the human
Disposition by Education and Discipline that it may with regard to political Notions be wound up to
the highest Spirit of Liberty and Independance, or brought down to the lowest pitch of Servility even
to adore the chain that binds it. Nor do we see less flexibility in mens Religious opinions w hich
when formed entirely by Authority and Education may be eith(er) wound up to the most extravagant
heights of Enthusiasm or sunk into the most abject Superstition" (MS. 8/1V/30, fo. 2r); cf. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans, and ed. by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 45:
"habit would have to change nature".
42Cf. PracticalElhies, p. 281.
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very difficult if not impossible to change the minds of those whose very natures have
been so moulded. Human nature, while in principle infinitely malleable, is by no
means endlessly changeable within the intellectual career of an individual. In all of
this Reid was making important concessions to the sceptics and tacitly criticizing
Francis Hutcheson.
Custom and habit change human nature. A more sceptical view could scarcely be
imagined. In this connection one thinks of Pascal's scattered remarks in the Pensees
on the formation of a second nature by means of custom and habituation ,43 It is not
difficult to imagine how Reid, armed with this insight, could have conceived that our
point of view or opinion must change to agree with changed nature.44
Despite his high regard for Montesquieu, Reid was unwilling to endorse the view that
it is the eternal fate of those who happen to be born in warm climates to suffer under
despotic governments. Moreover, despite his own grim pronouncement on our
capacity to lose our natural sense of liberty, Reid apparently believed in the gradual
spread of enlightenment, which in this context meant the habit of entertaining sounder
notions of liberty. (It must be emphasized that Reid's belief in progress — barely
hinted at here in his denial ofMontesquieu's determinism and, at any rate, all but taken
back in his pessimistic forecast — would become much more pronounced in later
years.) But even in this earlier stage Reid conceived of a gradual progress in human
affairs which would entail a dispelling of illusion and a lifting of spirits, thus
preparing the way for the enjoyment of real liberty and the practice of true virtue.
4.
43Cf. [Blaise] Pascal, Pensees, trans, and ed. A.J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1966), pp. 39, 61, 153, 237.
44One also recalls the sceptical conversion described by Boswell in his narration of one of his travels:
"1 entered Rome with full classical enthusiasm, but when I arrived at my inn and found myself
surrounded by the landlord, by valets deplace, by scoundrels, my fantastic sensibility w as wounded,
and at first I was in a bad humour. I had an odd thought which now makes me laugh heartily. As I
was walking along the streets of Rome, w hich are very little different from those of any other city, 1
said to myself, 'Was the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans written to the inhabitants of this city?
And did I use to be so terrified by it?' At once the Epistle of St. Paul seemed to me to be just an
ancient writing by some ecclesiastical zealot. The word of God was no longer in it. Great chemist of
human nature! you see how a mind can be changed. Ah, we must analyse with the most delicate
nicety" (B to Rousseau, from Boswell on the Grand Tour (1953), quoted in Elek, Elek and Johnston,
compilers, Age of the Grand Tour, p. 96).
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When faced with the blatant disregard for human happiness and prosperity entailed by
despotism, Reid could not help but criticize this form of government according to a
moral standard. Reid made it clear in his lectures that this standard was embodied in
"the more mild and Equitable Governments" of Europe which "afford us ... Models
from which we can form ... just notions of Political Government" or, in other words,
"of the Ends that may be attained by Government from which we must deduce both
the rights of civil Governours and the duties of Subjects." Although exemplified by
these "Moderate Governments", the moral standard by which regimes are judged is
actually grounded upon our natural sense of the rights and privileges of human nature
and upon naturally occurring sentiments of liberty.45 Under these circumstances, we
might ask why Reid did not simply install these natural instincts in his list of the first
principles of political reasoning. But the answer is clear, custom and habit may so
restructure human nature as to deaden our instincts, in which case how we commonly
act will be at variance with how we ought to act.
Reid was unwilling to reduce his account of political phenomena to a discussion of
efficiency; he endeavoured instead to evaluate the tendency of a given regime to
produce justice. This aspect of political jurisprudence was in some tension with his
political science, which required a greater degree of ironic detachment. The parallel
concerns of the republican ideologist (liberty and virtue) and of the theological moralist
(free will — or power — and accountability) overrode the agenda he shared with
Hume to create an independent political science.
The emphasis of Reid's political jurisprudence recalls Harrington's Ciceronian-curn-
Aristotelian account of the principles of government in the Oceana. Harrington's
treatment of power and authority in the Preliminaries to the Oceana resonate in the
account of power and virtue which Reid sketched out in his inaugural address, and
which he developed in his lectures. Invoking a familiar Ciceronian formula,
Harrington suggested that power derived from "the goods of fortune," i.e. beauty,
health, riches and strength, while authority was founded on "the goods of the mind",
e.g. courage, prudence and wisdom. Thus a "learned writer may have authority,
though he have no power; and a foolish magistrate may have power, though he have
otherwise no esteem or authority." In Oceana, power was combined with authority
according to "ancient prudence", i.e. the "art whereby a civil society ofmen is
instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common right or interest" so that it is
45MS. 8/1V/10, fo 2r-v.
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an "empire of laws and not of men." Ancient prudence was to be distinguished from
its modern counterpart, according to which "some man, or some few men, subject a
city or a nation, and rule it according unto his or their private interest; which, because
the laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man or of some few
families, may be said to be the empire of men and not of laws." Because the common
right on which a government of laws is founded is identical to "right reason", ancient
prudence required that these laws be the embodiment of reason, i.e. "reason ...
brought forth by ... will into action," or, in other words, the incarnation of liberty and
virtue itself.46
Reid's own formula followed easily from Harrington's. In order for a government to
be "consistent with the rights ofMankind and the ends of Government" it must fulfil
two conditions. First, it must be a "Government of Laws and not of Men." This is
essential because "Man is a being compounded of Reason and Passion, and in most
men the last principle is often prevalent over the first", so that impartiality, for
example, cannot be guaranteed in a government ofmen. On the other hand, "Law is
Reason without Passion" and is therefore a safeguard against "partial favour".
(Despotism clearly fails to meet this requirement.) Secondly, these laws must be
"framed and directed with a view to the good & happiness of the Subject." Reid
maintained that "no form ofGovernment can be reconciled to the principles of sound
Morals in which the people or such a representative of the people as cannot have a
different Interest from the whole have not the Legislative power or such a share of it as
that they may not be subjected to laws that are grievous to them without their consent."
Thus, according to Reid,
Every Government therefore which is not directed to promote the good
of the Governed is a Usurpation without Right nor can any Length of
Time give it a just Tittle. The people may be subject through fear or
through ignorance. But if they are sufficiently enlightned to understand
the Rights that belong to them as men, And if at the same time they
have it in their power to shake it off and to establish a better and more
equitable Government, I have no doubt but they have as good Right to
do it as a man has to defend himself against a highwayman. They need
not search into ancient Records or Usages to prove their Right to be
free and happy. Every man is born with this Right and if all his
ancestors from Adam had agreed to deprive him of this Right, this
cannot weaken it47
46James Harrington, The Commonwealth ofOceana, in The Political Works ofJames Harrington, ed.
J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 161, 163, 169; see also p. 165.
47MS. 4/111/9, fos 1 r-2r.
Chapter 11
Enforcing Morals and Restricting Property
In this chapter I will examine ReicTs account of the fundamental principles by which
morality can be enforced and property restricted. These principles were conscience
and the common good. Reid's account of conscience owed something to Smith, but
his insistence on the enforceability of imperfect as well as perfect rights as essential to
the realization of the common good (which he identified as the end of government)
distinguished him from both Hume and Smith. For Reid, the jurisdiction of the State
went far beyond the enforcement of mere justice.
1.
As 1 have discussed, Reid suggested that the moral standard against which all forms of
government were to be judged was embodied in the mild and equitable governments of
Europe. These were models on which one could form just notions of government
(i.e. of the good ends that may be attained by it) and from which one could deduce the
rights of governors and the duties of subjects. Yet Reid's notion of politics as the art
ofmodelling political societies so as to answer the end proposed by them did not relate
only to experience, for in his view the origin of the rights and duties that are enshrined
in moderate governments lay in the moral faculty or in right reason. As Reid
expressed it: "every Man has within him a touchstone of Morals, the dictates of his
own Conscience which approves of what is Right and condemns what is wrong,
when it is fairly represented and considered without prejudice." Or, as he also put it.
by our conscience or right reason we have an "immediate perception ofRight and
wrong of Moral Rectitude & Depravity in moral Agents". Smith had considered it as
"altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and
wrong can be derived from reason"; these perceptions had to be historically cultivated.
For Reid, however, our duties were derived from our immediately felt sentiments.
Thus our duties to God "must be grounded upon just sentiments of him". This made
it incumbent on us to "endeavour by the best use of our Reason to attain just Notions
of him". In the same manner, our natural rights, including our political rights, had to
be "founded upon Natural Reason and Equity, and not barely upon positive institution
and Compact". This made it our duty to "consult [our] inward Monitor in [our] calm
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and serious moments" and thus to judge rightly of where our duties lie. According to
Reid, this monitor which God "hath planted in every mans breast distinguishes right
conduct from wrong in most instances no less immediately, no less clearly and
certainly than the taste discerns sweet from bitter." As Reid observed: our natural
rights bear the "Same Relation to our moral faculty as the legal or civil Rights ofmen
have to the law of the Land. Every mans Conscience is a law to him. It enjoyns
certain actions & forbids others[;] it prescribes to him a certain rule of conduct and as
far as he deviates from this Rule, so far is he guilty in his own Judgment and in the
Judgment of others." At this point Reid took the opportunity to reply to sceptical
humanists like Montaigne who were critical of attempts to elevate existing legal codes
to the status of natural law:
It is easy to see how ... those ... who made the Laws their Study
would be led to form a Notion of a Natural Law and Natural Rights of
Men which were not grounded upon the Code or Pandects but in the
human Nature and in that faculty by which we discern Right from
Wrong.
Conscience having dictated where our duty lies and discovered of what our rights
consist, the object of politics as the art ofmodelling is clear:
The end of all Constitutions of Government of all Civil Laws and of all
Civil Judicatories is to preserve & support the Rights of Mankind.
And this is the proper Test or Touchstone by which Forms of
Government & of Civil Judicatories and Systems of civil Laws are to
be tried and Judged, Namely, if such Forms or such Systems are
agreeable to the Rights of Mankind and conducive to the preservation
of them, that is if they are founded upon the Law of Nature, they are
good, otherwise they are bad and ought to be corrected.1
2.
1 PracticalEthics, pp. ] 10-111, 113, [117], 143, 144, 145, 179; Adam Smith, The Theory ofMora!
Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis: LibertyC/axsvcj, 1976), p. 320; cf.
Works, p. 599b. When understood this w ay rather than in non-judgemental Montesquieuian terms,
Reid's notion of the "political art" recalls a formula of Turnbull's. Reid's teacher had distinguished
two questions in politics, the prudential (rightly understood) question of "'what ends right reason
dictates to mankind as the ends to be proposed in constituting civil government; and w hat means, i.e.
what orders and constitutions it points out as the proper means in order to attain these good ends'" and
the empirical question of'"how in fact various governments were formed, and how, being formed,
they changed gradually their frame to the better or worse."' Turnbull's first question answers to
Reid's exhortation to consult conscience; the second underlines the notion that the principal purpose
of modelling is to reform or improve existing political constitutions. (George Turnbull, Remarks on
Jo[hann] Gotftlieb] Hcineccius, A Methodical System of Universal Law, trans. Turnbull, 2 vols
(London, 1743), vol. 2, pp. 110-111.)
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Interestingly enough, Reid couched his discussion of the dictates of our moral faculty
or conscience within the highly Smithian notion of the approval of a "candid
Spectator'.2 But it must also be emphasized that even where Reid employed the
Smithian language of the "witness in [the] ... breast", he was sharply critical of
Smith's exclusion of God from his explanation of conscience. Reid insisted that God,
not the witness in the breast, was the "fountain of true Honour & the sole infallible
Judge ofWorth". Unlike Smith, he did not take his starting-point in our "fellow-
feeling with the sorrow of others" but in the existence of a "Supreme Being!, a] ...
compassionate Father and faithfull Guardian, whose goodness sympathizes with us
even in the afflictions and trials which his wisdom sees necessary for our discipline
and culture". Our duties to God (i.e. seeking his approval) and to ourselves (i.e.
earning the approbation of our own conscience) outweigh our "Duty to gain & to
preserve the good Opinion of others by all fair and Laudable means, and to avoid what
may lessen [our] Reputation with them." Smith, it must be underlined, had suggested
that we "must... in all ... cases ... view ourselves not so much according to that light
in which we may naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we
naturally appear to others."3
Notwithstanding Reid's differences with Smith on these points, he employed Smith's
language of changing places with others in our imagination both in Aberdeen and in
Glasgow. Thus in what is probably his abstract of Wise Club question 35, "How far
it is allowable to principle Children with Opinions before they are capable of a Rational
Enquiry into them", which was handled on 1 April 1760, he wrote:
One method of preventing [the] undue influence of the Passions on our
Opinions is to imagine a Change of persons and put ourselves in the
place of another. The Rule of our Saviour [is] admirable to this
purpose what soever you would that others should do unto you &c".4
2PracticalEthics, p. 149. Reid probably went along with the Butlerian concept of' conscience as a
faculty as this appeared in the first edition of Smith's Theory ofMora! Sentiments. Reid would not
be so much in sympathy with Smith's later views of the conscience, for in the process of developing
his concept of the impartial spectator in the second and sixth editions of the Theory, Smith came to
portray the conscience more as a social construct than as a Butlenan faculty.
^PracticalEthics, pp. 118, 119, 135, 153; Smith, Theory of Mora! Sentiments, ed. Raphael and
Macfie, pp. 10, 83; sec also D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Introduction to The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 15, 37.
For Rcid's criticisms of Smith's concept of the impartial spectator, see MS. 2131/7/V/7, quoted in
David Fate Norton and J.C. Stewart-Robertson, "Thomas Reid on Adam Smith's Theory ofMorals,"
Journal of the History ofIdeas, vol. 41, no. 3 (Jul.-Sept. 1980), pp. 395-396; Thomas Reid, "A
Sketch of Dr Smith's Theory of Morals," in J.C. Stewart-Robertson and David Fate Norton, "Thomas
Rcid on Adam Smith's Theory of Morals," Journal of the History ofIdeas, vol. 45, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar.
1984), pp. 311, 317.
4MS. 2/11/1, fo. 2r.
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Reid was expressly critical of the grounds on which Smith distinguished perfect and
imperfect rights in his first set of lectures on jurisprudence at Glasgow College. In an
incomplete set of notes from Reid's lectures found among Archibald Arthur's papers5
the view is expressed that
In general the perfect & imperfect rights of men cannot be better
exprest then our Saviour's precept Do to others as you would be done
to. This is an appeal to our own faculty. Not what we would desire
from inordinate self-love a miser would wish to have his neighbour's
esta(te) this is not the precept, but what we ought to expect or ought to
do. When we place ourselves in the place of the person benefited this
takes away all prejudice.
Our Moral faculty determines what we app(rove) ordin(arily)
As Judgment is compared often to a ballance so may this. 1 am in the
one Scale my neighbour in the other. In order to detect this ballance if
false it is right to change weights I put myself in your ballance & you
in mine. There cannot be a better way of seeing our obligation to our
duty than conceiving that we should do to othe(rs) what we expect
from them. We may easily judge from this rule what is our duty to our
fellow Creatures. We will always judge acording to equity & any
faults we may fall into will not be imputed by God. We naturally judge
by this rule in our Claims on others we desire them to put themselves
in our place nothing more moves us. This rule contains both the
perfect & imperfect rights. The first is only a negative virtue, the other
contains all doing good/'
Here lies the connection between carrying out our duties (whether of justice or of
humanity) and exerting our power, for we are called upon to be "injurious to no man
to be just to all and usefull to [our] country according to [our] power."7 In theory at
5I discovered these notes at the Mitchell Library in Glasgow. See Appendix 2, item 2.
6ML MS. 891086, fos 2r-3r, 4r-5\ of loose, uncatalogued booklet. These extracts are important
because they flesh out and fill in a gap in the lecture notes that have survived in Reid's own hand (see
PracticalEthics, pp. 147-148). In so reading Reid as intending that both perfect and imperfect rights
are expressed by the golden rule I differ from Knud Haakonssen's interpretation of this passage (see
Commentary on Practical Ethics, p. 322, n. 27). This is an example of how the student notes may
be helpful in solving interpretative puzzles in Reid's own notes. Reid underlined this point in the
Active Powers: "[the golden rule) comprehends every rule of justice without exception. It
comprehends all the relative duties, arising either from the more permanent relations of parent and
child, of master and servant, of magistrate and subject, of husband and wife, or from the more
transient relations of rich and poor, of buyer and seller, of debtor and creditor, of benefactor and
beneficiary, of friend and enemy. It comprehends every duty of cha'ijrjy and humanity, and even of
courtesy and good manners. Nay, I think, that, without any force or straining, it extends even to the
duties of self-government. For, as every man approves in others the virtues of prudence, temperance,
self-command, and fortitude, he must perceive that what is right in others must be right in himself in
like circumstances" (Works, p. 639a-b).
7Practical Ethics, p. 129. Reid recast this formula in the Active Powers: "When we employ our
power to promote the good and happiness of others, this is a benefit or favour; when we employ it to
hurt them, it is an injury. Justice fills up the middle between these two. It is such a conduct as does
no injury to others; but it does not imply the doing them any favour" (Works, p. 654b).
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least this poses no problem, for we may be assured that "as these are the Worthiest &
Noblest Ends a Man can pursue so they are most in our Power.''
One final point must be underlined in this connection. Despite the lip-service Smith
paid to the faculty of conscience in the first edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments
(1759), the evolutionary concept of conscience he was to develop in subsequent
editions was already lurking beneath the surface in the 1759 edition. Smith expressed
this evolutionary concept in terms of the relationship between laws and manners:
In some countries, the rudeness and barbarism of the people hinder the
natural sentiments of justice from arriving at that accuracy and
precision which, in more civilized nations, they naturally attain to.
Their laws are like their manners gross and rude and undistinguishing.
In other countries the unfortunate constitution of their courts of
judicature hinders any regular system of jurisprudence from ever
establishing itself among them, tho' the improved manners of the
people may be such as would admit of the most accurate.8
Given Reid's concessions to the theorists of manners on the question of the influence
of custom and habit on our sense of rights and liberties, he probably would have had
some sympathy with Smith's views on this point, although clearly he would have
resisted a full-blown evolutionary theory of conscience. Thus in his lectures on
private jurisprudence he suggested that "nations tho extreamly rude and unimproved
are conscious of their obligation to deal fairly & honestly by one another and act
accordingly." Reid regarded fair dealing as among our natural rights and counted it
among the virtues that could survive even under the denaturing pressures of despotic
government. This point, which clearly had implications for Reid's assessment of
Smith, was in fact aimed directly against Hume's view that the obligation of contracts
was artificial in nature. I shall return to this point.9
Although Reid's use of the Smithian device of an imaginary change of persons to
counteract the influence of the passions in shaping our opinions did not involve a
"cool consideration of its distant consequences upon the good of society" (for Reid
such a calculation was "confined to the higher ranks, who, by their education or by
their office, are led to make the public good an object") it still required an act of
judgement. As Reid put it: the golden rule would lead one "to the knowledge of every
branch of justice, without the consideration of public good, or of laws and statutes
8Smith, Theory ofMora! Sentiments (London, 1759), pp. 548—549.
9PracticalEthics, pp. 157, 193; cf. MS. 4/111/1, fo. 1 v.
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made to promote it."10 In his Theory ofMoral Sentiments Smith had distinguished
between perfect and imperfect rights. Perfect rights were those which corresponded to
the duties of justice and whose legal enforcement was absolutely essential to the
existence of society. Imperfect rights corresponded to the duties of humanity or
beneficence; their enforcement or encouragement was important but not crucial to the
maintenance of society. As Smith put it, even if there were no "mutual love and
affection" among the members of a given society that "society, tho' less happy and
agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved", for it was possible for a society to
"subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility
... [for] ... tho' no one man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude
to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according
to an agreed valuation." On the other hand, were people "at all times ready to hurt and
injure one another", no society could subsist among them, for the "moment that injury
begins, the moment that mutual resentment and animosity take place, all the bands of it
are broke asunder, and the different members of which it consisted are, as it were,
dissipated and scattered abroad by the violence and opposition of their discordant
affections." On the basis of these observations, Smith concluded that "Beneficence ...
[was] less essential to the existence of society than justice." It was to be regarded as
the "ornament which embellish[ed]" rather than the "foundation which support[ed]"
the great edifice of human society. This foundation was justice.
For all that,justice remained for Smith a "Mere ... negative virtue ... [which] only
hinder[ed] us from hurting our neighbour" and earned us "very little positive merit."
The greatest exertions of beneficence, by contrast, "deserv[ed] the highest reward."
On the other hand, the "meer want of beneficence ... meritfed] no punishment from
equals". In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith suggested that our perfect rights
corresponded to the negative virtue of justice, whereas our imperfect rights answered
to the positive virtue of beneficence. The former are those which we have a "title to
demand and if refused to compel an other to perform", while the latter "correspond) ed[
to those duties which ought to be performed to us by others but which we have no title
to compel them to perform". Perfect rights were, properly speaking, the only rights
that belonged to jurisprudence; imperfect rights, Smith is reported to have said,
belonged rather to a "system ofmoralls as they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the
laws." As Haakonssen has shown, the distinction between perfect and imperfect
1 ®Works, pp. 653a, b; 661b; cf. p. 639b.
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rights underlined the priority of the negative virtue ofjustice over the positive virtue of
beneficence in point of "moral urgency".
Despite his apparently rigid separation of the claims ofjustice and beneficence, Smith
did mix law with morals when he advocated that the provision of a minimal education
be enshrined in law, presumably on the basis that not to do so would be tantamount to
an "infringement of the liberty of the child and/or parent". With regard to Smith's
apparent collapsing of the distinction between justice and beneficence (or perfect and
imperfect rights) on this point, Haakonssen has shrewdly commented that even if this
were true, the utility at stake was "rather negatively defined: Smith [was] not
concerned with any positive standard of education, but only with preventing men from
becoming 'mutilated and deformed' in 'the proper use of the intellectual faculties'."
Be that as it may, Smith did allow that a
superior may, ... sometimes ... with universal approbation, oblige
those under his jurisdiction to behave ... with a certain degree of
propriety to one another. The laws of all civilized nations oblige
parents to maintain their children, and children to maintain their
parents, and impose upon men many other duties of beneficence. The
civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of preserving the
public peace by restraining injustice, but of promoting the prosperity of
the commonwealth, by establishing good discipline, and by
discouraging every sort of vice and impropriety; he may prescribe
rules, therefore, which not only prohibit mutual injuries among fellow-
citizens, but command mutual good offices to a certain degree .... Of
all the duties of a law-giver, however, this, perhaps, is that which it
requires the greatest delicacy and reserve to execute with propriety and
judgment. To neglect it altogether exposes the commonwealth to many
gross disorders and shocking enormities, and to push it too far is
destructive of all liberty, security, and justice.11
Obviously, much depends on the interpretative weight assigned to this passage as
against that given to passages in which Smith asserted the primacy of justice over
beneficence and dismissed the latter as belonging to morals. Haakonssen evidently
places greater importance on the passages in which Smith excluded the duties of
humanity from the discussion of natural jurisprudence. He emphasizes that Reid, for
his part, was sharply critical of Smith's belief that imperfect rights and the duties of
' 'Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence: Report of 1762—3, in Adam Smith, lectures on
Jurisprudence, R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein, eds (Indianapolis: LibertyC/a.vs/c-.s, 1978),
p. 9; Adam Smith, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (London, 1759), pp. 177-178, 179, 189—191;
Smith, Theory ofMoral Sentiments, p. 137; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth ofNations, ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner; text ed. W.B. Todd/ 2 volsy'(Oxford,
197^, v, i, f. 61, quoted in Knud Haakonssen, Science ofa Legislator, p. 122; Knud Haakonssen,
Scidnce ofa Legislator, p. 102; cf. pp. 92, 94, 97, 131.
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charity and humanity did not belong to the discussion of natural jurisprudence and of
his insistence that these duties "cannot be enforced by human laws, but must be left to
the judgment and conscience ofmen, free from compulsion." In his Glasgow lectures
Reid praised the "authors of greatest Reputation," i.e. Grotius, Pufendorf, Barbeyrac
and Hutcheson for having included the duties of charity and humanity in their
"Systems" and declared that our performance of such duties "tend[s] equally to the
happiness and perfection of our own Nature and to the benefite of human Society."
Reid believed that the possession of only those "virtues which regard ... the perfect
Rights ofMankind constitute but a very imperfect Character"; by contrast, an
"attention to ... the imperfect rights ofMankind constitutes the perfection ofVirtue."
A person who performs only the negative duty of causing his neighbour no harm
may be very far from discharging the duty incumbent upon him as a
Member of Human Society. As a withered Arm or hand is to the
natural Body an Useless incumbrance, so that the body would be as
well or better without it: In like Manner a Person who is in no way
subservient to the good of the Political Body, is onely a dead weight
upon it. it receives no benefite from him, it would be at no loss if he
were extinct.12
More to the point, Reid asserted that such a person "deserves punishment for every ...
transgression of the Law of his mind", which encompasses the duties of charity and
humanity. On the other hand, when a person cannot even refrain from injuring others,
Reid wrote in versions of his lectures on politics after 1764-1765, "[he] is no longer
fit for Society ... [and] is justly cut off as a rotten member by capital Punishment for
the terror of others."13
Furthermore, in dealing with those who are disposed to misuse their freedom, Reid
recommended that "That degree of Liberty which men will abuse to their own hurt and
that of others ought to be taken from them" and maintained that this policy would be
"for their own good & necessary for the safety of others". Reid was, however, also
quick to add that "Good Men ought to have liberty", observing that "they are entitled
to it and will make a good Use of it." Reid arrived at this far-reaching normative
conclusion by making the general observation that "The more a people are corrupted in
their Morals the less they are capable of freedom."
^PracticalEthics, pp. [ 138]—139, 145; see also Knud Haakonssen, "Reid's Politics: A Natural Law
Theory," Reid Studies no. 1 (1986-1987), p. [10],
13MS. 4/III/3, fo. 5v; cf. MS. 4/III/2, fo. lv: "When such Characters appear in Society they must
either be confined as w ild beasts for the common Safety, or they must be delivered over to publick
justice for the terror of others & cut off from the political Body as rotten members."
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It is apparent, therefore, that for Reid governments may legally enforce at least some
of the duties of humanity as well as those of justice. His lectures on the rights and
duties of states make evident his belief that the "civil Power may punish Men for
immoralities in Selfgovernment where no injury is done to [their] neighbour". As he
wrote,
Whatever impairs the Morals, enervates the mindes, or bodies of the
Members of a State is hurtfull to the State and as every individual so
every political Body has right and is obliged to use its endeavours to
preserve all its Members in that Sound State which fits them for being
most usefull to the Society.
[It is also t]he duty of a State to promote Industry Agriculture Arts and
Science. To provide for the Necessities of the Poor, to Punish idleness
Riot and Dissipation. To manage the Publick Revenue to provide Ships
& Harbours and all the Implements of forreign Trade to drain Marches
make highways Bridges Canals Fortresses. To polish the Manners as
well as preserve the Morals of its Subjects. To maintain the Respect
due to Magistrates Parents Seniors persons of Superior Rank.14
Given Reid's emphasis on the duties of humanity in addition to those of justice, his
belief in the necessity ofmoral and religious instruction and ultimately in the need for
an established religion follow readily. As Reid wrote:
The exercises of a rational Piety and Devotion have a manifest &
powerfull tendency in their very Nature to strengthen every virtuous
principle to confirm every good purpose, to fortify the Mind against
every temptation, to raise it in adversity, to temper the giddiness of
prosperity and to enlarge our hearts in Sentiments of humanity & kind
affection towards the whole creation of God.1'1
The moral urgency of religious exercise is clear: the enlargement of our hearts is
precisely what enables us to recognize our wider responsibilities, for it opens the eye
of conscience. Hence the importance of parental authority, which is intended to
supervise the slow progress of that act of opening.
In his Glasgow lectures Reid suggested that in practice it is "very difficult to ascertain
the precise limit between [perfect and imperfect rights[." He elaborated on this in
print: "Like the colours in a prismatic image, they run into each other, so that the best
14MS. 7/VII/23, fo. lv; cf. PracticalEthics, pp. 187, 234. Reid underlined this point in the Active
Powers (1788): "As wise legislators and magistrates ought to have it as their end to make the citizens
good as well as just, we find, in all civilized nations, laws that are intended to encourage the duties of
humanity. Where human laws cannot enforce them by punishments, they may encourage them by
rewards. Of this the wisest legislators have given examples; and how far this branch of legislation
may be earned, no man can foresee" (Works, p. 645b).
15PracticalEthics, p. 124.
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eye cannot fix the precise boundary between them."16 Smith was sceptical of our
ability to recognize imperfect duties and therefore fearful of the consequences of trying
to enforce them. He acknowledged the importance of observing duties of humanity to
the well-being of the State, yet he favoured sociocultural forms of reinforcement, i.e.
an educational rather than a legal approach.17 Reid, to repeat, was untroubled by the
scepticism of Smith; for him, our oracular moral faculty or conscience provided a
ready solution to the epistemological problem of recognizing imperfect duties, and no
one could long condemn an honest mistake of policy in this regard. He suggested that
the "universal ... Consent of Mankind with regard to the main points of right and
wrong of virtue and vice ought to satisfy the most sceptical not onely of the reality of
the distinction between the one and the other, but also that the Almighty has taken care
of the Constitution of our Nature, to make this distinction so apparent and obvious that
it requires no deep enquiry or laborious reasoning to discover it."18
While Smith was the immediate target of Reid's arguments in this area, it must be
emphasized that his criticisms apply equally well against Hume. Moreover, while
Reid adopted the Smithian device of an imaginary change of persons to rid ourselves
of the prejudices that prevent us from perceiving where our duties lie (in other words
to open our hearts and minds to the dictates of conscience), he did not believe that our
moral faculty was constituted by this change of persons; the dictates of conscience
were themselves grounded on the common good. As Reid put it: the "Right of
Punishment of crimes that do not directly injure us but are of bad Example & hurtfull
to Human Society [are] grounded upon this that every man ought to do his utmost to
promote the common Good of the human kind."19 Furthermore, while Reid did not
believe that this principle was accessible to any but the "higher ranks," he did believe
that the voice of conscience which is audible to "all men that are not greatly corrupted"
proclaimed not only acts of injustice but also those of inhumanity to be "base,
unworthy, and deserving of punishment."20 It was presumably the voice of
conscience which authorized people to "Unite ... under Government! s] in order to
carry on some common Interest or End".21 Hume, it will be recalled, had tacitly
^PracticalEthics, p. 203; Works, p. 645b.
17See Haakonssen, Introduction to PracticalEthics, pp. 62-63.
18PracticalEthics, p. 179; cf. Works, p. 642b. In hard cases (i.e. where it is difficult to determine
where our duty lies), Reid allow ed that a "man may often prescribe Rules to himself, which he ought
not to prescribe nor has any tittle to prescribe to another" (PracticalEthics, p. [140]).
PracticalEthics, p. 169.
^Works, p. 653b.
21PracticalEthics, p. 195; cf. pp. 180, 245.
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denied the voice of conscience in basing our sympathy with public utility on our
opinion of interest, i.e. the utile (prudent). Reid's remarks in the Active Powers make
it clear that for him conscience was equivalent to the honestum (honest) and it was his
belief in an honesty distinct from prudence and pleasure that separated him from Hume
on this point.22
3.
Reid's concept of the common good had far-reaching consequences for his account of
property, which was also couched in the Smithian language of the approval of a
"candid Spectator", a term he used interchangeably with "moral faculty".23 Because
the "Law of Nature ... Justifies & guards Property onely as far as it conduces to
publick Utility" the right of occupation "must be limited and restrained as the common
good requires." Thus by the "Law of Nature & Right Reason occupation ... onely
founds a valid Right when it is made without any injurious intention towards our
fellow men and when in reality it neither hurts them nor deprives them of any
advantage ease or Security which they formerly enjoyed."24 This proviso bears a
marked similarity to Locke's doctrine in his "Essay Concerning the True Original,
Extent and End of Civil Government" (the Second Treatise) that a man makes his
property that which nature placed in a "common state" by "mixfingl his Labour with
it". By these means he may exclude the "common right of otherMen" provided that
there is "enough ... and as good left in common for others."2:> As Haakonssen has
pointed out, there is also a Lockean resonance in Reid's suggestion that only those
things that are for "present Use & Consumption" may become private property, while
those that are of a "permanent Nature & [which] are used without being consumed"
must be "left in the Community of Nature or at least remain in a State of positive
Communion".26 As James Tully has shown, in the Two Treatises Locke "providefd]
a justification ... of the English Common", which is a "positive community," i.e. one
in which the individual can acquire a share ofwhat "belong[s] to everyone in
22Cf. Works, pp. 582b; 587b; 588a-b; 589b; 651a-b; 653a-654a; 656a; 662b.
^PracticalEthics, p. 149.
^PracticalEthics, pp. 148-149; cf. pp. [204]-205, 206.
2:,[John Locke], Two Treatises ofGovernment (London, 1690), pp. 245-246; cf. p. 255.
-^PracticalEthics, p. 210; cf. Haakonssen, Introduction to Practical Ethics, pp. 64 and n. 80; 325, n.
31.
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common". This state is to be distinguished from that of negative community, in which
one can acquire a real property in what is "equally open to occupation by everyone."
While it is not clear whether Reid actually subscribed to Locke's view that private
property in land is illegitimate, he clearly did believe that private property can only be
legitimate where it positively contributes to the common good, i.e. the realization of
our moral potential.27 When Reid's successor at King's, William Ogilvie, published
his Essay on the Right ofProperty in Land (1781 or 1782) Reid approved of the
latter's Utopian scheme to "increase the number of landholders by advancing farmers
to that more independent situation". Although they appear to have subscribed
wholeheartedly to the negative-community construct, Reid and Ogilvie could not in the
final analysis accept this view with regard to the acquisition of property in land.
Ogilvie, like Reid, supposed that, fundamentally, God gave the earth to mankind in
"common occupancy" (positive community), with the result that each individual
"seems to have by nature a right to possess and cultivate an equal share." Unlike
Reid, however, Ogilvie regarded Locke as an apologist for the acquisition of property
from an initial state of negative communion. In his interpretation of Locke, he laid
great stress on the following passage, which he took to be a justification of private
property in land based on the right which labour gives: "'God gave the earth in
common to all men, but since He gave it for their benefit, and the greatest
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed that He
meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it for the use of the
industrious and rational; and labour was to be his title to it.'" Ogilvie's own view was
that a "right founded in labour cannot supersede [the] natural right of occupancy,"
which is founded on the "genuine principles of public good and natural right".
Indeed, the right of every man to an "equal share of the soil ... in its original state"
was for this reason to be esteemed a "maxim of natural law." Ogilvie acknowledged
that labour did give a right as well, but not to the land whose fertility is increased
thereby, but only to the "additional produce of that fertility, or to the value of it, and
[to the] ... transmission of] this right to other men." Balancing the "original right of
equal property in land" with the right deriving from labour was the object of Ogilvie's
scheme for agrarian reform.28 Reid expressed his approval of his friend's Utopian
scheme in the following terms:
27Cf. Haakonssen, Introduction to PracticalEthics, pp. 64--65/ frdf PP- ) '
28Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, ed. Hollis, quoted in William Ogilvie, An Essax on the
Right ofProperty in Land, in D.C. MacDonald, ed., Birthright in Land (London: Kegal Paul, Trench,
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Men seem by degrees to improve in the notion of liberty, and I hope
likewise will in that of property. But though this earthly globe should
be monopolised by a few to the exclusion of others, I hope the
intellectual Globe will always be common, and that those who possess
the largest share will be still ready to impart to such as are willing to
improve it.29
Tying the right to property back to human nature, Reid wrote: "A man is capable of
acquiring property because Nature has endowed him with such a measure of Judgment
and Understanding as that he may make a good use of it." The hope of acquiring
property is the "most powerfull spur to Diligence & patience" and "serves to give
exercise to many of the Noblest Social Virtues. Liberality friendship Natural
Affection." In the Active Powers Reid underlined his view that a central purpose of
acquiring permanent property or riches is to enlarge our sphere of power by enabling
us to "requite [our] benefactors, to relieve objects of compassion ... |and] to make
friends". And part of Reid's approval of Ogilvie's Utopian scheme must have derived
from the "active progressive industry" and incitement to "diligence" that lay at the heart
of the latter's scheme.
Reid believed that a "Man or a Nation may be hindred from acquiring such an extent of
Property as endangers the Safety and Liberty of others", for
If one Man had the sole Property of any of the Necessaries of Life, &
power to defend that Property he might make all others give him what
he pleased to demand, that is he might make them his Servants. Thus
Pharaoh by monolizing the Corn of Egypt became proprietor of all
Egypt.
Indeed, Reid believed that monopolies that were "oppressive" in any way should be
"prevented or punished."30
He also suggested that "Restraints may be laid upon the disposal of Property by will
or by Entails." The Scottish Law of Entail was a contentious subject in the 1760s. In
a very Harringtonian passage Reid observed that great estates had initially been given
as a reward for heroic virtue. While such estates remained intact, they reflected
honour upon the descendants of heroes and statesmen. But "by the gradual Change of
Trubner & Co., Ltd.], p. 9, n. *; Ogilvie, Essay, in MacDonald, ed., Birthright, pp. 4,5, fV], 10, 11,
12; cf. pp. 9, 13.
29R to Ogil vie, 7 Apr 1789, in MacDonald, Biographical Notes to MacDonald, ed., Birthright, pp.
151-152.
^PracticalEthics, pp. 151, 164, 207, 210; Works, p. 658b; Ogilvie, Essay, in MacDonald, cd.,
Birthright, p. 17, n. [*]; cf. PracticalEthics, p. 148; MS. 4/111/15, fo. lv.
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Manners" associated with the introduction ofmoney, landholders had begun to
squander their fortunes on luxuries, thus sinking the reputation of their families. The
law of entail was hit upon as a means of preserving the great estates and ensuring that
the families to whom they belonged continued to bask in the glory of their illustrious
ancestors. But while this law was essentially conceived as a way of stretching out the
reward of virtue, it unfortunately ended up promoting all manner of vices. First,
instead of encouraging industry and virtue in those who were due to inherit an estate,
it increased in them the temptation to sloth and vice. In a passage resonant with his
inaugural message about power and virtue Reid wrote:
Every human Institution is unfavourable to Virtue & Industry which
provides other Roads to Riches and honour than this [i.e. virtue and
industry | which Nature has appointed. Entails, therefore seem to have
a natural Influence to take away the incitements to Virtue and Industry
in a family, in the same degree as they secure Riches to every Heir of
Entail without those Qualities which onely can enable a man to make a
proper use of them.
A second ill effect of entailment is that it tends to weaken parental authority, "which
Nature has ordained for the benefite of Children and for the Punishment of those who
are incorrigibly vicious." Finally, entailment tends to discourage trade, not only
because it decreases credit but also because it keeps entailed estates from becoming
"Subjects of Commerce," in other words off the market, and thereby "Precludefs]
those who have made fortunes by their Industry from the great end they have in View
in all their Labours, And tend to lead us back to that Gothick Constitution wherein
Merchants Manufacturers & Farmers were the Slaves of the Land holders." In time,
prosperous traders, frustrated by the short supply of purchaseable land, will seek
greener pastures elsewhere.
Reid's objection to entailment was both philosophical and ideological. It was
philosophical in the sense that the decision to entail in perpetuity is contrary to reason
and philosophy, which can only justify a bequest to a living heir whose virtues are
known.31 The ideological content of this passage is indicated by Reid's concern with
the familiar republican themes of liberty and virtue.
What Haakonssen has identified as Reid's wariness of the emerging commercial
society comes to sight in a further limitation imposed by the common good on the right
of property. As Reid wrote, "A Proprietor has no Right to destroy his Property when
3 ' PracticalEthics, pp. 150-152; see also p. 214.
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the common Good requires that fit] should be preserved, not to keep up Mercatable
Commodities when the common Good requires that they should be brought to
Market."32
Reid also made the Harringtonian suggestion that "The State for its own Security and
to preserve the Constitution may set Bounds to the Acquisition of Property by
Agrarian Laws or other Means of that kind." In this Reid echoed Hutcheson, who had
remarked that '"some publick interests of societies may justify such Agrarian Laws as
put a stop to the immoderate acquisitions of private citizens which may prove
dangerous to the state'."33 In his Commonwealth ofOceana Harrington observed that
the balance of power in a state follows the balance of property in land. Reid regarded
this as "one of the most important discoverys in the Science of Politicks, the honour of
which is entirely due to him.'The duration of a government, whether monarchical,
aristocratic or popular requires agrarian laws to fix the balance of property in land.
The agrarian law upon which that "Grand Machine", a commonwealth, is established
preserves this balance "by such a distribution that no one man or number ofmen
within the compass of the few or aristocracy can come to overpower the whole people
by their possessions in lands." Reid doubted whether even Harrington's agrarian law
"be a Sufficient Security against an undue Accumulation of wealth in the hands of one
or a few, and a sufficient security for that Equality among the Citizens which a
Republick seems to require." As Harrington acknowledged that "governments ...
which are said to subsist by confusion" may be exceptions to the "general rule" that
the balance of power in a state follows the balance of property in land, for in these
cases to "fix the balance is to entail misery", so Reid argued "there may possibly be
others which he did not discover". Thus Reid continued
There are some Species of Property now known in Britain which are
not restrained by Harringtons Agrarian, whereby men may accumulate
very great Estates unsuitable to the Nature of a Republican
Government.
The publick funds amount to 130,000,000 £ Estates in the Colonies.
Presumably what Reid had in mind was the mortgaging of the revenue, which
"Creates a Moneyd Interest."34 Reid's critique of Harrington's agrarian law thus went
32PracticalEthics, p. 207; cf. Haakonssen, Introduction to Practical Ethics, p. 65, n. 82.
33Hutcheson, System, vol. 1, p. 327, quoted in Haakonssen, Commen tan,' on Practical Ethics, p.
382, n. 31.
34MSS. 4/III/6, fo. 4r-v; 4/III/7, fo. 1 v; 4/111/11, fo. 2v; James Harrington, The Commonwealth of
Oceana, in The Political Works ofJames Harrington, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), pp. 164, 181; cf. p. 333.
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beyond Hume, who merely observed that the agrarian law was "impracticable"
because men would "soon learn the art which was practised in ancient Rome of
concealing their possessions under other people's names, till at last the abuse [would j
become so common that they [would] throw off even the appearance of restraint."35
One further limitation on the right to property needs to be considered, namely
dominium eminens, or eminent dominion. According to this principle individuals
could if necessary be "compelled ... to part with their Property" for the sake of a
legitimate public purpose (building a road, for example). It was, however, incumbent
on the state to indemnify these individuals "as far [a]s possible" for whatever property
was "taken from [them] to serve the Publick."36
Reid had been following the rumblings among the American colonists at least since the
furore surrounding the passing of the Stamp Act in 1765-1766. At this time he
branded the colonists as pusillanimous. He criticized them, that is, for their lack of
moral virtue, specifically for their lack of fortitude. By April 1769 he had aligned
himself with those who favoured a crack-down on the American colonists.37
Reid is reported to have told his pupils in his lectures on political jurisprudence in
1768-1769 that "resistence is bad & ought never to [be] used[. E]ven when two or 3
subjects have their propertys violated, resistence ought not to be made except [when]
such oppression is like to be continued and the liberty of the whole subjects [is] at
stake[;] then resistence is not only laudable but glorious." Taxes, according to Reid,
are raised "by virtue of Dominium eminense" in order to finance legitimate public
35Da\ id Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," in Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, ed.
Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1948), p. 374.
3^PracticalEthics, pp. 208, 260; cf. Works, p. 659a. As Reid wrote to his friend Dr Andrew Skene:
"The temper of our Northern Colonies makes our Mercantile people here look very grave Several of
them are going to London about this matter to attend the proceedings of Parliament. It is said that the
Effects in those Colonies belonging to this town amount to above 400,000 £ St. The Mercantile
people are for suspending the stamp Act and redressing the grievances of the Colonists. Others
consider their conduct as an open Rebellion and an avowed Claim to independance, Which ought to be
checked in the beginning. They say that for all their boasting the Colonists are a dastardly
pusilanimous race and that a british fleet and Army would soon reduce them to such terms as would
secure their future dependancc upon the Mother Country that this is the most proper time for doing so
when we are at peace with all our Neighbours. In what light the House of Commons will view this
matter 1 dont know, but it seems to be one of the most important Matters that have come before
them. I wish often an evening with you such as we have enjoyed in the days of former times, to
settle the important affairs of State & Church, Colleges & Corporations. 1 have found this the best
Expedient to enable me to think of them without Melancholy and Chagrin. And I think that all a
man has to do in the world is to keep his temper and to do his duty" (R to S, 30 Dec 1765, NCL MS.
THO 2, fos 7v-8r).
37Cf. PracticalEthics, pp. 130, [140].
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purposes, i.e. those sanctioned by the "Publick good" or for the "service of the State
in War and Peace." For Reid such projects included building bridges and fortresses,
draining marshes, equipping fleets, making highways, opening canals and promoting
agriculture, industry and literature. And when taxes are raised to serve such purposes.
Reid asserted, the "subjects consent is not at all thought upon." As Reid continued,
"It is the Deuty of the state to place the power of laying on taxes in such hands as may
lay it on equally, and may be rightly managed, this is done accordingly by the house
of commons who are representatives of the several shires". And this being done the
State must be supposed to have carried out its duty and its authority to levy taxes
thence must be assumed to be legitimate.
Reid was therefore sharply critical of what he regarded as the "mistaken opinion in Mr
Lock ... who mentains that the people can not be taxed w* out the peoples consent".
He observed "how much mischief this doctrine & opinion has done in America" and
suggested that "To conceive ... that every single subject should be consulted whether
he may be taxed is a maxime wc would indew [undoj all government." In his lectures
on police Reid elaborated on this position, ridiculing Locke's "absurd hypothesis" that
the "Government has no right to touch a farthing of the subjects Money wl out their
consent." Reid suspected that "Some [unspecified] Writers", undoubtedly including
Locke in Section 138 of his Second Treatise, had been led to this conclusion by
"taking the word benevolences in its most proper meaning". Benevolence, a term
dating from the reign of Edward IV, originally referred to a levy made by the King
without legal authority. It was with this connotation of the word that Locke and his
followers — i.e. "the Americans & Ld Chatam" as well as Chatham's circle,
especially Lord Camden — had got "carried away". Taxes, Reid asserted, are "not
now to be considered as benevolences as they were formerly called, they are to be
reconed necisary publick expense". He regarded as "mear playing upon words" the
view of those "writers" who equate having representatives with "consenting by
representative". For Reid the justice of levying taxes had little or nothing to do with
either representation or consent, for justice in this case requires only that "publick
Money be frugally managed and that taxes be made as equal as possible." As Reid
continued, "there does not appear to me a Shaddow of Reason why the Consent of a
Subject should be necessary to his bearing an equal Share of the publick burdthen
which the service of the State demands." The "burthen of taxes [is] compensated by
the advantage of defence by the Laws and arms of the State." Reid considered it as
unfortunate, therefore, that Locke had "unhappily vented a maxime wc perhaps may
produce a distressing war betwixt gt britain & its colonys." Reid concluded by stating
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that "we should therefore be careful in venting any Maxim wc may be productive of
such consequences."
Here we see Reid's belief that duty, which arises from conscience and is therefore
self-evident, is prior to all considerations of liberty. Whereas all forms of
government, including democracy, put some constraint upon liberty, duty places a
prior and necessary restraint on individuals and their governors and cannot be gainsaid
even by the most liberal forms of government. By Reid's lights, however, conscience
merely dictates the correct use of liberty and must not be regarded as inconsistent with
it. Ultimately, a persuasion of one's duty gives to just governments their authority
and revokes the authority of unjust governments. But, as we have seen, the question
of when resistance may be justified is a separate, albeit related, question.38
As Robert Jack's notes show, by the 1775-1776 session Reid had added further
refinements to his arguments against the doctrine espoused by Locke and his
followers. In 1775-1776 Reid countered Locke's claim that the "state has no right to
take away a mans property for the common utility without [his] consent" by making
the point that "if we consider property to be as dear as [his] Life, we might as well say
that the state could not take away a man's Life without his Consent". Yet such "a
notion ... would ... unhinge all government & take away all power in that state" no
less than the notion that the State has no right to take away a man's property for the
common good. Elaborating on the distinction between having representatives and
consenting by representatives, which he had made in previous years, Reid observed
that although Members of Parliament represent their borough or town, neither their
unanimous consent nor that of their electors, nor that of those who lack representatives
— constituents of boroughs that were originally small but are now flourishing, or
planters who have not purchased estates in England and who have therefore not
become members of the State — is essential to the passing of a money-bill. The
principle of majority rule requires only that a majority of Members vote for a proposed
38PracticalEthics, pp. 176, 259-260; Monteath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 191,
196-197, 243-244; cf. PracticalEthics, p. 208; see also [John Locke], Two Treatises ofGovernment
(London, 1690), pp. 360-362. For contemporary material relating to Locke and his followers on the
question of taxation and representation, see [William Pitt], PoliticalDebates (Paris, 1766), pp. 7, 12-
13; speeches by Pitt, John Wilkes and Lord Camden in R.C. Simmons and P.D.G. Thomas, eds.
Proceedings of the British Parliaments Respecting North America 1754-1783, vol. 5 (While Plains,
NY: Kraus International Publications, 1986), pp. 273-274, 278 ("The spirit which now resists your
taxation in America, is the same which formerly opposed loans, benevolences, and ship-money; in
England"), 280, 283, 365-366; and the quotations from speeches by Lord Camden in Max Beloff, ed..
The Debate on the American Revolution, 1761-1783 (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1949), pp. 112, 123—
124, for example.
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measure. As Reid put it: there may be "little unequalities in the representations But
this does not take away the liberty ofTaxation." The American colonists were not
Aliens as a french Man or a Dutch Man is: They [were] intitled to all the
Rights and privileges of British subjects. They [could] succeed to land
in great Britain by Inheritance by Disposition or Sale or Testament as
any Subject of Britain may. And in consequence of any Succession in
Land [could] vote for members of Parliament or be members of
Parliament as any other British Subject may be.
Moreover, government for Reid rested on principles in addition to representation,
consent and majority rule. Thus Reid maintained that the maxim that the State has no
right to take away a man's property for the common utility without his consent, or his
consenting by representatives, "has no meaning at all But as Confounds & destroy[s]
all government". Reid therefore regretted that this "strange notion" which tends to
unhinge "all the very notions of a state" has been "very hurtfully taken up by the
American Colonies in the present disturbances," although it was hardly surprising that
it would be "readily grasped upon by those who think their rights injured." On the
other hand, Reid was inclined to deny that Locke ever intended to "have it made this
handle" and went on to suggest that "great advantage has been taken ofMr Locke
when he says & lays it down as a free principle that no body can be taxed without their
consent". This lends support to the view that Reid understood Locke in the way that
Tully does.
Reid believed that Locke went wrong on the question of taxation because he based his
principle on an imperfect view ofmen's intentions in entering into political society.
According to Reid, Locke supposed that men enter into such an association merely in
order to defend their property, whereas Reid was of the opinion that men's intentions
in this regard were far more complicated. As Reid is reported to have said: the
"Intention of mens Entering into society is not simply to defend his property But it is
[also] to defend his Life his honour, & his esteem". Reid suggested that if Locke had
considered this fact with his "usual acuteness" he might have allowed not only that an
individual may be forced to "pay his private debts" but also, by analogy, that an
individual may "in a public Capacity" be forced to "pay his public debts which are no
less obliging upon him". Reid agreed that in the early days of English society when
the Monarchy was supported by Crown lands and taxes were unnecessary, levies
were quite rightly called and regarded as benevolences. But he emphasized that times
had changed drastically since that time; taxes had "become absolutely necessary for the
subsistence of [the] state" and they had therefore become indeed "a kind of duty
Imposed upon most people". Moreover should subjects fail to pay their taxes it would
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become impossible for the State to do "its duty to provide for & protect the subject, to
guard & guide them". For Reid, therefore, paying one's taxes was thus a point both
of honour and of prudence.39
39Jack's Notes, 1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lectures 120-121, i.e. 26, 29 Apr 1776, pp. 667-
670, 673-674; Practical Ethics, p. 261; cf. Monteath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp.
196, 243; see also Jack's Notes, p. 671. It is interesting that Reid's view of the disturbances in
America remained unchanged during the course of the War of Independence, for in February 1778 (i.e.
about two years after he delivered the material of which we have been speaking) Reid wrote to his
friend Lord Karnes: "I read the yesterdays News, which make me Melancholy, more than I care to
own, and more than a Man ought to be who believes the World to be under a good Administration. I
believe Lord North allways was & is an honest Man, but he seems to despair of the State more than
becomes his place. To give back Canada to France & Florida to Spain, I should have thought a
tollerable issue to the War. But to sacrifice all America for a mere name of Dependance without the
reality, looks to me very Strange. God Almighty give us a more comfortable Prospect. If the British
Lyon must die God grant that he may die like a Lyon & preserve his Spirit to the last Gasp" (R to K,
[27 Feb 1778], Ian Ross, ed., "Unpublished Letters of Thomas Reid to Lord Karnes, 1762-1782,"
Texas Studies in Literature and language, vol. 7 (1965/1966), p. 33). Karnes was probably
sympathetic to Reid's opinion, given the fact that at the beginning of the decade he had spoken




In this chapter I will outline Reid's thoughts on the tendency to corruption that lurked
within the British constitution, as well as the remedies he proposed for this weakness.
What emerges is his unshakeable faith in the importance of a certain degree ofmoral
virtue to the subsistence of every state and his overriding concern with the means of
encouraging it. Reid was also critical of the damaging effects of trade and the division
of labour and of the use ofmoney on the morals of a people. In this analysis we find
reaffirmed Reid's bias for a community of property or, at the very least, of a radical
land redistribution policy as discussed in Chapter 11.
1.
Reid followed Montesquieu in regarding the British constitution as "more admirably
fitted for preserving the Liberty of the Subject than any other form of government that
ever existed ... or even any model that ever was proposed even the Oceana itself'.1
As Reid remarked in his private class at Glasgow: "It is not yet a century since Civil &
Ecclesiastical Liberty came to be properly established in great Brittain, and a great part
of that time has been employed in resisting attempts to destroy both", pointing out later
that "The British Government is now, as I apprehend, more favourable to political
Liberty than any other Government ever was, but it has not long been so. Since the
Revolution which we may look upon as the era of british Liberty, The principles and
the Temper of free Government have been gradually spreading among the people, and
are now so established".2
Reid also endorsed the following Montesquieuian criticism of the British constitution:
"I do not affirm says [Montesquieu] that the extreme degree of liberty which is to be
found in this constitution ought to mortifie those who enjoy Liberty onely in a
5 MS. 4/1II/8, fo. Ir; Montesquieu, see also Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler et al., pp. 157,
166.
2MS. 8/1/2, p. 2 (of the second run of pages, which comes immediately after fo. 5v of the first
sequence in this booklet); fo. 7r (which is in the third sequence, which follows p. 2 of the second); see
also fo. lr (w hich bears the date 1 Nov 1766).
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moderate degree. An excess of the best things is not always desirable and human
Nature suits itself better to a mediocrity than to the extremes even of things that are
good."3 At this point, Reid invoked the political scepticism we saw in Chapter 9,
observing that
this admirable Plan ofGovernment in which every british man glories,
and for which the most enlightened of other nations do envy us; was
never contrived by any Lawgiver, it is the work of time and of
Accidents. The generosity and Courage of the British Nation impatient
of tyranny has always made them shake it off when they began to feel
it and make such changes in their Political System as seemed most
proper for preventing for the future the grievances they had already
felt.4
In emphasizing the advantage of political liberty, Reid underlined its potential for
abuse:
It is one of the advantages of this Government that we may freely
philosophize about the principles of Policy and even of our own
Government as well as about every other object of human knowledge.
A happiness which is not enjoyed in an equal Degree under any other
Government. Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Loix was burnt in France &
he as well as the other best political writers of that Nation do not chuse
to own what they write. In Brittain we see that the Subjects have not
onely the Liberty to canvass the form of Government but to arraign the
administration of it in a manner that never was permitted on any other
Government under heaven. This liberty indeed has of late been much
abused & it is to be wished that the abuse of it may not make it
necessary to lay some restraint upon it. But there is no Restraint upon
a calm and candid Philosophical Discussion of the Principles of our
happy Constitution, nor even on pointing out the Defects and weak
sides of it that those who have it in their Power may apply the proper
Remedies.-"'
3MS. 4/III/8, fo. Ir. Reid's rephrasing of Montesquieu on this point is highly significant, for Reid
would undoubtedly have been uncomfortable with Montesquieu's scepticism with regard to reason: "I
do not claim hereby to disparage other governments, or to say that this extreme political liberty
should humble those who have only a moderate one. How could 1 say that, 1 who believe that the
excess of reason is not always desirable and that men almost always accommodate themselves better
to middles than to extremities" (Spirit of the Laws, trans and ed. Cohler el al., p. 166).
4MS. 4/111/8, fo. lr.
-'MS. 4/111/8, fo. Ir. This formula recalls Turnbull's comment that on the subject of government "we
of this nation, and we only, dare write freely. For our happy constitution is the blessed effect of
thinking freely on this matter; and it must last uncorrupted, unimpaired, while we continue to exercise
the right to which we owe it: A right without the exercise of which men are not indeed men. For
w ho will say that slaves, who know not the price of liberty, or w ho know not that they are slaves,
deserve to be called men" (Turnbull, Remarks on Heineccius, Methodical System, trans. Turnbull,
vol. 1, p. 323). Moreover, in his ow n remarks Reid may have been remembering the following
reflections in Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments w hich also point to the reciprocal relationship
between political science and political liberty: "Nothing tends so much to promote public spirit as the
study of politics, of the several systems of civil government, their advantages and disadvantages, of
the constitution of our own country, its situation, and interest with regard to foreign nations, its
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Reid himself underlined a number of "Defects or Inconveniencies in the British
Constitution." He observed that it lay "a foundation for Corruption or undue
Influence in Elections and Nominations which may be used by the Ministry or by the
Candidates to Offices & to faction in those that would be in it." Reid further observed
that "A place at Court (is) often got by Opposition to the Administration rather than by
serving the Public." He seems to have followed Hume in supposing that "some
degree and some kind of (corruption and dependence] are inseparable from the very
nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of ... mixed
government."6
Reid went on to suggest that "The British Constitution has a tendency to a Corruption
ofMorals & seems to have no sufficient provision against that." He then detailed the
aetiology of corruption:
The Corruption of Morals grows from the Influence of And the
Example of a Court, the Manner in which Elections & Nominations to
offices are carried on The Number of Oaths the Profanation of the
Sacraments (i)n being made a Qualification to a place. The Abuse of
Liberty of Speech & of the Press its degenerating into a Spirit of
Libertinism. The Contempt of Religion & of the Clergy. The Numbers
that live a City Life The increase of Trade w hich makes every thing to
be bought & Sold.
Finally, Reid discussed four options for stopping the progress of vice. First, by the
"Example (and ] Influence" of a "King & Court", in its "Strict Execution of the Laws
against Immorality" (a strategy Reid considered in his lectures on police, as we shall
see presently) and "By its Power in Universitys & the Church & in the Disposal of
Places". Second, by the possible revival of the "Censorial Power" of ancient
republics. Third, by the substitution of a "Proper Church Discipline" for the censorial
power. (Reid was sceptical about this solution, for when he considered "the
Education Election & deprivation ofClergymen", he concluded that "The Constitution
of the Churches both of Scotland & England has a tendency to Corruption of Morals
among the Clergy. Which must be followed by Corruption among the people".) And
commerce, its defence, the disadvantages it labours under, the dangers to which it may be exposed,
how to remove the one, and how to guard against the other. Upon this account political disquisitions,
if just, are reasonable, and practicable, are of all the works of speculation the most useful. Even the
weakest and the worst of them are not altogether without their utility. They serve at least to animate
the public passions of men, and rouze them to seek out the means of promoting the happiness of the
society" ((London, 1759), p. 355).
6Essays, p. 45; cf. MS. 4/111/11, fo. 2n "Whether the Ballance of the British Government inclines
more to Liberty or Despotism See Hume Essay on the Indcpcndancy of Parliaments on the above
Quest."
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fourth, by "The Encouragement of Rural Life & making it free and independant"; on
this point, Reid was unequivocal.
He later added a note in which he pointed out the relationship between morals and a
sense of (or capacity for) liberty, thus underlining the importance of stopping the
progress of vice by such means as those enumerated above. For Reid, everything
depended on the preservation of virtue, for "A certain degree of corruption ofMorals
Makes a people incapable of free Government." Reid then added "& therefore the br".
If I might finish his sentence: and therefore the British constitution lays the foundation
for its own destruction. It is in this light that one must view the question Reid posed
at the end of this passage, i.e. "Whether all Governments must have a period as Men
have", which he undoubtedly lifted from Hume's essay, "Whether the British
Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic" (1741 ).7 How
Reid at this time may have answered the question of the natural inclination of the
British constitution is unclear, but he probably would have denied the premiss,
insisting that political constitutions have a life beyond corruption. Moreover, he
would undoubtedly have taken exception to Hume's perhaps pessimistic estimate of
the consequences of preferring a republican resolution and opted for reforms in the
direction of republicanism.
What Reid undoubtedly had in mind by the fourth option was a radical land
redistribution policy whereby farmers would no longer be tenants who held their land
7MS. 4/111/11, to. 2v. Hume had written: "It is well known, that every government must come to a
period, and that death is unavoidable to the political as well as to the animal body. But, as one kind
of death may be preferable to another, it may be enquired, whether it be more desirable for the British
constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in absolute monarchy? Here 1 would frankly
declare, that, though liberty be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I should rather wish to
see an absolute monarch than a republic in this island. For, let us consider, what kind of republic we
have reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary republic, of which a man
may form a plan in his closet. There is no doubt, but a popular government may be imagined more
perfect than absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But what reason have we to
expect that any such government will ever be established in Great Britain, upon the dissolution of our
monarchy? If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution to pieces, and put it up
a-new, he is really an absolute monarch; and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to
convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or establish any free government.
Matters, therefore, must be trusted to their natural progress and operation; and the house of commons,
according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature in such a popular government. The
inconvcnicncies attending such a situation of affairs, present themselves by thousands. If the house of
commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to be expected, we may look for a civil
war every election. If it continue itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction, subdivided into
new factions. And, as such a violent government cannot long subsist, we shall, at last, after many
convulsions, and civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have been happier for
us to have established peaceably from the beginning. Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest
death, the true Euthanasia of the British constitution" (Essays, pp. 51-53).
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property in exchange for giving military service or who acted as placemen (to recall
Reid's formulation of the system of landholding under despotism); instead, they
would hold their land independently of the Crown. When viewed against this
background, Reid's subsequent approval ofWilliam Ogilvie's Essay on the Right of
Property in Land (1781) makes perfect sense. Reid's criticism of the law of entail and
his advocacy of the breakup of feudal tenures must be regarded as crucial elements in
his strategy (whatever that might have been) to implement this policy.
2.
Reid elaborated on the theme of preserving morals in his lectures on police, i.e. the
second half of his course on politics. He was, however, unsure about the precise
distinction between the two halves. At first he suggested that this distinction related to
another one, i.e. that between the chief and subordinate ends of political society, the
chief ends, which are to be "attained by a proper form and Model of Government",
being "Security from forreign Enemies and the maintenance of Peace and justice
among the Subjects" and the subordinate ends, the "attainment of which tho not
necessary to the being or continuance of it may yet conduce greately to its wellbeing
and Prosperity", being "Population. Virtue, Learning, Riches & Opulence, Publick
Revenue and Arms." Later, when he reiterated his distinction between the "primary
and Secondary or principal and Subordinate" ends of political society, Reid dropped
that part of his original distinction according to which only the attainment of the
principal ends was necessary to the being or continuance of political society, stating
that the subordinate ends were "whatever may render the Society more happy and
flourishing."8 I would suggest that Reid wavered on this point because of the
centrality of one of the so-called subordinate ends — namely virtue — to his very
conception of political society.
On the question of the "importance of Virtue in a State and the Means by which it may
be most effectually promoted" Reid began in highly Montesquieuian fashion. He was
interested not so much in the moral or religious significance of virtue as in its political
importance.9 As he wrote:
8MSS. 4/111/9, fo. 2r; 4/III/10, fo. lr.
9MS. 4/III/9, fo. 2v; cf. Montesquieu, Author's Explanatory Notes to The Spirit of the Laws, trans.
.Nugent; ed. Franz Neumann, p. 71: "For the better understanding of the first four books of this work,
it is to be observ ed that what 1 distinguish by the name of v irtue, in a republic, is the love of one's
country, that is, the love of equality. It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political virtue; and it
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That Virtue is the highest Excellence of a Man[,J that it contributes
more than all other things put together to make a man usefull to others
and happy in himself in the present Life and is the onely mean of
securing happiness in the life to come; these are no doubt truths of the
highest importance, but they do not belong to our present Argument
which leads us onely to consider how far Virtue is necessary or
conducive towards making men good citizens or good Members of a
State. As far as it deserves the Care and Attention of the Legislator, and
he neglects an important part of his province if he takes no Care of it.
It is doubtful that Reid would have endorsed Montesquieu's view that, although "in
every country in the world morality is desired", what is esteemed to be morality in a
given country will be deemed so relative to the agenda of the political regime. In his
Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu wrote: "I speak here about political virtue, which is
moral virtue in the sense that it points toward the general good, very little about moral
virtues, and not at all about that virtue which relates to revealed truths."10 Reid would
doubtless have appreciated Montesquieu's reference to the general good but in the
above passage Reid clearly and unequivocally understood virtue to be moral virtue.
His point was that a man may be a good citizen without being a good man in the sense
of possessing the highest degree of moral virtue. Hence Reid's observation:
It appears to be very certain that all wise Schemes of Political
Government suppose men to be neither perfectly virtuous nor perfectly
vicious & profligate[. I]f men were perfectly virtuous there would be
little Use for political Government!;J men would live very happily
without it, they would onely need to know their duty in order to do it
and would not need to be compelled to it by laws & sanctions.
Here Reid was very likely alluding to 1 Timothy 1.9: "the law is not made for a
righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners,
for unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers, and murderers of mothers, for man-
slayers".11 For in a related passage composed sometime after 1766 he remarked: "if
men were perfectly virtuous & proof against all temptations there would be no Need of
Civil Government. Men would do their duty without being compelled by Laws and
punishments. It is therefore very true which a sacred writer observes that the Law is
not made for the just but for the unjust."12
is the spring which sets the republican government in motion, as honor is the spring which gives
motion to monarchy."
I °Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler elal., pp. xli; 25, n. 9.
II The Holy Bible containing the Old and New Testaments [A V) (Oxford, [ 1764)).
12MS. 4/111/3, fo. 5r.
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On the other hand, if any political society were composed entirely of unjust men no
degree of moral virtue could provide a sufficient "cement or principle ofUnion" to
hold it together:
if all the members of a state were as wicked and profligate as some
individuals are no Scheme of Government would be sufficient to hold
them together, the Society behoved to disband, every individual would
be as a beast of prey to the rest and they would mutually destroy each
other. All political Government therefore supposes human Nature to
be in some middle State between these extreme degrees of Virtue and
vice. And indeed it has always been so in the bulk of Mankind, and we
have no reason to believe that there is any nation on the face of the
Earth where the whole or the greater part are so extreamly wicked and
so abandoned as some individuals in every nation may be found to be
But between the extremes of Virtue and vice which may (on the) one
hand make Political Government unnecessary or on the other hand
make it impossible there are a great many different degrees of
Corruption of Morals in the body of a State which may make political
Government more or less easy and more or less secure and quiet.13
At this point in his argument, Reid summarized Montesquieu's teaching on political
virtue, but was careful to note an important point of disagreement: some degree of
virtue, according to Reid, was necessary to maintain even a despotism. As 1 have
shown, the virtues of a people subject to despotic power were chiefly the passive
virtues of patience and resignation, but also included "fair Dealing" and honesty.14
Thus, despite his best efforts, and unlike Machiavelli and Montesquieu, Reid found
himself unable to make a firm distinction between the ethico-theological and political
faces of virtue. He did not understand virtue to be either extraordinary prudence in a
ruler or an optional quality in the ruled, depending on the regime under which they
happened to live. For Reid, virtue was rather a medium grade of those intellectual
habits the acquisition of which was no less essential to making good citizens or good
members of the State (whatever its form) than it was to making people happy or
earning them a place in Heaven.
Reid's stance was polemical. Against the Machiavellian view that moral virtue is
either dangerous to its possessor or unattainable by the politician, Reid argued that a
modest degree of this virtue was both within the reach ofmost people (governors and
governed alike) and necessary to the very existence of political society. Consequently
he aligned himself against Montesquieu, who allowed that "virtuous princes are not
13MS. 4/III/9, fo. 2v.
14MS. 4/111/1, fo. lv; cf. PracticalEthics, pp. 121, 157; Works, pp. 663a, 667a.
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rare" but suggested in the same breath that in a "monarchy it is very difficult for the
people to be virtuous."15 As a result Montesquieu emphasized the separation and
balance of powers (an institutional mechanism) and minimized the role and importance
of personal virtue (which could not be relied upon as a security against the insidious
tendency of those possessed of power to encroach upon the authority of others and
thus upset the balance of power). Reid's criticism of Montesquieu was
characteristically gentle:
Montesquieu conceives that fear without Virtue is sufficient to support
a Despotick Government, that a principle of honour without Virtue is
sufficient to support a pure Monarchy such as that of France but he
conceives that a Republick cannot Subsist without Virtue. I agree with
this Author that a greater degree of Virtue is necessary in a Republick
or in any free Government than in a Despotick Government or pure
Monarchy.16
What Reid is saying is that no regime can subsist without at least some degree of
virtue. He would have taken small comfort in Montesquieu's prevarication that the
potential for virtue may exist in a monarchy or that the actual practice of virtue is not
inconsistent with the nature of a monarchy:
there is a very great difference between saying that a certain quality,
modification of the soul, or virtue is not the spring that makes a
government act and saying that it is not present in that government. If 1
were to say that a certain wheel, a certain gear, is not the spring that
makes this watch move, would one conclude that it is not present in the
watch? Far from excluding moral and Christian virtues, monarchy
does not even exclude political virtue. In a word, honor is in the
republic though political virtue is its spring; political virtue is in the
monarchy though honor is its spring.
It must be supposed that Reid would have regarded as overstatement Montesquieu's
suggestion that a monarchical government "continues to exist independently of love of
the homeland, desire for true glory, self-renunciation, sacrifice of one's dearest
interests, and all those heroic virtues we find in the ancients and know only by
hearsay."17 By the same token, Reid was not unaware of the substitution of
distinction for true duty, of politeness for true prudence, of good breeding for true
glory in monarchies, for
Here a Man is taught that his Virtues ought to be such as shew an
elevation of Spirit his Morals ought not to be too strait or Stiff. That
1 -"'Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler et al., p. 25.
16MS. 4/III/9, fo. 2v.
17Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler et al., pp. \li, 25.
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his behaviour should allways be frank and Polite. The Virtues which
this principle of Honour inspires are not these which point out our duty
to others but such as teach us what a man owes to himself. Not those
that draw our affections towards our fellow creatures but those that
may give us some distinction & preeminense above them. This
Honour does not judge of Actions by their Justice or Utility but by
their brilliancy and lustre. It aims not at real Worth but at Distinction
and Fame. Sincerity Modesty Justice Temperance are to the Man of
Honour plebeian Virtues, which have [here Reid ran into difficulty:
initially he wrote "no"; later he penned in "little" above it without
obliterating or stroking it out, indicating his uncertainty (little would
have supported Reid's view that virtue was necessary even in a
monarchical government)] connexion with the Principle of Honour and
ought not to stand in its way, when it aims at any thing that [is] spirited
and Noble. The Man of Honour to raise his fortune can Supplant the
man that confides in him. He can boast of an amorous intrigue with a
person of superior rank or of eminent Perfections, tho the wife of his
Friend or benefactor. If he can gain a Post by servile adulation and
flattery of one whom in his heart he despises, or by a dexterous piece
of Craft & cunning this is a laudable finesse in which he will glory.
His honour requires that his should be open and speak the Truth, not
from the love of Sincerity and Truth; By no Means, but because to
speak the truth is a Sign of boldness and Courage.
Reid accepted that politeness and good-breeding were "noble accomplishments] ...
which real Virtue and Humanity ought to inspire. As men are born to live together and
mutually to promote each others Satisfaction comfort and happiness. And nothing
tends to promote peace harmony and good will in Society (more) than a polite and
obliging behaviour towards one another." Yet he conceded to the Mandevillian sceptic
Montesquieu that these "amiable Qualities] ... [are] often the offspring ofVanity and
the desire of Esteam."18
Reid also doubted whether there was in Harrington's Commonwealth ofOceana
"sufficient provision for preserving that degree of Morals and publick Virtue which is
necessary in a Commonwealth." As Reid put it, the duration of such a government
requires not only agrarian laws but also the "preservation of Morals, the Suppression
of Luxury. The inspiring the people with a Spirit of Libertyl,] of Zeal for the
Government^] ofModeration in the Use of Richesf] of Respect to the Laws &
Magistrates."19 Harrington merely assumed that the very constitution of a popular
government, i.e. the senate debating and proposing, the people resolving and the
18MS. 4/111/] 4, fo. 2v; cf. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler eta!., pp. 31-34.
Montesquieu himself made the highly Mandevillian remark that in monarchies "each person works for
the common good ... believing he works for his individual interests" (p. 27).
19MS. 4/111/6, fo. lr.
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magistracy executing, guaranteed its virtue. As Harrington put it: "reason in the
debate of a commonwealth, being brought forth by the result, must be virtue".20
Undoubtedly Reid would have had more sympathy for Montesquieu's view that in
republican governments the "full power of education is needed" in addition to
institutional checks and balances to "mould Men into that Character and temperwhich
agrees best with the Nature of the Government", for "political virtue" (or "love of the
homeland and of equality") is a "renunciation of oneself, which is always a very
painful thing."21 But, to repeat, Reid went beyond Montesquieu (who had denied that
the virtue which was the "leading Principle" of republican governments was a "moral
or a Christian virtue") and spoke of the "Morals and publick Virtue which is necessary
in a Commonwealth," Moreover, he broadened the definition of that virtue which is
"suited to the Nature of [republican governments]" to include the "Love [of] their
Constitution ... of Liberty and of the Laws", which he declared to be the "true Spirit
of a free Government". Reid could scarcely have stated his preference for republics in
more certain terms.
The difference between the views of Reid and Montesquieu on the subject of virtue in
republics is brought into high relief in Montesquieu's account of the virtue of Sparta,
which showed the extent to which self-denial involved not only the restraint but also
the release of the passions. This apparent paradox may be explained by considering
that when Montesquieu spoke of self-denial he did not necessarily have in mind a
moral virtue; indeed, part of what he meant by self-denial was that forgetting of
oneself which implies a lack of awareness of the highest virtue. It was in this spirit
that Montesquieu praised the
genius of those legislators who saw that by running counter to all
received usages and by confusing all virtues, they would show their
wisdom to the universe. Lycurgus, mixing larceny with the spirit of
justice, the harshest slavery with extreme liberty, the most heinous
feelings with the greatest moderation, gave stability to his town. He
seemed to remove all its resources, arts, commerce, silver, walls: one
had ambition there without the expectation of bettering onself; one had
natural feelings but was removed from chastity. In these ways, Sparta
was led to greatness and glory, with such an infallibility in its
institutions that nothing was gained by winning battles against it, until
its policy was taken away.
20Harrington, Commonwealth ofOceana, in Political Works ofJames Harrington, ed. Pocock, p.
170; cf. p. 174.
21MSS. 4/III/6, fo. 4v; 4/111/14. fo. 2r; Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans, and ed. Cohler et al.,
pp. xli, 35.
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It is highly significant that Reid identified as the "great End" of republics the "common
good of the Whole and the Preservation of civil Liberty", for he did not apply this
description to any other form of government.22 This must imply that he regarded the
republic as the only form of government that reflected the dictates of ourmoral faculty
and truly respected our moral liberty.
Given his belief that some degree of virtue was a precondition of every government,
Reid had to consider how this virtue might be secured. His outline of "The means of
promoting and preserving Virtue in a State" reiterated some of his suggestions for
ways in which the progress of vice in the British constitution could be stopped):
1 Good Education. Publick Schools properly endowed and provided.
2 Execution of the Laws against Vice and Immorality.
3 Zeal & Strictness of Life in the Ministers ofReligion & Magistrates
4 Care of the Army and Navy. Learning and Arts.23
It is clear that Reid favoured the gentler methods — education and example — as the
most effective in the promotion of virtue. As Monteath's notes show, Reid believed
that "Mens Characters are generally formed from education & example, and those who
have had a virtuous life set before ym also follow it". What is more, in a crucial
passage on the "education of Youth", he observed that it is a mistake to suppose that
"people who are dissolute, & profain Drunkards & so on, are piteful Creatures and do
hurt only to yms,... for the vices of individuals hurts always the state, for tis of
individuals tis made up."24
Reid continued his exploration of virtue in that part of his course devoted to
commerce.25 Reid pointed out that "The Spirit of Commerce in a Nation is favourable
to some Virtues and unfavourable to others." A heading in his lecture notes underlines
his concern with "The ... Effects of [commerce] with regard to the Manners of a
22MS. 4/111/14, fo. 2r.
23MS. 2/III/9, fos 2v—3r.
24Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp. 205-207, 213-214.
25He began by observing that "Commerce has of Late been made a Subject of Philosophical
Disquisition; and as it must be acknowledged to be both a curious and interesting Subject, it has been
pursued by many able Writers with much ingenuity, and with considerable Sucess. It has been made
abundantly evident that very gross mistakes in the Political Eoconomy of States have been committed
and are still committed through Ignorance of the Principles of Commerce. Future ages must reap
benefit from ever}' discovery of this kind, and may on the other hand be greatly hurt by false Notions
upon this Subject" (MS. 4/I1I/3, fo. 3r; cf. Montcath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p.
217).
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people" as well as with regard to "Their Morals."26 While no record in Reid's own
hand on this head hav^ survived, a subsequent passage in his lecture notes is very
suggestive:
Effects of Trade carried to the highest pitch.
It increases cities corrupts the Morals of a Nation. Makes every thing
venal.27
Fortunately Monteath's notes are more illuminating. Reid's remarks as recorded there
are not without paradox. Although the deleterious effects of commerce upon morals
were apparent to Reid, he also had no doubt that commerce had "a mighty influence to
inlighten mens minds, & open their Understandings." It therefore tended both to lead
them to a knowledge of "their rights" and to engender in them the "spirit to assert
ym_"28 William Robertson, in his View of the Progress ofSociety in Europe, an
essay which Reid read in September 1769, expressed a similar opinion of the effects
of commerce on the minds and passions of men.29 Given the similarity ofReid's line
of reasoning, it is not surprising that he should have remarked upon the "Causes
which cooperated ... to rouse the Minds of Men and to enlighten them in the principles
of Knowledge & Liberty" when he read Robertson on this subject.30 Such sentiments
were very much in keeping with the views of Defoe, Hume and Hutcheson. They
also recalled Montesquieu's view that commerce was a "cure for the most destructive
prejudices" and had "everywhere diffused a knowledge of the manners of all nations;
these are compared one with another, and from this comparison arise the greatest
advantages."31
Reid also underlined the benefits associated with the specialization that accompanies
the rise of commerce, as his account of "The Steps whereby Artificial Traffick or the
Profession of Merchants is introduced into Society" shows:
1 Labour assorted into particular Trades and Arts which are made
distinct Professions. As Shoemakers Weavers Taylors Blacksmiths
farmers and the like The Advantage of this to Society 2 Markets or
26MS. 4/111/15, fo. 3v.
27MS. 4/111/10, fo. 2r.
28Monteath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 214.
29In The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, 11th ed., 4 vols (London, 1806), vol. 1,
pp. 34, 37-38, 48, 91, 97; cf. pp. 31, 173.
30MS. 4/111/21, fo. 3v; cf. fo. 4r: "The Effects of the Crusades in enlightening those who had been
engaged in them".
3 'Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. [Thomas] Nugent, 2nd ed., 2 vols (London, 1752), vol. 2,
pp. 1-2.
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Fairs for the Sale of those several Commodities. 3 Merchants who buy
at one Market and carry to another 4 Manufacturers who hire artificers
to work for them. The last state most favourable to Commerce it
multiplys professions, makes men more dexterous and Skillfull in their
several Professions more laborious and produces better commodities.
Gives rise to the Invention of Machines, & the multiplication of them
by which more work is done with the same Quantity of Labour.32
Having subscribed to the fashionable view, Reid characteristically then proceeded to
qualify his endorsement. For he was quick to point out that the repetitive
manufacturing tasks associated with the division of labour among tradesmen, which
he regarded as a "gl improvement," had a tendency in the opposite direction. For
according to Reid it was
of gl hurt to the morals of ye peoplef. T]hus it habituates ym to live
from day to day[. T]his puts a stop to all project(s) or regard for
futurity or old age, they enter into Scenes of riot & disipation for being
unlarned|,] they are uncapable of any oyr recreation, or relaxation from
bussiness.
In another place Reid underlined his point that commerce
tends to debase ... understandings as well as corrupt ... moralsf.] A
Man who is imployed from morn to night in turning the head or
shaping the point of a pin his thoughts are confined and narrow, and
indead few enter into his head So that he cant at his leasure hours
imploy himself in any thing except in drinking & debachery, as indead
the manner of his life leaves him hardly any oyr Method of employing
himself, for they become like mear machines wl out almost those
facultys & powers wc the auther of nature has implanted in us.33
The reported views of Reid on this subject bear a striking resemblance to the opinions
expressed in a surviving set of student notes from Adam Smith's lectures on
jurisprudence, which probably relate to the 1763-1764 session. Here Smith is
reported to have said that one of the "inconveniences ... arising from a commercial
spirit" is that it "confines the views ofmen." As Smith explained:
Where the division of labour is brought to perfection, every man has
only a simple operation to perform. To this his whole attention is
confined, and few ideas pass in his mind but what have an immediate
connection with it. When the mind is employed about a variety of
objects it is some how expanded and enlarged, and on this account a
32MS. 4/III/10, fo. lv. Reid's account must be compared with the even more compressed account of
"the origin of merchants" in Hume's Essay "Of Interest" (1754) (Essays, pp. 299-300).
33Monteath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp. 223, 237-238; cf. MSS. 4/III/10, fo. 2r;
4/111/15, fo. 3v.
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country artist is generally acknowledged to have a range of thoughts
much above a city one. ... This must be much more the case when a
person's whole attention is bestowed on the 17th part of a pin or the
80lh part of a button, so far divided are these manufactures.
Another passage in the Lectures on Jurisprudence which reveals an affinity between
Reid and Smith relates to the drawbacks of "putting boys too soon to work'':
The boy begins to find that his father is obliged to him, and therefore
throws off his authority. When he is grown up he has no ideas with
which he can amuse himself. When he is away from his work he must
therefore betake himself to drunkeness and riot. Accordingly we find
that in the commercial parts of England, the tradesmen are for the most
part in this despicable condition: their work thro' half the week is
sufficient to maintain them, and thro' want of education they have no
amusement for the other but riot and debauchery.34
These similarities, both in point of content and of language, suggest that Reid had
access to a set of student notes from Smith's lectures.35 Smith substantially restated
his opinion in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe Wealth ofNations
(1776) 36 a work which Reid evidently read, for notes which he took have survived in
his lectures on politics.37
Reid was also highly critical of the luxury that accompanied the rise of commerce. In
his lectures, he drew a distinction between the "original Value" of things in a "solitary
or unsocial State", i.e. previous to all "traffick and exchange", and the value they take
on in "a social & commercial State." In a solitary state, each person "will ... be
disposed to consider onely his own wants and desires in rating things" and
consequently "will value every thing according to the benefite, advantage or pleasure
he receives by it." In the social state, by contrast, people "learn to take in the desires
34LJ(B) in Adam Smith, lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein
(Indianapolis: LibertyC/axy/cr, 1978, pp. 539-540; cf. p. 541.
35Further evidence that Reid's call for notes from Smith's lectures was answered and that he in fact
managed to get his hands on a set during his first year of teaching at Glasgow may be seen in the
uncanny resemblance that Reid's list of "False Notions concerning Money" bears to the equivalent
material in Smith's "Early Draft of Part of The Wealth ofNationsReid's list was apparently a
recrafting (probably dating from shortly before April 1763) of the economics material in Smith's
lectures on jurisprudence (MS. 4/111/15, fo. 4r; cf. Smith, "Early Draft," pp. 577-578; Introduction to
Appendix to Lectures, p. [561]).
36See Wealth ofNations, ed. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner; textual editor, W.B. Todd, 2 vols
(Indianapolis: LibertyCIassies, 1976), vol. 2, p. 783.
37See MS. 4/111/16, fo. lr-v; cf. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, 3 vols (Dublin, 1776), vol. 1, pp. 34-35, 38-39, 56.
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and wants of [others] into the Account" and accordingly learn to value everything
according to "what it brings." As Reid put it,
Traffick and Commerce when carried to a considerable pitch produces
a wonderful! Change in many of our Notions, but in none of them does
it produce a greater Change than in our notions of the Value of things
which may be the Subjects of Traffick.
Thus Reid observed that land "can be of no use" to a man "cut off from all traffick and
exchange with other men" except insofar as he
tills and plants it or feeds his cattle in it or hunts on it. If he is not
straitned in these Articles anybody may take the rest that pleases he
does not think it worth occupation. If he had a forrest of the finest
Wood a very small part of it serves all the purposes he can have for
wood. If he had full granaries he can consume but a very small part
before the grain is corrupted and all that is over is of no more value to
him than the clods of the field. If he had Gold and Jewels in
aboundance they would probably be of no more value in his eye than a
bed of tulips. He would not even find that pleasure in his riches which
they borrow from the vanity of a man who enjoys them in civil Society
because they could procure him no courtship or flattery.
Evidently, it was from the value attached to things in this unsocial state that Reid
arrived at his concept of the common good and inferred the illegitimacy of private
property in land. The "wonderfull Change" ofwhich Reid spoke clearly involved a
corruption of our natural and original sentiments and resulted from the introduction of
the use ofmoney and the spread of commerce.38
Reid's line of reasoning must again be compared with that of Locke, who in his
Second Treatise suggested that
as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in
different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the
opportunity to continue and enlarge them. For supposing an Island,
separate from all possible Commerce with the rest of the World,
wherein there were but a hundred Families, but there were Sheep,
Horses and Cows, with other useful Animals, wholsome Fruits, and
Land enough for Corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but
nothing in the Island, either because of its Commonness, or
Perishableness, fit to supply the place of Money: What reason could
any one have there to enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his
Family, and a plentiful supply to its Consumption, either in what their
own Industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful
Commodities, with others? Where there is not something both lasting
and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt
38MSS. 4/111/4, Cos lv—2v; 4/111/17, fo. lr.
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to enlarge their Possessions of Land, were it never so rich, never so
free for them to take. For 1 ask, What would a Man value Ten
Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent Land, ready
cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land
Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with other
Parts of the World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product?
It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up
again to the wild Common of Nature, whatever was more than would
supply the Conveniencies of Life to be had there for him and his
Family.39
The obvious Lockean resonances in Reid's lecture notes on this question provide
additional support formy view that Reid's opinions on whatmay legitimately become
private property were derived from Locke (at least from the Locke that Tully has
portrayed). Reid would, toward the end of his life, develop the theme ofmoney being
at the root of all evil and the Utopian community of property in his "Thoughts on the
Utopian System."40
39John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, cd. Peter Laslett, student ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 301.
40See AUL MS. 3061/6, pp. 7-26.
Section 3
Creating a Political Jurisprudence
Chapter 13
Putting the Science on the Foundation of Rational Liberty
In the 1765-1766 session Reid further elaborated the critique of Hume's politics that
he had begun in the previous year. Characteristically, he began by underlining an
important conceptual distinction insisted upon by Hume, i.e. the separation of the
science of politics from that of ethics. It will be recalled that in his Treatise Hume,
while acknowledging the dependence ofmorals and politics on the "knowledge of
man," asserted the independence of politics from morals: "morals and criticism regard
our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society and dependent
on each other."1 In his introductory lecture and in his IntellectualPowers Reid
approved Hume's observation that "all the Sciences have a reference to the human
Mind & however far they may seem to go off from it, they still return by one channel
or another." Yet Reid quickly added that Hume's "sceptical System is all built upon a
wrong & mistaken Account of the intellectual Powers of Man," thus dissociating
himself from the latter's characterization of the separate sciences ofmorals and
politics.2 In this chapter I describe how Reid strove to underwrite his emerging
science of politics-cum-political jurisprudence with what he considered to be genuine
first principles and with an account of free will. The result was the establishment of a
new science on the foundationiof rational liberty.
1.
Reid was also critical of Hutcheson, who tended to blur the distinction between these
two sciences, and argued instead on Machiavellian grounds that ethics and politics
were and ought to be carefully distinguished from each other. Reid believed that
"most writers on Jurisprudence ha[d] confounded [political] Jurisprudence with the
Science of Politicks". This was particularly true, Reid continued, of Hutcheson, who
had devoted some parts of his System and of his Short Introduction relating to this
part of jurisprudence to questions that Reid believed belonged not to morals, ofwhich
jurisprudence was a part, but to politics. He then indicated that he would "entirely
' David Hume, Treatise, p. xv.
2PracticalEthics, p. 107; cf. Works, pp. 217b-218a; Hume, Treatise, p. xv.
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pass over" these chapters, "leaving the Subjects treated in them to be considered in
their proper place in Our System of Politicks."3 Reid argued that "All Questions
belonging to Jurisprudence are Questions concerning Right and wrong." They
concern our duties, i.e. what we should or ought to do. Thus in political
jurisprudence "we enquire: What the duties of the Citizens are towards the State in
general, towards the Magistrate or towards their fellow citizens." Moreover, Reid
suggested that in political jurisprudence, as in the rest of jurisprudence, "the Rules of
Right and wrong are determined by the Judgment of our Moral Faculty." The
"foundation" of our reasonings in ethics, including political jurisprudence, is made of
intuitive "Moral Axioms".4
The political axioms on which our reasonings in politics are grounded are "of a quite
Different Nature" They are not intuitive, but empirical, that is, they are "ascertained
from our Knowledge of human Nature, or from Experience".5 Politics, Reid argued,
is "a quite different Science" from ethics or morals:
The intention of this Science is to shew from what Causes the Different
Kinds of Civil Government Whether Despotick Monarchical
Aristocratical Democratical take their Rise how they are preserved or
Destroyed, What Effects they produce with Regard to Liberty National
Riches Commerc Learning Morals & Religion War Conquest, and
what Constitution of them is best adapted to produce those Effects
whether Good or Bad.
Reid went on to compare politics to mathematics and physics and observed that in
politics we do not "Enquire what is right or wrong either in the Conduct of States or in
that of Individuals", just as we would not pursue an ethical line of inquiry into the
processes of nature, for example. Instead, "We enquire from what causes Political
Events do arise. And what Political Constitutions are most adapted to produce certain
Effects or promote certain Ends."6 In other words, in our political judgements we
may be permitted an ironic detachment or double vision that we cannot afford in our
3MS. 8/1V/9, fo. lr. It is undoubtedly this difference with Hutchcsonian/Pufendorfian systematics as
much as any narrow Baconianism left over from the Aberdeen period that lies behind Reid's remark in
the introductory lecture to his course as a whole in subsequent years that "because 1 know not any one
or even a few Authors w ho have treated these Subjects in that Order & Method which to me seems
most Natural, I shall not confine my self by any Text Book But under the different branches shall
direct you to such Authors as 1 think have wrote best on these Subjects" (MS. 7/V/4, p. 17).
4MS. 8/IV/9, fo. lr.
5MS. 4/I1I/3, fo. lv.
6MS. 8/1V/9, fo. lr.
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moral reasonings. But, as I observed in the previous chapter, even this descriptive
distance was compassed in Reid within a prescriptive perimeter.
While Reid believed that Hutcheson had confounded politics with morals, he observed
that Machiavelli and Harrington were "free from this Fault." In their systems, politics
was concerned with men as they are not as they ought to be.7 Where Reid mentions
Machiavelli, therefore, it is difficult to resist the suspicion that he had in mind the
following infamous passage from the Prince:
many Principalities and Republicks, have been in imagination, which
neither have been seen nor known to be indeed: for there is such a
distance between how men do live, and how men ought to live, that he
who learns that which is done, for that which ought to be done, learns
sooner his ruine than his preservation; for that man who will profess
honestly in all his actions, must needs go to ruine amongst so many
that are dishonest. Whereupon it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to
preserve himself, to be able to make use of that honesty, and to lay it
aside again, as need shall require.8
Needless to say, Reid would not have gone along with Machiavelli's counsel of
prudence at the expense ofmorality, for from the 1764—1765 session onwards he
criticized "The Notion of some Minute Politicians that however men in private life are
bound by the Laws of Justice and Equity yet it is impossible to govern States properly
w ithout sometimes transgressing the Rules of Justice". Reid regarded this as "dark
and crooked Politicks," which "always sink the credit of a nation and make it
suspected and hated."9 He also believed it to be "contrary to trueWisdom ... Equity
and Truth." He appealed to the authority of Cicero to "ballance that of a thousand
such little Politicians."10 The following passage from Cicero's De Repuhlica, 2.44
was evidently a favourite of Reid's, for he quoted it no fewer than four times in his
lecture notes:
There is nothing which I may judge [putem] spoken so far concerning
the state, and on which I am able to further progress [progrediJ, unless
it be confirmed, not only to be false that the state cannot be ruled
7AUL MS. 4/III/3, fos lr, 5r.
8Pp. 582-583.
9PracticalEthics, p. [182]; cf. p. 255; MS. 4/111/10, fo. lv.
^PracticalEthics, p. 273. Cf. Smith's characterization of Guicciardini's "whole History [as] a
cnticall dissertation on the Schemes, the little and often crooked artifices of the times" (Adam Smith,
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.
115). The same sentiment was also expressed by Dugald Stewart, Dissertation, in The Collected
Works ofDugald Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co.,
1854), p. 488.
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without injustice [iniuriaJ, but also most particularly, that it cannot be
ruled without the highest justice [summa iustitia\.11
This was, of course, precisely the view that Grotius endeavoured to affirm in the
opening pages of his Rights ofWar and Peace and the view that Hume had tried to
combat in his Treatise, as 1 have shown.
Moreover, while Reid was anxious to maintain the separation between ethics and
politics, he admitted that questions of conduct "may be considered either in a political
or in a Moral Light". The sole example he gave was that of "Tolleration of those who
are not of the established Religion."12 Although Reid's own notes are somewhat
elliptical on this point, Robert Jack's notes from the lectures on politics in the 1775-
1776 session provide useful clarification. Thus the relevant passage in Jack's
admittedly haphazard phrasing reads as follows:
there are some questions which may be either treated politicaly or
Ethically thus whether a departing from the Established Religion right
to be tolerated this is trating it Ethically But if it were whether it would
be more for the advantage of the society or politically Body that such
things should be done this is trating it politically.13
Elsewhere in Jack's notes Reid is reported as saying that "it is a part of the Duty of a
nation to have the public worship of god established at certain times & placed &
dispensed by certain hands". On the other hand he remained equivocal as to "Whether
it is necessary for a state that there should be an established religion," regarding this
question as one of which "we can Judge only by experience". Pennsylvania, the one
province which had no established religion, had by Reid's account been "in so short
Continuance that we cannot determine what may be the Consequence & cannot
determine so Important an Question by so Imperfect an Instance." On the other hand,
Reid suggested that "It seem[s] ... Reasonable to think that there should be some
established religion", for just as
1 1 MS. 2/II/10, fo. 4r; cf. PracticalEthics, pp. 182, 255, 273. I owe this translation to my classicist
fnend Ruth Wade. Haakonssen unaccountably omitted this passage, written vertically from the
bottom to the top of the page in the left-hand margin of MS. 2/II/10, fo. 4r, in his transcription of
this paper on pp. [237]-244 of Reid's Practical Ethics.
12MS. 4/III/3, fo. 5r.
13GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 125, 3 May 1776, pp. 715-716. Interestingly enough this issue
would become important to the note-taker himself, for he went on to become Secession minister
successively at Linlithgow, Greenock and Manchester. See W. Innes Addison, ed., The Matriculation
Alburns of the University of Glasgow from 1728 to 1858 (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons,
1913), p. 102.
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It has been found necessary by some in order for the most better
advantage of men that there should be some persons bred up to the
study of the Diseases incident to human Bodies & that they should
have some trials before they enter upon a dispensing of them ... [so] it
is reasonable for us to suppose that those bred up for the dispensing
the Ministry should undergo some trials & not be left to the disgression
of Individuals the most Impudent & the most Ignorant who might
easily fill the people with Inthusiastic notions, & be Very hurtful to a
state.
But despite the political advantage of having an established religion, some reasonable
provision must be made for individuals who do not subscribe to the essential beliefs of
the established religion. This toleration was necessary not only for ethical reasons but
for political ones as well. As Reid is reported to have said:
it is ... evident that even in the Best Religions & among the Best
governed peoples yet every good man may Not all be of one opinion,
this cannot possibly be[. I]t is as might as well be supposed that they
could have the same coat to fit them all as to make them all of one
opinion[. NJow since this is the case a Toleration seems absolutely
necessary & very reasonable because it is very hard for a person to be
obliged to fall in with public opinion altho' his own private opinion
may be very Contrary .... Because it surely is very hard but for the
good & happiness & quietness of government all well dispensed states
have given a Toleration to almost all opinions.
Thus Reid acknowledged that people have a moral right to their separate opinions in
religion deriving from the faculty of conscience. But it also made good political sense
to be gentle with certain dissenters. This point is worth underlining, for Reid was
obviously not advocating toleration of the intolerant, but only of those whose
/
"opinions were not Contary to the welfare of a state." Presumably referring to Johnv~
Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration Reid is reported to have stated that "Mr Locke
seems to have wrote most sensibly upon the subject". Reid is also reported to have
suggested that "There may ... [be] some sects that need not to be tolerated such as
those whild & extravagant opinions ofmen thinking that it was no Government unless
the persons [who] administrated it should be endowed with the grace of god, or of
those who own the sovereignty of no Magistrate unless those who are of their own
opinion", for "these shurely are opinions tending evidently to the heart of society &
Consequently must not be tolerated." In such cases the moral right to be tolerated
must, in Reid's view, give way to the political imperative to preserve the State.14
14MS. Gen. 118, Lectures 118-119, i.e. 24, 25 Apr 11776], pp. 649^653, 655, 657-658; cf.
PracticalEthics, pp. 256-258; MS. 4/III/6, fo. 2r, where Reid elaborated on w hat he considered to be
a sufficient trial for a preacher: "Those w ho contend so earnestly for popular Elections of Ministers
among us are for allowing the people to chose upon having heard a Man preach tw o or three times,
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As his course developed Reid found himself collapsing still further his distinction
between the provinces of ethics and of politics. He did so in the course of three
particular discussions. Taken in the order in which they would finally appear in his
lectures these were: first, his inquiry into "the natural Measure of the Price of things in
Society"; second, his distinction between the justificatory reasons for war and "The
Prudential Motives toWar"; and third, his judgement of forms of government by "the
moral Standart".15 I shall deal with each of these in turn.
Before he began his discussion of the price of things Reid made an apology for mixing
with his lectures on ethics reflections which, according to his own definition,
belonged more properly to political science: "It is difficult in this question to separate
the Provinces of Morals and Politicks Though I have given such Definitions of these
as make them very Distinct Sciences, & propose to handle them distinctly yet; yet in
this particular Quest and in some others they meet as it were together." Reid's
purpose in examining the valuation of things was to enable him "to determine more
justly the limits of right and wrong in those Contracts wherein a price or Value is put
upon things", for "It can admit of no doubt, that a Man taking advantage of the
Ignorance or Necessity of another may take an unreasonable or exorbitant Price and
thereby Injure his Neighbour". Since it was concerned with rights and wrongs Reid's
investigation came within the terms of reference of the science of ethics. But in order
to determine what constitutes an injury of this type in the first place he had first to find
out "upon what principles the Natural and Reasonable Price depends & how it is
measured", and such an investigation clearly fell within the remit of political science.
The "Natural Measure" of the value of commodities, according to Reid, was their
relative usefulness in supplying "Mens real or Imaginary Wants" and in gratifying
"their desires whether reasonable or unreasonable". Their price also depended upon
such wants and desires as well as on men's "opinions whether wise or foolish," i.e.
upon a "vast Multitude ofContingencies which may seem beyond the reach of Human
Prudence and foresight." Because price depended on opinion, even "the most skillfull
in Subjects of this Nature ought to be modest & even somewhat diffident in their
Conclusions." Nonetheless, the "more fixed and determined" nature of the opinion of
the many lent some stability to prices or the opinion of value. Reid concluded that "the
which is altogether an insufficient trial for enabling the people to make a true Judgment. Harrington
gives them a Years Trial wherein they have access to observe his abilities and diligence in every
branch of his office & therefore may make a much more Rational Choice."
15MSS. 4/111/14, fo. 2v; 4/II1/9, fo. lr; 8/1V/9, fo. lr; PracticalEthics, p. 264.
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natural Measure of the Price of things in Society", or "the natural price of
Commodities," is that which allows those by whose labour given commodities are
produced "to live in the manner in which according to the Customs and Opinions of
the Country, they are entitled to live." Such a definition is obviously relativistic, for
as Reid freely admitted "this very Standart must vary as Customs and Opinions vary in
different Countrys, or change in the Same country in Succession of time."
Accordingly, and shifting from politics to ethics, Reid determined that "Combinations
to raise prices [were] wrong" and judged that "Monopolies in order to raise the price to
an unreasonable height [were] no less so." By the same token he condemned the
"Practices of Princes and States in debasing the Coin or Raising its Nominal Value" as
"Contrary to Equity", for he observed "Money is not barely a Measure of the price of
things but it is a commodity which has an intrinsick value according to its weight and
fineness" and therefore it has a "Natural Price as other Commodities have."16
To turn to the second discussion, Reid also distinguished between "justificatory
reasons" for making war,17 which belong to ethics, and "The Prudential Motives to
War", which "belong to Politicks rather than Jurisprudence."18 Vattel, whom Reid
followed in drawing this distinction, had observed that "As nations or leaders are not
only to make justice the rule of their conduct, but also to regulate it for the good of the
state. So decent and commendable motives must concur with the justificative reasons,
that they should undertake a war."19 Of course the words decent and commendable,
which do duty for prudential in this passage, are eminently moralistic terms and
correspond to the neo-Ciceronian language of prudence that Reid was developing in
his inaugural lecture at Glasgow College. They tend to confirm the view, expressed
above, that Reid was comfortable with an ethics-driven science of politics despite the
damage it undoubtedly caused to his distinction between "the Science ofEthicks" and
that of politics.20
Finally, because of his moral and theological biases Reid could not help but judge of a
given political constitution according to the end it ought to pursue, i.e. "the good and
16MSS. 4/111/4, fo. 2v; 4/111/17, fo. lr-v; 4/III/15, fo. 4r; cf. Monteath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL
MS. Box 32.3, pp. 163, 217-218.
17Emerich de Vattel, Imw ofNations, 111.3, quoted in Knud Haakonssen, Commentary on Practical
Ethics, p. 432, n. 49.
^PracticalEthics, p. 264.
19Vattel, Imw ofNations, III.3.29, quoted in Haakonssen, Commentarv on PracticalEthics, p. 433,
n. 50.
2()MS. 4/II/1, p. 2.
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happiness of the Governed". It was in view of this end that the members of a political
body were to "enjoy the common Rights and Liberties which mankind are entitled to"
according to the lights of common sense and conscience. Clearly, in Reid's thought,
morals were prior to politics and it is evident that Reid found it difficult to separate the
one from the other in attempting to frame an independent science of politics. Thus, in
the 1764—1765 session he digressed at length on the conditions a given form of
government must meet if it is to be "reconciled [with] the principles of sound Morals".
When Reid returned to politics as a science a few pages later, his shift of emphasis
from the common rights and liberties of mankind to national defence and justice
among subjects is hardly convincing. Plainly, Reid's Ciceronian bias toward holding
together prudence and honesty was stronger than his commitment to a Machiavellian
science of prudence. His characterization of politics as the art ofmodelling and
governing societies ofmen so as to answer the end proposed by them, though a pure
statement of political prudence, was obviously never intended by Reid as the proper
object of political striving, which must include a notion of justice distinct from mere
obedience and a concept of of real flourishing above and beyond mere survival.21
Hence Reid's unforgiving condemnation of Turkish despotism, however perfect a
model of its type it was, on the grounds that it rode roughshod over the common
rights and liberties of mankind. As Reid put it: "all Despotick Government is in its
very Constitution injurious to the Rights of Mankind because it assumes the power of
Judging of Mens lives and Fortunes without giving any Security of its Judging
according to Equity." "I had rather", he said, "be left in the State of Nature to
vindicate my Rights by the vigor ofmy arm and the assistance ofmy friends, than in a
State of Society (l)eave my Rights depend upon the will of a Man [i.e. the despot],
who is tied down by no law in his Judgment." Even such laws as may be established
under a despotic government would be "iniquous and unjust and contrary to the rights
2 'in our own era, political modelling was practised with horrifying results by the National Socialist
party in Germany. In 1933 the Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels chillingly described politics
as '"the highest and most comprehensive art there is, and we who shape modern German policy feel
ourselves to be artists ... the task of art and the artist [being] to form, to give shape, to remove the
diseased and create freedom for the healthy'" (quoted in Susan Sontag, Under the Sign ofSaturn
(London: Writers and Readers, 1983), p. 92). Unlike Reid, who had emphasized the encouragement of
learning and virtue in characterizing "The art of government" as "the medicine of the mind" (Works, p.
578a; cf. Hume, Essays, p. 169), the Nazis insisted on much more radical intervention: "'We shape
the life of our people and our legislation according to the verdicts of genetics'" (Nazi Printer, quoted in
Hannah Arendt, The Origitts of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958),
p. 350). Moreover, for Reid, a political constitution could not create liberty; on the contrary , liberty
was the expression of the virtue that sustained it. (Virtue in the sense in which Reid understood it
was a quality decidedly lacking under National Socialism).
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ofMankind" because they could not possibly be ''framed and directed with a view to
the good & hapiness of the Subject", i.e. the "publick good".22
Despite his unwavering condemnation of despotism, Reid bracketed these remarks in
his MS, as he did not consider them to be germane to a lecture on politics, and
reminded himself that such material "belongfed] to Political Jurisprudence."23 Reid's
decision in this regard is interesting because it shows just how difficult it was for him
to maintain the distinction between jurisprudence and politics.
In order to rationalize his own blurring of the distinction between ethics and politics
Reid drew an Aristotelian/Hutchesonian analogy between politics and medicine:
Politicks has a like Relation to States & to Government as the Science
of Medicine has to the human Body, and the Politician is the State
Physician. He knows wharein the Sound & healthfull Constitution of
the State consists. When any disorder appears in it he can judge [italics
mine] by the Symptoms what is the cause of that disorder and he
knows what are the Remedies and can prescribe for them with great
probability of Success.
In the course of this discussion Reid used the phrase "political Knowledge" to identify
the sphere of expertise of the state physician.24
In his Politics Aristotle was at some pains to emphasize the imperfection of the
comparison between the politician and the physician, for physicians "do not act against
22MS. 4/III/9, fo. lr-v. This principle was so fundamental that it could even apply to our
governance of animals. Reid argued that "We have a right to the serv ice of inferior animals" because
"A superior degree of knowledge intitles to authority. We ever assume it ov er Children. Tho' Brutes
may hav e quicker external Senses, Tho" they have many instincts, yet they are inferior to men. They
are incapable of abstraction or reflection on past & future They therefore want many passions which
we have They have no moral faculty. Some of these indeed sensible to Shame as Dogs, who
naturally own men as their Master and are unhappy out of Serv ice. They are ashamed in Disgrace &
proud of honour but they seem not to have any moral faculty. Tho' they have some sounds &
motions to indicate their passions, yet they cannot be said to have speech, they cannot make
cov enants, nor are sensible of Obligations from promises They have a bond between male & female,
but this lasts not but till the young are capable to provide for themselves. Tho some are gregarious
yet instinct alone makes them to what serves the community Nature points out by the aptness of
some to be tamed, that they are intended for our use. We have not however a right to make them
suffer more than they would in a natural state" (ML MS. 891086, fos 2r-3r, 4r-5v of loose,
uncatalogued booklet). Therefore he suggested that "Even that Dominion that we assume over the
Brute Animals which serve us such as sheep oxen horses dogs could hardly be reconciled to the
principles of Morality, if their life was upon the whole made more unhappy by that Dominion. Far
less can any Government of a few over the rest of the human Species be justified if it is not directed
to the good and happiness of the Governed. For there is in human Government no Superiority of
Nature in the Governors, as there is in mankind over the brutes" (MS. 4/111/9, fo. lv).
23MS. 4/111/9, fos lv-2r.
24MS. 4/III/3, fo. lr; cf. Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935,
Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 69r-v.
reason on account of affection, but earn their pay by making the sick healthy",
whereas politicians "are accustomed to acting in many matters with a view to spite or
favor."25 The fact that politicians often act against reason was not a problem for Reid,
for he subscribed to the Ciceronian view that in the true statesman virtue would not
only direct the exercise of power but would also be the main source of that power.
Reid agreed with Aristotle that a healthy scepticism ought to be preserved with regard
to the efficaciousness of the science ofmedicine and of politics alike. Reid allowed
only that the politician can prescribe for disorders in the State with greatprobability of
success and Aristotle noted that physicians "sometimes neither judge rightly what the
quality of a healthy body should be nor achieve what is productive in relation to the
object they set for themselves."26
While preparing to read his lectures in 1768-1769 Reid evidently believed his use of
the term political knowledge in the passage we have been considering to be somewhat
opaque and he therefore added the following Ciceronian material as a gloss:
The Analogy between Prudence in an individual and Political
Knowledge in the Government of a State(.) Prudence consists chiefly
in chusing proper Means to accomplish the Ends we have in View. So
does Political Knowledge.) The ends of a Private Man concern him
self chiefly & his family & Friends. The ends of a Politician concern
the State. Prudence distinguished from Craft in the Politician as in the
Private Man. Prudence in the one as in the other grounded chiefly
upon the knowledge ofMankind.27
Reid's medical metaphor may well have been intended as a response to Hume's view
that "every government must come to a period, and that death is unavoidable to the
political as well as to the animal body." Reid examined the question "Whether all
Governments must have a period as Men have" in his lectures on politics.28 Hume's
25Trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 114, 217;
cf. pp. 200-201; Aristotle, EthicaNicomachea, trans. Ross, 1112b ("a doctor does not deliberate
whether he shall heal").
26Trans. Lord, p. 217.
27MS. 4/II1/3, fo. lr; see also Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, trans. Ross, 1094b, 1112b. My
hypothesis for placing this material here is not disproved by Robert Jack's notes from Reid's lectures,
1775-1776. In Jack's abbreviated version the following passage is placed immediately after Reid's
remark on toleration which we examined earlier: "there is a great simularity between prudence in a
private life & prudence in a politically capacity. Both proudence in the gov ernment of pro ate affairs
& political knowlege in the government of a state consist in a Knowlege of mankind by which I dont
[mean] any particular set of men". See GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 125, 3 May 1776, p. 716.
28MS. 4/111/11, fo. 2v; Essays, p. 51; cf. p. 378.
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view supposes, of course, that medical intervention in the affairs of the state is futile
and therefore denies the reality of political knowledge.
Reid insisted on his medical metaphor to the end, observing in the Active Powers that
The most useful part of medicine is that which strengthens the
constitution, and prevents diseases by good regimen; the rest is
somewhat like propping a ruinous fabric at great expense, and to little
purpose. The art of government is the medicine of the mind, and the
most useful part of it is that which prevents crimes and bad habits, and
trains men to virtue and good habits by proper education and
discipline.29
Wisdom and prudence were for Reid moral virtues and excluded the Machiavellian
formula according to which the end justifies the means. According to Reid "Wisdom
& true Prudence" has a regard to the morality of the means as well as to the goodness
of the end we have in view and "teaches us to weigh in an even Ballance both the Ends
we pursue & the Means of attaining them." In a passage that evokes Plato's
"philosophic dog," Reid's man of "upright heart" pursues the "best and the Noblest
Ends" and "pants after true Glory & Honour." By his characterization of political
knowledge as concerning ends as well as means, and his insistence that political
means must be directed towards moral ends, Reid situated the science of politics
squarely within the science of morals. Politics could be regarded as a science of
prudence only in the fullest sense of the word prudence, i.e. the choice of ends as well
as the selection of means.30
The true statesman constantly had in view the"good and happiness of the Governed",
i.e. the noblest end. But because "there may be other ends of Government proposed",
the political scientist had to maintain a double vision: "as an expert Physician ought to
understand the nature and Effects of Poisons as well as Medicines; so an able
Politician ought to understand the nature & Effects of all kinds ofGovernment the bad
as well as the good."
29Works, p. 578a; cf. AUL MS. 3061/6, pp. 6, 15—16; Practical Ethics, p. 105; Works, pp. 381a,
387a, 530a.
30PracticalEthics, pp. 119, 129, 133, 134, 137, 179; Arlene W. Saxonhouse, "Comedy in
Callipolis: Animal Imagery in the RepublicThe American Political Science Review, vol. 72, no. 3
(Sept 1978), p. 894, n. 17; cf. PracticalEthics, p. 130.
2.
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The remainder of this chapter deals with a further stage in Reid's attempt to create a
moderate, Christian and truly scientific science of politics which would be impervious
to Humean scepticism on the one hand and warm enough in the cause of virtue to
please a good Hutchesonian on the other. Reid attacked the probabilistic
necessitarianism of Book 2 of Hume's Treatise and the related determinist doctrine
implicit in the latter's essay "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science" by attacking
the epistemological assumption on which his argument rested. Reid was of course a
champion of free will and regarded liberty as the only intelligible foundation on which
to construct a sceince of politics.
The experience of a year in the strongly Smithian and Humean atmosphere of
Glasgow must have shown Reid that he needed to shore up the critique he had used at
Aberdeen. He rewrote his lectures on political jurisprudence and revised the opening
lectures of his politics course in 1765-1766 in an effort to sharpen his attack on Hume
and Smith. His lecture notes on political jurisprudence were more than twice the
length of those of the previous year, and the introduction to his politics lectures was
more fluid and lucid than the somewhat abrupt and telegraphic remarks he seems to
have offered the year before.
If Reid's method (or that of any other theological moralist) were examined through
Mandevillian or Humean lenses, his political science would appear as an exercise in
story-telling subject to the narrative imperative imposed by his own peculiar ethico-
theological commitments. Reid's story was about the governance of a society of free
beings, whose salvation depended on being able to live in a society free from
corruption.
I now proceed to the completely rewritten portion of the 1765-1766 lectures on
politics, which contains a crucial passage relating to a central plank of his entire
philosophical system, i.e. the concept of free will.
Reid's discussion of this problem was so deeply influenced by Hume that it may be
useful to review Hume's arguments for necessity before proceeding further. In the
Treatise Hume had set out to show that in the moral realm "our actions have a constant
union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances" in the same way that in the
material world "Every object is determin'd by an absolute fate to a certain degree and
direction of its motion, and can no more depart from that precise line, in which it
moves, than it can convert itself into an angel, or spirit, or any superior substance."
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Taking as writ the constant conjunction of cause with effect in the bodily world, Hume
observed the same relationship between cause and effect in the mental realm, where
our motives, tempers and circumstances could be considered as causes of our actions.
Experience revealed ''the same uniformity and regular operation of natural principles"
regardless of "Whether we consider mankind according to the difference of sexes,
ages, governments, conditions, or methods of education", and it is in the uniformity
of human actions, according to Hume, that their necessity consisted. This was why
Hume spoke of "the necessary and uniform principles of human nature". This was
why he believed that "There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as
in the operations of the sun and the climate". And this is why he concluded that
"There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well
as common to mankind."
Hume was of the opinion that the only way to refute this argument was to deny its
premiss, i.e. the assumption that human actions are uniform or necessary, or in other
words "regular and certain". He endeavoured to show that we are forever making
judgements in such subjects as politics and commerce that suppose the constancy of
the conjunction between the actions of men and their motives, tempers and
circumstances, and that we rely upon the necessity of these apparent connections every
minute of our lives. Thus, for example, "A prince, who imposes a tax upon his
subjects, expects their compliance" and "A man, who gives orders for his dinner,
doubts not of the obedience of his servants." Hume conceded that we often insist on
our freedom of action in the face of ineluctable necessity, but he regarded this
obstinacy as proceeding from some defect in our power of generating beliefs, whether
owing to a tendency to be inconsistent, to engage in revisionism or to give way to
fear. We will admit that in performing a given action we were "influenc'd by
particular views and motives", but we nevertheless find it hard "to perswade ourselves
we were govern'd by necessity, and that 'twas utterly impossible for us to have acted
otherwise". Or we "imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves" when we perform a
given action, even though "a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our
motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he
might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and
temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition." Or we deny
"the doctrine of necessity" because, reasoning under the influence of religion, we
believe "'tis of dangerous consequence" to religion and morality notwithstanding the
fact, according to Hume, that all law, both human and divine, is "founded on rewards
and punishments," which are species of motives and are "suppos'd ... [to] have an
influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions." If
there were no necessary connection between rewards and punishments on the one
hand and obedience on the other there could be no such thing as a character, i.e. a
responsible person on whom to fix blame or bestow praise, for, on the supposition of
"the doctrine of liberty or chance," all actions would be "casual and accidental",
neither adhering to persons nor admitting of approbation or disapprobation.31
In his essay "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science," Hume extended the
necessary connection between motives and actions to include the effects of political
constitutions as well as of human and of divine laws. In the following passage he
responds to those sceptics who believed that politics was determined by the
idiosyncrasies of particular rulers rather than by patterns of behaviour common to
most men:
So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government,
and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers ofmen,
that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be
deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.
Hume used this line of reasoning to cut off the arguments of Sir Robert Walpole's
enemies and partisans alike. The former were wrong to blame Walpole for subverting
the constitution, because if the constitution were so good in the first place, "it would
never have suffered a wicked and weak minister to govern triumphantly for a course
of twenty years, when opposed by the greatest geniuses in the nation". On the other
hand, the latter were wrong to mourn his passing and criticize the British constitution,
for "Public affairs, in such a government, must necessarily go to confusion, by
whatever hands they are conducted". In both of these rebukes Hume emphasized the
necessary connection between political constitutions and the causes of political events.
Hume also took here the opportunity to underline "the natural depravity of mankind."
Hence his insistence upon the importance of laws in curbing the idiosyncrasies of
individuals. Only the operation of "Good laws may beget order and moderation in the
government, where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice
into the tempers ofmen."32
3 1 Treatise pp. 400-403, 405, 407-411.
32Essays, pp. 16, 24—25, 29-30; cf. p. 26; Treatise, p. 411.
Kitagawa 233
When considered in this context Reid's remarks read like a point-by-point response to
Hume calculated to meet the sceptic on his own terms and to put political science on a
theologically correct footing. Reid began by restating Hume's problem:
Every Science must be grounded on certain principles & if Politicks
can be at all reduced to a Science, as I doubt not but it may, there must
be first Principles from which all our Reasonings in Politicks are
deduced as there are certain first Principles or Axioms in Mathematicks
upon which all our Reasonings in Mathematicks are built, and as there
are in Morals certain first Principles ... upon which our Reasoning in
the Science of Morals are built.33
Already a difference between Hume and Reid begins to emerge, for whereas Hume
had concentrated on "general truths, which are invariable by the humour or education
either of subject or sovereign," Reid rather emphasized first principles from which all
our reasonings in politics are deduced.
Reid began his own account of axioms in politics by attacking Hume's views in the
latter's essay "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science" (1741 ).34 While Reid was
on the whole prepared to accept these general truths as being "principles sufficiently
established on good foundation," he denied that they were "first principles".35 The
"first Principles of Political Reasoning must in general be of this Kind, to wit, That
such is the Nature of Mankind that Men placed in such Circumstances will generally
act in such a manner."36
In his "Politics a Science" essay, Hume gave three examples of what he meant by
general truths. Reid copied down two of them in his notes: first, "That an hereditary
prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their representatives, form
33MS. 4/111/3, fo. lr-v. Reid's formulation was not unlike the view expressed by Shaftesbury in his
Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom ofWit and Humour. Speaking of the British "sense of
government" he wrote: "We have the notion of a public, and a constitution; how a legislative and how
an executive is modelled. We understand weight and measure in this kind, and can reasonjustly on
the balance of power and property. The maxims we draw from hence, are as evident as those in
mathematics. Our increasing knowledge shows us every day, more and more, what common sense is
in politics; and this must of necessity lead us to understand a like sense in morals, which is the
foundation" (in Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. John M. Robertson
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Mcrrill Company, Inc., 1964), vol. 1, p. 73; cf. "Soliloquy, or Advice to an
Author" (1710), in Characteristics, vol. 1, p. 189, where Shaftesbury indicated what he meant by
knowledge in the following terms: "knowledge of human nature or the world"). Reid w ould have
welcomed Shaftesbury 's grounding of the sense of government on the sense of morals.
3"*See MS. 4/1II/3, fo. 2v; Monteath's Notes, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 205; Baird's Notes, ML MS.
A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 72v.
35Baird's Notes, vol. 7, fo. 72v.
36MS. 4/III/3, fo. lv.
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the best monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy"; and secondly, the Machiavellian
maxim "that monarchies, governed according to eastern policy ... [are] easily kept
when once subdued".37 While such observations might profitably be debated (Hume
in fact made some modifications to them), they were for Reid in the nature of shrewd
insights rather than fundamental principles from which a science might be raised. This
methodological disagreement figures importantly in Reid's effort to prepare an
alternative account of how "political may be reduced to a Science".38
Reid's first step was to compare a "Political Body" (by which he meant "a
Commonwealth or State") to "a vast Machine made up of a great Number of Parts."
Continuing with this metaphor, he suggested that "it is impossible to know
scientifically the Effects that will be produced by the whole Machine without knowing
the parts ofwhich it is compounded and the powers that actuate those parts, for the
Effect of the whole is an aggregate or composition of the Effects of the several Parts."
The parts of which a political body is made are of course men, "Each of whom has his
particular Principles of Activity in himself, his fears, his hopes his desires, his
passions, his Reason, his Conscience." Moreover, "These principles in every
individual influence him to a certain course ofAction or operation." Only by knowing
how individuals act in different circumstances can we know how political bodies will
act in given circumstances, i.e. "what Effects they will produce". In such knowledge,
according to Reid, consist the first principles of political reasoning, i.e. "the
foundation" upon which all sound political reasoning is built, "And the Conclusions
that may justly be drawn from such Principles ... make up the Science of Politicks."
By basing his argument on the effects of constitutions and not enquiring into their
causes or components, Hume had failed, in Reid's view, to lay a scientific foundation
for political reasoning. Reid's line of criticism reflects a familiar Baconianism, to
which methodology he evidently remained committed despite his new-found
Ciceronian political agenda. Reid's approach recalls Smith's assessment of
Machiavelli, who "seems to have had chiefly in his view to prove certain maxims
which he had laid down, as the impolitickness of keeping up a standing army, and
37Essays, pp. 18, 23; cf. MS. 4/II1/3, fo. 2v: "The best Monarchy Hereditary. The best Aristocracy a
Nobility without Vassals The best Democracy a people voting by their Representatives. Despotick
Governments easily held when Conquered."
38Baird's Notes, vol. 7, fo. 72v.
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others of the same sort, generally Contradictory to the received politicks of the
times."39
3.
Having been obliged to set up his own discussion of the science of politics in order to
respond to Hume's "Politics a Science" essay, Reid was driven next to reply to an
argument against the liberty of human actions which had been made very eloquently
and forcefully by Hume in Book 2 of the Treatise and which Reid perceived to be "a
general Objection against all Political Knowledge". It will be recalled that in the
Treatise Hume had insisted that there is a necessary connection between motives and
actions and implied that in fact only on the assumption of such a connection is a
science of politics possible at all. In Reid's understanding, Hume's argument
proceeded according to the following logic: only ifwe suppose that actions
"necessarly follow upon motives" and that men always act "according to the Strongest
motive" can there be any "foundation for human foresight of their Actions from the
knowledge of their Situation and the Principles of their Nature." And where we
cannot know how men will behave in given situations, there can be no "foundation for
any political Knowledge." For if we suppose that human actions are free, we cannot
"fortell how a man will act in any particular Situation even although we know all the
principles and motives which influence him because he may yield to the force of those
motives or ... resist them and act contrary to them." But if we cannot know how any
one man will act in a given situation, how shall we know how a great body of men
will act (which is of course exactly what we need to know if we are to pretend to have
any political knowledge)?
Reid challenged the conception of science on which Hume's "general truths" were
raised. His first move in replying to Hume on this score was to best him at his own
game by showing that the latter's scepticism with regard to the possibility of political
knowledge on the assumption of liberty undercuts the possibility of such knowledge
on the supposition of necessity as well. He then endeavoured to prove that even on
the supposition of liberty Hume's sceptical "objection has no force against the reality
of political Knowledge."
39Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1983), p. 114.
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With regard to the first objection, Reid argued that those like Hume who insisted that
there was a necessary connection between motives and actions would have to admit
that the motives from which a given action are thought to follow by necessity "cannot
be known to a Spectator, nay that they cannot be known to the Agent himself."40 To
be fair, this formulation involved a slight misrepresentation of Hume's view, for what
Hume actually said was that "a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our
motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he
might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and
temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition."41
Reid was evidently trying to best Hume by being a more thoroughgoing sceptic. His
strategy at this point was to emphasize just how very uncertain we can be of how a
person is going to behave in a given situations, for "It is evident from experience that
the same Motives have not always the same Operation upon the same Man, and that
different Men in like Circumstances as far as can be perceived act differently." From
this observation, the libertarian could conclude that there is no necessary connection
between the motives and the action, whereas the necessitarian is forced to concede that
unknown causes must have been at work. Thus
a Fatalist supposing his System to be true, has no better means of
establishing any Principles of Politiks than the Assertor of the Liberty
of human Actions. If the fatalist affirms that certain Rules may be
pointed out according to which men generally Act, although sometimes
from unknown Causes they may deviate from those Rules. This may¬
be affirmed no less on the Supposition of our being free. And whether
those deviations from the common Rules of Conduct be the Effect of
Necessary but unknown Causes or whether they be the Effect of
Caprice in men who act freely, they are equally unaccountable. And all
that can be inferred from them is That Politicks is founded chiefly on
Probability and not on Demonstration. This is undoubtedly true.
In other words, Hume had falsely dichotomized the question of liberty and necessity.
For Reid caprice was not the essence of, but the exception to, liberty. The small
admixture of caprice in our conduct was insufficient to impede the growth of political
knowledge.
The uncertainty with respect to causes that is common to both the necessitarian and the
libertarian systems does nevertheless underline a further, crippling uncertainty that
attends all necessitarian calculation but does not arise within libertarian assumptions.
40MS. 4/111/3, fos 1 v-2r.
41 Treatise, pp. 408-409.
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For while necessitarian argument supposes that "the Action necessarly depends upon
the Strongest motive" and admits that "there are motives so hidden & obscure that we
cannot perceive them", whether the motives are known or unknown it does not give us
"any Standard by which we may judge of their Strength." The necessitarian system,
that is, does not afford us any test for predicting whether and to what extent passion
will prevail over reason or vice versa.
Reid's next move was to show that we can with a great degree of confidence "know
how men will commonly act in certain circumstances notwithstanding the liberty of
human Action." A wise man, Reid insisted, may be counted upon to act wisely even
though he is free not to and a good man to act a good part notwithstanding the fact that
it is in his power to do otherwise: "in proportion as men are wise and good they will
act wisely and well".42 It is clear that at least part of what underlies Reid's difference
of opinion with Hume is his view that although human wisdom and goodness are
"both imperfect" and consequently "we cannot reckon upon it that [men] will always
act the wisest and the best part", there is nevertheless, as Reid put it, "some degree of
Wisdom some degree of virtue even in Men. One that has no degree of wisdom or
prudence is an Idiot or Changeling." (Curiously, virtue drops out of the second
formulation or is perhaps absorbed by prudence. )43 This is a far cry from "the natural
depravity of mankind" described in Hume's "Politics a Science" essay.44 Reid did not
deny that there are some people completely lacking in wisdom or prudence, but he
maintained, as we suggested above, that a political society could not be formed of
such people: "Men must be supposed to have common understanding in order to form
a Common wealth."45 As we shall see in the next chapter, with this assertion Reid
effectively laid the groundwork for an argument he would develop in the years that
followed, namely that common sense is a prerequisite both for politics and for political
reasoning and therefore underwrites the axioms or first principles of politics. (It is
worth underlining that Reid was here arguing from character, not from motives, which
of course formed the basis of Hume's case. In this Hume exhibited a pragmatic
scepticism with regard to human character according to which individuals tend to act
upon, rather than rise above, low motives, thus compromising themselves instead of
retaining their integrity. Reid, by contrast, was inclined to set rather more store by a
42MS. 4/111/3, fo. 2r-v; cf. Works, pp. 609a, 612a.
43MS. 4/111/3, fo. 2v.
^Essays, p. 24; cf. Treatise, p. 411.
45MS. 4/111/3, fo. 2v.
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regard to reputation and a reliance on voluntary regularity.) In the Treatise Hume had
suggested that anybody who admitted such a probability but denied that necessity
underwrote it was merely engaging in a verbal dispute, i.e. "altering [his] definitions,
and assigning a different meaning to the terms of cause, and effect, and necessity, and
liberty, and chance."46
Reid's views on character may also be regarded as a critique of Smith's views as
reported in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, to which Reid may well have
had access. Smith had spoken of the "Generall tenor of conduct which [a] person
follows," deriving from the "prevailing temper and passions of the man". As Smith
put it, "Tis not the degrees of virtue or vice, of courage, good nature etc. that
distinguish a character, as the particular turns they have received from the temper and
turn of the mind". The following passage indicates Smith's sympathy with the
Humean doctrine of necessity with its codicil of caprice which Reid was at pains to
oppose:
in no case is the proof of facts from the causes more uncertain than in
that of Human actions. The causes of Human actions are motives; And
so far is Certain that no one ever acts without a motive. But then it is
no Sufficient proof that one committed any action, that he had a motive
to do so. There are many things which may occasion the contrary. If
the action be not suitable to the character of the person the motive will
not influence him to commit the action it prompts him to. Besides tho
one had a motive to such or such an action and tho it was altogether
suitable to his character it is still requisite that he should have an
opportunity, otherwise the action could not have been committed. In
proving therefore an action to have happend by proving that its causes
subsisted, we must not only prove that one had a motive to character,
and that he had an opportunity also. But even when all this is done it
does by no means amount to a proof of the action. The character of
man is a thing so fluctuating that no proof which depends on it can be
altogether conclusive. There may many circumstances interfere which
will entirely alter the designs and disposition of the person for that
time, and prevent the execution of an action even when there is a strong
motive for it, the disposition and character of the person agreable to the
action and the fairest opportunity offers 47
1765-1766 was thus a period of revision for Reid, in which as well as attemping to
correct Hutcheson and to satisfy his own scientific expectations by properly separating
the sciences of ethics and politics from each other he also faced up to Hume and
46Treatise, p. 407; see also p. 403.
47Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, pp. 80, 82, 94—95, 171; cf. pp. [78], 79, 92, 194.
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applied his theological assumptions to politics by making liberty rather than necessity
the basis of his new science of politics.
Chapter 14
Framing Governments and Reforming Constitutions: The Centrality of
Common Sense
In this chapter I will review the major changes Reid made to his lectures on politics
circa 1767 to 1769. Against the background of his reading of Sir James Steuart's
interventionist Inquiry, 1 will examine Reid's amplified discussion of political
modelling, particularly with respect to his views on revolutions, his admiration for
Penn's Frame, and his criticism of Pope's notion that constitutional form bears no
relation to the excellence of a regime. The chapterwill conclude with Reid's criticism
of Hume's thesis of human depravity. Reid put forth a doctrine of perfectibility
grounded on the common prudence and common honesty — i.e. common sense —
that may be assumed of any group assembled into a political society.
1.
Undoubtedly owing to the demands of his student audience Reid read Sir James
Steuart's two-volume Inquiry into the Principles ofPolitical Oeconomy (1767) in the
summer of 1767. As Reid wrote to his friend Dr David Skene: "I have gone over Sr
Ja Stewart's great Book of Political Oeconomy, wherein 1 think there is a great deal of
good Materials; carelessly put together indeed; but I think it contains more sound
principles concerning Commerce & Police than any book we have yet had."1 Reid
undoubtedly appreciated Steuart's appeal to the "plain principles of common sense,"2
for we find him referring respectfully to Steuart and frequently drawing upon his w ork
in Monteath's invaluable report.3 And he must have had some sympathy with the
genera] principles underlying Steuart's emphasis on the long-sighted statesman and his
endorsement of interventionist policies.
Given Reid's characterization of politics as the art of modelling and governing states
and his confidence in our power to improve ourselves and our situation it is extremely
'R to S, 14 Sept 1767, NCL MS. THO 2, fo. 20r.
2James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles ofPolitical Oeconomy, ed. Andrew S. Skinner, 2 vols
(Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), vol. 1, p. 12.
3See Monteath's Notes, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp. 217, 232, for example.
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likely that he would have welcomed Steuart's conception of political economy
expressed in the following terms: "The great art... of political oeconomy is, first to
adapt the different operations of it to the spirit, manners, habits, and customs of the
people; and afterwards to model these circumstances so, as to be able to introduce a set
of new and more useful institutions." Steuart's division of the principles of politics
into those which "regard the cool administration of ... government" and those which
"contrive bulwarks against [the] passions vices and weaknesses [of princes], as men"
mirrored Reid's division of his subject into forms of government and police.
Underlying Steuart's approach was a direct criticism of Montesquieu, who "reasoned
from fact and from experience, and from the power and tendency of natural causes, to
produce certain effects, when they are not checked by other circumstances". For,
Steuart remarked, "1 do not suppose that these causes are ever to be allowed to
produce their natural and immediate effects, when such effects would be followed by a
political inconvenience: but I constantly suppose a statesman at the head of
government, who makes every circumstance concur in promoting the execution of the
plan he has laid down." Steuart's statesman "sytematically conduces] every part of
[the government], so as to prevent the vicissitudes of manners, and innovations, by
their natural and immediate effects or consequences, from hurting any interest within
the commonwealth." This meant that a "government must be continually in action,"
for advancing the public good, which is the statesman's duty, makes it incumbent on
him to "make every exercise even of liberty and refinement an object of government
and administration". As Steuart put it, the "more he has [the people's] actions under
his influence, the easier it is for him to make them concur in advancing the general
good."4 State intervention on this scale would be savaged by Smith, who believed
that
The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better
his condition, the principle from which publick and national, as well as
private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to
maintain the natural progress of things towards improvement, in spite
both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of
administration.5
While Reid would have opposed Smith's principle of improvement, he would also
have strenuously resisted Steuart's view that self-interest was the "main spring, and
4Steuart, Inquiry, vol. 1, pp. 16, 21, 122, 217, 238, 278; cf. pp. 11, 142, 334.
5A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, ed. R.H. Campbell,
A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), vol. 1, p. 343.
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only motive which a statesman should make use of, to engage a free people to concur
in the plans which he lays down for their government" and his suspicicion that if
public spirit rather than self-interest were to "become the spring of action in the
individuals of a well-governed state ... it would spoil all."6 Reid would have had
much more sympathy with Steuart's view that our "duty [is] ... relative to the general
good of... society".7
Given his own emphasis on virtue and industry Reid would undoubtedly have
approved of Steuart's view that a statesman should "have it in his power at all times,
either to check prodigality and hurtful luxury, or to extend industry and domestic
consumption" and "make it his endeavour to employ as many of every class as
possible, and when employment fails in the common run of affairs, to contrive new
outlets for young people of every denomination." Reid would also have sympathized
with Steuart's recommendation that the state "provide retreats of all sorts, for the
different conditions of her decayed inhabitants: humanity, good policy, and
Christianity, require it."8
Given his own condemnation ofmonopolies and stringent injunctions against taking
advantage of the "many, the poor, and the simple" in those "Contracts wherein a price
or value is put upon things" Reid would certainly have supported Steuart's
authorization of government intervention in the grain market to "prevent the frauds of
merchants, and to promote an equal distribution of food in all corners of the country".
Reid's view that a proprietor has no right "not to keep up Mercatable Commodities
when the common Good requires that they should be brought to Market" was perfectly
consistent with Steuart's castigation of the "avarice and evil designs ofmen who hoard
[grain] up" in order to make it "rise to immoderate prices."9
Finally, it is not difficult to detect in Reid's notion of the most natural measure of the
price of things an echo of Steuart's concept ofpoliticalnecessaries, which referred to
those luxuries requisite to keeping us in the style that befits our rank in society, the
6J. Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles ofPolitical Economy, 3 vols (1770), vol. 1, pp. 42-3,
quoted in Terence Hutchison, "History and Political Economy in Scotland: Alternative 'Inquiries' and
Scottish Ascendancy," in Douglas Mair, ed., The Scottish Contribution to Modern Economic
Thought (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), p. 76.
7Steuart, Inquiry, vol. 1, p. 11.
8Steuart, Inquiry, vol. 1, pp. 73, 323; cf. pp. 263, 267.
9MS. 4/1II/4, fo. 2v; PracticalEthics, p. 207; R to [Dr James Gregory], 5 Sept 1788, in Works, p.
73a; Steuart, Inquiry, vol. 1, pp. 254, 255; cf. MSS. 4/111/17, fo. Ir; 7/VII/6, fo. 2r, quoted in
Haakonssen, Commentary on Practical Ethics, p. 350, n. 109.
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measure of which was "determined by general opinion only, and therefore can never
be justly ascertained", being variable over time.10
2.
Reid began his lectures on politics in 1768-1769 as he had done in 1765-1766 by
distinguishing between the art and the science of politics and by characterizing the art
of politics as having to do with reforming existing constitutions on the basis of the
most perfect models. He defined "perfecting" a government as studying the "natural
Effects and Consequences" of different political constitutions and hitting upon the
"Constitution & model" that is best suited to realize the end for which a political
society was instituted or established. "The bussiness of the politician" could be
discussed in these practical terms:
either to frame a Model of Government for a larger or lesser political
Society. Or to preserve repair alter or amend a Government already
formed. To discover the latent seeds of those diseases, which if not
cured in time are destructive of the political Union, & bring it to
dissolution at last, & to be able to find out and apply the proper
Remedies.11
This formulation, which as we have seen underlined another of Reid's disagreements
with Hume, was further amplified in his notes on Butler's Analogy on 22 August
1781, where he distinguished between what he called the active and the speculative
politician. "The knowledge of the first", Reid explained,
is of Individuals, that of the last, of the Species. The first is bussied in
active Life. He goes deep into the Characters the Talents the Virtues &
Foibles of persons with whom he has to do. He observes their looks,
their Motions, their most indifferent speeches & Actions as well as
those that are more important, & endeavours to penetrate into their
Views & Ends, their Principles of Action & how they may be brought
to serve his purposes.
10Steuart, Inquiry, vol. 1, p. 271; cf. p. 270.
1 'MS. 4/III/3, fos Ir, 5r; cf. MS. 8/IV/IO, fo. 3r: "Those who have power or have any share of the
Legislature ought to be very watchful! to discover the diseases of the body politick and to apply
timely remedies." There is an echo of Machiavelli in Reid's suggestion that part of what is implied
by the art of politics is the diagnosis and cure of diseases which are potentially destructive of the
political union. Speaking of the advantage for a prince in living in a state that he has just conquered,
Machiavelli wrote: "he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them;
whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown to some height, and then there
is no help for them" (Nicholas Machiavel[li], Prince (1673), in Discourses upon the First Decade of
T. Livius, 2nd ed., trans. E. Dacres (London, 1674), p. 522).
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The Speculative Politician studies the Nature of the human Species, the
principles from which they commonly act, according to the variety of
Natural Temper, Education, Habit Example and instruction they receive
& from these principles accounts for & forms conclusions concerning
the Causes & Effects of Political Events.12
Reid was quite aware of the revolutionary possibilities here; a speculative politician
might, for example, argue for of this line of reasoning: "the Destruction of a bad form
of Government... [asj a mean to the Production of a better".13 However, he
cautioned his pupils that "Changes in a form of Government that hath been established
& acquiesced in ought not to be made without very weighty Reasons".14 Reid was
also acutely aware of the improbability of sweeping changes, for the surviving
evidence shows that in the course of his reflections on Harrington's Oceana
throughout the Glasgow period he lectured his pupils on "The Difficulty of totally
Changing the Form of a Government even from worse to Better" which arises from
customary attachments and entrenched opinions.15 Thus "It is not probable that O.
Cromwell could have established Harringtons commonwealth in England, because of
the Attachment of the People to the Old Forms the Hereditary Nobility and the Opinion
of the greatest Part of the Right of the R. Family". In the same spirit was Reid's
observation that a "people long inured to arbitrary Government grow tame and think
no more of changing the form of their Government than of changing the Elements or
the course of Nature."16 Here Reid underlined his Humean view that opinion or
belief, no matter how wide of the truth it may be, is the decisive support of
government. Changing the form of government must therefore require changing
people's beliefs through a process of enlightenment and moral sensitization.
Moreover, near the end of his life Reid would take a dim view of political revolutions,
stating in print
That such Changes are so dangerous in the Attempt, so uncertain in the
Issue, and so dismal and destructive in the means by which they are
brought about, that it must be a very bad form of Government indeed,
with circumstances very favourable to a Change concurring, that will
12MS. 3061/12, fo. 2r; cf. Works, p. 237a.
13MS. 4/I1I/3, fo. lr; cf. Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3,
p. 190: "In the year 1688 at the revolution viz when King James thought that fhe] could change both
the form of government & make it absolute beside introduce popery, when this was attempted they all
rose to a man".
14MS. 8/IV/9, fo. 3v.
15MS. 4/JII/6, fo. lr, the passage in question dating from the 1764-1765 session; see also Baird's
Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 116, vol. 8, fo. 26v.
16MS. 8/1V/10, fos lv-2r.
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justify a Wise and good Man in putting a hand to them. It is not with
an Old Government as with an old House, from which the Inhabitant,
who desires a new one, may remove with his Family and Goods till it
be pulled down and rebuilt. If we pull down the old Government, it
must be pulled down about our Ears, and we must submit to the
Danger of having the New built over our Heads.17
Although Reid nowhere said so, presumably he believed that it was within the fhe role
of political science to reckon the consequences of revolution and weigh them against
the evils of continuing to support a defective form of government. As he put it in his
lectures on political jurisprudence in 1765-1766: "The Causes of Resistance ought to
be great and Evident &c. All the certain and probable Consequences of it duly
weighed." In a later gloss Reid added the following: "The Evils arising from
Resistance greater than those that arise from Suffering".18 And, as I discussed in
Chapter 11, in the 1768-1769 session he specified that "resistence is bad & ought
never to ... be made except... the liberty of the whole subjects at stake then resistence
is not only laudable but Glorious."19
3.
As I have shown, Hume and Ferguson had emphasized that political constitutions
were the effect of human action but not of human design. Smith, too, subscribed to
this doctrine, as his Lectures on Rhetoric show. In the following passage he
underlined the role of chance in bringing about "great revolutions and changes in
States and Governments":
The Separation of the province of distributing Justice between man and
man from that of conducting publick affairs and leading Armies is the
great advantage which modern times have over antient, and the
foundation of that greater Security which we now enjoy both with
regard to Liberty, property and Life. It was introduced only by chance
and to ease the Supreme Magistrate of this the most Laborious and least
Glorious part of his Power, and has never taken place untill the
increase of Refinement and the Growth of Society have multiplied
business immensely.
This scepticism was of a piece with Smith's sceptical view that the "Practicall Science
of Politicks and ... Ethicks" had hitherto been "treated too much in a Speculative
17AUL MS. 3061/6, p. 4, the paper being a discourse read before the Glasgow Literarv Society on 28
Nov 1794.
18MS. 8/1V/9, fo. 3v.
19Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 191.
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manner."20 It raised the difficult question of the importance of political art and
political knowledge in establishing or perfecting a system of government. In the past
Reid had taken a Humean line on the matter, arguing that no government could be
framed or changed by human art and that the English constitution was the work of
time and accident.
In this period, however, Reid abandoned this article of political scepticism. He now
characterized great political events not as "the Effects of human Reason and human
Passions operating variously according to the Characters of the Agents and the
Circumstances in which they are placed, and by their cooperation in multitudes
producing, very often without Design, one great Event", but rather, as "the effects of
human power and human reason & passion, operating according the Character &
circumstances of the agents."21
Support for my view that Reid changed his mind in this manner comes from Baird's
notes from the 1779-1780 session (although this material probably originated ten or
eleven years years earlier). These notes show that Reid replied directly to the sceptical
argument. According to Reid, the adherents of political scepticism
attempt to weaken the foundation of political reasoning by conceiving,
that the great events happening to states, — revolutions of the
Government — its progress & decline arise from causes which can
neither be foreseen nor remedied by the wisdom of Man or any society
of Men but flow from the Nature of things. They will not allow that
the glory or duration of Sparta was owing to the wisdom of Lycurgus
or the splendor of Athens to the wisdom of Solon, or of Rome to
Numa, but that all followed from the particular circumstances of these
countries.
Reid cautioned that "This reasoning may undoubtedly be carried to(o) far." He then
appealed to Solomon, i.e. apparently Ecclesiastes 9.15, which Reid remembered as
"One by his wisdom may save a city". To this Reid added the following
embellishment: "& no doubt one ... by his folly & vice may destroy a city." He then
offered the following Machiavellian insight:
There is great reason to believe that a political society will more or less
continue & flourish according to its first constitution & that when
proper remedies are applied to the diseases of that state, it will
contribute to prolong its political existence. The Government of great
Britain would undoubtedly before now have landed in an absolute
20Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, pp. 41, 90, 176; cf. p. 137.
2'MS. 7/V/4. p. 16; Baird's Notes, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 68r.
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Monarchy or a Commonwealth, if it had not been for the revolution of
88, which was established then on a proper footing so as to be a
limited Monarchy.22
Reid confirmed this position in his lectures on Harrington's Oceana. In his notes
Baird reported Reid's belief that the "best model of a Commonwealth hitherto laid
down is by Mr Harrington in his Oceana". Reid asserted that forms of government are
"better understood by models, than from general principles", and he "wished that this
plan of a Commonwealth which Harrington proposed had been exemplyfied in some
state, by which its effects might have been known." He then affirmed that the only
attempt to establish "a Government entirely on the plan of Harringtons Oceana" had
been made in the seventeenth century by the QuakerWilliam Penn in the province of
Pennsylvania. Penn, Reid wrote, "seems to have been an upright man & wished to
establish a Government which might really promote the happiness of the people &
preserve their political freedom."23
In view of Penn's success in his endeavour Reid reminded his pupils that
"Montesquieu the greatest political writer since Harrington's time, admired it so much,
that he said, Mr Pen, without any disparagement might be compared to Numa or
Lycurgus."24 Reid affirmed that Pennsylvania, true to the object Penn had in view,
"subsisted for a long time in great tranquillity while the provinces around were all in
confusion, or at war with the Indian nations."2^ According to Robert Jack's report of
22ML MS. A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 73r-v; cf. AUL MS. 3061/6, p. 5.
23ML MS. A104935, Lecture 115, vol. 8, fos 13v, 19r; cf. MS. 4/III/6, fo. 4r: "If the Oceana of Mr
Harrington is considered in itself onely, or if it were once established in a Nation sufficiently
enlightned, & not prejudiced against this or in favours of another form of Government. 1 conceive it
to be the best model of Republican Government that has ever been proposed."
24Baird's Notes, Lecture 115, vol. 8, fo. 19v; cf. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 2nd ed., trans.
Nugent (London, 1752), vol. 1, p. 51: "Mr. Pen is a real Lycurgus". Montesquieu had in fact
described Penn as a true "legislator, an honnete homme, [who] has formed a people in whom integrity
seems as natural as bravery among the Spartans." He suggested that Penn and Lycurgus were alike in
the "unique path on which they have set their people, in their ascendancy over free men, in the
prejudices they have vanquished, and the passions they have subdued." According to Montesquieu, the
real genius or honesty of such legislators consisted not so much in suppressing the passions of the
people (although in their capacity as legislators they had to control as much as possible their own
passions and eradicate, to the extent that this was possible, their own prejudices) as in putting them to
work in the service of the state, not in fighting political brushfires but in "fathom[ingl by a stroke ...
the whole of a state's constitution." Because of their inability to contain their ow n particular
prejudices, Montesquieu faulted Machiavelli, who was "full of his idol, Duke Valentino"; Thomas
More, w ho "wanted to govern all states with the simplicity of a Greek tow n"; and Harrington, w ho
"saw only the republic of England, while a crowd of writers found disorder wherever they did not see a
crown" (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Imws, trans, and ed. Cohler el al., pp. xliv, 37, 618).
2%aird's Notes, Lecture 115, vol. 8, fo. 19v.
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Reid's lectures from the 1775-1776 session, however, Reid had been unwilling to
draw conclusions about a regime that had been "in so short Continuance".26
Although all of the preceding evidence of Reid's change ofmind on the question of
whether governments can be framed or changed by art derives from Baird's notes
from Reid's lectures in the 1779-1780 session, it is known that on 27 August 1768
Reid read both the Charter of Pennsylvania, 4March 1681 and The Frame of the
Government ofthe Province ofPennsylvania in America: together with Certain Laws
Agreed upon in England (1682). Reid's reading notes provide a very revealing
summary of the Preface ("admirably wrote") to The Frame of the Government and
give us an indication not only that Reid instantly recognized the Frame as "perfectly
Republican & Harringtonian" but also of his obvious appreciation of the "Excellent
Body of Laws" appended to it. This much of Reid's notes is already enough to
corroborate the suggestion that Reid's shift away from political scepticism towards a
view that accommodated the ethos of the wise legislator occurred significantly earlier
than the 1779-1780 session. A closer reading of Reid's notes further substantiates
this claim and sheds new light on the thought that likely informed his lectures on
politics in 1768-1769. Insights arrived at in this manner are necessary because Reid's
lecture notes are often elliptical, and no more so than on the matter we are considering
here.
In the Preface to his Frame ofGovernment Penn quoted from three of St Paul's
epistles to show, in Reid's paraphrase, "that Government is the Ordinance of God for
these two Ends First to terrify evildoers Secondly to encourage and cherish those that
do well."27 This dovetailed nicely with Reid's view that government should promote
the common good, which purpose required the enforcement not only of perfect rights
but of imperfect ones as well. Reid would go on to make use of one of these
passages, i.e. 1 Timothy 1.9-10 "that the law is not made for a righteous man, but for
the lawless and disobedient," in his lectures on politics first during the 1768-1769
session and every year he taught thereafter.28 Encouraging and cherishing good men,
to proceed with Reid's paraphrase, "gives to Government a Life beyond Corruption,
& [makes it] as durable as good men shall be." This would, of course, have rung true
26GUL MS. 118, Lecture 118, 24 Apr (1776], p. 650.
27MS. 4/111/19, fo. lr-v.
28As Reid wrote: "It is ... very true which a sacred writer observes that the Law is not made for the
just but for the unjust." See MS. 4/III/3, fo. 5r; cf. Baird's Notes, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935,
Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 74r: "we see that Laws are made not for the just but for the
injurious".
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to a good reader ofMontesquieu like Reid, who would have recalled Montesquieu's
view that the "principle of despotic government is endlessly corrupted because it is
corrupt by its nature. Other governments are destroyed because particular accidents
violate their principle; this one is destroyed by its internal vice if accidental causes do
not prevent its principle from becoming corrupt."
Next, Reid remarked Penn's injunction against the uncritical application of a single
model of government to all times and places: "Models ofGovernment the Author
thinks ... may be variable as times and Circumstances require, and that it is not easy to
frame any one that shall serve all places Alike." He then recorded Penn's
Aristotelian/Harringtonian notion "That any Government is free to the People under it
(whatever be the frame) where the Laws Rule, and the People are a party to those
Laws; and more than this is Tyranny Oligarchy or Confusion."29 And, still following
Penn's text very closely, Reid remarked Penn's observation "that there is hardly any
Government so ill designed by its first founders, that in good hands will no{t) do well
enough; and the best in ill ones can do nothing that is great or good".30 This is of
course very close to the view, which we discussed above, that Reid would espouse in
the classroom in 1779-1780.31
Reid recorded Penn's conclusion and the essence of the subsequent paragraph. The
full text from Penn is as follows:
governments rather depend upon men, than men upon governments.
Let men be good, and the government can't be bad; if it be ill, they will
cure it. But if men be bad, let the government be never so good; they
will endeavor to warp and spoil it to their turn.
I know some say, let us have good laws, and no matter for the men
that execute them. But let them consider, that though good laws do
well, good men do better; for good laws may want good men, and be
abolished or evaded by ill men; but good men will never want good
laws nor suffer ill ones. It is true, good laws have some awe upon ill
ministers, but that is where they have not power to escape or abolish
29MS. 4/111/19, fo. Ir; cf. Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Lord, pp. 103, 111, 113. Penn seems to
have been oblivious to some of the darker implications of this kind of argument; these were apparent
in Grolius' defence of absolutist regimes, as we saw in Chapter 7.
30MS. 4/111/19, fo. lr-v.
3 'interestingly enough, the first part of Penn's next sentence, unrecorded by Reid, is consistent with
Reid's gloss in his final year of active teaching on the maxim of King Solomon which we quoted
above. In Penn's words: "Governments, like clocks, go from the motion men give to them; and as
governments are made and moved by men, so by them are ruined too". Reid must have approved of
Penn's clock metaphor given his strenuous opposition to the fatalism or necessitarianism of Leibniz,
who believed that the "mind was originally formed like a watch wound up; and that all its thoughts,
purposes, passions, and actions, are effected by the gradual evolution of the original spnng of the
machine" {Works, p. 382a; cf. 526a).
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them, and the people are generally wise and good. But a loose and
depraved people (which is the question) love laws and an
administration like themselves. That therefore which makes a good
constitution must keep it, viz.: men of wisdom and virtue; qualities,
that because they descend not with worldly inheritances, must be
carefully propagated by a virtuous education of youth; for which after-
ages will owe more to the care and prudence of founders and the
successive magistracy than to their parents for their private
patrimonies.32
Reid must have sympathized with Penn's improvement-oriented approach and
emphasis on education. Moreover, in Penn, Reid evidently found an alternative to
Hume's somewhat mechanistic thesis about the effects of political constitutions. It
will be recalled that in his essay "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science" (1741)
Hume maintained that
So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government,
and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers ofmen,
that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be
deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford
As I will demonstrate presently, Reid could deny the overwhelming force of law
required by Hume for his doctrine of probable certainty because he believed that
certain things may be assumed of any group of people joined together in political
society, or they would not have been able to associate in the first place. Thus by
siding with Penn in this debate Reid could combine the certainty he needed in his
science of politics with the supposition of free will he needed to underwrite his ethics
and theology.
Reid concluded his notes on the Preface to Penn's Frame with a paraphrase of the final
paragraph. Penn's words "we have ... to the best of our skill contrived and composed
the Frame and Laws of this government to the great end of all government, viz.: to
support power in reverence with the people, and to secure the people from the abuse
of power" provided evidence forReid's view that governments can be framed by
art.34 In Reid's paraphrase the substance of the rest of the passage is as follows:
"Liberty without Obedience is confusion, & Obedience without Liberty is Slavery. To
32Preface to the Frame, in Jean R. Soderlund, ed., William Penn and the Founding ofPennsylvania
1680-1684: A Documentary History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press / Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, 1983), p. 122; cf. MS. 4/111/19, fo. lv.
33Essays, p. 16.
34Preface to Frame, p. 122.
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carry this Evenness is partly owing to the Constitution and Partly to the Magistracy.
And where neither of these fail the Government is like to endure."35 Thus from Penn
Reid learned the importance not only of the appropriateness of the form given to a
particular government but also of the integrity of its administration.
After defending the view that governments may be moulded by art Reid carried on as
he had done since 1765-1766 by outlining the requirements of a science of politics
and considering a major objection to the possibility of political knowledge which
allegedly derived from his much-cherished principle of liberty. Whereas individuals
may be capricious in their actions, "much more certain conclusions" may be formed
about "a body ofMen united in political Society":
although the Many are made up of individuals, yet it is easier, in many
cases to guess at the behaviour of the Many than at that of the
individuals which compose it[.] The jarring Passions Interests and
Views of individuals when mingled together make a Compound whose
Nature is more fixed and determined than that of the Ingredients of
which it is made up. Wisdom and Folly, Reason and Passion Virtue
and Vice blended together make a pretty Uniform Character in great
Bodies of Men in all Ages and Nations; where there is not an
uncommon Degree of general Corruption on the one hand or of Virtue
on the Other.
"It is from this Uniformity of Character in a Multitude ofMen notwithstanding of the
Diversity of the Individuals of which it is composed," Reid wrote, "that all General
Principles in Politicks are derived".36
Reid's views on this subject were strikingly similar to Hume's, for in his essay "Of
the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences" (1742) Hume laid it down as a
"general rule" that "What depends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to be
ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes: What arises from a great number,
35MS. 4/1II/19, fo. 1 v; cf. Works, p. 577b.
36It is interesling thai in 1764-1765 Reid had used the expression "thrown together" rather than
"mingled together". Reid's change of terminology is most interesting. The phrase "mingled
together" does not carry the same connotation of gross haphazardness as "thrown together." Whether
we are meant to presuppose a deliberate agency in this mingling is less clear, but it seems fair to say
that Reid's change of phrase reflects a view of the complexity more compatible with the idea that
government may be changed or framed by art. MSS. 4/I1I/3, fo. 2v; 4/111/17, fo. lr; cf. John
Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, pp. 205, 218; Jack's Notes
from Reid's Lectures, 1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 125, 3 May 1776, pp. 720-722;
Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol.
7, fos 71v-72r.
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may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes." For this Hume gave
two reasons. First, in an obvious reference to the Classical notion of the force of
rhetoric, he likened the "causes" or principles of action that "beget a particular
inclination or passion" to a "contagion" from which "many individuals may escape ...
and be ruled by passions peculiar to themselves" but by which "the multitude will
certainly be seized ... and governed ... in all their actions." Secondly, he suggested
that "Those principles or causes, which are fitted to operate on a multitude, are always
of a grosser and more stubborn nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced
by whim and private fancy, than those which operate on a few only." Hume then
asserted that his general rule applied both to "the domestic and the gradual revolutions
of a state" and to "the rise and progress of commerce in any kingdom".37
5.
Having enlarged upon his reply to Hume's objection that political knowledge is
inconsistent with the assumption of human liberty, Reid moved on in 1768-1769 to
consider a second objection against political knowledge, i.e. Pope's classic
observation that "The good or Bad Effects of Government depend entirely upon the
Administration & not upon the form of the Government."38 Pope's view that "in vain
does the politician prefer one form [of government] to another" and that "all contests
about Governments are vain & idle" was entirely at odds with Reid's project to
establish a system of political knowledge and with his belief that it is the "intention of
political knowledge to point out such forms of Government, when (they) find it for
their interest to act for the public good." All that Reid would allow on this point was
"that a great deal depends on the integrity & virtue of the administration of the
Government" and that in despotic governments, "where all is determined by the will of
one", it is undoubtedly the case that "the happiness or misery of the people depends on
it". He gave as examples of "despots" who had "spread happiness & peace thro' all"
the Roman emperors Trajan and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, while pointing out that
37Essays, pp. 112—113.
38MS. 4/III/3, fo. 2v. This objection had been made with sceptical clarity by the poet Alexander
Pope (1688-1744) in Book 3 of his Essay on Man (1732-1734): "Let fools for forms of Government
contest; / Whate'er is best administ'red is best" (quoted in Batrd's Notes, 1779-1780, ML MS.
A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 72r). As Reid's ow n lecture notes consist of heads
only in this passage, we shall use Baird's notes from the 1779-1780 session as a guide to what Reid
may have said in 1768-1769.
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"others on the same throne, have made every subject tremble."39 Baird's notes from
Reid's lectures on politics in the 1779-1780 session are corroborated on this topic by
ReicTs own lecture notes relating to political jurisprudence, which were first read in
the 1764-1765 and 1765-1766 sessions. Thus on 11 April 1765 Reid concluded on
the basis of the "Valuable Ends that may be attained by a good plan ofGovernment...
that such a Plan is indeed the greatest Good that can be bestowed upon a Nation" and
is the reason why legislators or constitution-makers are so "highly revered".40 And in
his expanded presentation of the material on political jurisprudence on 24AprM766 he
suggested that political government is both a divine and a human institution: divine
"because it is the intention of the author of our constitution" and human because "God
has prescribed no particular form of government but left it to mens own reason and
circumstances to direct their choice".41 A "good Form of Political Government is the
greatest of all temporal Blessings to a Nation,"42 Reid continued, and "As the blessing
itself is the greatest so that which procures such a form must be a very great blessing
also."43 It is therefore a "very false Sentiment that Mr Pope expresses", for a "Bad
form of Government will corrupt those who have the Administration of it, & make
them bad when otherwise they might have been good", whereas a good form of
government is "one of the most effectual means ofmaking both Governors and the
Governed good, or at least of making them act a good part, & restraining them from
actions that would be detrimental to the publick."44 Reid later conceded that a bad
form of government which is "well administred" will "produce order& regularity if
administrated by those who ... have the real good of their people at heart." He gave as
39Baird's Notes, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 72r-v. Reid
is believed to have owned a copy of the 3rd ed. of Marcus Aurelius's Meditations thought to be
housed at the Bodleian Library , although 1 have been unable to locate it. Reid must have enjoyed
reading the Emperor's Meditations, given his appreciation of Epictetus (as 1 discussed earlier, on
whose doctrine of opinion Marcus Aurelius modelled his own in The Meditations. See e.g. The
Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Glasgow , 1759), vols 1, p.
145; 2, p. 422. In his essay "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations" (1754) Hume had also spoken
of "the age of Trajan and the Antonines" in which the Roman Empire, "civilized and cultivated ... and
living under the same regular police and government", "settled almost in a profound peace both
foreign and domestic" (Essays, pp. 457—458). Smith echoed Hume in his Lectures on Rhetoric.
(Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric, p. 112: "The Roman (Empire) was in the Reign of Trajan arrived to its
greatest pitch of Glory, The people enjoyed greater Tranquillity and Security than they had done in any
of the former reigns or indeed in the last 150 (years) of the Republick.")
40MS. 8/IV/10, fo. 2v.
41Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104929, Lecture 111, 12 Apr 1780,
vol. 7, fo. 84v; cf. Jack's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 116,
22 Apr 1776, p. 627; see also MS. 8/IV/9, fo. 2r.
42MS. 8/1V/9, fo. 2v.
43Baird's Notes, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104929, Lecture 111, 12 Apr 1780, fo. 85r.
44MS. 8/1V/9, fo. 2v.
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examples of this the Government of Turkey and of ancient Rome under the
Emperors,45 but quickly added that such instances are "extremely rare", for "Great
power intoxicats men & makes them look down upon all others as an inferior
species", making them "apt therefore to degenerate into tyrants."46
Interestingly enough, it was to Hume's "disputation ... to shew that political may be
reduced to a Science" that Reid directed the attention of his pupils in the 1768-1769
session in order to underline his own point that the form a given government takes is
important and that it is the business of the politician to make informed choices about
forms of government.47 In his essay "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science"
(1741) Hume had declared himself to be against those who agreed with Pope that
administration is all. "I cannot forbear condemning this sentiment," Hume wrote,
"and should be sorry to think, that human affairs admit of no greater stability, than
what they receive from the casual humours and characters of particularmen."48
45In selecting these examples Reid may have been following the lead of William Robertson, who
went far beyond Montesquieu in suggesting that order and regularity was not inconsistent with the
nature of despotic government in his History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V. which Reid read
in the summer of 1769. See A View of the Progress of Society in Europe, in The History of the
Reign of the Emperor Charles V, 11th ed., 4 vols (London, 1806), vol. 1, pp. 228-229; 469-471, n.
43; 475, n. 45; cf. p. 100. We shall discuss Reid's reading notes on Robertson's History later in the
present chapter and in the chapter that follows.
46Baird's Notes, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104929, Lecture 111, 12 Apr 1780, fo. 85r; Jack's Notes,
1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 116, 22 Apr 1776, pp. 627-628.
47Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 109, 6 Apr 1780, vol.
7, fo. 72v; cf MS. 4/111/3, fo. 2v.
48Essays, p. 15. It is interesting that this same three-pronged debate — i.e. concerning the
possibility of framing or changing governments by art, the very possibility of political knowledge
and the importance of choosing among forms of government — which occupied Reid's attention in
the 1768-1769 session was aired again twenty years later in 1787-1788 in the controversy
surrounding the ratification of the new American constitution. In that debate Alexander Hamilton
dramatized on the public stage Reid's pedagogical critique of Hume. In Number 1 of The Federalist
(1788) Hamilton posed the question relating to framing governments to which Reid had addressed
himself in 1768-1769. In Hamilton's words: "It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have
been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on
accident and force" (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist, ed. Benjamin
Fletcher Wright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 89). Hamilton, like Reid
before him, made it clear that his allegiances lay with reflection and choice. Just as Reid had done, he
appealed to metaphysical argument: in The Federalist Number 31, he argued that there are in ethics
and politics just as there are in geometry "certain primary truths, or first principles, upon w hich all
subsequent reasonings must depend." Among these "maxims" in ethics and politics is the proposition
"that there cannot be an effect without a cause". Moreover, in ethics and politics there are "other
truths ... which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences
from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates
of common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a degree of force
and conviction almost equally irresistible." In the style of Reid, Hamilton then invoked the term
political knowledge to describe this body of certain maxims and self-evident truths in ethics and
politics, although he was apparently not as convinced as Reid of the politician's ability to "foresee"
6.
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In the next stage of his critique of Hume's political science Reid addressed the
problem of the moral and intellectual capacities that the political reasonermay suppose
of the members of a political body. In his essay "Of the Original Contract" (1748)
Hume had written:
Were all men possessed of so inflexible a regard to justice, that, of
themselves, they would totally abstain from the properties of others;
they had for ever remained in a state of absolute liberty, without
subjection to any magistrate or political society: But this is a state of
perfection, of which human nature is justly deemed incapable. Again;
were all men possessed of so perfect an understanding, as always to
know their own interests, no form of government had ever been
submitted to, but what was established on consent, and was fully
canvassed by every member of the society: But this state of perfection
is likewise much superior to human nature.49
Thus Hume restated his belief that justice was an artificial virtue, underlining his
equation of the power of understanding with a knowledge of interest. Thus, too, he
downplayed perfectibility, emphasizing the natural depravity of humankind.
Once again, therefore, Hume provided a clear target for Reid, who rejected Hume's
indiscriminate assessment of human depravity and prepared the way for perfectibility
events against which a government must provide or to predict the behaviour of men in given
circumstances. As Hamilton wrote: "it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political
knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have
much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we
should be disposed to allow them" (The Federalist, pp. 236-237; cf. Numbers 23, p. 200; 85, p. 546,
both by Hamilton; see also Numbers 16, p. 167; 22, p. 193; 29, p. 229, all by H). And finally, in
The Federalist Number 68 Hamilton described Pope's maxim as a "political heresy", although he
quickly conceded "that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a
good administration." Opinion was divided within the anti-Federalist camp on the utility of debating
forms of government. (P. 443; for contemporary documents addressing this point see 11te Complete
Anti-Federalist, ed. Herbert J. Storing, with the assistance of Murray Dry, 7 vols (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1981), vols 2, pp. 224; 350, n. 3; 5, p. 24; 6, pp. 63-64, for
example.) In this Hamilton, like Reid, showed himself to incline toward a belief in the tendency of a
political constitution to achieve its ends mechanistically. Although it must be said that Reid was,
probably for ethico-theological reasons, far less inclined than Hamilton was to dispense with the
concept of cultivating moral and political virtue as an essential means of ensuring the success of a
government (Hamilton merely assumed, for example, "that there will be a constant probability of
seeing the station [of President] filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue") (TheFederalist,
Number 68, p. 443). Indeed, Hamilton seems to have been much more ready than Reid was to rely
upon the checks and balances built into well-contrived institutions as a means of "supplying" in
James Madison's felicitous phrase, "the defect of better motives" (The Federalist, Number 51, p. 356).
As I pointed out above, Reid seriously believed that a good form of government "may even reclaim
those that were formerly wicked" (Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS.
A104935, Lecture 111, 12 Apr 1780, fo. 85r).
^Essays, p. 474.
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with his account of "persons of ... a middle Character' who are endowed not only
with a "certain degree of Understanding" but also with a "certain degree ofMorals", in
other words, those who have common sense and whose actions are governed by the
dictates of conscience.50 Clearly, in this particular, too, Reid could not avoid
blending morals and politics. In political science, Reid told his pupils, we must
"suppose Men endowed with that degree of Understanding which we actually perceive
in the generality ofMen that are come to maturity." In other words, in envisaging a
political body we must presuppose that its members be possessed of a minimum
degree of common sense. Children and idiots, Reid continued, "do not properly make
a part of the political Body" because of "their defect of Understanding" and political
events do not "depend upon them." He observed further that as they are incapable of
"directing their own Conduct" and are not, therefore, "capable of political
Government", their actions form no part of the subject of political reasoning.51
Reid's characterization of the prerequisites for entry into a political body agree
substantially with the definition of common sense he had introduced to his pupils in
his public prelections at Glasgow College at least as early as the 1768-1769 session
and which he had been sharpening in prelections he read before his private class in the
1769-1770 session and in discourses he delivered before the Glasgow Literary
Society in the winters of 1769 and 1770. In about the middle of December 1768 Reid
observed in a lecture to his public class that "Common sense is that degree of natural
understanding wc distinquishes men that are adult... from Idiots, Brutes, and
Lunaticks."52 He elaborated on this definition in the following terms in a paper he
prepared for a meeting of the Glasgow Literary Society on 10 February 1769:
Common Sense seems to denote a certain Degree of Natural
Understanding that is intermediate between Ideocy on one hand & an
uncommon Quickness & Penetration on the othe(r.) We do not
attribute common Sense to Brutes nor do we expect to find it in Infants
or Ideots; but in persons ofmature Age who have no natural Defect we
allways expect that degree of Discernment and of Understanding which
we call common Sense.53
50MS. 4/III/2, fos lr, 2r.
5'MS. 4/III/2, fo. lr.
52Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 28.
53lt is worth pointing out that Reid had initially written that common sense is intermediate "between
Ideocy & good Sense" before replacing the term good sense with the phrase "uncommon Quickness &
Penetration" (MS. 2/111/7, p. 1). While his reason for making this change is unclear, we may
conjecture that he was simply trying to make his definition more discursive; when he published his
Intellectual Powers in 1785, he certainly did not refrain from using the term good sense. Indeed, there
he remarked that "Good sense is good judgment" and quoted Pope, who wrote that "Good sense ... is
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In a second discourse on common sense which he prepared for a meeting of the
Glasgow Literary Society in February 1770, Reid made the connection between
common sense and political capacity that would appear in material he added to his
lectures on politics in this period. His remarks on this occasion are worth quoting at
some length:
we mean by it [common sense] that natural Power of the
Understanding by which Men that are adult and Sound in their mind
are distinguished from Brutes from Ideots and from infants. This
Power has been, and indeed must have been an Object of Attention to
Men of Business in all Ages, & particularly to Lawgivers Magistrates
and Civilians ... . As it is Common Sense that makes Man capable of
acting his part in human Society, and that makes him accountable for
his Conduct, the Laws of all Nations, and the Practice of all Tribunals,
distinguish with more or less Accuracy, those of the human Species
who have this Talent from th(ose) who want it, whether through unripe
Age, or Dotage, whether from Insanity or Ideocy or Lunacy.
Such are not the proper Subjects of Law and civil Government, they
cannot transact bussiness validly for themselves nor be accountable for
their conduct towards others. And although they may have Rights and
interests which ought not to be violated, yet having no Understanding
in themselves to direct their Actions, the Laws of all civilized Nations
appoint them to be guided by the Understanding of others.
As Brutes even the most sagacious were never by any Nation thought
capable of being the Subjects of civil Laws and civil Government, so
all Mankind in the first period of Life, & some individuals through the
whole of it, are conceived to be under the same incapacity.54
The evolution of the equation of common sense with "common prudence'"5^ and its
characterization in these passages from the winters of 1768-1769 and 1770 as a
degree of understanding essential to our being subjects of law and civil government
are undoubtedly the antecedents of Reid's additions to his lectures on politics in this
period. It may be noted that substantially the same points are underlined in the
the gift of heaven, / And, though no science, fairly worth the seven; / A light w hich in yourself you
must perceive, / Jones and Le Notre have it not to give" (Alexander Pope, Epistle to the Earl of
Burlington, quoted by Reid, Works, p. 422b). Cf. Descartes, Discourse on the Method, in
Philosophical Writings, trans, and ed. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), p. 7; MS. 6/1/17, fo. lr, where Reid seems to have used the terms "reason" and
"good Sense" interchangeably; see also MSS. 4/1/3, fo. lr; 2/1II/7, pp. 1-2; 2/III/8, pp. 1, 5-6.
54It is interesting that at one point Reid had ascribed rights and interests to the unborn, for after the
phrase "they may have Rights and interests which ought not to be violated" he inserted the following
interlineation: "as a child may have that is yet unborn". (MS. 2/II1/8, p. 1.) It is unclear why he
crossed it out, unless he found the notion too perplexing, involving imponderables like the problem
of enforcement.
55MS. 4/III/2, fo. lr; cf. Works, p. 422b: "The same degree of understanding which makes a man
capable of acting with common prudence in the conduct of life, makes him capable of discovering
what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he distinctly apprehends."
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IntellectualPowers. Indeed, it is interesting that a residue of the lectures on politics,
which unlike those on pneumatology and ethics Reid failed to publish systematically,
should have surfaced in what is perhaps the most pivotal passage of his entire ceuvre,
the one providing the metaphysical underpinning of his entire philosophy, i.e. the
famous chapter on common sense.56 Politics could never have been very far from
Reid's mind, a point to which I shall return in the Epilogue.
It is quite possible that Reid was influenced in the passage just cited by the following
remarks in Locke's Second Treatise:
if through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of
Nature, any one comes not to such a degree of Reason, wherein he
might be supposed capable of knowing the Law, and so living within
the Rules of it, he is never capable of being a Free Man, he is never let
loose to the disposure of his own Will (because he knows no bounds
to it, has not Understanding, its proper Guide) but is continued under
the Tuition and Government of others, all the time his own
Understanding is uncapable of that Charge. And so Lunaticks and
Ideots are never set free from the Government of their Parents;
Children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may
have; and Innocents which are excluded by a natural defect from ever
having; Thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have
the use of right Reason to guide themselves, have for their Guide, the
Reason that guideth other Men which are Tutors over them, to seek and
procure their good for them.57
Having considered common sense or common prudence, Reid proceeded to a
discussion of the second prerequisite of political participation, i.e. common decency or
common honesty.58 Reid characterized this quality as the "cement or principle of
Union" that holds a given political society together. He believed that most individuals
are animated by this principle of action but admitted that some are "so very profligate
and abandoned as to break through all the restraints which either their own interest or
that of their families and friends or a regard to reputation lay upon them." Such
profligates cannot be depended upon to "act by the Rules of common prudence &
decency." On the other hand, there are certain other individuals who are possessed of
"such perfect Virtue and Integrity that they have no need of the restraints of human
laws and government." Such men "discharge their Duty to the publick & to
individuals from principle and inclination and would injure no man even tho they
56See Works, p. 422b.
57John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, ed. Peter Lasletl, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), pp. 325-326.
58See MS. 4/III/2, fo. lr.
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could do it with impunity." But there are so few who belong to these two classes of
men that the "Common maxims of Politicks" do not apply to them, nor do political
events depend on them. These maxims apply, rather, only to "persons of ... a middle
Character" who constitute the "great bulk ofMankind and of every Political Society"
and on whom all political events depend. Speaking now the language of prudence
rather than of political knowledge, Reid elaborated on the analogy he had drawn earlier
(see Chapter 13) between prudence in an individual and in the government of a State:
Political Prudence is grounded upon the very same Principles as the
Prudence of a private Man in his transactions with other Men. Real
Prudence in the conduct of Life requires that we should keep the proper
mean between too much trust in those we deal with and too much
distrust. If we go into the first extream, we expose ourselves to
frequent danger & disappointment. If we go into the other extream we
shall frequently lose the best opportunities of carrying on our
bussinessf.] The prudent Man takes the just medium between these
extreams, and by that means generally accomplishes his Ends. The
political Reasoner in like Manner must form his judgment of the
conduct of political Societes, neither upon the Supposition that they are
more vicious & profligate than men generaly are nor upon the
Supposition that they are more virtuous & upright.59
In Reid's account political prudence was identical to the (moral and intellectual)
cardinal virtue of prudence itself. As Reid put it in his ethics lectures:
It is no small point of Wisdom for a Man to know himself and to make
a right judgment of his own Talents that he may not put on a Person
which Nature has not qualified him to act Nor attempt things beyond
his Force. Here the contrary extremes are to be avoided of
Presumption & Arrogance on the one hand & of Pusilanimity on the
other. Every man should endeavour to know his weak side and his
Strong.60
Reid therefore offered a Ciceronian account of political prudence in place of Hume's
thoroughly Machiavellian account of politics as a science of prudence. His long¬
standing tendency to identify the dictates of common sense and of conscience with the
common good is typified by his speaking in the same breath of what is "agreable to
59MS. 4/111/2, fo. lr-2r; cf. Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 110, 11
Apr 1780, vol. 7, fos 75v-77r; Works, p. 470a.
^PracticalEthics, p. 130; cf. p. 133; MS. 8/1/2, f. 4, quoted in Charles Stewart-Robertson, "Fort
and Foible; or on Learning to Exercise the Editorial Mind," Reid Studies, no. 1 (1986-87), p. |28],
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reason and Equity and to the publick good".61 The connection between political
prudence and character is the subject of the next chapter.
6 'in his abstract of Wise Club question 51, "Whether it be better that every Verdict of a Jury should
be unanimous as it is in England or that the Verdict should be by a Majority as it is in Scotland",
which was handled on 9 Mar 1762 (MS. 6/1/17, fo. lr).
Chapter 15
Taking upon Oneself a Character: The Foundations of Prudence
In this chapter I will examine the last phase of Reid's creation of a political
jurisprudence in the classroom at Glasgow. Reid's science of politics culminated in a
neo-Ciceronian doctrine of taking upon oneself a character resonant with the Lockean
theme of trust deserved or betrayed. Reid was forced into this resolution by his
students' impatience with his recital of the modern natural law tradition and their
eagerness to proceed to the subject of politics. Reid found himself unable, however,
to develop the science of politics as a science ofmeans without giving some account of
the ends for which men at first united in political societies and the reasons that might
induce a sufficiently enlightened people to abridge their liberty by entering into and
remaining in civil societies. These ends provided the critical standard of his political
jurisprudence, which now went far beyond a discussion of whether a government
could be framed or changed by art into a discussion of when revolutions could be
justified. Here the science and the art of politics, together with those ethical principles
that Reid had originally included in his science of politics and later redeployed in a
narrowly defined "political jurisprudence," converged in a reconceptualized master
science of political jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, the impetus for this realignment
was Reid's need to respond to Hume on the subject of contracts, including the original
contract between a people and their king.
1.
In 1779-1780, his last year of teaching at Glasgow, Reid added yet another dimension
to his critique of Hume's science of prudence. In characteristic fashion he collapsed
still further his previously held Humean distinction between ethics and politics.
Reid's reflections on jurisprudence, to which the question of the prudential
inducements to political society had belonged prior to the 1779-1780 session, were
interrupted by his pupils, who were anxious for him to get on with the science of
politics. According to Baird, on breaking off his increasingly belaboured recital of the
natural law tradition Reid offered the following explanation:
here I shall stop with this subject for the present, as I have this day
received a paper from the greatest part of the students petitioning me to
give the Lectures on Politics before them on Jurisprudence. I shall
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comply with their desire & begin my Lectures on Politics next
meeting.1
Accordingly, in his next lecture Reid began the politics section of his course,
beginning by reviewing the first principles in which the science of politics must be
grounded. He then deviated from his usual practice of moving directly into the subject
of forms of government by adding a new section to his lectures. His purpose was to
incorporate at this juncture the material relating to jurisprudence which he had been
forced to skip over at the insistence of his pupils and which he had in previous years
tried, although not always very successfully, to keep separate from questions which
by his earlier, restrictive definition belonged to politics. Reid probably feared that his
lectures on politics (which was concerned pre-eminently with means) would be
unintelligible without an analysis of the proper ends of government, such as was
included in the unused lectures on jurisprudence. Only by examining the ends of
government would it make sense to explore the means available to governors in
particular regimes. Interestingly enough, Reid's restructuring of the lectures on
politics and jurisprudence in 1779-1780 has a parallel in an early schema of politics
made by Locke, according to which the subject is divided into '"Fundamentals', 'The
form of the State', and 'Administration', and [where] the two fundamentals are Jus
Paternum and Consensus Populi."2
Reid introduced what had previously been jurisprudential material into his lectures on
politics with the following observation: "It is usual in treating of this Subject to
consider the Causes of political Government in general".3 This clearly involved a
retraction of his 1765-1766 observation that "It is usual with those who have treated
of this part of Jurisprudence [italics mine] to begin it with pointing out the causes that
induced men at first not onely to unite in families, but to form those larger Unions
which we call States or Civil Governments."4 Having in the previous lecture drawn
his usual distinction between political science, which is concerned with "how we
generally do act", and the "Science of Morals", which deals with "how we ought to
'Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 108, 4 Apr 1780, vol.
7, fo. 66v.
2MS. c.28, fo. 41, "Sapientia 72", quoted in Peter Laslett, Introduction to John Locke, Two Treatises
of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ ersity Press, 1970), p. 34 and
n. $.
3MS. 4/III/2, fo. 2r; cf. Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture
110, 11 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fo. 77n "It seems proper however to consider in general, before we attend
to the particular forms of Government, from what causes, political government would at first arise."
4MS. 8/1V/9, fo. lv.
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act," it would introduce an embarrassing contradiction for Reid to refer to writers on
jurisprudence when he is trying to stick to the subject of politics per se.5 As it is not
likely that he intended to collapse the distinction between political jurisprudence and
politics at this point, the most likely explanation for this awkwardness is his ongoing
effort to elaborate a neo-Ciceronian science of prudence.
Reid's first observation on this head concerned liberty or free will. In keeping with
his ethico-theological views, Reid described the proper use of liberty as requiring the
highest prudence:
Every Man is by Nature free; it cannot be said, that there is any
constitution of the Author of our Being which leads men to subject
themselves to any political Government or Society. All these are the
works of Men. It is otherwise with regard to some brutes, instinct
leads some of the gregarious kinds to certain species of Government &
we may say, that they act agreeably to Nature whe(n) they are members
of such a government. But as God has endowed man with reason, he
has left it to his own prudence to associate when necessary under
proper rules & laws. Some unite under one form of these & others
under another nor can it be affirmed that any of them is of divine
authority or the necessary result of the Laws of Nature. Children when
they first come into the world are destitute of reason, must be under the
dominion of parents & therefore are incapable of being members of a
political Society, but as they come to years of Understanding the
parental authority naturally diminishes. Men then become capable of
acting for themselves & have a principle which leads them to assume
the direction of their own actions.
Here Reid emphasized that the true origin of political constitutions lay in deliberation
and planning or at the very least free choice or consent. He believed that the "love of
liberty in all is so strong that there must be some considerable inducement which will
make Men subject themselves to these governments which of necessity abridge their
freedom".6 Such inducements will, in principle, be effective among men of common
sense or common prudence, i.e. among all those who are animated by that rational
principle which leads them to direct their own actions.
5Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lectures 109-110, 6th and
11th Apr 1780, vol. 7, fos 73v, 76v.
6Baird's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104935, Lecture 110, 11 Apr 1780, vol.
7, fo. 77r-v; cf. AUL MSS. 8/IV/10, fo. lr ("the Love of Liberty is so natural to mankind that there
must be some considerable inducement to engage them to give up their Natural Liberty & subject
themselves to laws and taxes, and be bound to that submission and allegiance which is due to the civil
Powers"); 8/1V/9, fo. lv ("as the Love of Liberty is, and justly ought to be very powerfull in the
human kind, there ought to be very powerfull Inducements to engage Men to give up their natural
Liberty and to submit to the yoke of Laws and civil Policy").
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Reid proposed to enumerate the prudential motives which spurred men on to
relinquish some of their freedom, but found it necessary first to separate two questions
which are "really distinct yet not commonly distinguished by writers",7 that is, "What
really and in Fact was and must have been the Origin of the Various States and Civil
Governments that have been established. Or what reasons did actually induce those
who first framed them to enter into this political Union" and "What Might justly induce
men sufficiently enlightned, and acquainted with the Effects that may be produced by
Civil Government to enter into this State."8
With regard to the first question, Reid conceded at the outset in Bolingbrokean fashion
that the "history ofman is too little known to give a clear account of it."9 In the course
of his remarks he gave little credit to the views of those who "refer the origin of
Government to patriarchal authority", considering in the Xenophontian, Ciceronian
and latterly Humean tradition which I examined in Chapter 4 that it was "more
probable that some opinion Of superior wisdom, prudence or Virtue was the first
cause of investing our [leaders] with great authority." Where opinion is the source of
authority, "reason dictates" our choice of a leader and serves to "render [political
society] convenient". As Reid explained, this is "probably ... the reason why the
most antient governments we know of are all Kingly Governments." These were
"abolished and Aristocratical or Democratical [Governments] Substituted in their
Place" when they degenerated into tyrannies. Reid concluded his remarks on this
subject by drawing an analogy between the origin of government and that of the
human body. Just as in our investigation of the human body, "We see [it] when
formed & organized but its first origin we know not", so in our study of governments
"we see them in their impressive state but are ignorant of their first origin & we can
therefore only form conjecture(s) of what at first united men in political Society." All
discussion of the origins of government therefore collapses into arguments about
greater or lesser probabilities, which is to say that such debates must terminate in
conjectures about "what could induce men sufficiently enlightened to unite under a
civil government", i.e. Reid's second question, to which he addressed himself next.
7Baird's Notes, Lecture 110, vol. 7, fo. 78r; cf. MS. 8/IV/9, fo. lr.
8AUL MS. 8/IV/9, fo. lr; cf. Band's Notes, Lecture 110, vol. 7, fo. 78r.
9Baird's Notes, Lecture 110, vol. 7, fo. 78r; cf. fo. 80n "We are unable to trace antient
Government(s) to their origin, as men must be long under government before the Art & Sciences
make any considerable progress & of consequence before a history could be wrote of their
transactions."
Reid began by pointing out that this was not a "question of a master", for in a "state of
Natural liberty every man is his own master," but of the "prudence of men constituted
as Men generally are", in other words, of what motives "ought to induce" men
sufficiently enlightened to "prefer the Political State" in which they are "bound up by
... laws." Reid also gave some attention to non-rational "Parts of the human
constitution" which show us that we are intended for "Political Society". "The
different Capacities of men," Reid argued, "fit them to be parts of one greatWhole."
Moreover, the "Bulk of Men" are "tame and naturally disposed to follow a leader."
The "qualities which produce this Submission and Respect", i.e. wisdom, valour and
power, "especially if transmitted through a long Race of Ancestors", he continued, are
to be found only in the few. It turns out that those who have this "degree of Sagacity"
commonly have an "ambition to lead & to govern" as well. As Reid explained, "This
disposition in the many to be governed & the few to govern plainly lays the foundation
ofpolitical Society for were all equal in ambition men never could unite in Society at
all." Finally, he pointed to the "Love of ones Country", which he regarded as a
"Natural Affection" which could "have no Exercise without a Political Union."
Assuming that this affection was given to us for a purpose, it would appear that it was
bestowed on us in order that we should unite in political society. While we ought not
to underestimate the importance Reid attached to these non-rational factors, it is clear
that he considered them as supports for prudence rather than as alternatives to it.
In his Discours sur I'origine et les fondemens de Vinegalite parmi les hommes (1754)
Jean-Jacques Rousseau had argued that a state of solitude was preferable to one of
society and suggested that the "perfection of our Nature may be carried to the highest
pitch there." Reid disputed this, pointing to the "very great advantages" that attach to
the state of political society and which enjoin us to prudence, i.e. to unite under a civil
government. At the same time he was careful to avoid the Hobbesian notion that pre-
political society was a state of continual fear, with its ineluctable implication that any
government is better than no government at all. Reid doubted the existence of such a
state of insecurity and denied that the "worst political Government is preferable to the
best state of Natural Liberty". Rousseau was a "professed admirer" of Daniel Defoe's
novel The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures ofRobinson Crusoe (1719), a
book which Reid apparently also admired and considered to be unrivalled in the
portrait it paints of the "Advantage of the Civilized above the Savage." Yet, Reid
complained, as in the case of other "great men" such as Locke and Hume, who from a
"desire of peculiarity & a love of paradoxes" were apt to "take up some strange
doctrines," Rousseau preferred the "Savage State to the civilized." Reid, for his part,
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considered that "Robison fs/c] owed all the Advantages he had over his Man Friday to
this that he had the civilization of a common English Sailor," whereas Friday was
"next to a Savage."10 This civilization enabled Crusoe to improvise where the
resources ready to hand proved insufficient to the tasks he had set for himself. While
Crusoe would come to boast that such problems "cost [him] as much Thought as a
Statesman would have bestow'd upon a grand Point of Politics, or a Judge upon the
Life and Death of a Man", he confessed that for a considerable time after becoming
stranded he was "merely thoughtless of God, or a Providence; [he] acted like a mere
Brute from the Principles of Nature and by the Dictates of common sense only, and
indeed hardly that." This surprising assimilation of brutishness with common sense
would have appealed more readily to a Rousseau than to a Reid, but Defoe's views
were less ambiguous in a subsequent passage in which Crusoe remarks that Friday's
childlike devotion and engaging simplicity
frequently gave [him] Occasion to observe, and that with Wonder, that,
however it had pleased God in his Providence, and in the Government
of the Works of his Hands, to take from so great a Part of the World of
his Creatures the best Uses to which their Faculties and the Powers of
their Souls, are adapted; yet that he has bestow'd upon them the same
Powers, the same Reason, the same Affections, the same Sentiments
of Kindness and Obligation, the same Passions and Resentments of
Wrongs, the same Sense of Gratitude, Sincerity, Fidelity, and all the
Capacities of doing Good and receiving Good, that he has given to us;
and that when he pleases to offer to them Occasions of exerting these,
they are as ready, nay, more ready to apply them to the right Uses for
which they were bestow'd, than we are. And this made [him] very
melancholy sometimes, in reflecting, as the several Occasions
presented, how mean an Use we make of all these, even though we
have these Powers enlighten'd by the great Lamp of Instruction, the
Spirit of God, and by the Knowledge of his Word, added to our
Understanding; and why it has pleased God to hide the like saving
Knowledge from so many Millions of Souls, who, if I might judge by
this poor Savage, would make a much better Use of it than we did.11
Thus Defoe underlines the misfortunes of both Friday and Crusoe. The former is
disadvantaged by his underdeveloped rationality and dormant passions, the latter by
his gross inattention to the Holy Spirit. The condition of Crusoe was clearly
preferable to that of his servant, although even this relatively favourable state was less
than could be achieved were he to consistently follow his consience. There is in
10BaircTs Notes, Lectures 110-111, 11th and 12th Apr 1780, vol. 7, fos 78v-79r, 80r-81r, 84r-v;cf.
83r-v; MS. 8/1V/9, fos lv-2r.
11 [Daniel Defoe], The Life, and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, 9th ed., vol. 1
(London, 1747), pp. 80, 86, 197-198; cf. p. 208.
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Defoe, then, a suggestion of a theory of the progress of reason and sentiment which
was undoubtedly congenial to Reid's purposes. Reid would pick up this theme later
in his lectures on jurisprudence, as I will show presently.
Having steered, via Defoe, a course between Hobbes and Rousseau, Reid enumerated
the prudential motives that might induce reasonable men to enter into political society
or persuade those already in such a society of their obligation to remain there. One
advantage would derive from the richness and diversity of "Accommodations of the
Body," i.e. food, clothing and shelter, made possible by the "division of Labour."
Another would derive from the conduciveness of political society to a greater
"advancement of knowledge", including political knowledge. "Savages", i.e. the
indigenous peoples of the New World, Reid is reported to have said, may for example
"acquire a great degree of cunning as we see from them also, a great degree of
activity," but will not develop prudence. As we have seen, Reid was at pains to
distinguish prudence — the virtuous adaptation ofmeans to ends — from cunning,
which was also adaptive, but derived from low motives. The advent of political
society called forth for Reid a Ciceronian change in the degree of rationality and
morals that is required of both governors and governed. A third advantage enjoyed by
"Europeans" derived from the greater "Security of Property" their political society
afforded, owing to the superior means available for redressing "private Injuries". In
political society, Reid observed, men are "guarded by the Laws & by Judges." In an
idiom reminiscent of Hume, he suggested that "These laws mark out to them a proper
course of conduct & accustomed to be restrained by them they become creatures of a
very different kind". A further advantage derived from the superior means political
society offered for "defence against foreign enemies." Uniting in political society
enabled men to raise an army and to acquire a "knowledge of the art ofWar", although
standing armies brought with them their own problems according to republicans like
Reid, as I have shown.
The fifth and sixth advantages which Reid considered to derive from political society
were highly Ciceronian in character: it "furnishe[d] an occasion to employ the most
exalted powers & capacities of a human Mind", and it gave men "room to exercise the
most enlarged affections & the noblest Virtues." As it is a Ciceronian emphasis that
gives Reid's lectures on politics their distinctive character, I shall give particular
attention to these two points.
The savage who is concerned only with himself and a few friends has but a very
"narrow sphere" in which to act and an extremely limited field of objects over which to
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exercise his mind. In political society the powers of the mind are "more elevated"
because men's concerns "extend to a larger sphere of carefull knowledge & the arts of
active life." Individuals in such a society consider it their "glory to raise [their]
powers to the highest pitch". Reid was quick to point out that men in a savage state
were just as capable of exerting their mental powers to the full as their counterparts in
civilized society, but wanted only the opportunity to do so. For Reid, who entertained
Butlerian notions on this subject (as we have seen) there was no question of savages
lacking the appropriate faculties and having to evolve them. As he put it:
We see even in a Savage tribe, where they unite in self defence, are
conducted by a chosen leader of superior wisdom & prudence, & we
often find these display an ability or stratagem which is a sufficient
indication of th(eir) being the same with other men, but so little
opportunity have they of exercising this that they remain unimproved in
their savage state.
Political society also provides an opportunity for the exercise of the "most Enlarged
Affections and Noblest Virtues." As Reid explained, the "Virtues of a Savage are
commonly all exercised about their own self-preservation. They have no more
extensive view as the object of their affections, perhaps they may extend to a few
friends or associates but the situation of men in Society affords A larger sphere of
action & exertion to his noblest power(s)." This passage underlines the Ciceronian
concept of prudence as the virtuous use of our powers which Reid had articulated in
his inaugural lecture at Glasgow College.
While these advantages "might... & ought to induce" men who are sufficiently
enlightened to prefer political society to the state of natural liberty, yet we "are not ...
to suppose that a Savage could foresee all these, they arise gradually & could be
known only in a succession of ages." Such a remark is both stoical and sceptical:
stoical because it suggests that prudence is a state of mind, i.e. dependent on self-
consciousness; and sceptical in so far as it involves a retreat into historicism. It must
also be remarked that once men have perceived these advantages — or enough of them
to be induced to enter into political society — at least some will become conditions that
must be fulfilled by governors in order to ensure continuing obedience on the part of
the governed. As Reid put it in a subsequent passage in the lecture notes which he
used from 1765-1766 onwards but seems to have been obliged to pass over in the
1779-1780 session,
The Political Union between Governours and Subjects, in what manner
soever it might have begun or been continued must have the Nature and
force of an Onerous Contract. The Obligations are mutual. And as the
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Subjects are bound to Respect and honour those who are set over them
to obey the Laws and to contribute their utmost endeavours to support
the Government: So on the other hand those who are in the
Government whether Kings or Senators Representatives of the people
or Magistrates are under no less strict obligation in their several
Stations to make the best laws they can devise for the preservation of
Justice and for promoting the publick good, to execute those laws
strictly and impartially, & to take the most prudent and Effectuall
means to defend their people from forreign Ennemies.
Reasoning a priori Reid regarded this as a corollary of his enumeration of the
prudential motives that ought to induce those sufficiently enlightened to enter into civil
society. Another such inference from these motives, one which Reid drew in 1779-
1780 as well as in 1765-1766, 1768-1769 and 1775-1776, is as follows:
The End of All Political Government is to preserve the Rights and to
promote the felicity of the Governed. The Prince who considers his
Subjects as the tools of his Ambition, and who conceives that their
Rights and their happiness may be Sacrificed to his Glory is a Tyrant.
Those onely have the true Spirit of Government who conceive of their
exalted Station as a Publick Trust, in the Execution whereof the
common felicity of their Subjects ought to be their first care.
Here Reid combined a Ciceronian language of prudence, signalled by the word glory,
with a post-Lockean language of contract, encapsulated in the term public trust.12
2.
The final stage in Reid's critique of Hume's science of politics and in the construction
of his own political jurisprudence was his contribution to the ongoing debate on the
contractual foundations of government. Reid had been exposed to this subject at least
as early as 26 June 1759, when the Aberdeen Philosophical Society discussed
AlexanderGerard's question "What is the origin of civil government?"13 He himself
opened a discussion of a related question, "Whether the Supposition of a tacit Contract
at the beginning of Societies is well founded", at a meeting of the Glasgow Literary
Society on 1 April 1768 and he touched upon the topic — probably with the same
paper ready to hand that he used when he opened the discussion in the Glasgow
12MS. 8/IV/9, fo. 2r-v; Baud's Notes, Lecture 111, 12 Apr 1780, vol. 7, fos 81 v-83v; cf. fos 81 r,
85r; Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, p. 186; Jack's Notes
from Reid's Lectures, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 116, 22 Apr 1776, pp. 628-630; Works, pp.
561b, 563a; Hume, Essays, p. 16.
13Quoted in Paul B. Wood, "Thomas Reid, Natural Philosopher: A Study of Science and Philosophy
in the Scottish Enlightenment" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leeds, 1984), p. 377.
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Literary Society — in his lectures on political jurisprudence in the 1768-1769 and
1775-1776 sessions. He also opened the discussion on a third question, "Wherein
consists the nature of a Contract and does it i(n)volve Contradictions as Mr. Hume
asserts"', in a meeting of the Glasgow Literary Society on 7 May 1779.14
First in the Glasgow Literary Society and then in the classroom, Reid began his
remarks on the subject of tacit contracts by observing that the consent necessary to a
contract need not be expressed by words, whether in writing or speech, but may be
conveyed by sign language15 or even by the silence of the parties, as in the case of an
14Entries for 1 Apr 1768 and 30 Apr 1779, in the Minute Book of the Glasgow College Literary
Society, 1764-1779, Royal Faculty of Procurators Library MS. Hill 378.8, pp. 24, 119; cf. David
Murray's Copy of the Minute Book of the Literary Society of Glasgow, 1764—1779, GUL MS.
Murray 505, pp. 27, 86; see also MS. 2/11/10, fo. lr; Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-
1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, Lecture dated 14 Apr [1769], pp. 186-187; Jack's Notes from Reid's
Lectures, 1775-1776, Lectures 116-117, 22nd and 23rd Apr 1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, pp. 630-
638.
15For Reid such implied contracts were grounded in human psychology. Reid excavated this ground
in the account of natural language which he developed in two discourses delivered before the Aberdeen
Philosophical Society on 15 March and 23 September 1760 and subsequently published in Chapters
4-6 of the Inquiry. As a moral philosopher Reid sought to explain and predict mental phenomena,
and one of the chief means of investigating the mind was for him to attend to language or, more
precisely, to the signs people use in order "to communicate their thoughts, purposes & desires to one
another". These signs, Reid considered, are either artificial, as in 'The articulations of the voice" (i.e.
words), whose meaning is established "by common consent", or natural, i.e. "the modulations of the
voice, the gestures of the body & the features of the face", whose meaning is established "by nature"
and understood or "discovered to us by a natural principle without reasoning or experience." Artificial
signs "speak to the understanding as Algebraical characters may do; but the passions the affections &
the will [to which natural signs are addressed] hear them not." These two sets of signs then make up
natural and artificial language respectively. But if there were no natural language, artificial languages
could never arise, "For all artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain
meaning to certain signs; there must therefore be compacts & agreements before the use of artificial
signs: but there can be no compact or agreement without language; & therefore, there must be a
natural language before any artificial language can be invented". According to Reid, if two "Savages"
who did not share a common artificial language were to meet, they would be able to communicate
their intentions almost effortlessly by means of gesture, tone of voice, and so forth. By indulging
overmuch in the refinements of their artificial languages "civilized" peoples have increasingly silenced
their natural language and lost touch with basic interpretative instincts. (AUL MSS. 3107/1/5, fo.
14% ; 3107/1/6, fo. 31r. These are Thomas Gordon's copies of Reid's 15 Mar and 23 Sept discourses
respectively. Cf. R to Dr James Gregory, 26 Aug 1787, p. 71a: "The seed of language is the natural
signs of our thoughts, which nature has taught all men to use, and all men to understand." Reid's
interest in language apparently went back to about 1747-1748, i.e. about the time when he made the
notes on Hume's definition of the self which are discussed in Chapter 3. He read Pierre F.X. de
Charlevoix 'Flistory ofNew France, a work which evidently made a lasting impression on him (see R
to Dr James Gregory , 26 Aug 1787, in Works, p. 71b). It was at least in part through a careful study
of human language that Reid sought to trace the concepts of liberty and power and of the
consciousness of self which were so crucial to his various attempts to answer the sceptics in the
Aberdeen period and, increasingly, in the Glasgow period.) It must be emphasized that for Reid this
was an intuitive ability, for, as he suggested in his abstract of Wise Club question 56;"Whether it is
best that Courts of Law should be different from Courts of Equity, or that the same Courts whether
subordinate or supreme should judge both according to Law and Equity", discussed on 22 February
1763, "the common signs of human purposes and intentions ... cannot be reduced to rules" MS.
6/1/14, fo. 1 v). Nevertheless, the "savage hath within him the seeds of the logician, the man of taste
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elector called to a meeting to choose a Member of Parliament where there is "some rule
that if any person has any objection he may speak & fhis] silence ... is taken for a
silent assent". Where silence is taken as consent, the contract thus sealed is
"commonly called a tacit Contract." Occasionally the terms of a contract are "most
minutely expressed so as to remove every doubt as far as is possible with regard to the
obligations brought upon the several parties by it; But the nature of human affairs will
not always admit of this caution & precision" and in most contracts the terms are not
expressed but "implyed in the very nature of the Transaction."
Reid's examples of tacit contracts are rich in Ciceronian associations. I quote the first,
which shows how tacit duties are understood and accepted as part of the fabric of
everyday life:
Thus I send for a Taylor 1 desire him to make me a suit of Cloaths of
superfine Cloath of such a Colour; he takes my Measure makes a bow
and walks off, under the same obligation as if by an Indenture stamped
paper we had been mutually bound to each other, he to chuse the cloath
according to his best skillf] to cut it according to the fashion and the
rules of his Art[,] to fit it to my size and shape[,] to furnish and make it
up workmanlike & to charge a reasonable price, & I to pay him for it.
This is all implyed in the order I gave him though not a tittle of it be
expressed.
A subsequent example is not cited in either set of student notes.16 In this example
Reid moves from our apprehension of implied obligations to the metaphysical
underpinning of these obligations, i.e. to the moral constitution that gives rise to our
expectations of what is owed to us in a given situation and which enjoins us to fulfil
our end of the bargain. Although Reid does not employ the term common sense in
this connection it is clear that the moral constitution we are talking about is a
commonsensical one; in other words, it has definite affinities to the ethico-cognitive
equipment or endowments of Reid's man of common sense. His example in this case
relates to the practice of medicine:
and breeding, the orator, the statesman, the man of virtue, and the saint; which seeds, though planted
in the mind by nature, yet, through want of culture and exercise, must lie for ever buried, and be
hardly perceivable by himself or by others" (Works, p. 98b. There is something of an antecedent to
this in the first of the two discourses we have been considering: if the use of speech and writing,
which rely on artificial as opposed to natural signs, were abolished for a century, "Every man would
then be a painter, an actor, & an orator" (AUL MS. 3107/1/5, fo. 15r). A version of this passage was
subsequently incorporated into Chapter 4 of the Inquiry (Works, pp. 118b—119a)). Despite his ow n
scepticism, Reid's reference point in all of this was undoubtedly Hume's discussion of justice as an
artificial virtue, which, as I have pointed out, Reid was anxious to combat.
16I suspect this reflects not Reid's omission of the passage but rather his pupils'5having passed over
it in their highly abbreviated notes, for it dovetails nicely with the material that is presented there and
subsequent passages follow with little loss of continuity.
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I apply to a man who professes the healing Art[.] I tell him that I
labour under such an ailment, & desire his advice. He prescribes for
me without any more ado. It is evident that he comes under an
obligation to prescribe for me according to the best of his skill, & I to
pay him a reasonable fee though no such thing was expressed on the
one hand or the other. The consent to this reciprocal Obligation is
implyed in the Nature of his Profession my application to him & his
prescription for my health. It is not solely the Physicians Oath taken at
his inauguration that binds him to the faithfull discharge of the duty of
a Physician; his taking upon him the Character virtually & implicitly
binds him to this without Oath or Promise. He violates the contract
implied in his profession, when he does not prescribe faithfully and
honestly.
Here Reid exposed the mechanism by which moral obligations attach to a character or
"office". In Reid's view, taking upon oneself any character or office in society
"virtually & implicitly" puts one under such obligations: "He who claims the character
of a Man binds himself to the duty of a Man, he who enlists in the Army binds himself
to the duty of a Soldier, & he who takes the office of a General binds himself to do the
duty of a General." As I have shown, for Reid taking upon oneself an appropriate
character was a matter of prudence, which enabled a man to "make a right judgment of
his own Talents that he may not put on a Person which Nature has not qualified him to
act Nor attempt things beyond his Force." Prudence allowed one to recognize whether
one was "fit to fabricate or govern a Commonwealth" or "onely to forge hob nails".
In this can be seen the neo-Ciceronian etiquette of role-playing acted out on the pages
of The Spectator, that common property of coffee-house culture.
In a further observation Reid progressed one step closer to spelling out the political
ramifications of his neo-Ciceronian formula. The "more important" a given office is to
the "well being & happiness of the human kind, so much the more Sacred are the
Obligations to the duties of it." It was a small step from this injunction to a theory
about the duty of a "King or Supreme Magistrate", who, "by taking that Office upon
him voluntarly (and no man is forced into it) engages or contracts to do the duty of a
king, that is to rule justly and equitably & to preserve the rights & promote the good
and happiness of his people as far as lies in his power."17 This statement does appear
in the student notes.18
'7MS. 2/11/10, fos lv-2r; Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box 32.3,
Lecture dated 14 Apr [ 1769], p. 186; Jack's Notes from Reid's Lectures, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture
116, 22 Apr 1776, p. 630; cf. MS. 2/11/10, fos 3v-4r; PracticalEthics, pp. 128, 130. The notion of
playing a part on the "stage of life" figures prominently in Reid's published writings. In the
Intellectual Powers, Reid argued that effective role-playing was a function of becoming accustomed to
the various "scenes of life", for "almost every station in civil socieLrequires a multitude of regular
trains of thought," i.e. a "versatility of imagination" whereby one is able to "[put] on the fnend, the
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A people by the authority they have invested in their king also put themselves under
certain obligations to him, for just as the "Obligation of a King to the Duty of a King
must necessarly commence from the time of his taking that Character upon him; so the
Obligation of the people to subjection must commence from the time of their taking the
Character of his Subjects." But while they have invested their king with the authority
to dispense justice at home and to defend them against foreign enemies, they must not
be supposed to have thereby surrendered themselves utterly to him, but only to have
"committed" certain powers to him. The more powers they have so committed to him,
the "more sacredly bound to the right Exercise" of these powers has he in consequence
become. In this Reid may be seen to assert the Ciceronian belief that with great power
comes great responsibility. A post-Lockean component later becomes visible in his
characterization of the obligations imposed upon the Decemvirs by the Roman people:
"They were intrusted with unlimited Power for a certain purpose. The Nature of their
Institution implyed that they were to govern the Roman people justly untill they had
framed and established a body of Laws and then to resign". The Roman people had
emphatically not therefore "given up their Liberty, they had onely committed it to the
keeping of Persons whom they esteemed worthy of that Trust. And when they proved
unworthy the Roman People wanted neither judgment to understand nor the Power
and Spirit to vindicate their just Rights." Here Reid made the transition from a people
and their rulers taking upon themselves their respective characters to the concept of
government as a sacred trust. The emphasis shifted accordingly from duties and
obligations to liberty and rights. And as prudence directed one in the duties one might
reasonably take upon onself, so prudence served as a standard of how much to trust
others and when to revoke one's trust. As Reid put it, prudence "leadjsj us ... to
know mankind among whom we live, that we may avoid the fatal Extremes of
unreasonable distrust and suspicion of every man on the one hand, and of exposing
our selves to the Arts of the crafty, by too great trust and security on the other."
Reid identified the reciprocal obligations "implyed" in the "Relation" between a people
and their king thus described as an "Original Contract". Similar contracts prescribing
the respective duties of rulers and ruled could be supposed to underlie all other
political constitutions, according to Reid. These onerous contracts confirmed the
courtier, the patriot, the fine gentleman, with more ease than fone] put[s] off one suit and put[s] on
another" (Works, pp. 384a, b; 620b).
J8See Jack's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 316, 22 Apr
1776, pp. 630-631: "a king by voluntarly acting & taking the government upon him for no man is
forced into it he lays himself under an obligation to act equitably & Justly upon all occasions."
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existence of a people's original liberty and therewith their rights against sovereigns
who dared to encroach unduly upon it. Reid conceded that a people could forfeit their
liberty only by expressly renouncing it in full consciousness of what they were doing.
If a people "submit" to their king on the basis that "in his administration he is to have
no Regard to Justice or Mercy any farther than he finds them answer his own Ends"
(as happened in the case of Rehoboam, cited in such republican writings as
Harrington's Oceana and Machiavelli's Discourses, and of Richard II, an example
used by the mid-eighteenth-century Country opposition writer Bolingbroke) the
original contractmight thereby be presumed to be dissolved at least while that king
reigns. But as early as 1764-1765 Reid had pointed out that even if all of a man's
"ancestors from Adam had agreed to deprive him" of his right to resist incursions
against his fundamental liberty he must not by these means be supposed to have lost
his liberty, although it may indeed "put him in such circumstances as that it is not in
his power to assert and vindicate his Right."19 In this he followed in the tradition of
those "republican writers" alluded to by Hume in the latter's essay "Of the Original
Contract" (1748).20 Short of a deliberate, temporary renunciation of their basic
liberty, Reid argued,
A People have lost their liberty onely when they are either brought to
believe that they have no Right to resist oppression, or when they have
not power to resist it. While they do not believe in the Divine Right of
Kings to Govern ... while they believe that their lives and Fortunes are
onely deposited in the hands of the Magistrate for safe Custody, not
given away to serve his pleasure and Ambition, they are free whatever
the form of the Government may be; nothing but superior force can
make them slaves. The Subjects of the great Mogul want nothing to
make them free but to have their Minds enlightned and their Courrage
raised. The Mogul would then, notwithstanding the Absolute Nature
of the Government, find himself bound by the Nature of his office and
the Rights of his Subjects, and if he disregarded their Rights and Ruled
tyrranically & oppressively he might justly be charged with breaking
the Original Contract between him and his people.
According to Reid, King James II, though bound by the nature of his office and the
rights of his subjects, "broke the Original Contract between King and People." Reid
therefore took issue with Hume, who had argued in his essay "Of the Original
Contract" that there was "no such thing as a Contract between King and People in
19 MSS. 2/11/10, fos 2r-4v; 4/III/9, fos lv-2r; PracticalEthics, p. 133; cf. p. 130; Jack's Notes
from Reid's Lectures, 1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lectures 116-117, 22nd and 23rd Apr 1776,
pp. 633, 636; see Knud Haakonssen, Commentary on PracticalEthics, p. 404, n. (6); see also
Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, NCL MS. Box 32.3, Lecture dated 14 Apr [1769], p. 187;
Jack's Notes, Lecture 116, pp. 631-632.
2()Hume, Essays, p. 471.
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these Ages". Reid's criticism of Hume is revealing, for it shows just how fearful he
was that the tendency ofHume's political scepticism on this issue was to undermine
the very stability which Hume set so much store by. His own position may be seen to
be an ideologically motivated attempt to shore up the polite, neo-Ciceronian
foundations of political obligation and to commend the Revolution of 1688. 1
therefore quote him in full on this point:
The Sentiments which Mr Hume has on many occasions expressed of
the claims of the house of Stuart, & of the Conduct of those who
opposed their pretensions; make it less surprizing that he should
oppose a principle upon which those who brought about the revolution
justified their Conduct. If the Lords & Commons who found the
throne to be vacant upon this ground among others that King James
had broke the Original Contract between King and People acted upon
chimerical Principles they are not to be justifyed and we ought either to
condemn the Revolution altogether, or justify it upon different
Principles. But if on the other hand this Notion of a Contract between
King and People has a Meaning, & a meaning consistent with the
Principles of Justice and Equity why should it be traduced as
chimerical & Visionary by those who have no intention to throw a
Reproach upon the Revolution.21
In the student notes Reid accused Hume of paying "no attention to the Contract
between various persons", i.e. the acts by which people of every rank have taken
upon themselves a character to which rights and duties are attached.22 He observed
that the
Contract of a petty Constable to perform the office of a petty Constable
is as evident as can be & the Contract that a king makes is as strong as
real as this can be so that Mr Hume seems to have set out upon wrong
principles as it is surely very far Contrary to the nature of things to say
that [there is no such thing as] a Contract between a king & a subject,
the supreme Magistraite seems to be really Bound by the laws of nature
(to) dispense Justice to keep by the laws of the particular Constitution
to do every thing that tends to the happiness of his subjects sin(ce) this
is rational & what must be Indispensably bound up (with) the supreme
magistrate on the other hand the subjects ar(e) bound down by their
near connection to submit to every lawful design of the king to obey
his orders in what is reasonable surely without the mutual obedience
of bodies there could be no government carried on as this is the handle
upon which all government turns.23
21MS. 2/II/10, fos 2v-3r; cf. Hume, Essays, p. 473; Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-
3769, NCL MS. Box 32.3, Lecture dated 14 Apr [1769], p. 187; Jack's Notes from Reid's Lectures,
1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lecture 117, 23 Apr [1776], p. 636.
22Jack's Notes, Lecture 116, 22 Apr 1776, p. 633.
23Jack's Notes, Lecture 116, pp. 633-634; cf. Hume, Essays, p. 467.
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In this Reid echoed Locke, who wrote in his Second Treatise that
exceeding the Bounds of Authority is no more a Right in a great, than a
petty Officer; no more justifiable in a King than a Constable. But is so
much the worse in him in that he has more trust put in him, has already
a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is supposed
from the advantages of Education, imployment and Counsellors to be
more knowing in the measure of right or wrong.24
Hume denied that any such contract lay at the centre of government. He
acknowledged that our "Obligation to allegiance has the same foundation as our
obligation to be faithfull to our promises" but did not accept that the moral expectation
of keeping one's promises was the hinge upon which society, any more than
government, turned. These associations owed their very existence to prudential
calculations and were sustained by habitual obedience rather than a web ofmore or
less self-conscious mutual trust. Reid showed no sympathy for this side of Hume's
argument, insisting in a rather flat-footed manner that there would be "no living in
Society without fidelity to promises" and suggesting that "For the same Reason we are
bound to submit to Government." He simply could not shake his Ciceronian bias,
according to which virtue is prior to prudence or, rather, subsumes it. Indeed,
virtually the only points on which the two philosophers agreed in their respective
analyses were that political obligation involved an "Act ofMind" and that we may
"trace" the "charter of our liberties" in the "nature ofman".25
In another place in the student notes Reid is reported to have said that "it is evident that
those who govern should always act equitably & do to the utmost of their power to
keep up the original Intention of government which is to make the subjects the most
happy[. 0]n the other hand it seems very reasonable that those who are subjects
should act with all the Allegiance possible to their sovereigns", for a "submittance to
the law of our Country is absolutely necessary for the keeping up that government."
By arguing from the nature of things Reid was appealing to an a priori rational
standard, and in asserting the contractual, i.e. consensual, basis of the entire social
and political order he was aligning himself withWhig theorists like Locke. For Reid,
both the existence and the obligatoriness of every link in this great chain of contracts
were rationally self-evident — in other words, backed up by common sense. So
"evident in the Constitution of our Country & government" is the contract between a
people and their king Reid is also reported to have said, "that it is renewed every time
24Locke, Two Treatises, ed. Laslett, 2nd ed., p. 419.
25Hume, Essays, p. 468; MS. 2/11/10, fo. 4v; cf. Hume, Essays, p. 470; see also pp. 479^481.
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that adresses are made unto the king[.] Thus we see the subject making all the
protestations of keeping by his majesty of giving him all the asistance he can of giving
obedience to the laws of his Country & the king on his part protests that he will
endeavour to make the happiness of his people his particular study to keep Continually
by the law of his Country & not to swerve from them."26
For Reid, then, the "measure of political society" was the extent to which a given form
of government actually preserved the rights and promoted the felicity of the governed.
It followed that the "most Important question In political Jurisprudence is whether
when governments become contrary to the public good whether they may be thrown
of{f)."27 Even where a given sovereign's powers are not circumscribed by the letter
of a constitution, his authority is "still limited to things that may be lawfully done or
that have no inherent turpitude in them & to things that are not destructive to the
Society"; the law of nature, whose terms are implied in the original contract between a
king and his subjects and which is anyhow of higher authority, does not authorize
such actions.28 Reid was quite emphatic on this point: should a sovereign "command
us to do any thing wc is base, we ought rather to obey God yn Man". He regarded as
"very absurd" and "not worth confuting" the doctrine of Hobbes, whom he
characterized as a "corruptor" rather than an "improver" of jurisprudence, that a
subject "must do w'ever the Sovereign commands". Reid probably held a similar
view of the Scots jurist William Barclay, who also defended absolutism. It is simply
not "possible" for a Christian to carry out certain orders. In this connection Reid cited
the example of Orte, the Governor ofBayonne, who when he received orders from
Charles IX of France to massacre all the Huguenots in Paris refused to execute those
orders, begging the King to "order him to do things possible."29 On this issue Reid
was inclined to side with Grotius, who while favouring non-resistance as a general
policy approved of resistance in cases where the "prince leads to the ruine of the
subjects". Thus it was "lawful for David to resist the persecution of Saul. & it was
26Jack's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1775-1776, GUL MS. Gen. 118, Lectures 116-117, 22nd and
23rd Apr 1776, pp. 634-637; cf. Monteath's Notes from Reid's Lectures, 1768-1769, NCL MS. Box
32.3, Lecture dated 14 Apr [1769], p. 187.
27Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 14 Apr [1769], p. 187; Jack's Notes, Lecture 117, 23 Apr [1776],
p. 637.
28MS. 8/IV/9, fo. 3r.
29Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 17 Apr [1769], pp. 188-189; cf. MSS. 47111/23, fo. 2r; 8/1V/9, fo.
3r; Jack's Notes, Lecture 117, 23 Apr [1776], pp. 639-640; cf. MS. 8/1V/9, fo. 3v.
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lawful for the Maccabees to oppose the princes then opposing & oppressing the
Jews."30
The question of resistance was keenly debated in England by philosophers and
theologians after the accession of James I. The patriarchalism of Robert Filmer was
countered by the republican Algernon Sidney and the Whig theorists John Locke and
Bishop Benjamin Hoadly. The non-juror Charles Leslie later reasserted Filmerian
patriarchalism, while the High Tory divine Bishop Francis Atterbury attacked "all
forms of contract-based and rights-based resistance theory." Hoadly in turn criticized
the passive obedience teaching ofAtterbury.31 Reid had a qualified sympathy for
members of the "Sect" of "high flyers" in England, namely Sidney, Locke and
Hoadly, who despite the fact that they "preached up" the "doctrine of unlimited
submission" in strenuous terms, still "allowed that where the destruction of a state is
inevitable or where our rights & Liberties are extremely violated ... resistance is
lawfull."32 He wondered why when they admitted that resistance was lawful in such
cases they continued to "reason upon none resistance because surely no person will be
so hurtful to his own ... [interest] where it is not necessary."33 Reid was sharply
critical of the tendency of high flyer doctrine to encourage King James II in his
mistaken belief that he "could change both the form of government & make it absolute
beside(s) introduc(ing) popery".34 But he himself regarded the revolution of 1688 as
"not onely Lawfull but laudable & glorious", for James II "had brok(en) the contract
betwixt King & people" and as his "Aim was arbitrary government" resistance in this
instance was "necessary to save [the] Nation from tyrrany".35
30Jack's Notes, Lecture 117, pp. 642-643; cf. AUL MS. 8/IV/9, fo. 3v; Monteath's Notes, Lecture
dated 17 Apr [1769], p. 189.
31Knud Haakonssen, Commentary on Practical Ethics, p. 416, n. [14].
32MS. 8/IV/9, fo. 3v; Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 17 Apr [1769], pp. 188-189; Jack's Notes,
Lecture 117, p. 643.
33Jack's Notes, Lecture 117, pp. 643-644.
34Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 17 Apr [1769], p. 190; cf. pp. 188-189.
33MS. 8/1V/9, fo. 3v; Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 17 Apr [1769], p. 190; Jack's Notes, Lecture
117, p. 638. As the following paraphrase from Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments which he made
in the 1758-1759 session shows, Reid endorsed the latter's view that "Reason and Philosophy teach
us that Kings are the Servants of the People & it prescribes limits to our obedience and Submission
to them according to the Laws of the Land & teaches us even to resist & oppose them when the
publick Safety makes it necessary. But Nature teaches us to Submit to them for their own Sake to
tremble and bow down before their exalted Station, to regard their Smile as a reward sufficient to
compensate Services, and to dread their displeasure, tho no other evil was to follow it as the Severest
of all Mortifications" (MS. 3/1/27, fo. 2v; cf. Theory ofMoral Sentiments (London, 1759), pp. 115-
116; Smith, lectures on Rhetoric, ed. J.C. Bryce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 124
("There is in human Nature a Servility which inclines us to adore our Superiors"), 174). But despite
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Reid finished his treatment of this topic by adding the proviso that no resistance
should be made if the "Evils arising from Resistance [are] greater than those that arise
from Suffering" or, as he told his pupils in the 1768-1769 session, revolution is
unjustified "except when it tends to the good of almost [the] whole community". He
was quick to point out that "This Doctrine does not encourage Rebelion, [or] tend to
disturb Government", although at the same time he rather suspected that "none
resistance encourages Tyranny & despotism."36 In this connection he praised
Socrates, who refused to escape from jail even "tho he knew his Sentence to be
unjust," because he did not wish to jeopardize the principle that a "Man of his
Character ... ought not to disregard the laws of his Country."37 So Reid ended his
lectures on political jurisprudence the same note with which he began, i.e. a neo-
Ciceronian regard to characterwith its attendant rights and duties couched in the idiom
of post-Lockean contractualism and firmly anchored in common sense or common
prudence.
his concession on the pow er of sen ile habit, Reid staunchly believed that the weight of common
sense or common prudence would be sufficient to redress the balance erf" nature.
36MS. 8/1V/9, fo. 3v; Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 17 Apr [1769], p. 189; Jack's Notes, Lecture
117, p. 642; cf. Jack's Notes. Lecture 118, 24 Apr [ 1776], pp. 644-645.
37Monteath's Notes, Lecture dated 17 Apr [1769], p. 189; cf. Practical Ethics, pp. 169, 177 ("As
men may suffer hardships and injuries under the best Government from iniquity of witnesses or of
Judges these ought to be patiently born. This is a Sacrifice to the publick weal. Socrates Conduct
Noble and worthy of the Prince of Philosophers").
Epilogue
In the Prologue I observed that while Reid devoted major attention to pneumatology
and ethics in his two great works of the 1780s, he did not work up his classroom
reflections on politics nearly to the same extent. Indeed, to scholars unfamiliar with
Reid's manuscripts, it has always appeared that Reid devoted no space whatever to
politics in his last books. Yet upon examining the manuscript evidence and collating it
with the published record one discovers that politics was never very far from Reid's
mind as he worked up his reflections on the first two parts of his course and that he
managed to incorporate a large number of references to politics in both the Intellectual
Powers and the Active Powers. I shall examine a few of these references here in order
to show how Reid translated his pedagogical agenda into print.
Perhaps the most striking of these references were to the "fundamental principles of ...
politics," which, in kinship with Shaftesbury, Reid described as "dictates of common
sense". Reid reduced these "common principles of human nature" about which he had
so much to say in his lectures on politics to the following formula, which he repeated
or enlarged upon no fewer than six times in the books he published in the 1780s:
It may always be expected that [our fellow-men] will regard their own
interest and reputation, and that of their families and friends; that they
will repel injuries, and have some sense of good offices; and that they
will have some regard to truth and justice, so far at least as not to
swerve from them without temptation.1
Our tendency to "regulate" our actions by such principles not only makes us "capable
of living in society, and uniting in a political body under government" but also makes
a science of politics possible. As Reid put it,
Such maxims with regard to human conduct, are the foundation of all
political reasoning, and of common prudence in the conduct of life.
Hardly can a man form any project in public or in private life, which
does not depend upon the conduct of other men, as well as his own,
and which does not go upon the supposition that men will act such a
part in such circumstances.
Be that as it may, political science remained a science of probabilities. Thus, just as he
had done in his lectures on politics, Reid made important concessions to the sceptics.
"[Political] reasoning is never demonstrative", he wrote, "but it may have a very great
degree of probability, especially when applied to great bodies of men." Troublesome
uncertainty was a function of the behaviour of individuals, for as Reid admitted, "The
1 Works, pp. 424a, 451a; cf. pp. 483b, 562a-b, 577a, 636b, 654b.
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best concerted project may fail, and wise counsels may be frustrated, because some
individual acted a part which it would have been against all reason to expect."2 But
even this uncertainty was not to be overestimated, for as Reid shrewdly observed, "If
man were either a more perfect or a more imperfect, a better or a worse, creature than
he is, politics would be a different science from what it is."3 Reid's point was that
there is at least a "certain degree of prudence and probity [on] which we [can] rely in
every man that is not insane" and which forms the groundwork both of political
society and of political science, for it is on the assumption that people are generally
prudent and honest that we "reason concerning the causes and effects of different
forms of government, laws, customs, and manners." That is to say, assuming that
people have common sense and are usually virtuous, we may "conclude what part
[they] will act in different situations and circumstances." Although Reid employed the
Machiavellian rhetoric of taking people as they are rather than as they ought to be, it is
clear that he included common sense and common honesty in his reckoning of the way
people are.4
It will be recalled that this prudence-and-honesty formula was itself part of a larger
equation in Reid's introductory lectures on politics, which included his account of free
will and necessity. In his lectures Reid felt compelled to respond to necessitarians like
Hume and Karnes who believed that human actions were necessarily determined by
the strongest motive and who equated acting freely with acting capriciously.
According to Hume, only on the supposition that our actions were determined by the
strongest motive could politics be reduced to a science. Reid replied that the same
motive does not always produce the same action among different people and that even
in the same person it does not always produce the same effect. He observed,
moreover, that there was no standard by which the strength of a given motive could be
judged. Given these circumstances Reid concluded that according to their own
principles necessitarians could not hope to establish a political science. Moreover, in
order to demonstrate that liberty was not equivalent to capriciousness, he pointed out
that a good person will act a good part be it ever so much in his power to act a bad
one.
In the Active Powers, Reid enlarged upon his discussion of these points. He
emphasized that in addition to "animal motives", which human beings have in
common with brutes, there are also "rational motives," which are peculiar to human
2Works, pp. 451a, 483 b.
3Works, p. 591b.
4Works, pp. 483a, 591b; cf. pp. 451a, 481a.
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beings. He also distinguished between two measures of the relative strength of
motives. The first, i.e. the "animal test", measures the relative irresistibility of a given
passion or appetite. The second, i.e. the "rational test," measures the obligatoriness of
a certain course of action in point of duty or of "real happiness". Typically, those
motives which are strongest when judged by the animal test are weakest when judged
by the rational test and vice versa. Human life may be characterized as a "state of trial"
precisely because our passions and appetites very often push us one way while our
reason pulls us in the opposite direction. In this contest, our reason sometimes
prevails over our passions and appetites and sometimes our passions and appetites
supplant our reason. Far from being determined by the strongest animal motive, then,
human beings frequently choose to act on the strongest rational motive. When they do
so, their actions are truly free, not capricious. This freedom, expressed in the
observation that "Rational beings, in proportion as they are wise and good, ... act
according to the best motives", provides the foundation for political science. Thus
when Reid championed the doctrine of free will in opposition to Hume's doctrine of
necessity, he had in mind not capriciousness, which he probably regarded as no less
compulsive than animal necessity, but rational or "moral liberty," which, like animal
necessity, had the virtue of being predictable.-"'
And it was here, at the heart of his account ofmoral liberty in the Active Powers, that
Reid placed his reflections on political jurisprudence. Despotism precluded virtue
because it "prescribeld] laws to [persons] which they [had] not the power to obey ...
[and] require[d] ... servicefs] beyond their power". For the same reason, it
constituted "injustice in the highest degree" because the principles upon which it
trampled, i.e. "That a man cannot be under an obligation to what is impossible; that he
cannot be criminal in yielding to necessity, nor justly punished for what he could not
avoid," were for Reid "fundamental rules of justice" which "ought never to be
violated." They are indeed recognized as such in all "equitable civil governments" and
in general are "so evident to all men, that the most tyrannical governments profess to
be guided by them, and endeavour to palliate what is contrary to them by the plea of
necessity." Civil government, Reid suggested, is "a species ofmoral government"
and it is to the standard ofmoral government that all civil governments ought to aspire.
The fact that so many regimes miss the mark may be a function of human imperfection
— "unwise or unjust" laws or "partial or unskilful" judges — but the means of their
^Works, pp. 609a, 611b; 612a, b.
Kjtagawa 283
reform lies in the proper application of human power and in the encouragement of
virtue, i.e. in our perfectibility.6
In conclusion, I would like to give some account of Reid's "Thoughts on the Utopian
System," a twenty-seven page paper which Reid read before the Glasgow Literary
Society on 28 November 1794.7 In this paper Reid drew together the key themes of
his political jurisprudence, notably a circumspect attitude towards the possibility (and
the justice) of revolutionary change, a more sanguine view of the ability to reform a
constitution, and an underlying faith in human perfectibility. In his remarks on the
possibility of revolutionary change, Reid reiterated the Montesquieuian myth of the
wise legislator and exercised a Montesquieuian scepticism with regard to the "political
knowledge" of the many: "a good Model of Government can never, all at once, be
invented by a Multitude, of which the greater part is ignorant, & of the knowing, the
greater part is led by Interest or by Ambition." He also harboured a Humean (and
anti-Montesquieuian) suspicion that the stability of a government depended largely on
its "Customs & Manners by which [a people] & [their] Forefathers for many
Generations have been governed" rather than on the "Climate or ... any peculiarity in
the Genius of the People". Reid's doubtfulness about the possibility of "violent &
sudden Changes of the Form of Government" largely arose, therefore, from the
observation that
The practical Politician, who is to Model or to direct the Government of
a Nation actually existing, has to do with Men who are not in the State
of Nature, but who by Education & by the State of Society in which
they live have acquired Habits & Dispositions, which it is not in his
Power to eradicate, and which may be called a second Nature. To this
second Nature as well as to the first his Principles of Government must
be adapted.
In his reflections on reforming constitutions, Reid repeated the formula he found in
Penn that "New Laws and Ordinances wisely contrived may remedy the Defects of a
Constitution, remove grievances, and promote general happiness." At the same time,
he sceptically conceded that
so limited is the Wisdom ofMan, so short his Foresight, that new
Laws, even when made with the best intention, do not always produce
the Effect intended and expected from them, or they bring unforseen
inconveniences that do more than counterbalance their good Effects.
6Works, pp. 613b, 614b.
7An abbreviated version of this paper was published in the Glasgow Courier a few months later, on
18 December 1794, under the title "Danger of Political Innovation." It was subsequently reprinted,
first in Robert Cleghorn's Sketch of the Character of the late Thomas Reid 1796), and then as
Appendix 2 to Archibald Arthur's Discourses on Theological & Literary Subjects (1803). The full
text was printed as Section 18 in Practical Ethics.
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Be that as it may, Reid remained dedicated to the principle of reform and sought to
inform that principle by engaging in certain Utopian speculations with a view not only
to "enlarging] our Conceptions & ... strengthen[ing] our Faculties" but also to
"influenc[ing] ... practice." Central to Reid's political speculation was a doctrine of
human perfectibility according to which man is
a Being who brings into the World with him the Seeds of Reason and
Conscience, along with various Appetites and Passions, by which he is
often missled into Error, and seduced into wrong Conduct by
Temptations that arise from within, or from external circumstances: At
the same time capable of a high Degree of Improvement in Knowledge
& Virtue, by right Education and good Government; and on the other
hand, of great Degeneracy, to Barbarity & even to Brutality, by the
Want or the Corruption of these Means.
Such a view of human nature led easily into a More-inspired Utopian policy, whose
aristocracy of virtue and community of property evidently appealed to Reid. The
abolition of private property would greatly reduce temptation and the public
recognition of virtue would ensure the release of free will and the proper development
of people's moral and intellectual powers, thus producing good citizens in this world
and preparing the way for happiness in the hereafter. Only in this way, Reid
suggested, could "that Perfection and Happiness of Society which every good Man
desires" be achieved.
But despite his apparent enthusiasm for Utopian policy, Reid deepened the political
scepticism of the IntellectualPowers by suggesting that the actions of great bodies of
men no less than that of individuals may be unpredictable:
political Reasoning is not of the Demonstrative but of the probable
kind. The Heart ofMan is a Labrinth, too intricate to be fully traced by
his Understanding, and we often see, not onely Individuals, but great
Bodies of Men act a part very different from that which by the common
principles of human Nature we would have expected.
Reid was also critical of Utopian policy because it left little room for the exercise of the
"noble Virtues" of fortitude and liberality, the opportunities to practise which were
more prevalent under a system of private property. He was also worried that "the
consistent pursuit of Honour & of the Esteem of Men" might actually "supplant the
Virtue which it ought onely to Aid." In other words, acting exclusively from these
motives may close the soul to such higher motives as doing one's duty for its own
sake or because one knows that it is good, and consistent with God's will, to be
virtuous. One may, in consequence, lose one's "Sense of ... Dependence and
Demerit," i.e. one's awareness of one's "Imperfections". The arrogance that takes the
place of this humility is destructive of religion and liberty, which were the final
arbiters of Reid's full-blown political jurisprudence just as they had been the starting-
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points of the political science he had begun to develop in the classroom, first at
Aberdeen and then at Glasgow.8
8AUL MS. 3061/6, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 15, 25, 26, 27.
Appendices
Appendix 1
Reconstructing Reid's Lectures on Politics
Among the manuscripts sorted through by Reid's colleague, the professor of logic,
George Jardine, shortly after Reid's death was a folder marked "Politicks" in Reid's
hand. The folder contained various lecture notes on politics,1 assorted reading notes,2
portions of Reid's lecture notes on jurisprudence closely related to politics,3 a draft of
a portion of his Essays on the Active Powers ofMan relating to natural rights,4 and an
aide-memoire reporting a conversation with Adam Smith.5 Jardine bundled up this
folder with a large number of other MSS and placed them in a wrapper which he
labelled "Heads of Lectures on Pneumatology, Ethicks & Politicks which seem to
have been delivered the first Session Dr Reid Taught in Glasgow College."6 With this
bundle, but included in the politics folder, were three additional MSS; these were a set
of reading notes7 and two lecture notes on politics.8 The MSS were organized in this
way when Alex Liddell and David Fate Norton catalogued them in 1958 and 1977
respectively. The three "additional" MSS were subsequently inserted in the politics
folder. At present, only MSS. 4/111/12—23c are enclosed in this folder, evidently for
reasons of archival convenience. The materials which 1 have transcribed and edited as
Reid's lectures on politics in Appendix 4 are AUL MSS. 4/III/1—3, 5-11, 14—16.
1.
I now record basic descriptions of all of the papers which belong with the folder
labelled "Politicks":
• MS. 4/111/1: 2 fols, 19.9 cm long x 16.1 cm wide,9 fol. 2v blank.
• MS. 4/I1I/2: 4 fols, 20.0 cm x 16.1 cm, fols 2v-4v blank.
'MSS. 4/111/1—3, 5-10, 14, 16.







9In subsequent references, I have stated the dimensions of individual manuscripts in the form LxW
and have rounded all figures up to the nearest mm.
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• MS. 4/III/3: two "signatures," Signature 1, 4fols, 20.8 cm x 16.1 cm, fols 3v-4v
blank; Signature 2, 4 fols, 19.4 cm x 15.9 cm, fols 6r, 7r-8v blank.
• MS. 4/III/4: 2 fols, 19.4 cm x 15.6 cm.
• MS. 4/I1I/5: 6 fols, 19.3 cm x 15.2 cm, fols 4-5 uncut, fols 3v-6v blank.
• MS. 4/III/6: 4 fols, 19.7 cm x 15.8 cm, fols 2v-3v blank.
• MS. 4/III/7: 1 fo., 19.4 cm x 14.4 cm.
• MS. 4/III/8: 2 fols, 19.1 cm x 15.6 cm, fo. lv blank.
• MS. 4/III/9: 4 fols, 18.9 cm x 15.4 cm, fols 3v^fv blank.
• MS. 4/111/10: 4 fols, 19.3 cm x 15.5 cm, fols 3-4 uncut, fols 2v-4v blank.
• MS. 4/111/11: 2 fols, 19.8 cm x 16.1 cm.
• MS. 4/111/12: 4 fols, 18.5 cm x 15.5 cm, fols 1-2, 3-4 uncut, fols lv-4v blank.
• MS. 4/III/13: 4 fols, 20.6 cm x 16.3 cm, fols 1-2, 3-4 uncut, fols lv-4v blank.
• MS. 4/111/14: 2 fols, 19.8 cm x 15.8 cm.
• MS. 4/111/15: 4 fols, 19.2 cm x 15.6 cm.
• MS. 4/111/16: 1 fo., 16.5 cm x 10.1 cm.
• MS. 4/111/17: 3 fols, 20.8 cm x 16.6 cm, fo. 2v blank.
• MS. 4/111/18: 2 fols, 19.0 cm x 15.4 cm.
• MS. 4/111/19: 1 fo., 18.5 cm x 15.1 cm.
• MS. 4/III/20: 4 fols, 18.5 cm x 15.0 cm, fols 1-2, 3-4 uncut, fols lv-4v blank.
• MS. 4/1II/21: 4 fols, 20.1 cm x 16.0 cm.
• MS. 4/III/22: 2 fols, 19.3 cm x 15.5 cm, fols 3v-2v blank.
• MS. 4/III/23: 2 fols, 18.6 cm x 15.4 cm, fo. 2r-v blank.
• MS. 4/III/23a: 1 fo.. 20.0 cm x 16.3 cm.
• MS. 4/Ill/23b: 4 fols, 18.6 cm x 15.4 cm, fols 1-2, 3—4 uncut, fols lv-^4v blank.
• MS. 4/IIl/23c: 2 fols, 20.7 cm x 16.6 cm.
2.
Considering now only those papers which are lecture notes on politics, one is
confronted by the following problem. The order in which the papers happen to have
been preserved would appear not to have been the order in which Reid used them in
his lectures, for in their present arrangement they do not form a coherent whole.
Moreover, as George Jardine observed, while these papers seem to have formed the
core of Reid's lectures on politics in the first year he taught at Glasgow, "so many
additional notes and illustrations have been made in succeeding years that they cannot
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easily be put in exact order."10 These things being so, it was difficult but not
impossible to restore the papers to their original order. I shall now explain how I have
reconstructed Reid's lectures on politics.
Consecutively dated material provided the starting-point formy reconstruction of
Reid's text. Reid's use of preview11 and recapitulation12 provided forward and
backward linkages which aided me at the second stage of this process. Where dates
were lacking, Reid's undated list of "Heads of Lectures on Politicks" in MS. 4/111/113
provided additional clues as to the rearrangement of the MSS in the next stage and for
the most part corroborated the order dictated by consecutively dated material. The
order thus established was substantially corroborated by the order observed in
surviving student notes relating to politics deriving from Reid's lectures in the 1768-
1769, 1775-1776 and 1779-1780 sessions. I shall have more to say about Baird and
the importance of student notes in Appendix 2.
It should be pointed out that the various pieces of text that have been rearranged
according to these principles are largely discrete papers. Only in a small number of
cases have I broken up individual papers but even then I have only rearranged the text
where there were no apparent connections between pieces of text that could otherwise
stand alone, where no logical gap would be created by removing a block of text and
replacing it in a more sensible position, and where the rearrangement was consistent
with the result obtained on the one hand by triangulating between evidence supplied by
dates, by Reid's list of lecture heads and by his use of preview and recapitulation and
on the other by comparing Reid's notes with those made by his students. The result is
a text that leaves nothing of Reid's out but follows the argument from beginning to
end, sticking to Reid's original outline but changing course when he does (as indicated
by the dates on his papers).
3.
One final point remains to be made. In so far as it has been possible forme to
determine Reid's final intention from MSS in his own hand, it is this version of the
text that I have reproduced in the main body of the transcription, relegating superseded
10In Box 2131.5.
1 ^ee MSS. 4/111/2, fo. 2r; 47111/5, fo. 2v; 4/111/9, fo. 3r; 4/III/10, fo. 2r.
12Examples of this practice may be found in MSS 4/111/2, fo. lr; 4/111/5, fo. lr; 4/111/6, fo. 2r;
4/III/S, fo. lr.; 4/1II/9, fo. 2v; 4/111/10, fo. lr. On one occasion, Reid's "summary" at the beginning
of a new manuscript is little more than a list of headings with the odd point-form note thrown in to
fill it out (see MS. 4/111 /11, fo. lr).
13On fo. 2r.
Kitagawa 290
material to the footnotes. I have provided a full statement of the principles governing
my transcription in Appendix 3.
Appendix 2
The Importance of Contemporary Reports
In the course ofmy research I have made some important archival discoveries directly
relevant to this thesis. One of these — i.e. my recovery of the original MSS of Reid's
letters to Drs Andrew and David Skene, which had been known only in their abridged,
published form — is fully reported in the article appended to this thesis. In this
appendix I propose to report three other discoveries.
1.
In the winter of 1991 I identified the George Baird whose 8-volume set of notes from
Reid's moral philosophy lectures, 1779-1780, has long been known to Reid scholars,
as George Husband Baird (1761-1840), who went on to become principal of
Edinburgh University (1793-1840). I was able to make this positive identification by
comparing Baird's signature on the title page of Vol. 7 of his notes with his signatures
of 1782 and 1785 on the matriculation roll of Edinburgh University,1 with his
signatures of 18 April, 29 April and 6 December 1783 and 4 January 17852 and with
signatures on his letters to Charles Stewart of 24 January 1798 and 24 April 1804 and
to John Campbell of 8 March 1802.3
George Husband Baird seems to have had certain Moderate sympathies and it is
tempting to think that he acquired these while studying under Reid. Baird's notes
provide a very full picture of Reid's course and his notes from Reid's lectures on
forms of government (i.e. the first half of his lectures on politics) were an invaluable
aid to my understanding of the lecture notes in Reid's own hand, as the numerous
references toML MS. A104929 amply demonstrate. These politics notes have never
before been systematically transcribed, no doubt because of the disheartening
difficulty of interpreting Baird's all-but-illegible script.
2.
In the fall of 1991, while examining the papers of Reid's teaching assistant and hand-
picked successor, Archibald Arthur, I discovered an uncatalogued booklet containing
'Edinburgh University Archives MS. Da 35.
2EUL MSS. Da.2.15, 17.
3lnEUL MSS. La.111.353 and La.II.110.
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notes from Reid's lectures on jurisprudence, 1765. This hitherto unknown set of
notes, which appears to have been written by Arthur, provides a unique glimpse into
Reid's views at an early stage of his encounter with Adam Smith.
3.
In the summer of 19921 discovered a hitherto unknown set of student notes from
Reid's moral philosophy lectures, 1768-1769. This set of notes, in the hand of John
Monteath (71753-1843), is the only one that contains notes relating to Reid's lectures
on police, i.e. the second half of his lectures on politics. Monteath's notes are
especially useful for the numerous texts and authors cited. Monteath matriculated at
Glasgow in 1765.
4.
The student notes provide historical snapshots of Reid's course and help not only to
confirm the order of Reid's text but also to date certain additions and corrections
which Reid made to his own notes. Moreover, Baird's notes from the 1779-1780
session confirm the pertinence of MS. 4/1II/20 (on the government of Venice) to the
lectures on politics.4 They also furnish one with evidence of Reid's lecturing style.
Dugald Stewart, who by his own account attended Reid's lectures for a "considerable
part of the winter of 1772," reported that
In his elocution and mode of instruction, there was nothing peculiarly
attractive. He seldom, if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of
extempore discourse; nor was his manner of reading calculated to
increase the effect of what he had committed to writing. Such,
however, was the simplicity and perspicuity of his style, such the
gravity and authority of his character, and such the general interest of
his young hearers in the doctrines which he taught, that, by the
numerous audiences to which his instructions were addressed, he was
heard uniformly with the most silent and respectful attention.5
In this Reid differed from both Smith and John Millar, who were far more
extemporary in their delivery. According to Francis Jeffrey, Millar "wrote his
lectures, or had the heads of them, at least, in his book; but he seldom looked at it, and
4See Baird's Notes from Reid's Moral Philosophy Lectures, 1779-1780, ML MS. A104929, vol. 8,
fo. 10r., where the book of w hich Reid made an abstract in MS. 4/I1I/20 is referred to.
5Stewart, "Account," in Works, pp. lOb-lla.
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in fact he spoke them all."6 Millar, who was himself a pupil of Smith's, described
Smith's own lecturing style in the following terms:
In delivering his lectures, he trusted almost entirely to extemporary
elocution. His manner, though not graceful, was plain and unaffected;
and, as he seemed to be always interested in the subject, he never failed
to interest his hearers. Each discourse consisted commonly of several
distinct propositions, which he successively endeavoured to prove and
illustrate. These propositions, when announced in general terms, had,
from their extent, not unfrequently something of the air of a paradox.
In his attempts to explain them, he often appeared, at first, not to be
sufficiently possessed of the subject, and spoke with some hesitation.
As he advanced, however, the matter seemed to crowcfi upon him, his
manner became warm and animated, and his expression easy and
fluent. In points susceptible of controversy, you could easily discern,
that he secretly conceived an opposition to his opinions, and that he
was led upon this account to support them with greater energy and
vehemence. By the fulness and variety of his illustrations, the subject
gradually swelled in his hands, and acquired a dimension which,
without a tedious repetition of the same views, was calculated to seize
the attention of his audience, and to afford them pleasure, as well as
instruction, in following the same object, through all the diversity of
shades and aspects in which it was presented, and afterwards in tracing
it backwards to that original proposition or general truth from which
this beautiful train of speculation had proceeded.7
The point-form style that occasionally arises in Reid's notes would indicate, however,
that Reid sometimes did extemporize. As George Jardine noted on a bundle wrapper,
while some parts ofReid's lecture notes on the culture of the mind were "carefully
composed and fairly written", other parts were but "large Notes and Hints which were
inlarged and illustrated in the Delivery." An annotation which Jardine made on the
wrapper of the bundle in which he placed the folder marked "Politicks" (which
contained Reid's lecture notes on that subject) indicates that Reid's lecture notes on
politics were of this type.8
Baird's notes in particular provide some support for Jardine's description in so far as
they frequently contain substantial passages which have no precedent in Reid,
interlarded with passages which nearly duplicate surviving lecture-note material in
Reid's own hand.
6Evidence, Oral and Documentary, Taken and Received by the Commissioners ...for Visiting the
Universities ofScotland, vol. 1, University ofEdinburgh (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.
1837), p. 399.
'Millar, quoted in Dugald Stewart, "Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith," in Stewart,
The Collected Works ofDugald Stewart, ed. William Hamilton, vol. 10, BiographicalMemoirs
(Edinburgh: Thomas Constable and Co., 1858), p. 13.
8See label on parcel in AUL MS. Box 2131.7.
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Ideally, it would be extremely useful if it could be conclusively demonstrated that the
surviving student notes were, in intention at least, verbatim transcripts of what Reid
actually said in the classroom. Unfortunately, this cannot be demonstrated, even
though there is an almost verbatim correspondence between many passages in the
student notes and Reid's own MSS.9 While contemporary reports do not have the
same authority as material in Reid's own hand, they do point out certain lacunae in
Reid's own notes and are the only available reports of what Reid said in the classroom
on those points. In my thesis I used these materials extensively, for I believe that
there is a legitimate place for them in Reid scholarship where they are used
responsibly, i.e. where it is clearly indicated that they have been used and where the
appropriate disclaimers are understood.
9As an aid to interpretation 1 prepared a paste-up of Reid's^Baird's and Jack's notes in a sidc-by-side




• With one exception,1 the main body of the text in the following transcription
represents what I take to be the final version of Reid's lecture notes.
• Headings which are not prefixed by a letter or number are Reid's, with the
exception of the main title and the shoulder headings in MS. 4/III/9.
• Spelling, capitalization, punctuation and paragraphing all follow Reid.
• Material deleted by Reid through successive versions, as well as a record of
insertions and corrections, is given in the footnotes according to the following
formula: Reid's final intention] the text as it appears on the MS page.
• Material deleted by Reid is enclosed in square brackets.
• Inadvertent repetitions of words by Reid (resulting from his own process of
correction) are omitted from the main body of the text but indicated in the
footnotes.
• Interlineations are given in [half square brackets].
• Carets, if any, are inserted before the material inserted in half square brackets;
where Reid does not use a caret to indicate placement of an interlineation and
where the placement of this material is conjectural a note has been inserted to
indicate the element of conjecture involved in that placement. Where Reid has
added a letter to the middle of a word either with or without a caret to show its
placement the insertion is made silently.
• In cases where Reid has crossed out a word and written a different word above it,
I have in the footnotes given the deleted word in square brackets followed by the
new word in half square brackets.2
• Where Reid has corrected a word either by writing on top of his mistake so as to
obscure the mistake (whether he crossed it our first or not) the mistake is silently
passed over.
• Where Reid has drawn a line surmounted by a number over phrases he wished to
rearrange I have silently rendered his text in the new order.
• Catchwords have been silently omitted.
• Conjectural readings with a high degree of plausibility and the occasional word
added by me for sense are inserted in (angle brackets).
• Editorial remarks whether in the main body of the text or in the footnotes are
italicized in order to distinguish them from Reid's words.
• The long s is rendered as s.
' The exception comes right at the beginning, where I reproduce in the main body of the text both the
1764-1765 and the 1765-1766 versions of Reid's introductory lecture on the principles of politics.
My reason for so doing relates to the fact that the latter version only partly supersedes the former. As
splicing the versions together would be somewhat arbitrary, I have elected to print the two versions
seriatim, which has the virtue of dramatically illustrating Reid's change of approach to politics in his
second and subsequent years of teaching at Glasgow College.
2I have not recorded the one case in which Reid crossed out an incorrect prefix of a word and inscribed
the right prefix above it.
Appendix 4
Thomas Reid's Lectures on Politics
[4/111/1, 2r]
Heads of Lectures on Politicks
1 The Principles of Politicks in General Division.
2 The Constitution of a Despotick Government
3 The natural Consequences of Despotick Government with Reflexions
4 The Gothic Aristocracy Poland the Ancient Aristocracy Venice
5 Haringtons Oceana. Agrarian Rotation Suffrage. Parish Hundred & Tribe
Elections.
6 Senate & popular Assembly.
7 Musters of the Youth. Education. Consensual Power. Titles of honour
8 Provincial Governments. Reflexions upon this Model of Government.
9 Other Commonwealths Ideal or Real
10 Pure Monarchy.





4 Of National Riches wherein they Consist how2 at first produced & acquired &
kept
5 OfCommerce Natural Artificial the different periods of the Last
6 OfMoney. As a Commodity & a Medium of Commerce Weighed or Coined.
7 Of false Maxims with regard to Money
8 Of Interest ofMoney, & Exchange with forreign Nations. Ballance of Trade
9 Of Banks & Paper Credit. Of Luxury
10 Of Premiums, imposts, Prohibitions. Free Ports as they Affect Traffick
11 OfNavigation & Colonies as they Affect Trade




13 Arms Naval, &3 Land Forces. Hired Troops, Standing Armies Militia Forts
14 Revenue. Crown Lands. Customs, Excise, Land Tax. Taxes on the Necessaries
of Life on Luxury. Poll Taxes Census. Lotteries National Debt.
A. The Principles of Politics
1. INTRODUCTORY LECTURE
[ lr] Political is the Art ofModelling4 & Governing5 Societys ofMen6 so as to answer
the End proposed by them
The Principles of Political Reasoning7 must be the Active Principles8 (of)
Human Nature9 the Principles according to which the Governed commonly Act not
these according to which they ought to Act. How the Politician differs from the Man
of Address & Sagacity. & from the Cunning Man10 The General Principles of Action
Among Men are Such as these
1 Men will generally be just honest & true where they have no Temptation to be
otherwise
2 Men have always a Strong Resentment of Injuries and will resist them where it is
in their Power & have commonly some Gratitude for good Offices.
3 Tho a cool Desire of Happiness & a Regard to duty have some Influense on the
Actions of All men yet it does not appear that either of these are the Prevailing
Principles in Most Men
4 It may be therefore expected of the Generality ofMen that they will do things
contrary either to their real Interest or their Duty when they have Strong
temptations, either knowingly or by imposing upon themsel(ve)s
5 Few Men will do the most Atrocious Acts ofWickedness even upon a Strong
Temptation till they have been long hardned by Vicious habits
5Naval, &) Naval, a [&].
4Modelling] [Forming] [Modelling].
5Governing] Governing [Political].
6Societys of Men] Societys a [of Men].
7Political Reasoning] Political [Reasoning].
8be the Active Principles] be [drawn from] [the Active Principles].
9Nature] Nature [& be],
19Ac(. How ... Cunning Man] Act. [How ... Cunning Man]. Interlinearmaterial whose
placement is conjectural.
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6 Men always esteem Virtue Wisdom & Power in others where they are not
objects of Envy11 and desire to be possessed of them or to be thought to be
possessed of them themselves
7 Mens private Affections are commonly Stronger then thier publick ones
8. Mens Characters are formedmostly by Education Custom & Example
9. In a Great Number of Men taken without Distinction there will always be found
a few that are far Superior to the Rest in Wisdom or Virtue Power.12 or all these
10. People will not long receive Laws from Governors unless they have an opinion
that the Governors have superior Power Superior Wisdom & Virtue or Right to
Govern
11 Like Effects may be expected from like Causes, and similar Conduct from
persons of like Characters in like Circumstances.
12 In all great Bodies ofMen who either meet together or can easily communicate
their Sentiments to each other, the MANY will be led by a few, of Superior
Parts, Superior Eloquence or Superior Character, & will imbibe their Sentiments
Passions and Opinions.




|5r] Politicks like most other Branches13 ofKnowledge that relate to Practice may be
considered either as an Art or as a Science. If we consider it as an Art it may be
defined to be The Art ofModeling & governing a State so as to answer the End
intended by it. The bussiness of the politician is either to frame a Model of
Government for a larger or lesser political Society. Or to preserve repair alter or amend
a Government already formed. To discover the latent seeds of those diseases, which if
not cured in time are destructive of the political Union, & bring it to dissolution at last,
& to be able to find out and apply the proper Remedies14 [ lr] It is very obvious that
1 'others ... Envy] others a [where ... Envy].
12Virtue Power.] Virtue a [Power] or [Both].
1 ^Branches] Branches [that].
14Politicks ... Remedies] Politicks ... Remedies [lr] [Politicks like most branches of
Knowledge that relate to practice may be conceived either as an Art or as a Science If we
consider it as an Art it may be defined to be The Art of Modelling and Governing a State so as
to answer the Ends proposed by it. And this Art I conceive may be reduced to these two
Problems First A Constitution or Form of Government being given, to shew what are the
natural Effects and Consequences of that Constitution, Whether for Instance it will be lasting
or of short Duration, whether powerfull against forreign Enemies or weak and easily Subdued,
whether it will be internally quiet and peaceable, or turbulent and seditious, whether the
Subjects will be oppressed, or enjoy the common Rights [which] & Liberties of Men.
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the end of Government ought to be the good and happiness of the Governed: And
therefore every Model or Form ofGovernment, if we judge of it by the moral Standard
is to be more or less approved according as it tends more or less to promote15 this end.
In this view the Destruction of a bad form of Government may be a mean to the
Production of a better16 But there may be other ends of Government proposed, and as
an expert Physician ought to understand the nature and Effects of Poisons as well as
Medicines; so an able Politician ought to understand the nature & Effects of all kinds
of Government the bad as well as the good.
[5r] Many Ancient and Modern17 Authors have confounded Politicks with
Morals, which ought carefully to be avoided. Machiavel & Harrington free from this
Fault.18 There is a Branch of Jurisprudence which is very properly called political
Jurisprudence. The Object of this Branch. The Rights & moral Obligations that arise
from the political Union.
The same Question may be considered either in a political or in a Moral Light
Instance Tolleration of those who are not of the established Religion.19
[ 1 r J Politicks considered as a Science is the Knowledge of those principles by
which we may Judge of the Constitution and Effects of20 Government Knowledge in
Politicks enables us to Judge whether such a particular form of Government is
properly fitted and adapted to promote the happiness & preserve the Rights of the
Subjects: Or whether on the contrary from the nature and constitution of the
Government the subjects will frequently21 be oppressed, injured, and tyrannically
used?Whether the Political Body will be quiet & peceable or on the contrary
tumultuous and Seditious. Whether it will be Strong to defend itself against forreign
Ennemies, or feeble & easily subdued in War.
Political Bodies as well as Natural Bodies ofMen and Animals are liable both to
internal Disorders and Diseases and to external hurts & injuries It is by political
Knowledge that the Governours of States are enabled often to foresee those disorders
that are incident to the political Body and to prevent them, or to discover their causes
The second Problem is, Having given the end for which a Constitution is intended, to
shew that Constitution & model which will most effectually promote and Secure this end.].
Text has been replaced because Reid wrote Substitute A in left-hand margin next to this
passage, marking it offwith a line.
15to promote] to a [promote].
16end. In ... better] end. [In ... bad a [form of] Government... better],
17Manv Ancient and Modern] Many a [Ancient and Modem].
18avoided. Machiavel ... Fault.] avoided, a [Machiavel ... Fault.].
19Many ... Religion. Placement indicated by Reid's insertion add B after good.
20Effects of] Effects of [Effects] Of.
2'will frequently] will a [frequently].
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when they happen; & to22 apply proper remedies Politicks has a like Relation to States
& to Government as the Science ofMedicine has to the human Body, and the
Politician is the State Physician. He knows wharein the Sound & healthfull
Constitution of the State consists. When any disorder appears in it he can judge by the
Symptoms what is the cause of that disorder and he knows what are the Remedies and
can prescribe for23 them with great probability of Success
The Analogy between Prudence in an individual and Political Knowledge in the
Government of a State Prudence consists chiefly in chusing proper Means to
accomplish the Ends we have in View. So does Political Knowl The ends of a Private
Man concern him self chiefly & his family & Friends. The ends of a Politician concern
the State. Prudence distinguished from Craft in the Politician as in the Private Man.
Prudence in the one as in the other grounded chiefly upon the knowledge of
Mankind24
Objection. No Government framed or changed by Art
Every Science must be grounded on certain25 principles & if Politicks can be at
all reduced to a Science, as I doubt not but it may, there must be certain first Principles
from which all our Reasonings in Politicks are deduced [ 1 v] as there are certain first
Principles or Axioms in Mathematicks upon which all our Reasonings in Mathematicks
are built, and as there are in Morals certain first Principles, as we have had occasion to
shew, upon which our Reasoning in the Science ofMorals are built.
It is easy to shew that the first Principles of Politicks, upon which all Political
Reasoning is grounded, must be taken from the Knowledge of26 Mankind. By the
Knowledge of Mankind I mean not the Knowledge of the piculiar temper and talent(s)
of individuals but the Knowledge of the temper and Disposition, the Principles of
Action and general tenor of Conduct that is common to the whole Species.
Every Political Body may be conceived as a vast Machine made up of a great
Number of Parts. The Motions of the Whole are made up of the Motions of the
several Parts, and the motion of each Part must depend upon the powers that operate
upon27 that part and put it in motion. So that it is impossible to know scientifically28
22& to] & [to].
23prescribe for] prescribe a [for].
24The ... Mankind. Materialmarked X written vertically in left-hand margin from bottom to
top ofpage whose placement is indicated by Reid's X after Success. Deletedmaterial The
Nature of a Political Body compared with the Natural marked C from fol. 5r whose placement
here was indicated by Reid's C in left-handmargin.
25on certain] on [first] a [certain],
2^Knowledge of] Knowledge a [of].
27that operate upon] that [move] a [operate upon],
28know scientifically) know a [scientifically].
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the Effects that will be produced by the whole Machine without knowing the parts of
which it is compounded and the powers that actuate these parts, for the Effect of the
whole is an aggregate or composition of the Effects of the several Parts. The parts of
which a Commonwealth or State is made up are Men. Each of whom has his particular
Principles ofActivity in himself,29 his fears, his hopes his desires, his passions, his
Reason, his Conscience. These principles in every individual influence him to a
certain course ofAction or operation. And the Operation of the Several Individuals
makes up the Operation of the Whole Political Body. We cannot therefore know how
Political Bodies will act, what Effects they will produce in given Circumstances, but
by knowing how individuals of Mankind act in the various Circumstances in which
they may be placed. But if on the other hand we know how30 human Creatures will
Act when placed in the Circumstances in which the members of such a Political
Society are placed; then we may know; the Effects with regard to the whole Body
which will result from the United Operation of the Several Parts. Hence it is evident
that31 the first Principles of Political Reasoning must in general be of this Kind, to wit,
That such is the Nature ofMankind that Men placed in such Circumstances will
generally act in such a Manner. If any32 Principles of this kind can be ascertained
from our Knowledge of human Nature, or from Experiense; Such Principles must be
the foundation of all Political Reasoning. And the Conclusions that may justly be
drawn from such Principles will make up the Science of Politicks. If on the other
hand no Such principles can be discovered then there is no Such Science as Politicks.
Here a general Objection against all Political Knowledge may occur which we
shall consider before we proceed farther.
It may be said that human Actions are free and do not necessarly follow upon
motives. We cannot therefore33 fortell how a man will act in any particular Situation
even although we know34 all the principles and motives which influense him becaus
he may yield to the force of those motives or he may resist them and act contrary to
them. And if we cannot know how any one man will act in a particular case how shall
we know how a great many will act since the many are made up [2r] of individuals. If
men always acted according to the Strongest motive there is some foundation for
human foresight of their Actions from the knowledge of their Situation and the
Principles of their Nature. But if there is no Necessary connexion between Actions
29himself,] himself, [by these he isj.
30know how] know how how.
3 Evident that] evident that that that.
32any] any [such].
33therefore] therefore [ifwe].
34although we know ] although [we know].
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and the Motives of the Agent there is no foundation left for any human knowledge of
the Actions of free Agents, how they will behave in given Situations consequently no
foundation for any political Knowledge.
In answer to this objection I shall endeavour to prove these two things 1 That
although the Objection seems onely to affect those who hold the Liberty of human
Actions yet it will be found equally strong against those who hold them to be
necessary 2 That even35 on the supposition of Liberty, this objection has no force
against the reality of political Knowledge.
1 This Objection if it had any force would leave no foundation for Political
Knowledge to those who hold human Actions to be necessary any more than to those
who hold them free. Because it must be acknowledged by those who hold the
necessity of human Actions that the motives or Causes36 from which those actions
necessarly37 follow cannot be known to a Spectator, nay that they cannot be known to
the Agent himself. It is evident from experience that the same Motives have not
always the same Operation upon the same Man, and that different Men in like
Circumstances as far as can be perceived act differently. A Fatalist will say that in
these cases there were some causes unknown to us which produced this variety. Now
the uncertainty of the Event to us will be the same when38 it proceeds from causes or
motives39 that are unknown as when the motives do not necessarly produce the
Action. Upon the Supposition of Necessity the Action necessarly depends upon the
Strongest motive, but there are motives so hidden & obscure that we cannot perceive
them nor have we any Standard by which we may judge of their Strength. For it must
be acknowledged by those who hold the necessity of human Actions. That40 in human
Actions sometimes passion prevails over our Reason sometimes Reason prevails over
passion. Sometimes the desire of fame prevails over the desire of riches or of pleasure
and sometimes yields to them. A present good is sometimes preferred to a future and
sometimes a future to a present nor can there be any certain rule asscertained by which
we can judge when the one or when the other will be most prevalent. Now our
Ignorance of the event will be the very same whether it proceed from ignorance of the
causes of that Event or from, the want of a necessary connexion between those causes
and the event which is supposed to be their Effect. From hence I think it appears
evident that a Fatalist supposing his System to be true, has no better means of
35Thateven] That [in reality] a [even] [against].
36motives or Causes] motives a [or Causes].
37actions necessarly] actions a [necessarly].
38same when] same [whether] [when].
39causes or motives] causes a [or motives].
4CThat] That (men).
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establishing any Principles of Politiks than the Assertor of the Liberty of human
Actions. If the fatalist affirms that certain Rules41 may be pointed out according to
which men generally Act, although sometimes from unknown Causes they may
deviate from those Rules. This may be affirmed no less on the Supposition of our
being free. And whether those deviations from the common Rules of Conduct be the
Effect of Necessary but unknown Causes or whether they be the Effect of Caprice in
men who act freely, they are equally unaccountable, And all that can be inferred from
them is That Politicks is founded chiefly on Probability and not on Demonstration.
This is undoubtedly true
[2v] 2 There is indeed no force in the objection that has been moved to prove
that we may not know how men will commonly act in certain given circumstances
notwithstanding the liberty of human Action. A wise man will act wisely though it be
ever so much in his power to act otherwise. And a good man will act a good part
although it be in his power to act a bad one. The Supreme being being perfectly wise
and good always invariably acts according to perfect wisdom and goodness although
he acts with perfect freedom. And in proportion as men are wise and good they will act
wisely and well Human wisdom and goodness are both imperfect and therefore we
cannot reckon upon it that they will always act the wisest and the best part. But there is
some degree of Wisdom some degree of virtue even in Men. One that has no degree
of wisdom or prudence42 is an Idiot or Changeling. Some Such there are of the
human Species but a political Society could not be formed of Such. Men must be
supposed to have43 common understanding in order to form a Common wealth. Now
there are many things with regard to the conduct ofmen of common Understanding
which we may rely upon with great Security notwithstanding their being free Agents.
Thus we may rely upon it that a man of common Understanding will take some Care
of himself, both to avoid what is hurtfull and to procure what is agreable and usefull,
that he will44 take some Care of his Children and have some Natural Affection to his
Family Friends and Acquaintance We may reckon upon it, that he will have45 some
sense of good offices done him, and some resentment of Injuries. That in proportion
to his Strength and Courage he will defend himself & his Rights, and repell Injuries.
The common principles of human Nature lead every Man good and bad to act such a
part, in the common occurrences of Life. And a Man in whom these principles of
Conduct did not exert their Force must be as great a prodigy as a Man born without
4'certain Rules] certain [principles] [Rules].
42prudcnce] prudence (orWisdom],
43Such. Men ... have] Such. [It can onely be formed of] Men [that] [must ... have] have.
4_K\ ill] will [have].
4:,have] have [a sense].
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hands or feet, which indeed has sometimes happned but is an Event so rare that46 in
the course of human affairs we never think it deserves attention.
But farther it ought to be observed that we may form much more certain
conclusions with regard to the conduct of a body ofMen united in political Society
than with respect to the conduct of an individual. For although the Many are made up
of individuals, yet it is easier, in many cases to guess at the behaviour of the Many
than at that of the individuals which compose it The jarring Passions Interests and
Views of individuals when mingled together make a Compound whose Nature is more
fixed and determined than that of the Ingredients of which it is made up. Wisdom and
Folly, Reason and Passion Virtue and Vice blended together make a pretty Uniform
Charactes in great Bodies of Men in all Ages and Nations; where there is not an
uncommon Degree of general Corruption on the one hand or of Virtue on the Other. It
is from this Uniformity of Character in a Multitude ofMen notwithstanding of the
Diversity of the Individuals of which it is composed, that all General Principles in
Politicks are derived
2 Obj. The good or Bad Effects of Government depend entirely upon the
Administration & not upon the form of the Government. See D. Humes Essay. 3
Whether Politicks may be reduced to a Science The best Monarchy Hereditary. The
best Aristocracy a Nobility without Vassals The best Democracy a people voting by
their Representatives. Despotick Governments easily held when Conquered.
[5r] Ax 1. To denominate a Man truly Virtuous it is necessary not onely that he
should have the47 Principles of Virtue in his Constitution, which all men have in some
degree, but that these, in the general Course of his Life, should be superior to the
temptations to which he is exposed, so that his conduct be48 in the main49 agreable to
his Duty. This degree of Virtue is not supposed in the Axiom laid down. But it may
will be supposed that the generality of men-"10 will not do bad things without any
temptation. This must be true of every man at least that is not corrupted in his
principles and morals to the highest degree so as to have totally-"11 lost all sense52 of
duty and even all regard to character, which it is to be hoped is the case of very few if
any at all of mankind. And indeed if we should suppose that the generality ofMen of
any Nation were so abandoned as to have no degree of regard to Justice Honesty and
46that] that [there].
47nccessary ... the] necessary a [not onely] that he [should have the],
48conduct be] conduct a [be].
49main] main [(is)].
50generality of men] generality a [of men],
51have totally] have a [totally],
52sense] sense [both].
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truth, I think it is not possible that53 they could be kept together under any kind of54
Government but that of absolute Slavery. They behoved to be chained as wild beasts
and have the dread of punishment constantly hanging over their heads to keep them
from doeng mischief.
Ifmen were perfectly virtuous & proof against all temptations there would be no
Need ofCivil Government. Men would do their duty without being compelled by
Laws and punishments. It is therefore very true which a sacred writer observes that
the Law is not made for the just but for the unjust. What is here said of Law which is
a part of political Government may be applyed to the whole of it.
|5v] The bulk ofMen are neither so good as they ought to be nor so bad as they
might be. Natural Affection, Gratitude, Compassion & other good Affections have55
commonly a considerable degree of force even in the vicious. As Regard to Character
& dread of the Contempt and Indignation of Mankind are powerfull restraints-"'6 even
upon bad Men,57 Common Prudence & the desire of self preservation oblige them to
abstain from open Violations of the rights of58 others. When individuals are found,
who break through all these Restraints; the terror of legal Punishment and publick
Disgrace, are a very properAdminicle, to those Restraints that Nature hath provided
against criminal Conduct. And when all these restraints lose their force a man is no
longer fit for Society, he is justly cut off as a rotten member59 by capital Punishment
for the terror of others. There is therefore a certain degree of profligacy that makes a
Man fit onely for a prison,60 for the stocks or the Gibett.61 And if we should suppose
all Men of this Character they would not be materials fit for Political Society.
In some States of Society62 the generality ofmen may live very innocently with
a small degree of Virtue. This is the case of rude Nations. Small Property In others
states there will be both greater exertions of Virtue in some individuals63 and greater
corruption in other. Difference of Ranks great Trust Refinements of high living.
Ax 2 Personal Injuries have often occasioned Revolutions in States One of the




56powerfull restraints] powerful! a [restraints],
57Men,] Men, [And even],
58of ... of] of a [the rights of].
59off ... member] off a [as ... member].
60prison,] prison, [or].
6,the ... Gibett.] the a [stocks ... Gibett] [Gallows],
62Society] Society [men].
63some individuals] some [individuals].
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among men in the laws and Judicatures and thereby greatly weakens the fury of
Resentment and Revenge
Ax 3. It is good that Men be instructed in their Duty & Interest but this is not
enough.
Ax 4 The more a people are corrupted in their Morals the less they are capable of
freedom. That degree of Liberty which men will abuse to their own hurt and that of
others ought to be taken from them. Good Men ought to have Liberty They are
entitled to it and will make a good Use of it. But in proportion as Men are disposed to
make a bad use of their Liberty it is for their own good & necessary for the safety of
others that it should be taken from them.
[6v] Ax 9. When we consider the Nature of Political Government, there is
something in64 it that may seem at first view strange and difficult to be accounted for.
In all Governments a few govern the Many the greater part are led & there is perhaps
not above one hundred part of the whole that can be said to direct and govern in
matters that concern the whole Body, the Multitude are swayed by the Judgement of a
few,
[3r] Commerce has of Late been made a Subject of Philosophical Disquisition;
and as it must be acknowledged to be both a curious and interesting65 Subject, it has
been pursued by many able66 Writers with much ingenuity, and with considerable
Success. It has been made abundantly evident that very gross mistakes in the Political
Eoconomy of States have been committed and are still committed through Ignorance of
the Principles of Commerce. Future ages must reap benefit from every discovery of
this kind, and may on the other hand be greatly hurt by false Notions upon this
Subject.
3. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS - CONTINUATION
[4/III/2, lr]
Having pointed out some of67 the axioms or first Principles upon which reasoning in
Politicks must be grounded, you will see by the Specimen I have given, for I do not
pretend to a full enumeration, of what kind these axioms are. They are the rules
according to which men generally Act. The Actions ofMen are the Subject of all
Political Reasoning. The design of it is to shew how great bodies of Men will act in
the various Situations in which they are placed & how they may be placed in such
64in] in [the Nature ofj.
65and interesting] and [important] [interesting],
66many able] many [ingenious] [able],
67out some of] out a [some of].
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Situations as to lead them or the greater part of them to act the part which it is intended
they should act. We must therefore in this Science suppose Men endowed with that
degree of Understanding which we actually perceive in the generality ofMen That are
come to maturity. Children that are underAge are not capable of political
Government. They are under the restraint68 and discipline of parents until they come to
be of Age to act for themselves. And as there are some few69 of the human race that
are born ideots and never acquire the Understanding of a Man, or to be capable of
directing their own Conduct, they must likewise be entrusted to the care of others,
who may guard them from doing hurt to themselves or others. And they do not
properly make a part of the political Body, There can be no70 reasoning with regard to
their Actions, nor do political Events depend upon them. Thus we see that when we
reason in Politicks about the Actions ofMen, we do not include Children or Idiots in
the Number on account of their defect of Understanding.
It is farther to be observed that political Reasonings, suppose not onley a certain
degree of Understanding in Man but likewise a certain degree of Morals. Mankind
with regard to their Morals may be comprehended under three Classes
1 There are some individuals of Mankind so very profligate and abandoned as to
break through all the resraints which either their own interest or that of their families
and friends or a regard to reputation lay upon them. There can be no Reasoning about
the actions of such profligates, nor any dependance upon them that71 they will act by
the Rules of common prudence & decency. It is to be hoped that those of this character
are so few in comparison, that they may be altogether [ 1 v] overlooked in political
Reasoning. A political Society could not be formed of such Men. It would have no
cement or principle ofUnion & therefore would immediately fall to pieces and
dissolve. When such Characters appear in Society they must either be confined as
wild beasts for the common Safety, or they must be delivered over to publick Justice
for the terror of other & cut off from the political Body as rotten members. The
maxims of Politicks therefore do not extend to these
2, On the other hand it is to be hoped that in all great bodies of Men there are to
be found some Persons of such perfect Virtue and Integrity that they have no need of
the restraints of human laws and government. They discharge their Duty to the publick
& to individuals from principle and inclination and would injure no man even tho they
could do it with impunity.
68restraint] restraint [of pa].
69somc few] some [few].
70Body ... no] Bod) , [nor can] There [be any] [can be no].
7'them that] them a [that].
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If any Society of Men were so happy as to be made up of persons of this
Character, it might be without Laws and Government, or all kinds of Government
would be alike & have the same Effect. But the Number of Persons of such
incorruptible Virtue is so small in any great Body ofMen, that they also are
overlooked in political reasonings and the72 Common maxims of Politicks do not
apply to them.
3 There remains a third Class which comprehends the great bulk ofMankind
and of every Political Society. And it is to them onely that the Maxims of Politicks can
properly be applyed, because upon them and their Conduct all political Events must
depend.
They are neither so abandoned as the first class, nor so much to be trusted as the
second, they fill up all the interval between the two, and are such as we may
reasonably expect men to be, of whose characters we have no particular knowledge73
Political Prudence is grounded upon the very same Principles as the Prudence of
a private Man in his transactions with other Men. Real Prudence in the conduct of Life
requires that we should keep the proper mean between too much trust in those we deal
with and to much distrust. If we go into the first extream, we expose ourselves to
frequent danger& disappointment. Ifwe go into the other extream we shall frequently
lose the best opportunities of carrying on our bussiness The prudent Man takes the
just medium between these extreams, and by that means generally accomplishes his
Ends. The political Reasoner in like Manner must form his judgment of the conduct of
political Societies, neither upon the Supposition that they are more vicious & [2r|
profligate than men generaly are nor upon the Supposition that they are more virtuous
& upright. And you will easily perceive that the Axioms or Principles I have
mentioned are applicable to persons of such a middle Character which will always be
found to make up the74 great body of every political Society
Having thus pointed out the first principles from which we must Reason in
Politicks, I proceed to the first branch of that Science I proposed to handle, to wit the
various Forms of Political Government with their Causes & Effects.
It is usual in treating of this Subject to consider the Causes of political
Government in general
B. Forms of Political Government with Their Causes and Effects
[4/111/1, lv]
72the] the [M],




Definition of the 3 Simple Forms of political75 Government Despotism Pure
Aristocracy pure Democracy. All others Mixt
The Parts of Supreme Power Legislative Executive Judiciary. The imposing of
Taxes.
1. THE CONSTITUTION OF A DESPOTIC GOVERNMENT
1 Despotism Requires 1 That the Grand Seignior should be possessed of the Greatest
part (or)Whole of the Land as his property & that the Subjects should be his Tennants
atWill and hold it by military Service or Offices.76 2 That no Honours be Hereditary,
but depend on the will of the Prince 3 That the Grand Seignior be Heir to those who
hold offices in the Government77 3 That there be a Standing Army of Soldiers that
have no interest in the Country sufficient to keep the people in Awe 4 That there be no
Standing Laws or very few. 5 That the Provinces be governed by a Basha & his
Deputies who have both the civil & Military Power 6 That these be often Changed. 7
That the punishment of crimes against the State be Severe & Sudden without formal
trial 8 That the Apparent Sucessor to the Crown have no Access to corrupt the Army 9
The Reigning Family be believed to have a Divine Right. 10 That the Subjects be
trained by Education and Instruction of their Priests to absolute & unlimited
submission to the will of his Superiors as to the will of Heaven.
a. Maxims Relating to Despotism
Maxims Relating to Despotism
1 The Grand Seignior will commonly throw the whole care of the Government upon
one Person called the Grand Vizir & be entirely Swallowed up in the Pleasures of his
Seraglio. The Choise of the Vizir & other Officers of State78 will commonly depend
on the Women and Eunuchs. 2 The Grand Vizir must be Sacrifised when the Army is
out of Humor or he must Sacrifise the Grand Seignior. 3 The Government of
Families will be absolute as well as that of the State. 4 Commerce can never flourish
in such a State 5 Learning will commonly be discouragd 6 Patience Contentment
Resignation Contempt of Riches & a Contemplative Devotion Caution Secrecy79 &
fair Dealing will be the Characteristic Virtues of the People 7 Such a Government
75of political] of a [political],
76Will ... Offices.] Will a [and ... Offices].
773 ... Government. Material written vertically in left-handmargin from bottom to top of
page whose placement is conjectural.
78of ... State] of [whom] a [the ... State].
79Devotion Caution Secrecy] Devotion [Caution Secrecy].
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under a good and Vigilant & peaceable80 Prince may be happy but such a one will be
most likely to fall a Sacrifise to the Army. 8. A despotic Government in the Hands of
Warlic Princes is fit for making Conquests & very difficult to be conquered. But if
onse conquered easily submits to the Victor. 9 A good Turk ought to spend his
vacant hours either with his wives or in the Exercises of his Religion 10 As the
Grand Seignior derives his Authority in a Great Measure from the Religion of the
Country so that81 is the onely thing that sets any bounds to it. The power of the Clergy
is therefore a blessing in Such a Government. The Grand Seignior can not impose a
New Tax but this Occasions the Greater Oppression by his Bashaws Turkey the most




We have explained as briefly as we could the Nature of Dispotick Government; the
Principles, upon which alone it can stand firm; and the natural Consequences of it with
regard to the Commerce learning Morals82 and happiness of a Nation that is thus
governed.
From the Nature of this Government it is evident that the Reason of State in such
Governments is not the Good & happiness of the Governed but the gratification of the
Monarch he is so far exalted above his slaves that he considers them as created onely
to serve his ambition his lust & (one word illegible)83 his Caprice Thousands of his
slaves must be buried in mines digging for Rubies and Diamonds to adorn his Diadem
and his Throne.84 A vast Empire must be ransacked8:> for fine Women who are shut
up by hundreds in the Seraglio to serve his pleasures; great numbers of Eunuchs must
be made and trained up to guard the Women and to do all the offices of the Seraglio.
The Eunuchs & the Women are his onely Companions. And these are valued in
proportion to their Address in inventing new pleasures & amusements;86 His Mind
inerirvated by sloth sensuality and Luxury. He sees not his Subjects nor do they see
him least they should conceive him to be but a man.87 His repose must not be
disturbed by the groans and miseries of the wretched. Like the Gods of Epicurus he
80Vigilant & peaceable] Vigilant a [& peaceable],
8'that] that that.
82learning Morals] learning a [Morals],
83&] & a one word illegible.
84Thousands ... Throne. Material written vertically in left-hand margin from bottom to top of
page whose placement is indicated by Reid's reference mark.
86be ransacked] be [searched] [ransacked].
86amusements;] amusements; [which].
87him man.] him a [least ... man].
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lives far removed from human affairs and deigns not to concern himself about beings
so far below his Nature. He throws the Whole burthen of the Government upon his
grand Vizier and neither knows nor desires to know what is doing in his vast
dominion. If his subjects are oppressed and plundered and ravaged by cruel Bashas
their cries cannot reach the throne. If the Seraglio be safe and in peace he hears of what
happens beyond its precincts, if he hears of it at all, as we hear of a Revolution in
China or Japan.
But after all what is this Mighty Monarch who is thus to be pampered at the
expence of the labour and treasure and blood ofMillions of the human Race? Why, by
his birth he is a man of the same Nature with the meannest of his Slaves. By his
Education and manner of Life he is sunk below humanity. He is neither endowed with
that Knowledge that enlarges and elevates a human Mind, nor will those habits of
Prudence Selfcommand temperance fortitude Justice and goodness which constitute
real Worth and Merit. Yet with all this worthlessness & real Meanness he conceives
himself a God, or something of a [ lv] nature far superior to other Men. And every
thing that is said or done to him every thing about him conspires to fix this vain conceit
of his own Superiority
Such Must88 the Monarch in those Despotick Governments be for the most part.
This is the natural Consequence of his treining and manner of Life; and such we know
from History the greater part of Such Monarchs are and have been.
The depression of the Subjects in such a Government must bear proportion to
the Exaltation of the Soveraign. Those who on account of their poverty and meanness
are unknown to the people in power have the best chance to escape oppression. Every
man that is eminent in Riches in Authority or in Parts and in Knowledge becomes a
mark to the avarice or envy or jeaulosy of those who have him absolutely in their
power. This state to men who are trained up with89 a sense of Liberty would be
intollerable, they would rather in habit the wilds ofAmerica with the Hurons or
Eskimaux than be the slaves of the Great Mogul. But man is a very tractable Animal
and can be trained to bear the extremities ofwant poverty pain hunger cold and even
Slavery itself with patience and resignation. The ancients Greeks and Romans who
enjoyed a happy Climate and a moderate temperature ofAir thought it impossible for
human Creatures to subsist either in the torrid or in the frozed Zone, but Experience
has discovered their Error. A laplander or a Samoeid thinks his countrey the finest in
the World which an Italiian would conceive it the greatest Misery to be condemned to.
An Eskimaux can Regale upon a meal of raw fish orWhale blubber which a person
88Must] Must be.
89up with] up in a [with]
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used to the delicacies of cookery90 could not swallow if he should starve. The meanest
cottager in England who is an object of pity and Charity on account of his poverty,
lives in a more delicate manner and has more real Riches and Accommodations in his
house furniture apparel & table than a Canadian Prince at the head of his tribe. In like
manner a Chinese91 or a Subject of the Great Mogul, thinks himselfmore92 happy in
being the slave of93 a mighty Monarch, than the Subject of a free Government. Lord
Molesworth in his Account of Denmark observes very justly that Slavery like a sickly
constitution becomes in time habitual so as to be thought no burthen. It mortifies
ambition Emulation and other troublesome as well as active qualities which the sense
of Liberty produces. And the Slave banishing all thought of the future and reflexion
upon the past, sings in his chains like a bird confined to a Cage94 And makes the best
of the present Moment.
[2r] There is not a more mortifying view of human Nature than we are presented
with when we reflect that so great a part of the human Race have been for thousands of
years held in this dreadfull Slavery of Despotick Government. But it would be still
more Mortifying to conceive as the Ingenious Montesquieu does that those Climates
which Nature has favoured most by a variety of natural Productions for the use of the
human Species95 should by a kind of fatality be necessarly subjected to this kind of
Government.
This kind ofGovernment the most simple and inartificial therefore has prevailed
among the least enlightened Nations and must always keep those Nations in Ignorance
of the Rights of Mankind And the principles of policy. This Government cannot




Oligarchy and Aristocracy sometimes confounded96 by ancient writers Oligarchy is
considered as the corruption of Aristocracy as Despotism is by him accounted the
corruption of Monarchy, and Anarchy the Corruption of Democracy.
90cookery] cookery [would starve rather than S].
9'a Chinese] a [turk] [Chinese].
92himself more] himself a [more].
93of] of [such],
94chains ... Cage] chains a [like ... Cage].
95of ... Species] of a [the] human [Creatures] [Species],
96confounded] confounded sometimes.
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Aristocracy may either obtain in a Smal State like that ofVenice where the
Nobility can often Meet in counsil by living in one city or in a large State where the
Nobility have large land Estates live97 in their Castles, surrounded by their Vassals
and Dependants whom they can Arm in their own Defence; as in Poland. We may call
the first the Ancient Aristocraciy the last the Gothic Aristocracy.
Of the first the Venetian Government is the best Model. The Government
consists of an Assembly of the whole Nobility A Senate and annual Magistrates. The
Senate & Magistracy is chosen by the Assembly98
Account of the Constitution of Venice
Account of the Constitution of Polland
Cor 1 In the Gothic Aristocracy every Nobleman will be almost independant of
the Laws and must be possessed of the civil & military power in his own territory. The
King will be elective and have little or no Power. Every Nobleman will have a negative
in the Diet, the people will be slaves to the several Lords.
2 In the Ancient Aristocracy the Nobility will be in perfect Subjection to the
Laws, the Whole body will be closely United and the people will not be subject to any
particular Lord but to the Laws
[2v] 3 In such a State the Army ought to consist of forreigners hired The city
should be secured from the possibility of being attacked by them. The Nobility should
be allowed to marry the Daughters of the commons. And should from time to time
adopt commoners into their Body.
Democracy cannot Subsist but by delegating a part of their Power to Magistrates
and a Senate & to representees of the peoples.99 And therefore will coincide with that
Mixed kind ofGovernment called a Common Wealth. The Democracies of Athens
And Sparta & other Ancient Cities Require a certain equality of Rank among the
Citizens
Mixed forms ofGovernment of these 1 shall Mention three the Republican the
Pure Monarchy and the limited Monarchy Of the Republican form of Government the
Oceana seams to be the most perfect Model. Which I shall therefore describe. To these
mixed Forms add the Gothick. ofwhich a proper Specimen may be the English
Government about the Time of Hen 2 See Ld Littletons Hist, of Hen 2 vol 3d
Apr 23
[3r] The Essays of the Youth. 26 Order
"Estates live] Estates a [live].
98Senate ... Assembly] Senate [& Magistracy] ... [Popular] [Assembly].
"Senate ... peoples.] Senate [& ... peoples].
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3. THE REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT: HARRINGTON'S OCEANA
[4/III/7, lv]
Apr 19
a. The Principles of a Commonwealth
The Principles of a Commonwealth
1 An Agrarian which is the foundation or bottom100 upon which this Grand Machine
must be supported101
2 The Constituent parts of it102 consisting of a Senate proposing the
Representative of the people resolving and A Magistracy Executing.
3 The freedom of Voting and Rotation both which are secured by the Ballot.
1 Division of the Citizens into free men and103 Servants
2 Into Horse and Foot 100 £ pr An. a Horseman He that wasted his Patrimony
incapable of Office or Suffrage in the Commonwealth104
3 Into Elders and Youth. From 18 to 30 Youth, From 30 Elders
The Territory into Parishes Hundreds & Tribes
b. Elections
The Ballot of the Parish A Proposer chosen by lot
Every person proposed Balloted untill a fifth part be proposed & chosen by
ballot.105 The 1 & 2 Overseers the 3 Constable the 4 & 5 Church Wardens the whole
being a fift part of the Elders are deputies of the parish for a Year. The Deputies the
Militia of the Commonwealth
Election of Ministers to vacant parishes106
Apr 22
Such a District as contains about 100 Deputies makes a Hundred
Election of the Hundred, Jury Men Overseers of the Ballot,107 Justice of the
Peace, first Jury man Captain of the Hundred, Ensign those of the horse
100foundation or bottom] foundation [[wh]] or [Ground] [bottom],
101supported] supported [2 An Assembly in whom is the result or whole legislative [and part
of the] Judiciary power. Magistrates & A Senate Chosen by the people Accountable to them &
going out by a Rotation].
102The ... it] The [Superstructure] [Constituent ... it].
103and] and [Citizens].
104Foot ... Commonwealth] Foot [100 ... Commonwealth]. Interlinearmaterial whose
placement is conjectural.
105Balloted ... ballot] Balloted [untill ... ballot].
106Election ... parishes. Material written in left-handmargin whose placement is conjectural.
107Hundred ... Ballot] Hundred, [Jury ... Ballot], Interlinear material whose placement is
conjectural.
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Second Jury man, high Constable, Crowner of the foot
Ballot of the Hundred five Suits of Gold Balls Determined by lot which shall be
used. Seven Gold balls put into the (urn) and the seven proposers chosen by lot.
Three Competitors proposed for each office first one for each office by each of the
proposers then a second &c108 who must have a Majority of the proposers. The
person of the three who has most above half is chosen
Twenty Hundreds make a tribe
Deputies of the Tribe Mustered into Troops & Companies
Command of the Troops and companies allotted to the Captains and Ensigns by
lot.
Pavilions with the Urns for horse & foot
[4/I1I/6, 2r]
We have given an Account of the Parish Elections in the Commonwealth Of Oceana:
By ballot one fifth Part of the Elders of the Parish are chosen, who are called Deputies
& who have not served in that office the year before. The two first are the Overseers of
the Parish. They are Under Censors, & have the ordering of the Ballot at the next
years Election. The third Deputy is Constable of the Parish the 4 & 5 Church
Wardens. Officers already known in the Constitution ofEngland
We have likewise described the Manner of the Election of Ministers in this
Commonwealth, which is popular as in a Commonwealth it ought to be; And I
conceive it is the best form for a Popular Election of Ministers that has ever been
contrived Those who contend so earnestly for popular Elections of Ministers among
us are for allowing the people to chose upon having heard a Man preach two or three
times, which is altogether an insufficient trial for enabling the people to make a true
Judgment. Harrington gives them a Years Trial wherein they have access to observe
his abilities and diligence in every branch of his office & therefore may make a much
more Rational Choice. A Soldier will form a good Judgment of his Officer when he
has served a Campaign under him. But if he was desired109 to form his Judgment
onely by seing the behaviour of that officer at a Review, he would think you mocked
him, and if he was a sensible man would not pretend to judge upon so insufficient a
Trial. Two or three Sermons are as insufficient a trial of the Qualifications of a
Minister of a Parish as the figure an Officermakes at a Review is of hismilitary
Abilities.
We gave account likewise of the Elections in the Commonwealth of Oceana at
the Rendevous of the Hundred, where all the Deputies within that presinct meet
' -'^proposed ... &c] proposers ... office a [first ... &c],
109was desired] was a [desired].
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annually on a day prefixed, & chuse by ballot out of their Number 1 Justice. 1 Jury
man. 1 Captain. 1 Ensign, of the Horse & 1 Jury man one high Constable and one
Coroner of the foot. The Offices of Justices Jury men110 Constable & Coroner are
well known already in the English Government, & The Captain & Ensign are to serve
in their Offices in the Militia. These of the Horse. Jury men half horse half foot
The Parish Elections are annually upon the Monday next answering the last of
DecrThe Elections of the Hundred upon the Monday next ensuing the last of Jan> The
Elections of the Tribe come. Next to be explained which are partly of annual Officers
partly of triennial. First of the annual Officers of the Tribe. 1 Lord High Sheriff. 2
Lord Lieutenant. 3 Lord Custos Rotulorum Muster Master General. 4The Conductor
5 & 6 two Censors.
All the Deputies of the tribe in order to make this Election appear in Arms at the
Rendevous of the Tribe upon the Monday next ensuing the last of Feb. where they are
mustered into Troops of Horse and Companies of foot. By the L H Sh & Cust Rot.
from the Lists transmitted to them by the high Constables of the Several Hundreds.
The Captains of the 1, 2, 3d, Troops & of the 1, 2, 3, &c Companies fixed by drawing
gold balls for the horse & Silver for the foot out of an Urn111
[4/III/7, lr]
Magistrates of the tribe chosen in the first days Election L. H. Sheriff. 2 L Lieutenant
3 L. Custos Rotulorum Must. Mast 4 Conductor being Quarter Master General. 5 & 6
Two Censors
Two lots for the suit of the balls one for the side Urns, Another for the Middle
Urn. 24 Electors Chosen by Lot.
In the side Urns 60 Gold Balls divided in proportion to the Number of horse and
foot with as many blanks as make up the whole number of horse and foot respectively.
Those who draw gold balls at the Side Urns to proceed to the Middle Urn where there
are 24 Gold & 36 Silver balls. Those who draw the first six Gold balls are the first
Order of Electors & so on. Four orders in all
The Order of the files Outward Inward Middle, in advancing to the Ballot
determined by lot
Four Competitors for each Office to be named by the four Orders of Electors,
and he that has most above half is chosen
The Functions of the Magistrates of the Tribes
' '^Justices Jury men] Justices a [Jury men],
1' 'We have given ... Urn. Material whose placement is dictated by context.
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These together with the 20 Justices & 40 Jury men are the Phylarch or Prerogative
troop of the Tribe whose offices are 1 They are the Council of the Tribe, 2 Receive
the Itinerant Judges 3 To hold112 the Quarter Sessions. 4 All Commissions ishued
into the Tribe by the Parliament113 or Chancery are directed to the Phylarch or some of
that troop & executed by them 5 In Levys ofMoney the Parliament Taxes the Tribes,
They the Hundreds and they the parishes, who shall levy it upon themselves. Ten
children alive114 no taxes. Five half taxes. 25 Years & not married or three years and
no children double taxes
No Debate in any popular Assembly. The pillar of Nilus
2dDay's Election in the Tribe 2 Knights 3 Deputies out of the horse & 4
Deputies out of the foot. No Man to be thus chosen who has not been married
Agrarian Law.
c. The Senate and the Popular Assembly
Apr 23
Constitution of the Senate
Six Magistrates annually Chosen viz Strateg(u)s Orator, two Censors a third
Commissioner of the Seal & a third Commissioner of the Tresaury
Four Councils StateWar Religion Trade. Dictator Election of Ambassadors in
Ordinary115 Emergent Electors by Scrutiny116
Constitution of the Prerogative Tribe or Popular Assembly
Triennial Magistrates one Captain & one Cornet of the third Region of the Horse &
One Captain & one Ensign of the foot.
Annual Officers two Tribune of the horse & two of the foot
Provincial Knights and Deputies
d. Reflections on Harrington's Oceana
[4/III/6, lr]
Of Haringtons Oceana
112Tohold] To Receive] [hold],
113Parliament] Parliament of.
114children alive] children a [alive],
1 '^Dictator ... Ordinary] Dictator a [Election ... Ordinary],
1 '^Emergent ... Scrutiny. Material written in left-hand margin whose placement is
conjectural.
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Every part of this plan is admirable yet there are some things Necessary both to the
Establishment and Duration of such a Government, that this excellent Political writer
has not adverted to.
1 He lays to great Stress upon the Ballance of property as the onely Sourse of
Dominion117 Such a Ballance of Property as he prescribes is not sufficient for the
Establishment or Continuance of a Republick.
Three Sourses of118 Submission in the Governed 1 The opinion of Power 2
The Opinion of Right 3 The opinion of Wisdom and Virtue & Courage.119 Anyone
of these120 may preserve a Government long where it is not opposed by the others.
And it is onely where121 all three concurr that the Government cannot be122 changed
by the Governed.
The first Supported the Roman Emperors. The second supports most hereditary
Monarchys. The third Oliver Cromwel
A.123 People that believe that they have both the Power and Right in their hands
may chuse to submit to Kingly or Monarchical nay even to Despotic Government. 1
From Ignorance of the Evils it tends to produce & want of Experience 2 In order to
redress greater Evils 3 From the want of a Sense of Liberty124 4 From ignorance of
any other form of Government. The People of Israel chusing a King. English recalling
the Banished Family. Harringtons prophecy1 25 Danes giving up their Liberties.
The Difficulty of totally Changing the Form of a Government even from worse
to Better.
It is not probable that O. Cromwell could have established Harringtons
commonwealth126 in England, because of the Attachment of the People to the Old
Forms the Hereditary Nobility and the Opinion of127 the greatest Part of the Right of
the R. Family, There
2 The duration of Such a Government as Harrington proposes. Requires the
preservation of Morals, the Suppression of Luxury. The inspiring the people with a
1171 ... Dominion] 1 [He lays more stress upon] [He ... Dominion].
118of] [Dominion and] [[inGovernours]].
119Virtue & Courage.] Virtue a [& Courage],
120these] these [is suffi].
12'others ... where] others, a [And ... where] Where.
122cannot be] cannot a [be],
123A. Meaning unclear.
124Liberty] Liberty [The I].
12;>Family. Harringtons prophecy] Family, a [Harringtons prophecy].




Spirit of Liberty of Zeal for the Government ofModeration in the Use of Riches of
Respect to the Laws & Magistrates.
Of the Virtues required in each kind of Government.
[lv] Of Honour & Ignominy in a Republick
ofRespect to Magistrates & to Elders
Of Frugality & equal Expence in private persons & buildings
OfMagnificence in Magistrates & in publick buildings
Of publick Education.
Of Industry. Law anent Bankrupts.
How Citizens are to be distinguished from Servants by a Census. &
Character128 How a Citizen may be degraded, by the Overseers or Censors for a Year.
By a Hundred for life if he has never born Magistracy by a Tribe if he has born
Magistracy in the tribe onely by the popular assembly whatever he is
Of Honours & Titles of Honour. & Precedency.
Precedency and Priviledges of Citizens above Servants
Titles of Honour Conferred onely by the People in the Hundred Tribe or
Parliament, never to descend beyond the third Generation unless renewed.
e. Concluding Reflections on Harrington's Oceana
[4r] If the Oceana ofMr Harrington is considered in itself onely, or if it were once
established in a Nation sufficiently enlightned, & not prejudiced against this or in
favours of another form of Government. I conceive it to be the best model of
Republican Government that has ever been proposed. The Author was a Man of great
Genius, he made Politicks his Sole Study and had examined the Constitution ofMost
States ancient and Modern with a view to discover the Principles of Political
Government. He has united in one Uniform and consistent System the best things in
all the Ancient Republicks, as well as129 in that of Venice. I confess I think it difficult
to conceive how any part of it could be better contrived, for the time in which he lived
either to prevent Sedition among the Subjects,130 or for defence against forreign
Enemies. And I conceive most of those Authors who find fault with Harringtons
model of a Commonwealth, not excepting Montesquieu himself, have rather shewn an
Inclination to find fault than supported their censures by good Reasons. I shall onely
make two observations on this Plan considered in itself & then I shall make some
Observation upon it as a plan for the Government of England at the time it was offered
128Census. & Character] Census, a [& Character].
129RepubIicks ... well as] Republicks, [illegiblecharacter] [as well as].
I30Sedition ... Subjects] Sedition [among the Subjects].
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1 It may be doubted whether even the Agrarian Law of Harington be a
Sufficient Security against an undue Accumulation ofWealth in the hands of one or a
few, and a sufficient security for that Equality among the Citizens which a Republick
seams to require. That the Ballance of Power in a State131 follows the Ballance of
Land Property was indeed first Observed by Harington and is certainly one of the most
important discoverys in the Science of Politicks, the honour ofwhich is entirely due to
him. But as Harrington acknowledges that there may be some Exceptions to this
general rule, there may possibly be others which he did not132 discover There are
some Species of Property now known in Britain which are not restrained by
Harringtons Agrarian, whereby men accumulate very great Estates unsuitable to the
Nature of a Republican Government.
The publick funds amount to 130,CXX),000 £ Estates in the Colonies
[4v] 2 It may be doubted whether there is in this Model133 sufficient provision
for preserving that degree ofMorals and publick Virtue which is necessary in a
Commonwealth.
4. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
[lv] Of Colonies Ancient Modern. The Trade ofmodern Colonies with the Nations in
Cultivating Sugar Indigo Tobacco Pimento Tar Wood Logwood134 Their Government
Limitations of their Trade. Their Influence in the Government and in the House of
Commons. The colonies and Great trading Companies have produ(s)ed what is called
the Moneyed Interest which seems to bear hard both upon the Landed Interest and the
trading Interest. Modern Colonies tend to Depopulation.
5. OTHER COMMONWEALTHS IDEAL OR REAL
The Utopia of Sir Thomas More Paraguay
Population. Education Abbe de St Pierre's Political Collec.135 National Riches.
Trade & Commerce. Easy Conveyance Storehouses.136 Ballance of forreign Trade
Exchange. Money, Banks, Land Bank. Publick Revenue. Customs Excise Pol Tax
Sumptuary Laws137
13 'State] Slate [that has an extensive land Territory].
132not] not [forsee].
133is ... Model] is a [in this Model].
134Logwood] Logwood [Lim(.
135Education ... Collec.] Education a [Abbe ... Collec.].
136Commerce




There is a certain Character and Temper in the Subjects that suits every Government
This has been observed by Montesquieu and it is what he calls the principle of the
Several Governments by which he seems to mean onely that the stability and duration
of such a Plan of Government requires that the Subjects Should be chiefly actuated by
such a Principle.
This Principle in Despotism he makes to be fear in Monarchies Honour in
Republicks Virtue
Despotism suits best with the warm Climats. How little reason have we to envy
the Aseatics the Temperature of their Air Their Rubies & Diamonds and Silk; Their
Spiceries and all the other noble productions of the Climate Let me rather be free and if
I should138 wander in the Wilds of America with the Canadians or Exkimaux and live
upon Roots any game rather than be a Slave and wallow in all the Luxury of an
Eastern Court.
Of Pure Monarchy
In this form of Government first desribed by Montesquieu The Monarch has all the
parts of the Supreme power in himself but Exercises it by fixed Laws & Subordinate
Powers. It is therefore essential to this Government to have a Register of the Laws.
The Parliaments of France described Their Power to remonstrate against, the Kings
Edicts.
A Hereditary Nobility with Jurisdictions.
A Standing Army Army of the Nobility Gentry and Peasants
The Law a Separate Profession.
a. The Leading Principle of the Different Forms of Government
[2r] What Montesquieu has said with regard to the leading Principle of the differen(t)
forms of Government needs Explication and I conceive when properly understood is
of great Consequence in Politicks. He Observes that in Despotick Government the
Leading principle is fear, in Monarchy Honour, & in Democracy Virtue. For
understanding this it is proper to observe that as every Government that is secure and
lasting must be in some degree adapted to the principles by which human creatures are
commonly influenced in their conduct, so there are some Governments that are more
(adapted to) one principle of human Nature others to another. That Principle which is
138rather ... should] rather a [be ... should].
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peculiarly adapted to the Nature of the Government will always be cherished by that
and the natural tendency of the Government will be to mould Men into that Character
and temper which agrees best with the Nature of the Government On the other hand
the More that Principle, that temper and Character prevails which is suited to the
Nature of the Government, the more smoothly & easily139 will the wheels of
Government move.
Thus in a Republick the great End of the Government is the common good of the
Whole and the Preservation of civil Liberty. That Spirit therefore in the Subjects
which is best adapted to this form of Government is the Love their Constitution and
the love of Liberty and of the Laws140 this the true Spirit of a free Government and
while this Spirit prevails the Government will be well administered and powerfull
against its Enemies. &c Sparta. Athens. Rome.
In a Despotick Government The Arbitrary Will of one Man Moves the whole
Machine. And therefore the most abject & tame141 Submission to the Sovereign is the
onely thing that can make such a Government go on smoothly. And Fear or
Superstition142 are the onely principles that can produce such an Abject Submission in
a great Empire to the arbitrary will of one. These therefore are the principles of a
Despotick Government.
That Principle of Honour which, According to Montesquieu, in a Monarchy
supplies the want of Virtue, is nothing else but an Ambition to be distinguished and
applauded, a strong143 desire to cut a figure in the Eyes of men especially of those that
are above us in Rank.
[2v] Here a144 Man is145 taught that his Virtues ought to be146 such as shew an
elevation of Spirit his Morals ought147 not to be too strait or Stiff. That his behaviour
should allways be frank and Polite.148 The Virtues which this Principle of Honour
inspires are not these which point out our duty to others but such as teach us what a
man owes to himself. Not those that draw our affections towards our fellow creatures
but those that may give us some distinction & preeminense above them. This Honour
does not judge of Actions by their Justice or Utility but by their brilliancy and lustre. It
139smoothly & easily] smoothly a [& easily].
140Liberty ... Laws] Liberty a [and ... Laws].
141abject & tame] abject a [& tame].
142Fear or Superstition] Fear a [or Superstition].
143a strong] a a [strong].
144Here a] Here [a].
145Man is] Man [are] [is].
146ought to be] ought a [to be],
147Morals ought] Morals [ought],
148be ... Polite.] be [attended with acertain] [frankand] Polite[ness].
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aims not at real Worth but at Distinction and Fame. Sincerity Modesty Justice
Temperance are to the Man of Honour149 plebeian Virtues, which have little150
connexion with the Principle of Honour and ought not151 to stand in its way, when it
aims at any thing that spirited152 and Noble. The Man of Honour to raise his fortune
can Supplant the man that confides in him. He can boast of an amorous intrigue with a
person of superior rank or of eminent Perfections, the153 wife of his Friend or
benefactor. If he can gain a Post by servile adulation and flattery of one whom in his
heart he despises, or by a dexterous piece of Craft & cunning, this is a laudable finesse
in which he will154 glory. His honour requires that his should be open and155 speak
the Truth, not from the love of Sincerity and Truth; By no Means, but because to
speak the truth is a Sign of boldness and156 Courage.
This Principle of Honour always inspires Politeness and Good Breeding. Men
of high Rank, in all Countries distinguish themselves by Politeness to their inferiors,
the desire of Respect naturally produces this. Every obliging thing which a great man
says or does to us is taken as a great favour.157 It is a very cheap way of acquiring
respect and bringing man under obligations. Politeness and good breeding is
undoubtedly a most amiable accomplishment, an accomplishment which real Virtue
and Humanity ought to inspire, As men are born to live together and mutually to
promote each others Satisfaction comfort and happiness. And nothing tends to
promote peace harmony and good will in Society than a polite and obliging behaviour
in men towards one another. But this amiable Quality does not always proceed from
the principles of true Virtue & humanity it is often the offspring of Vanity and the
desire of Esteam. In the Monarchical Government there is a Gradation of Rank from
the Monarch down to the peasant and day labourer. This kind of Government
encourages Ambition and every man as he aspires to a higher Rank emulates the
Manners of those that are above him.158
[ 1 r] Ambition and the Love of Honour encouraged.
A Martial Spirit
149are ... Honour] are |one word illegible] [to ... Honour].
150have little] have no [little].
15honour ... not] Honour [nor] [and] ought [not],
152that spirited] that [grand] [spirited],
153the] the the.
154he will] he [will],
155should ... and] should a [be open and],
156of boldness and] of a [boldness and],
157favour] favour [by us].
158What ... him. Passagemarked A whose arrangement (That ... Rank precedes What ...
him] is indicated by lines drawn by Reid and by sense and whose placement is indicated by
Reid's instruction Add A in left-handmargin next to Profession.
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The Glory of the Monarch substituted in place of the love of ones Country.
[ lv] The Monarch must be hereditary and the Succession regulate by
fundamental laws159 must appear to his people. He must be gracious and affable to all
about him. Keep A Splendid Court He must if possible add the Glory of a Conqueror
to his other Titles160 Encourage the Nobility to live at Court to Spend their Fortunes in
high living and to have a dependance, by Places in the Army and Civil Government.
He ought to be an encourager of Learning. Acts of Clemancy should belong to him,
but Acts of Severity or Justice be always left to his Courts.
Taxes ought to be farmed but not to the Nobility or Army,
Every man should depend upon the Court and expect to rise by its favour, and
look upon disgrace at Court as the greatest of all Evils.
Such a Monarchy is apt to grow is very dangerous to its Neighbours. Difficult to
Conquer. Learning And Arts may flourish in it. but Commerce will never meet with
great Encouragement.
It may degenerate into Despotism by crushing the Nobility and taking away their
Jurisdictions 2 By taking away the priviledges of Parliaments. & their independency
The power of the Monarch may be diminished. 1 By the Subjects being more
enlightned. By Unsuccessfull Wars or bad administration. By Minoritys By a disputed
Succession and Pretenders to the Throne
b. Reflections on the French Monarchy
Reflexions on the French Monarchy
Its Power very great and all its Neighbours, we in particular ought to be jealous of it.
Its power had been greater had it not been for the Ambition of its Monarchs. Lewis 14.
The Present King. The most pacific Kings lay the foundation of its Strength.
Monastries and Nunneries weaken it
7. THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION
[4/III/11, Ir]
Of Monarchy
1 The french Monarchy a Model of Pure Monarchy
159Monarch ... laws] Monarch a [must ... laws].
I60Court ... Titles] Court [He ... Titles].
Aristocracies





Distribution of the Supreme Power
a. The Judiciary
Judiciary. Nomination of Judges Various Judicatories. Power of Juries their
Nomination & Election. Office of the Judge. Subordination of Courts Supreme
Judicature. Attainders.
b. Legislative Power
Legislative Power. 1 King Hereditary preferable to Elective Rules of Succession.161
No reason for Excluding the Female Line. Popish heirs excluded & those who marry
Papists inconvenient to marry Subjects.162 The King can do noWrong Prerogative
Revenue.163
Peers. Hereditary except in Scotland. Ought to have a Considerable Share of the
Landed Interest. Are an Intermediate Power that Binds the King & Commons together.
And therefore ought to have an Interest both in preserving the Liberties of the People.
& the Prerogative of the Crown. The Place of Extinct Families should be Supplied
from Time to time from the Richest of the Commons. Nobles & Commons ought to
Marry. And the Younger Sons of the Peers to be Commoners The164 King can make
Peers but cannot unmake them
The Constitution of Electors of the House of Commons, ought to be such as to
make them an Equal Representative. Some Inequalities arise 1 From the decay of
Burroughs once great. 2 From the Improvement of Land Rents 3 From excluding
these that Hold of Subjects. The Nature of Holdings and of the Feudal Law. The
!61Elective ... Succession.] Elective a [Rules of Succession.].
162Subjects.] Subjects. [Reason Sound.].
1 ^prerogative Revenue. Interlinearmaterial whose placement is conjectural.
164The] The [Nomination of Pee] the.
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changes that have happned in it. The inconveniense of having the Superiority divided
from the Property among Subjects.
The Constitution with regard to Elections. Enlisting of Barrons & Power of
Head Courts. Power of the Sherrif in Returns. Controverted Elections Removing of
Military force from the place of Elections
[lv] The Meetings of the Legislature. The calling & prorogation of the
Parliamene belongs to the Crown. Because their Sitting Constantly is not Necessary.
This prerogative checked by the Expence of the Government being provided from Year
to year. Estimates for the Publick laid always before the House of Commons Money
Bills must take their Rise there & not be altered or (one word illegible) elsewhere.165
Liberty of Speech. & Liberty of Access to the King. Liberty to Impeach any Subject.
The Lords ought to Judge in Impeachments. The Speaker of the House The Order of
Passing Bills The first Second & third Reading Engrossing. The Order of Debate & of
Voting by the house Dividing166 Committee of the Whole House. Conference in the
Painted Chamber.
The Accounts of Public Expences & of the Public Debt, ly on the Table
The Habeas Corpus Act & its Suspension. Liberty of the Press. Tolleration.
Papists
The Forms of Sitting & Proceeding in the House of Lords. Wool Sacks
Acts of Pardon & Oblivion take their Rise from the Crown & have one Reading
in each house
By Laws of Corporations Justices of the Peace & Commissioners of Supply &
the Limits of their Power & Jurisdiction.
c. Executive Power
Executive Power. Over the Army Kings Legislative Raises & dissolves it.167 The
Nomination to all Military Offices, restrained to protestants.Military Discipline
regulated by the Mutiny Act. Army has the same Interest as the Subjects in General168
Making War Treaties Naming Ambassadours. Naming Officers of the Excise &
Customs. Justices of the Peace Commissioners of Supply. All the Judges Bishops.
The Officers of the Navy. Officers of the Crown
OfPolitical 169Parties in the British Constitution Natural Accidental
Religious Parties Their Association with Political Ones Natural & Accidental
165there ... elsewhere.] there a [& ... elsewhere].
166Debate ... Dividing] Debate a [& ... Dividing].
167Army ... it.] Army a [Kings ... it].
168Act... General] Act. [Army ... General].
]69Of Political] Ol'a [Political],
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d. Defects or Inconveniences in the British Constitution
Defects or Inconveniencies in the British Constitution
[2r] 1 The Preservation of it Depends on the Preserving a Ballance of King Lords
& Commons who have or may Apprehend they have Different & Contrary
Interests & various Accidents may alter this Ballance. Concessions made to a
Good King may be abused by a Bad one. The House of Commons may be
weakened by the Inequality of the Representative The Kings Power Increased by
the Augmentation of the Revenue, the Multiplication of Places.
1 The British Constitution lays a foundation for the Division of the State into 2
Parties who may be Called the Court & Country Party There are 3 Interests in
the State King Lords & Commons. The 2d is not so considerable as to form a
third Party but divides into the other two. The Parties in the Roman State
Patricians & Plebeians Three things must occasion this Division in our
Government 1 The different apprehensions of those who wish well to the
Constitution. & act from publick170 principles. 2 The interested views of those
that want to keep their places or to get into places therefore arise from the Nature
of the Constitution 3 The designs of those that are Enemies to the Constitution
or to the Administration Neither the One nor the Other of these parties is always
in the Wrong171 Accidental Parties Whig & Torry. The Jacobite & Revolutioner
Church Man & Dissenter High & Low Church. Associations of Parties
sometimes Natural sometimes Accidental Papist or High Church172 Arminian &
Courtier. Puritan Calvinist & Republican or Countryman High Church & Torry
Low Church Dissenter &Whig. Since the Revolution Torry & Jacobite & High
Church. & Anticourtier, Whig Revolutioner. Low Church or Dissenter In
Scotland Jacobite & Episcopalian. Revolutioner & Presbyterian Jacobites a
Faction Revolutioners Not so Distinction between a Party & Faction. See Rapin
Diss, on Whigs & Torries. Bullinbroke Diss on Parties Cleghorn's Discourse.
2 The British Constitution lays a foundation for Corruption or undue Influence in
Elections and Nominations which may be used by the Ministry or by the
Candidates173 to Offices & to faction in174 those that would be in it. A place at
Court often got by Opposition to the Administration rather than by serving the
170from publick] from [good] [publick].
17'Wrong] Wrong [2 The British Constitution].
172Papist ... Church] Papist a [or High Church].
173Nominations ... Candidates] Nominations a [which ... Candidates],
174in] in in.
Kitagavva 328
Nation, and kept by serv ing the Administration rather than serving the Public.
The giving of a Place to a Demagogue in our Constitution answers to the
Ostracism of the Athenians
3 The Commons unequally represented175 The preservation of our Constitution
depends on keeping the Ballance even between the three parts of the Legislature.
Chiefly between the King & Commons which seems to be a ticklish thing. 1
What addsWeight to the Kings Scale. Personal Abilities. Long uninterrupted
hereditary Succession: connexion with forreign Princes176 The Civil List the
Number of Places & Pensions in his Disposal, besides the parts that are more
fixed, viz his Executive Power & his Part in the Legislative. Trade brings an
increase of Property to the Commons & to that Part of them that will always be
most zealous for Liberty. The power of giving or withholding money their great
Security Whether the Crown could Stand without the Dependance that the
Commons have on itWhether the Ballance of the British Government inclines
more to Liberty or Despotism See Hume Essay on the Independancy of
Parliaments177 on the above Quest.
[2v] 4 The British Constitution has a tendency to a Corruption ofMorals & seems
to have no sufficient provision against that. The Corruption of Morals grows
from the Influence of And Example of a Court, the Manner in which Elections &
Nominations to offices are carried on The Number of Oaths the Profanation of
the Sacraments n being made a Qualification to a place. The Abuse of Liberty of
Speech & of the Press its degenerating into a Spirit of Libertinism.178 The
Contempt of Religion & of the Clergy. The Numbers that live a City Life The
increase of Trade which makes every thing be bought & Sold How far it is in
the Power of a King & Court to stop the Progress of Vice by their Example
Influence Strict Execution of the Laws against Immorality. By its Power in
Universitys & the Church & in the Disposal of Places The Censorial Power in
Ancient Republicks how far capable of being revived. Whether a Proper Church
Discipline might Supply its place & how far the Clergy might be entrusted with
this Power. Of the Education Election & deprivation of Clergymen. The
Constitution of the Churches both of Scotland & England has a tendency to
Corruption ofMorals among the Clergy. Which must be followed by Corruption
1 /5The ... represented. Interlinearmaterial whoseplacement is conjectural.
176Succession ... Princes] Succession: [connexion ... Princes].
177Parliaments] Parliaments [Wheth].
178Press ... Libertinism.] Press [its ... Libertinism].
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among the people The Encouragement of Rural Life & making it free and
indepentant tends to preserve the Morals of a People
5. A certain Degree of corruption of Morals Makes a people incapable of free




We began to consider the Constitution of the Government of Great Brittain, which if
we may rely upon the Judgment of Montesquieu the greatest political Writer that either
ancient ormodern times have produced, is more admirably fitted for preserving the
liberty of the Subject than any other180 form of government181 that ever existed, or
even any model182 that ever was proposed183 even the Oceana itself.
Harrington says that Author has in his Oceana examined to how high a pitch
political Liberty may possibly be carried, but one may say that while he searched for
this Liberty in his Model of a Commonwealth he had it before his eyes in the real
constitution of his Country, and that he built Chalcedon in the Sight of Byzantium,
perhaps however Montesquieu did not consider that the Brit Constitution was not the
same when Harrington wrote as it is now.184 I do not affirm says he that the extreme
degree of liberty which is to be found in this constitution ought to mortifie those who
enjoy Liberty onely in a moderate degree. An excess of the best things is not always
desirable and human Nature suits itself better to a mediocrity than to the extremes even
of things that are good. Yet this admirable Plan of Government in which every british
man glories, and for which the most enlightened of other nations do envy us; was
never contrived by any Lawgiver, it is the work of time and of Accidents The
generosity and Courage of the British Nation impatient of tyrranny has always made
them shake it off when they began to feel it and make such changes in their Political
System as seemed most proper for preventing for the future the grievances they had
already felt.
It is one of the advantages of this Government that we may freely philosophize
about the principles of Policy and even of our own Government as well as about every
other object of human knowledge. A happiness which is not enjoyed in an equal
17 <4br. Passage ends abruptly here.
180any other] any a [other].
181 government] government [ancient ormodern].
182any model] any [form] [model].
183was proposed] was [dileneated] [proposed],
184perhaps ... now. MateriaI written in left-handmargin whose placement is indicated by
Reid's caret, which is keyed to one next passage in margin.
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Degree under any other Government Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Loix was burnt in
France & he as well as the other best political writers of that Nation do not chuse to
own what they write. In Brittain we see that the Subjects have not onely the Liberty to
canvass the form ofGovernment but to arraign the administration of it in a manner that
never was permitted on any other Government under heaven. This liberty indeed has
of late been much abused & it is to be wished that the abuse of it may not make it
necessary to lay some restraint upon it. But there is no Restraint upon a calm and
candid Philosophical Discussion of the Principles of our happy Constitution, nor even
on pointing out the Defects and weak sides of it that those who have it in their Power
may apply the proper Remedies
/. The Nobility
[2r] Lords Spiritual 2 Arch 24 Bishops. & formerly 26 Abbots & 2 Priors All these
hold or are Supposed to hold certain ancient Barronies of the King in virtue of which
they have their Seats in the House of Peers.
It is of no Consequence whether we make the Lords Spiritual & Temp, two
Estates or one. The Lords Temporal consist of all the Peers of the Realm for the
Bishops although Lords of Parliament are not Peers. The Peers are distinguished by
their different Titles ofNobility Dukes Marquises Earls Vicounts Barons.
(i) Titles ofthe Nobility
A Hereditary18-"' Nobility necessary in a Limited Monarchy. Equally inconsistent with
Despotism & a Republick Necessary that they should be an independant and Separate
Branch of the Legislature.
1 Duke Dux186 Originally signified the General or leader of an Army. Came to be
made a Title of Honour first of the Continent & the fashion spread into Britain. From
the time of the Norman Conquest till Edw 3 No Dukes in England probably because
the Kings were Dukes of Normandy, but when Edw 3 claimed to be King of France
he made his Son Edward the Black Prince and this dignity was afterwards bestowed
upon others chiefly of the Royal Family In the Reign of Q Eliz no Dukes Villiers Duke
of Buckingham the first after that. 1620
2 Marquess Marches. Originally a Lord of the Marches.
3 Earl. Ealderman Comes. Sometime after the Conquest called Counts. Sherriff
of a Shire187 In Writs Commissions and other formal Instruments any Peer of the
18*A Hereditary ] A a [Hereditary ].
186Duke Dux] Duke a [Dux].
187Shire] Shire [Wr],
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Degree of an Earle is stiled by the King his trusty and well beloved Cousin. The Rise
of this Custom from Hen 4
4 Viscount or Vice Comes, originally the Deputy of the Earl in his Government
of a Shire
5 Baron. Originally every Lord of a Mannor who had Jurisdiction in his
Mannour or the priviledge of holding a Baron Court was a Baron. And all such Barons
as held of the King had a right to sit in the great Council of the Nation. About the time
of King John it came (to) be in use that the King called onely the greater Barons in
Person and the lesser Barons were Summoned by the Sherrif to sit by their
Representatives in another House, which gave Rise to the Separation of the two
houses of Parliament. By degrees the tittle of Baron came to be confined to those who
were called by the Kings Writ to the upper House and in Richard the seconds time it
was made a meer tittle of Honour by his conferring it on divers persons by his Letters
patents
The Right of Peerage originally territorial. Instance the Bishops. & in Hen 6 the
Castle ofArundel was adjuded to confer188 an Earldom on its Possessor. But when
alienations became frequent the dignity of Peerage became Personal.
(ii) Privileges of the Nobility
Privilidges of the Nobility
1 In Criminal Cases a Nobleman must be tried by his Peers. Sitting in Judgment they
give their Verdict not upon Oath but upon their Honour. But when called as Witnesses
are Sworn Scandalum Magnatum. Can lose their Nobility onely by Death or Attainder.
One Instance of a Degradation by act of Parliament.
Scotch Peers. 16 chosen by Ballot, this a Temporary Expedient which ceases
when the Number is reduced to 16.
House of Commons Their Priviledge to their Persons 40 days before and after
the Session Money bills take their Rise there. Qualifications of the Electors, of the
Elected. Manner ofElection
[2v j By Statutes of 8. & 10 Hen 6. The Knights of the Shires shall be chosen by
the people dwelling in the same Counties having freehold to the value of 40 sh a year
within the county which by subsequent Statutes must be free of all charges and
deductions except Parliamentary and Parochial taxes, freehold i.e. for term of life at
least. 40 shill at that time equal at least to 20 £ now The Estate must have been
188confer] confer the.
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assessed to some land tax (aid) at least 12 Months before Elected Knights must have
600 £ pr An. free or copyhold Estate Burgesses 300 £ Many Restrictions to lesson the
Influence of the Crown in Elections.
Method of Elections.
Method of passing Bills
Adjournment Prorogation and dissolution
Impeachments Attainders Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.
C. Police
1. INTRODUCTION,WITH DIGRESSION ON POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE
[4/III/9, lr]
May 6 1765
The primary Object of the Science of Politicks is the Constitution of a State, and the
natural Effects and consequences of that Constitution and this capital189 part of the
Political Science may be reduced to these two Problems. First a Constitution or form
of Government being given to point out the Natural Effects and Consequences of that
Constitution Whether for Instance it will be lasting or of short duration, whether
powerfull against forreign Enemies or weak and Easy to be conquered, whether
internally quiet and peceable or turbulent and Seditious, whether the Subjects will be
oppressed or enjoy the common Rights and Liberties which mankind are entitled to.
The second Problem is having given the End for which a Constitution of Government
is intended to point out that Constitution orModel of Government which190 will most
effectually promote and secure this end. It is very obvious that the End of
Government ought to be the good and happiness of the Governed. And therefore every
Form orModel of Government if we judge of it by the moral Standart is to be more or
less approved of according as it tends more or less to promote this end.
Digression onpolitical government
A despotick Monarch may have many Ends that are no wise connected with the good
of his people nay that are directly contrary to them. An Aristocracy may also have
ends which are contrary to the good and happiness of their Subjects, and to agrandize
themselves may grievously oppress the lower ranks ofMen. It is onely191 a
representative of the people who192 can have no interest inconsistent with the
happiness of the whole political Society. Therefore I apprehend that we may safely
189capital] capital [Branch].
1 "which] which [is best].
191oneh [ onely a f [such]].
192who] who [[for]].
Kitagawa 333
affirm that no form of193 Government can be reconciled the principles of sound
Morals in which the people or such a representative of the people as cannot have a
different Interest from the whole have not the Legislative power or such a share of it as
that they may not be subjected to laws that are grievous to them without their consent.
There are two things essential to every Government which we can approve of as
consistent with the rights ofMankind and the ends of Government First that it be a
Government of Laws and not ofMen. Without this no man can know what is his own
or what he has a right to expect from others. I had rather be left in the State of Nature
to vindicate my Rights by the vigor ofmy arm and the assistance ofmy friends, than
in a State of Society heave my Rights depend upon the will of a Man, who is tied
down by no194 law in his Judgment. The will of a Man is liable to be influenced by
various motives bad as well as good by lust avarice ambition and revenge and partial
favour,195 as well as by Justice equity and Mercy.196 A Man is a being compounded
of Reason and Passion, and in most men the last principle is often prevalent over the
first. But the Law is Reason wihtout Passion. Its determinations are always the same
in like cases and it favours the plaintiff no more than the defendant. A man may trust
his rights with a Judge who is [lv] obliged to pass Sentence according to law & is
liable to severe punishment if he does otherwise, for the same reason as a man will
trust his money with a man whom he can compell to restore it if he should have a mind
to keep it. A man who has no reason to doubt of the integrity of his Debitor, yet197
when he lends him A Sum ofMoney takes a Security by which he has it in his power
to compell the debitor or his heirs to make just Restitution. And no Debitor however
honest takes it ill that men who entrust him with their Money should take such a
Security. In like a Man who is judge ofmy Life and fortune ought to give some
Security for his Judging equitably. And there can be no such security if there be no
Law according to which he is obliged to Judge. There can therefore be no equitable
Government without Laws. And all Despotick Government is in its very Constitution
injurious to the Rights ofMankind because it assumes the power of Judging of Mens
lives and Fortunes without giving any Security of its Judging according to Equity.
But Secondly there is another thing Essential to every Government which is consistent
with the Rights ofMankind and that is that the Laws be framed and directed with a
view to the good & happiness of the Subject.198 If the Laws are not directed to this
193no form of] no a ("form of|.
194by no] by a [no].
195revenge ... favour,] revenge a [and partial favour].
196Mercv.] Mercy. [But the law.].
197yet] yet [takes].
198the Subject.] the [governed] [Subject],
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End Iniquity may be established by a law, the laws themselves may be iniquous and
unjust and contrary to the rights of Mankind. It is possible that lawgivers may mistake
the publick good even when they intend it. But such mistakes are commonly
discovered by Experience and if the Law is very grievous the grievance will be felt and
may be remedied. But where the publick good is not intended there is no remedy to be
expected. And such Government is iniquous and contrary to the rights ofMankind.
Even that Dominion which we assume over the Brute Animals which serve us199 such
as sheap oxen horses & dogs could hardly be reconciled to the principles ofMorality,
if their life was upon the whole made more unhappy by that Dominion. Far less can
any Government of a few over the rest of the human Species be justified if it is not
directed to the good and happiness of the Governed. For there is in human
Government no Superiority of Nature in the Governors, as there is in mankind over
the brutes. Every Government therefore which is not directed to promote the good of
the Governed is a Usurpation without Right nor can any Length ofTime give it a just
Tittle. The people may be subject through fear or through ignorance. But if they are
sufficiently enlightned to understand the Rights that belong to them as men, And if at
the same time they have it in their power to shake it off and to establish a better and
more equitable Government, I have no doubt but they have as good Right to do it as a
man has to defend himself against a highwayman.200 They need not search into
ancient Records or Usages to prove their Right to be free and happy. Every man is
bom with this Right and if all his ancestors from Adam had agreed to deprive him of
this Right, this cannot [2r] weaken it, altho it may put him in such circumstances as
that it is not in his power to assert and vindicate his Right.201
Introduction resumes
The chief ends of Political Society Security from forreign Enemies and202 the
maintenance of Peace and justice among the Subjects, these Ends are to be attained by
a proper form and Model of Government. But there are also Subordinate ends of
Political Society the attainment of203 which tho not necessary to the being or
continuance of it may yet conduce greately to its well being and Prosperity. The proper
means of Promoting this care likewise an object of the Science of Politicks. I cannot
pretend to enumerate all these far less to Insist upon them. The chief of them may I
>"us] us [could].
200highwayman.] highwayman. [Every man],
201A ... Right. Passage about which Reid has here written the following: All that is marked
in the Margin in the two preceeding pages by a line drawn from top to bottom belongs to
Political Jurisprudence.
202and] and [against or],
203Society ... of] Society [the attainment of].
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think be reduced to these heads. Population. Virtue, Learning, Riches & Opulence,
Publick Revenue and Arms.
2. OF POPULATION
The Importance of Population. In some States it204 may be left to the Course of
Nature. In Some States laws and Customs obtain to prevent it. Exposing of Children.
One of a family marrying Persecution.205 Reasons of the defects in Population in
Modern Governments.
Two methods of Population 1 By admitting and Naturalizing foreigners Effects
of this in Holland. Of a Naturalization Bill in England. Colonies made up in a great
Measure of foreigners, disadvantages of foreigners both at home and in the Colonies
2 By encouraging marriage or rather removing the discouragements to it which
arise from the improvements of Society. High Living high Land Rent, dearth of the
necessaries of life high taxes upon the poor Leudness & prostitution206 The Rate of
the Natural Increase of Mankind when these impediments are removed, is to double in
25 years
1 Many ancient Nations found themselves too populous The population of the
Earth owing to this.207 The Reasons 1 The want of the Arts necessary for
subsisting many upon the territory of the State 2 The want of traffick which
brings men Subsistence from all the Corners of the Earth. 3 The small degree of
industry or riches necessary to maintain a family before luxury took place208
made them propagate faster and fewer live unmarried
2 Modern States find a great want of Population. Causes 1 They can maintain
more people & make their Numbers turn to account. 2 Monastries Nunneries &
Celibacy ofClergy 3 Luxury & high living which prevents many from marrying
& makesWomen less fruitfull. 4 The Waste of Men in Standing Armies Navies
and long Voyages. 5 The great Number of horses kept for riding on horseback
or in Wheel Carriages & for other Articles of Luxury.
3. OF NATIONAL VIRTUE
[2v] May 7 1765
We have considered the importance of Population in a State and the proper means of
promoting it. And we are next to consider the importance ofVirtue in a State and the
204some Slates it] some [Governmen] [States it].
205marrying Persecution.] marrying a [Persecution].
206Leudness & prostitution] Leudness a [& prostitution] [among the],
207populous ... this.] populous a [The ... this],
208f'amily ... place] family a [before ... place].
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Means by which it may be most effectually promoted. We do not here intend to
consider the importance of Virtue in a moral or Religious but onely in a political Light.
That Virtue is the highest Excellence of a Man that it contributes more than all other
things put together to make a man usefull to others and happy in himself in the present
Life and is the onely mean of securing happiness in the life to come; these are no doubt
truths of the highest importance, but they do not belong to our present Argument
which leads us onely to consider how far Virtue is necessary or conducive towards
making men good citizens or good Members of a State. As far as it is so it deserves the
Care and Attention of the Legislator, and he neglects an important part of his province
if he takes no Care of it.
It appears to be very certain that all wise Schemes of Political Government
suppose men to be neither perfectly virtuous nor perfectly vicious & profligate ifmen
were perfectly virtuous there would be little Use for political Government men would
live very happily without it, they would onely need to know their duty in order to do it
and would not need to be compelled to it by laws & sanctions, on the other hand if all
the members of a state were as wicked and profligate as some individuals are no
Scheme of Government would be sufficient to hold them together, the Society
behoved to disband, every individual would be as a beast of prey to the rest and they
would mutually destroy each other. All political Government therefore supposes
human Nature to be in some middle State between these extreme degrees of Virtue and
vice. And indeed it has always been so in the bulk of Mankind, and we have no reason
to believe that there is any nation on the face of the Earth where the whole or the
greater part are so extreamly wicked and so abandoned as some individuals in every
nation may be found to be But between the extremes ofVirtue and vice which may
one hand make Political Government unnecessary or on the other hand make it
impossible there are a great many different degrees of Corruption of Morals in the
body of a State which may make political Government more or less easy and209 more
or less secure and quiet.
Montesquieu conceives that fear without Virtue is sufficient to support a
Despotick Government, that210 a principle of honour without Virtue is sufficient to
support a pure Monarchy such as that of France but he conceives that a Republick
cannot Subsist without Virtue. I agree with this Author that a greater degree of Virtue
is necessary in a Republick or in any free Government than in a Despotick
Government or pure Monarchy
[3r] The means of promoting and preserving Virtue in a State
209less easy and] less [difficult one word illegible] [easy and],
210that] that [honour].
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1 Good Education. Publick Schools properly endowed and provided.
2 Execution of the Laws against Vice and Immorality.
3 Zeal & Strictness of Life in the211 Ministers ofReligion & Magistrates
4 Care of the Army and Navy. Learning and Arts
4. OF NATIONAL RICHES
1 What is to be called Riches in a Nation?
2 Food and Rayment, Houses Furniture Lands. How far Riches
3 The Riches of the Whole is the Sum of the Riches of Individuals
4 As every Mans Riches is the Ballance between his Goods & his Debt so it is in a
Nation.
What things have influence on the Price of Commodities or of Labour & skill
Of National Riches
[4/111/15, lr]
1 Def By Riches I mean The Possession & Property of alienable things by212
which human life is Supported or its Pleasure or Happiness213 increased, either
really or in the Common opinion.
1 There are things which the Earth Spontaneously affords that come under the
Denomination of Riches. Grottos214 Caves or Groves for Shelter. Wood for
Various Uses215 Some fruits and animals for food Water for drink Skins of
Beasts for Cloathing some Gold & other things which it is Needless to
Ennumerate
2 But the far greatest part of what may be called Riches is produced216 by human
Laboar & Industry. Food & drink Wearing Houses Utensils Tame Animals
Metals Wood Machines Vehicles Jewels &c. And the Riches produced by
Labour in every Civilized State do so far exceed the Spontaneous productions of
the Earth that the latter may pass almost for Nothing Compared with the former
The Earth affords the Materials but it is Labour & Industry that gives them form
&217 the far greatest part of their Worth
21 'the] the [teachers],
212mean ... by] mean [Every] [The ... alienable] things by [the Consumption of].
21 ^Happiness] Happiness a [[in the common opinio(n)]].
214Grottos] [one word illegible] [Grottos].
215SheIter ... Uses] Shelter, a [Wood ... Uses].
2l6is produced] is a [produced] [got].
217&] & [makes].
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3 Yet some parts of the Earth aford greater variety ofMaterials or such218 as are
brought to perfection with less labour. And in this Respect the Warm Climates
are generally preferable to the Colder, which219 require more Labour & Industry
in their Inhabitants
4 A great deal of the Riches produced by labour must be consumed by Use220 by
time orAccidents.
5 The Whole Acquired221 Riches of the Human Race consists of the Overplus of
what is produced by Labour above what is Consumed
6 A Man that in the Course of his Life produced more by his Labour than what he
consumes makes the World Richer by the Overplus
2 Def N.B. I reckon a Mans consumption not onely what he consumes by use
but what Perishes in his custody by Time or accidents.
7 A Man that in the Course of his Life consumes more than he produces by his
Labour makes the World poorer by the Overplus
8 The Riches of the Human Race will allwase Rise or fall in the Compound
proportion of the usefull Labour & Industry Directly and the Consumpt
Reciprocally 222
[ 1 v] 9 Altho every thing that can be called Riches was originally produced by the
Labour of some Body (excepting the Spontaneous productions of the Earth
which are altogether Inconsiderable) Yet being by their Nature alienable they223
are frequently found, in the possession of those that never produced them
10 Riches may be alienate either224 Involuntarly by force or fraud,225 or Voluntarly
by gift bargain or Exchange.
3 Def Where Riches are given in Exchange for other Riches Supposed to be of
equal Value Such a Transaction is called Commerse
What a Man produces by his Labour or purchases with a View to Employ it in
Commerce is called a Commodity226
218such] such such.
219Colder, which] Colder, [And] [which],
220Use] Use [or Perish].
221Whole Acquired] Whole a [Acquired],
222Rcciprocally. | Reciprocally. [9 Riches],
225they] they [must often fall].
224either] either [by f],
225force or fraud,] force [or] fraud, [Servitude],
226What ... Commodity. Material written vertically in left-hand margin from lop to bottom
ofpage whose placement is conjectural.
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11 The Comparative Value ofDifferent Commodities is influenced by somany
Things that it is extreamly Difficult if not impossible to settle it by any General
Rules.
12 If one227 Nation had the Sole property of any Necessary of Life that Nation
might oblige all others to228 give what they pleased to demand that is to be their
Servants
13 But when the Necessarys or Conveniencys229 of Life are in Many different
hands that have Separate Interests. & cannot combine to fix a price upon their
Commodities. Every one is divided betwixt the desire of a high price & the fear
of having his Commodity ly on his hands while others vend theirs at a lower
price. The Buyer is agitated by like hopes and fears as the Seller, however
bargains will be Struct. Some at a higher price some at a lower till at last after
vibrating for a while the price will Settle nearly230 at a Medium betwixt the
highest and lowest.
14 The most Equal Value of Commodities is that which enables those that produce
them by their Labour to purchase all the Conveniencies and Accommodations of
Life which labourers of231 that kind are by the Customs & Opinions of the
Country entitled to.
4Def Altho the Value of Comodities as defined in the last Article by very
Variable according to the Customs or Opinions of different nations or of the
same Nation at different times Yet since we cannot find any more equal or
Natural Standart of the Value ofCommodities we shall call this their Natural
Value.
15 When Commodities have once come to settle at their Natural232 price, That price
cannot be afterwards increased (if we exclude Monopolies & Combinations of
the Sellers or Buyers but by233 an Increase of the Demand or Decrease of the
Commodity [2r] In either of these cases the fear of234 the Commodity lying on
hand decreases in the Seller & makes him insist on a greater price. The buyer is
prompted to offer a higher price lest the Commodity be all taken up by other
buyers. A General opinion of the Increase of the Demand or Decrease of the
227one] one [Man or].
228to] to [be their Servants and].
229Necessarys or Conveniencys] Necessarys a [or Conveniencys].
230Settle nearly] Settle a [nearly].
23 3of] of [their],
232once ... Natural] once [a Settled] a [come ... Natural],
233but by] but a [by].
234ofj of [one word illegible].
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Commodity will have the same Effect for a Time. But Commonly. Such235
Opinions if ill founded do not last long in a Civilized Country people being very
attentive to their Interest and not easily deceived in that Respect236 where their
passions do not blind them.
16 The Decrease of the price of a Commodity must in like Manner be occasioned by
an Increase of the Commodity or a Decrease of the Demand either Real or in237
opinion
17 The Increase or Decrease of the Price of Commodities is not alwise in the Simple
proportion of the Causes above mentioned but Commonly as I apprehend in a
Greater. Thus Suppose two Countries A & B have a mutual Commerce in Corn
& that Neither of them deals with any Other Country in that Commodity A
commonly furnishes B with 10,000 Quarters ofWheat238 & has no more to
Spare. In a certain Year B has a demand for ten thousand Quarters239 as usual
but A can onely Spare 7000.1 apprehend that in this Case the price would rise
more than in the proportion of 7 to 10. However it must be acknowledged that
much would depend upon the possibility of easiness of Supplying the Want of
Corn by other provisions. On the other hand ifA has 15,000 Quarters240 to
spare and has no other Market than with B this would probably sink the price
more than in the proportion of 15 to 10. Yet this Depends much on
Circumstances. If the Commodity be such as will not keep to another year or if
the Sellers are in such Circumstances as that they cannot keep it. It must be sold
at any Rate & the price will fall one half or perhaps more But if the Com will
keep to another Year & the Sellers in Opulent Circumstances & furnished with
Conveniencies they will keep up the price nearly24' in proportion to the Natural
Value. And this will be the More easy if the Buyers have also ability &
convenience [2v] to buy & keep it242 for one or More243 Years
18. Hence it is obvious that Commodities that may be long kept do not rise or fall in
their prices so much in proportion to244 the Causes above mentioned as these
which cannot be long kept.
23%uch] Such [Opinions if 111 founded],
236that Respect] that a [Respect].
237in] in [the General].
23810,(XX)... Wheat] 10,000 [Balls] [Quarters ofWheat].
239thousand Quarters] thousand [Balls] [Quarters],
24015,000 Quarters] 15,000 [balls] [Quarters],
24'price ... proportion] price [nearly] in proportion.
242it] it [over Year.].
243More] More year.
244prices ... to] prices [from] a [so ... to].
Kitagavva341
19 It is likewise Evident that the Opulence of the Buyers & Sellers & their
Accomodations for Store245 is a Mean of preventing the fall or Rise of
Commodities that may be kept.
20 Vice Versa. A great Rise or fall of such Commodities as are Mentioned in the last
article above or below their Natural Value is an Indication of Poverty or Bad
Management in the Dealers that suffer by it.
21 There may be other Remote Causes besides these Mentioned Art 15 & 16 of the
Rise & fall of Commodities but they seam onely to operate in proportion as they
affect the plenty of the Commodity or the Demand for it. The Death of a Prince
may raise the price of Black Cloath but it does this onely by increasing the
Demand for it. Riches and Luxury increase the price of Commodities the same
way.
22 To the Causes Mentioned in Art 15 & 16, We may add this as a third Immediate
Cause of the Rise of prices viz where their Expence to the Manufacturer or
Merchant is visibly & at once increased as by a Tax by the Rising of Insurance
for Import And in this Case the Rise of the price is often Greater than the
increase of the Sellers Expence. Thus the Tax on Glass raised the price of that
Commodity more than the Amount of the Tax. In these Cases the246 buyer
expects that the Commodity will be raised as much as answers the tax. And the
Sellers have247 an opportunity of representing the tax as more heavy upon them
then it really is. And as the Merchant248 forsees there will be less demand249
when the price is raised they are before hand in providing250 less plenty of the
Commodity.
23 When Commodities by any of the Causes Mentioned are raised above or
brought251 below their Natural Value they have still a tendency to return to it in
the Natural Course of things.
242>2 As the price ofmost253 Commodities is still rising and falling it is
necessary where there is a Considerable Commerce to have some Commodity
that may Serve for a Common Measure of the Value of others. This Common
Measure must be something that (is) easily kept easily Conveyed not
245Sellers ... Store] Sellers a [& ... Store].
246the] the fMerchan],
247have] have of.
248Merchant] Merchant [or Manufacturer],
249demand] demand [the} ].
250in providing] in [one word illegible] [providing].
251Mentioned ... brought] Mentioned [rise] [areraised] above or [fall] [brought].
25224] 24 [Since],
253of most] of [most].
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perishable254 and is not liable to sudden Risings and fallings in its own value.
Gold and Silver by most civilized Nations have been Made the [3r] common
Measure of the price of Commodities and are very fit for that Use. And to
prevent the Necessity of alwise proofing and weighing those metals when we
take them in Exchange for Commodities it has been found Convenient to Coin
them into pieces of different weight which have a Certain Figure & Stamp to
assertain255 their value
25 Those that do not labour themselves must be supported by the Labour of Others.
Those whose fortunes & Stations exempt them from bodily Labour their
Servants & Attendants256 Lawiers Physicians Divines Soldiers257 School Men
Excise & customhouse Officers &c Sailors.258 there are others whose labour
does not produce Riches but transferrs them from one hand to another or fits
them for Consumption Merchants. Cooks Apothecaries Taylors. Others direct
the Labourers Stewarts overseers bookkepers &c259 Besides many that are at
times unable to labour through infancy old age Sickness bearing & Nursing
Children.260 If we consider that all these are maintained by the Labour of Others
& most of them consume several Times as much as most Labouring men261 we
shall see that the Labour, of less than one half ofMen provides the Riches of the
Whole
26. Hence the Riches of a Country are owing to the following Causes 1 When a
great proportion of the Inhabitants are Industrius & frugal & few Idle or profuse
2 When the Labour is employed in a great measure upon things that are more
permanent or not for immediate Consumption or if they are so are sent Abroad &
not consumed at home. Or wher it supplys the place of forreign Importations. 3
The Invention of Usefull Machines or Methods by which the same work may be
done by fewer hands or in Shorter Time.
27. Yet a Dealer in Manufactures who employs many hands does caeteris paribus
enrich the Country more than one who employs few because besides the profits
of the dealer we are to take in the profits of the people that Labour for him
254Conveyed not perishable] Conveyed a [not perishable].
255to assertain] to [denote] [assertain].
256Labour... Attendants] Labour a [their ... Attendants].
257Divines Soldiers] Divines [Soldiers].
258Excise ... Sailors. Interlinearmaterial.
259Taylors ... &c.] Taylors [Others ... &c],
260through ... Children.] through [infancy] ... [bearing ... Children],
26'men] men [do].
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28 Nay a Manufacture that hurts the Dealer may yet profit the Nation, tho this
cannot often happen & rather by Accident than from the Natural Course of
things.
5. OF COMMERCE
a. Of Domestic Commerce
Of Domestic Commerce
29 A Nation may be Rich & flourishing by the Industry of its inhabitents without
any forreign trade
30 Without Forreign Trade a Nation can have no silver and Gold but from Mines in
the Country.
31 It signifies little to a Nation whether silver and Gold be in plenty or Scarce
without forreign Commerce262
b. Of Foreign Commerce
Of Forreign Commerse
33 The difference betwixt the Import & Export of a Nation is what it gains by
forreign Commerce & is called the Ballance of Trade.
c. Of Commerce with Our Colonies
Of Commerce with our Collonies
The History of Commerce
The Other Effects of it with regard to the Manners of a people Their Morals.
Peace &War, the Arts & Sciences Liberty See Montesquieu Hume Preceptor. Petty
Davenunt Characteristics of the present political State ofGr BrittainWallace The
Querist 5th Edition 1750 Bishop of Cloyne Essay on the Advantages and
disadvantages which respectively attend France & Gr. Britain with regard to Trade &
by Mr Tucker of Bristol Sir Mathew Decker Enquiry into the Causes of the Decay of
forreign Trade & the Remedies thereof Of the National Debt the consequences of it &
the Schemes for paying it Hooke
262Commerce] Commerce [32 The Spirit of Commerce in a Nation is favourable to some
Virtues and unfavourable to others.).
6. OF MONEY
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a. Gold and Silver As a Measure of the Price of Commodities
[4r] Gold and Silver a proper Measure of the Price of Commodities 1 Because they do
not rise and fall much in value being durable and always esteemed 2 Because divisible
into small parts 3 Because the Quantity and Finness263 on which the value depends
may be exactly assertained. 4 Because easily conveyed 5 Because they keep without
Waste Facilitates Exchange264 The price of things Measured by Oxen or sheep in
homers time Gold and Silver at first Weighed. Inconveniences of this. Afterwards
coined by States. Coin authorised by Law as a lawfull tender of Payment.265
The Practices of Princes upon Coin. The practices of false coiners Clippers
washers Sweaters. &c
State of the Coin in King Williams Time Lockes Treatises
Laws of the Mint. Penal Laws against melting the Coin against Coining against
Exporting.
b. Of False Maxims with Regard to Money
False Notions concerning266 Money
1 That it receives its value from Edicts of Princes or States Silver & Gold must
have Value267 that depends not on the Will of Princes and States 1 Because it
cannot be found out dug from the Mines and Refined without much Labour and
Expence. 2 Because it has allways been in demand as a commodity and is
usefull for Vessels for ornaments for Utensils 3 it has therefore a Natural Price
as other Commodities have. Gold and Silver must have a Natural Price
compared with one another& with other Metals and other Commodities
2 It cannot have an unnatural Price fixed upon it by Princes and States without
Injury to the Subjects and injury to trad(e) 1 If the Price fixed upon it is too low
it can Neither be dug if it is in the Country {one word illegible) will be
263Finness] Finness [may be],
264Faci 1 i tates Exchange. Interlinearmaterial. Horizontal line drawn in left-handmargin under
this line.
265Payment.] Payment. [Hence the Notion of its Receiving its Value from Statute.].
266conceming] concerning [Coin],
267[Silvcr] must have [a] Value] [Silver] a [Silver & Gold] must have [a] Value.
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exported268 nor imported by trade. 2 If too high269 laburing people will leave
the Country.270
3 It cannot be raised or lowered without bringing distress to the Country. It will be
counterfitted.27'Raising the Denomination enriches the Monied Man, at the
Expence of others. Lowering the Denomination has the contrary Effect. [4v] It is
not altering the Denomination that can produce any Effect on Commerse good or
bad. But it is making the same quantity of Silver to be an equivalent to a greater
or a less quantity of other goods272
[4r] 2 That273 it is good policy to forbid the exportation of it.
3 That the Riches of a Nation consists in274 the Quantity ofMoney yet it must
consist chiefly in the Quantity of Commodities which are not perishable
4 That the price of other things must rise in a state in proportion to the plenty of
Money.
5 That base Money is more profitable to a Nation than that which is fine The
Nation ought to have onely one Standart viz Silver Of the proportion between
Gold and Silver
The difficulty of knowing the Ballance of Forreign Trade Ways in which the wealth of
a Nation may be increased independent of the Ballance of forreign Trade 1 Money
spent by forreigners. 2 Natives who live Abroad 3. Subsidies 4 Naturalizing rich
foreigners Emigrations of such 5 The alteration of the Coin by wearing or by any
other MeansWhy Bullion is dearer than Coin? Does not the loss of this fall upon the
Bank?
6 That trade is hurtfull with a Nation which takes not of our Commodities an equal
Value to what we take of theirs This Maxim False.
[4v] 7 That Banks & Paper Credit is hurtfull to the Nation275
c. Gold and Silver As Commodities of Intrinsic Value
14/111/16, lr]
Tho' Silver and Gold be the common Measure of the price of Commodities, yet it may
be said that those Metals have not allways the same Value Theire Value different in
268Country ... exported] Country \one word illegible ... exported].
269high] high [it will be exported.].
270leave ... Country. Interlinearmaterial.
27'it ... counterfitted. Interlinearmaterial.
272Silver ... goods. Materialmarked A whose placement is indicated by Reid's instruction see
A below in left-handmargin adjacent to States.
273That] That [a Nation may be impoverished].
274Nation consists in] Nation [bears proportion to] [consists in].
275Nation] Nation [8 That.].
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different Ages. How it is to be estimated. The low est value the Maintenance of those
who dig & refine it. This varies according to the depth and fertility ofMines & the
Improvements in the Art of refining.
Effects ofManufactores. 1 Trades & professions they produce. 1 Labourers in
the various parts of the Manufacture who work either by days wages or by the piece
The great advantage of this to the poor. It multiplys labouring hands, employs those
usefully who would otherwise be idle. 2 The Merchant. Subordinate to him are
porters Waggoners. Ships & Sailors. Carpenters Rope. Sail 3 The Retailer.
Of Banks
Bank Credit an Obligation upon the Bank to pay to the person that has it so much
Money on demand, Great Commerce requires much Money to carry it on276
The Armour of Diomed (says Homer cost 9 Oxen, that of Glaucus 100 Salt the
Instrument of Commerce in Abyssinia A Species of Shells in some parts of India Dried
Cod in Newfoundland Tobacco in Virginia Sugar in some of the West Indies Iron
among the ancient Spaniards. Copper among the Rom ServiusTullius first coined
Copper Money the As or pondo was a pound of Copper. In the later times of the
Republick it was onely half an ounce that is the 24th part of a pound,
The Romans began to coin Silver five years before the first punick War, but the
always reckoned Money either by Asses 2 which was a copper Coin or by Sestevly
which was 2 1/2 Asses
[ 1 v] The Northern Nations who established themselves upon the Ruins of the
Roman Empire seem to have used Silver money first & to have always reckoned by it.
There was little Gold coined in277 England till the time of Edward 3 & no Copper till
Ja 1 of England
7. SUMMARY OF SECTIONS 4-6
[4/III/10. lr]
May 13 1765
We have divided the ends of Political Society into primary and Secondary or principal
and Subordinate. The primary and Principal Ends are Defence against278 forreign
Enemies and internal peace & Justice among the Citizens. These are Secured by a
proper form Of Political Government of which we have discoursed.279 The secondary
27flGreat ... on. Reid has drawn a line under this line.
277in] in [Brit].
278are Defence against] are [Security from] [Defence against].
279have discoursed.] have [discoursed].
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and Subordinate Ends of Political Society are whatevermay render the Society more
happy and flourishing. The chief things of this kind and of which I proposed to
discourse Are the following 1 Population. 2 Virtue 3 Learning and Knowledge 4
Riches & Opulence 5 Publick Revenue, 6 Arms. We have dispatched what we
intended to say of the three first and began to Discourse of the 4 which is indeed so
copious a Subject and has been so little handled in a Systematical way that it is difficult
to reduce it into method. In order to280 prevent Embarrassment we have endeavoured
to give a Distinct Notion281 of what is understood by Riches. All alienable property
which contributes to the convenience and accommodation of Life either Really or in the
general opinion comes under the Denomination of Riches. We have endeavoured to
shew that almost every thing we can call Riches is produced by human Labour and
industry. We have considered how the productions of human Labour come to be rated
and what are the causes why things which require equal Labour in the production of
them have notwithstanding very282 unequal Values or prices put upon them, And
what it is that we may call the Natural Price of Commodities.We have endeavoured to
shew the causes which raise the Market Price of Commodities above or sink it below
their natural Value. We have considered the Use ofMoney as a common Measure of
the Price of Commodities as a mean of facilitating the exchange of them and as a
Commodity of intrinsick value. We have mentioned the advantages and
disadvantages283 of coining and Stamping284 gold and Silver by which it is converted
into what we call money and have given some Account of the practices of Princes and
theirMinisters in debasing the Coin & thereby defrauding their Subjects and Creditors.
And last of all we endeavoured to refute several false Notions which have been
entertained upon the Subject of Money Such as That it receives its value from Laws or
Edicts of princes. That it may be kept in a Country by laws prohibiting the Exportation
of it. That the Riches of a Nation Consist in the Quantity of Money that Circulates in it.
That the price of Commodities will be doubled if the Quantity of Money in a Nation is
doubled & raised or diminished in proportion to the Quantity of Money. L'Esprit des
Loix Lv 22 ch 8285 Lastly that the Money may be kept in a State by making it of a base
Alloy. We proposed in the next place to consider the Nature of Credit. Which will
lead us to the Consideration of Interest and of Banks and what is called Paper Money.
280to] to [this I h].
28'Distinct Notion] Distinct [Idea].
282very] very very.
283advantages and disadvantages] advantages a [anddisadvantages],
284StampingJ Stamping [Money].
28-\.'Esprit ... 8. Written in left-handmargin.
8. THE NATURE OF CREDIT
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a. Common Credit
In order to Reason distinctly about Credit, the various kinds of it and their Effects. It is
necessary to take a general View of what we call Traffick [lv] which we distinguished
into Natural and artificial. Natural Traffick is where a man buys things that he may use
them but Artificial Traffick is when a man buys things not for his own Use but that he
may sell them again at an advanced price and make profit upon them. There can be no
society wherein every man supplies all his own necessities without any exchange of
commodities with others. In natural Traffick there will be Credit All bargains must be
either for ready payment or upon Credit.
The most convenient time for buying will not always be the most convenient
time for paying It is accidental if these two points ofTime Coincide.
The Steps by which Artificial Traffick or the Profession ofMerchants is
introduced into Society.286 1 Labour assorted into particular Trades and Arts which
are made distinct Professions. As Shoemakers Weavers Taylors Blacksmiths farmers
and the like The Advantage of this to Society 2 Markets or Fairs for the Sale of those
several Commodities. 3 Merchants who buy at one Market and carry to another 4
Manufacturers287 who hire artificers to work for them. The last state most favourable
to Commerce it multiplys professions, makes men more dexterous and Skillfull in their
several Professions more laborious and produces better commodities. Gives rise to the
Invention ofMachines, & the multiplication of them by which more work is done with
the same Quantity of Labour
The Effects of Traffick in making Money fruitfull and employing the whole
Money in circulation. When this happens People fall upon ways to enlarge the
circulation by credit. Paper Credit, what
Of Interest of Money.288
b. Paper Credit
2 Different meanings of the Word Credit. It sometimes signifies money due to a man.
and is opposed to Debt which signifies money or value due by him.
May 14289
286Society.] Society. [Fairs or markets].
2874 Manufacturers] 4 [Merchants] [Manufacturers],
288Of ... Money. Material written in left-handmargin whoseplacement is conjectural andfor
which there is no corresponding discussion.
289May 14. Materia! written in left-handmargin whose placement is conjectural.
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But at other times it signifies the Esteem which Men have of a mans Riches and
Integrity in his dealing which makes it safe to trust him with money. How Paper
Credit differs from Common Credit? In this onely that it is easily transferred from one
man to another without loss of tim(e) or Expence.
Wherein Paper Credit agrees with money or differs from it 1 It answers the
same purpose with money as a measure of the Value of Commodities 2 As a mean of
facilitating the Exchange of Commodities In both these respects it not onely answers
the purpose of Money but in some degree is preferable to Gold and Silver. For first it
is more easily conveyed. 2 It is not liable to clipping or wearing 3 it is sooner Sold
and 4 If it is lost there is no loss to the Nation.
We are next to consider wherein Paper Credit differs from money and the
Essential Difference lies in this that it has no intrinsick value its value depends entirely
upon things extrinsick to it. Let a man be ever so carefull of his bank notes yet if the
bank fails and becomes insolvent his Notes are onely waste paper. If the bank is
suspected no body will take its notes as payment. And290 in general the Circulation of
those bank Notes must be limeted to places where the bank is known and believed
to291 stand upon a Solid foundation. It is not so with Money. The value of Gold and
Silver coin depends not upon any [2r] thing extrinsick to it. If I am possessed of 100 £
St in Gold or Silver292 whatever bank breaks or Stops my money loses none of its
value. The value of it does not even depend upon its stamp and form for if it is melted
down into a Mass it is still of the same value It is current in all civilized nations and
loses nothing of its value by being carried beyond Seas.
2 We may observe that whatever the quantity of Paper Credit293 is which is in a
Nation. That Nation is no richer upon that Account In this also it resembles Common
Credit which always supposes as much debt and the one ballances the other.
9. FURTHER TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
May 15 1765
Whether Banks are a benefit to a trading nation or destructive
Of Luxury. How far it tends to Opulence
Of Forreign Trade the Ballance ofTrade & Exchange
The Things that tend to enrich a Nation Industry, Frugality The Cultivation of
the Ground, & encouragement of Those that are employed in it. Invention of Machines
290And) And [wherever th],
29'to] to [be upo],
292St ... Silver] St a [in ... Silver].
293Paper Credit] Paper [money] [Credit],
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Taste and Skill in productions that go to forreign Markets. Low price of Labour and
increase of Labouring hands.
May 16 1765294
Effects of Trade carried to the highest pitch. It increases cities corrupts the Morals of a
Nation. Makes every thing venal. Creates a moneyd Interest distinct from the Landed
& trading Interest.
Arms Naval Strong Places295 Land Forces. Hired Standing ArmiesMilitia
May 17 1765296
Revenue Crown Lands Customs Excise Land Tax, Taxes on the necessarys of Life
Tax on Luxury Poll Tax or Census.297 National Debt. Lotteries
[4/111/11, 2v]
Of the Manner of Raising the public Money by Excises & Customs, whether298 This
is more suitable to a free Government than Poll Taxes or a Census. It increases the
power of the Crown is more heavy upon the Subject. Yet perhaps a Census would be
looked upon as more oppressive. Of Farming the Revenue.
OfMorgaging the Revenue & of the Public Debt. This enlarges the Power of the
Crown. Creates a Moneyd Interest. Where the Money is due to forreigners diminishes
the Riches of the Nation increases the Number of Taxes. Whether the Multiplying
Taxes does not increase Industry & how far see Hume. It makes the burthen of War
less Sensible.
Of the National Debt of Brittain.
Of Banks and Paper Credit & its Consequences
OfNational Riches Agriculture299 Trade The Price of Commodities, the Ballance
ofTrade Exchange. &c
Whether all Governments must have a period as Men have.300
294May ... 1765. Material written in left-handmargin whose placement is conjectural.
295Nava] Strong Places] Naval a [Strong Places],
290May ... 1765. Material written in left-handmargin whose placement is conjectural.
297Excise ... Census.] Excise [Land ... Life] ... [or Census].
298Customs. whether] Customs, [whether].
299Riches Agriculture] Riches a [Agriculture],
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For Anne
In the summer of 1991, while going through the papers ofAlexander Thomson
of Banchory (1798-1868)2 at New College Library, University of Edinburgh,
I discovered a volume (THO 2)3 labelled on the spine 'MSS. Letters' which
1. Written while the author held an Edinburgh University Post-graduate Studentship. In the
course of preparing this article, I have incurred a good many scholarly debts and would like to
acknowledge in particular the assistance of the following: Dr R. G. W. Anderson, Director,
British Museum (formerly Director, National Museums of Scotland); Dr Mike Barfoot, Senior
Assistant Librarian, Special Collections, Edinburgh University Library; Mr Iain Beavan, Sub¬
librarian, Special Collections and Archives, Aberdeen University Library; Dr Richard Bellamy,
Lecturer in Politics, University of Edinburgh; Dr John Cairns, Senior Lecturer in Scots Law,
University of Edinburgh; Mrs Marace Dareau, Senior Editor, Dictionary of the Older Scottish
Tongue, Edinburgh; Ms Gina Douglas, Librarian, Linnean Society of London; Professor Roger
L. Emerson, Department of History, University of Western Ontario; Miss Joan Ferguson,
Librarian, Royal College of Physicians, Edinburgh; Mr Brian Jackson, Curator of Minerals and
Gemstones, Royal Museum of Scotland; Miss Alison Morrison-Low, Curator of Scientific
Instruments, Royal Museum of Scotland; Dr Nicholas Phillipson, Reader in History, University
of Edinburgh; Mr Graham Reid, Secretary and Treasurer, Glasgow Society of Sons of the
Clergy; Dr Murray Simpson, Librarian, New College Library, University of Edinburgh; Mr
David Weston, Principal Assistant Librarian, Special Collections, Glasgow University Library;
Dr Paul Wood, Department of History, University of Victoria; Mrs Jennifer Woods, Senior
Scientific Officer, Retired, Royal Botanic Garden, Edinburgh. I would also like to thank my wife,
Anne Todkill, for her invaluable editorial assistance. This paper is dedicated to her.
2. Scholar, traveller, diarist, church elder, improver and philanthropist, Banchory was a man
ofmany interests and the leisure to pursue them, preferring his 'calling' as a country gentleman
to the legal profession to which he was trained. His estate was not far from Aberdeen (see George
Smeaton, Memoir ofAlexander Thomson ofBanchory, Edinburgh 1869).
3. Recently renumbered; formerly THO 37. This volume, which is approximately 33.7 cm
long, 21 cm wide, and 1.7 cm deep, is bound in marbled boards with half-calf binding. The
bookplate of Alexander Thomson of Banchory is affixed to the front end-paper, which also
contains, in Thomson's hand, the owner's address and a note about one of the Reid letters (i.e.
that of 23 March 1766) being 'Loose'. The following page contains a note, also in Thomson's
hand, indicating that the thirteen Reid letters are printed in Sir William Hamilton's 'memoir of
Reid prefixed to his collected writings 1846'. The back of this page is blank, as are the recto and
verso sides of the next folio. There are also two blank folios before the back end-paper, which
* contains an obituary notice of a certain Charlotte Knox who was related to the Scottish reformer
John Knox and therefore to Thomson, who was directly descended from Knox. The volume is
of mixed construction, the materials up to and including a letter from John Walker to Dr David
Skene being sewn into the binding and the remainder of the items being mounted on guards.
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includes among various other, mostly eighteenth-century, items4 thirteen
holograph letters from the Scottish common-sense philosopher Thomas Reid
(1710-1796) to his Aberdonian friends, the physician Andrew Skene (?i702-
1767) and Skene's son David (1731-1770), also a physician.5 The letters date
from the period 1764-1770 and therefore provide a record of Reid's first seven
years as professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow College — a chair to which
he succeeded after the resignation of Adam Smith. In his indispensable edition
of Reid's Works, Sir William Hamilton6 printed the letters but omitted certain
passages, amounting to almost 1,800 words, which he evidently considered to
be too delicate in nature or of insufficient interest to publish. These deleted
passages are here printed for the first time,7 along with the most material
variants8 between Hamilton's text and the original documents (see Schedule
of restored passages and corrections, p.22if.).
The retrieval of these manuscript letters from obscurity provides an occasion
to consider afresh their significance both as biographical documents and as
windows onto the intellectual and scientific milieu in which Reid circulated in
Glasgow. In the previously unpublished material we see Reid more clearly
than before as a family man9 and find confirmed our understanding of him as
a man of science with a love of precision in all of his observations, however
humble. The letters also reveal that the philosopher had a wry sense of humour
conspicuously absent in his public writings, a good example of which is
contained in a passage relating to Sir William Hamilton's grandfather, the
professor of anatomy and botany at Glasgow, Dr Thomas Hamilton (1728-
4. MSS not described in the following are listed in the Appendix.
5. The Reid letters are f.1-25.
6. Hamilton (1788-1856) was professor of logic and metaphysics at Edinburgh University. His
edition of Reid was first published in 1846.
7. With the kind permission of Dr Murray Simpson, Librarian, New College Library,
University of Edinburgh.
8. Variations in such particulars as spelling, capitalisation and punctuation are generally
not recorded.
9. Confiding details of his family's health problems and of difficulty in the birth of his 'little
Bess' (letters xi, i, vii-xi). The biographical value of the letters has long been recognised, but at
the expense of their scientific interest. Hamilton, writing in 1846, suggests that these letters
'shew us the philosopher in all the unaffected simplicity of his character, and as he appeared to
his friends in the familiar intercourse of ordinary life' (prefatory note to 'Correspondence of Dr
Rcid', The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh 1852 [1846]), 3rd ed.
(hereinafter abbreviated to Works), p.39; cf. Hamilton to Thomson, 28 April [1837], NCL MS
THO 2, f-73v). (The first five editions are identical, aside from prefatory material, up to p.914,
having been stereotyped. Material added to or salvaged from Hamilton's notes by H. L. Mansel
in the sixth (1863) and subsequent editions does not affect the pagination of the earlier material.) '
A. Campbell Fraser, writing in 1898, says that 'Reid's homely letters [...] give some interesting
pictures of the details of the family's life, in the years which immediately followed the settlement
in Glasgow' (Thomas Reid, Famous Scots Scries, Edinburgh, London [1898], p.79).
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[781), which is now restored to letter vii. The present discussion attempts to
situate the letters as a whole within Reid's personal and professional biography
and argues that a full annotation of their contents will yield much for our
understanding of Reid's character, preoccupations and habit of mind. As
considerations of space have made it impossible to reprint the letters here in
their entirety the present article must be used in conjunction with Hamilton's
abridged version.10 In sketching out some of the background for the letters I
have drawn from a great many contemporary manuscript and printed sources
which have thus far not been exploited by Reid scholars.
The provenance of the letters
How or when the Reid letters passed into Thomson of Banchory's possession
is obscure, although his claim to them presumably lay in the fact that David
Skene was his great-uncle.11 We do know that Banchory loaned the letters to
Hamilton when the latter was preparing his edition of Reid's Works for the
press in 1837. More than a quarter of a century later, Banchory sent them to
James McCosh (1811-1894), professor of logic and metaphysics at Queen's
College, Belfast,12 who was at that time engaged in researching and writing
the articles on Hume and Reid13 for his encyclopaedic Scottish philosophy.14
10. A fully glossed edition of the full text of the letters is currently in preparation by the
present author.
11. This familial relationship is stated in Banchory to Hamilton, 16 May 1837, NCL MS
THO 2, f.6gv.
12. Later President of Princeton College, New Jersey.
13. McCosh to Thomson, 19 October 1863, f.2r.
14. London 1875. McCosh did, however, make considerably better use of those Reid papers
(and materials relating to Reid) which he borrowed through the Aberdeen lawyer Francis
Edmond (1805-1892), liberally printing extracts and summaries of these hitherto unpublished
documents in his Scottish philosophy, p.199-200, 207, 223-24, 473-76 ('List of letters and papers',
AUL MS 2814/1/80, f.ir). It should be noted that the Thomson papers contain a fascinating
record of certain details connected with the publication ofHamilton's Works of Thomas Reid and
McCosh's Scottish philosophy, four letters each from Hamilton and McCosh to Thomson and
one letter from Thomson to Hamilton being scattered among uncatalogued correspondence in
boxes and bound volumes, including THO 2 itself. Details of this correspondence are as follows:
in THO 2, Thomson to Hamilton, dated Banchory House, 16 May 1837, (.bgr-jov, with
enclosures, i.e. an undated set of 'Notes' about Rcid by the professor of natural philosophy at
Marischal College and University, William Knight (1786-1844), ]ir-j2v, and Hamilton to
Thomson, dated Edinburgh, 28 April [1837], f.73r-74v; in THO 16, a Hamilton letter, dated
Edinburgh, 14 May 1837, which provides the context of the Thomson letter. Among the
uncatalogued correspondence is a third Hamilton letter (Alexander Thomson ofBanchory papers,
, letters, 1837), consisting of two folios, dated Edinburgh, 16 January 1837, part of which was
published by Smeaton in his Memoir (p. 153-54); 3 fourth Hamilton letter (Banchory papers,
letters, 1845) makes reference to 'a Note upon Reid' in his forthcoming edition of Reid's Works,
dated 16 Great King Street, 24 November 1845. (This letter is signed by Hamilton but is not in
Hamilton's hand.) Further details of the events leading up to the publication of Hamilton's
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After Thomson's death in 1868, 'many scores of volumes' from the Banchory
papers were obtained by the professor of exegetical theology at New College,
George Smeaton (1814-1889), who published his Memoir ofAlexander Thomson
ofBanchory in the following year.15 That Smeaton simply failed to notice the
Reid letters among the daunting quantity of material at his disposal is a matter
of conjecture, but at any rate the letters have lain in obscurity at New College
for well over a century. By what accident or design volume THO 2 did not go
with the rest of Banchory's bequest of certain of his own and the bulk of
David Skene's papers to Aberdeen University Library is not known, but this
circumstance has no doubt done nothing to draw the attention of the growing
number of Reid sleuths to the Banchory papers housed at New College.
The finest prospect in Glasgow
To gloss all of the personal and topical references contained in Reid's letters
to the Skenes is to reconstruct his circle at Glasgow College as a closely knit
scientific and technical community. Assuming Andrew Skene's own familiarity
with the place, Reid in letter 1 passes quickly over the amenities of the College -
'the fine houses of the Masters, [...] the Astronomical Observatory, [...] Robin
Fowlis Collection of Pictures & painting College, [...] ye Foundery for Types
& printing house' - with which he seems well pleased. But here already is a
glimpse of Glasgow College as a beehive of enlightened activity. The Macfar-
laneObservatory had recently been built on college grounds,16 and the professor
of practical astronomy, Alexander Wilson (1714-1786), ran a type foundry in
one of the College gardens and designed types, notably those for the Foulis
edition of Homer and for that common property of coffee-house culture, The
SpectatorThis is the same DrWilson whose invention (17.1758), the elliptical-
bore thermometer, Reid recommends to David Skene in letter ill, sends to
him in letter vii, and sends once more, following repairs, in letter ix.18 In
edition of Reid's Works may be found in John Veitch's Memoir of Sir William Hamilton
(Edinburgh, London 1869), p.207-208, 293-94. Also among the uncatalogued correspondence
are the four McCosh letters, consisting of two folios each (Banchory papers, letters, 1863),
concerning the 'Manuscript Book' and, more specifically, the 'Mss of Reid' with which we are
concerned here. Letter 1: Brechin, 3 July 1863. Letter 2: Brechin, 8 August 1863. Letter 3:
Queen's College, Belfast, 19 October 1863. Letter 4: Queen's College, Belfast, 26 October 1863.
15. p.[v],
16. The foundation stone was laid in 1757.
17. The Glasgow journal, 21/28 September 1769; Patrick Wilson, 'Biographical account of
Alexander Wilson', Transactions of the Royal Society ofEdinburgh 10, pt 2 (1824), p.283-84.
18. Wilson supplied Joseph Black's students at Edinburgh in the winter of 1768 with 'Small
pocket Thermometers' and 'boiling water ones' both 'made only of the choicest pieces of tubes'
for one guinea and one and a half guineas respectively (Wilson to Black, 21 January 1768, EUL
MS Gen. 873/1, f.26r).
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Alexander Wilson and his son Patrick, Reid would enjoy a 'similarity of [...]
—scientific pursuits, and an entire sympathy [... of] views and sentiments'.19
Robert Foulis (1707-1776), who with his brother Andrew (1712-1775) was
printer to the university, had established his Academy of the Fine Arts earlier
in the period. Reid and the elder Foulis were friends, and Reid was consulted
on publishing matters. While the actual printing-press was no longer located
within the College, the Foulis firm had its bookshop and bindery there and
the two brothers apparently lived in college rooms.20 The mathematician and
professor of Greek, James Moor, to whose insobriety Reid alludes in letter 1,
had revised the Greek texts of the Foulis Homer and collaborated on a
translation ofMarcus Aurelius's Meditations, also for the Foulis press, a copy
of which Reid is believed to have owned.21 Following Robert Foulis' death,
Reid offered to help Foulis' son-in-law and foreman, Robert Dewar (c.1755-
r.1781), set up a printing business of his own.
Glasgow College was home to a literary society which met on Fridays and
whose membership included David Hume, Adam Smith and the professor of
civil law John Millar (1735-1801). Reid himself was made a member shortly
after his arrival in Glasgow and remained an active participant in the Society
almost to the end of his life, giving his first discourse on 15 March 1765 and
delivering his last on 27 November 1795.22 Another of Reid's colleagues in the
club was the eminent chemist, Joseph Black (1728-1799), in whom he 'met a
simplicity of manners congenial to his own'23 and whose classes he attended
in 1765 (letter 111).
Also active at this time was James Watt (1736-1819), who had recently set
up shop within college bounds as mathematical instrument maker to the
University, and whom Reid would report to be making improvements to the
steam engine (letter ill), concocting a silver solution with which cambric could
be permanently stamped (letter xn), and inventing a perspective machine
which seems to have captured Reid's imagination (passage now restored to
letter ill).
One other figure attached to the College who is alluded to in Reid's letters
is Black's pupil John Robison (1739-1805), appointed lecturer in chemistry at
19. Dugald Stewart, 'Account of the life and writings of Thomas Reid', in Works, p.ioa.
20. Glasgow Bibliographical Society, Catalogue ofthe Foulis Exhibition (Glasgow 1913), p.[23];
James MacLehose, The Glasgow University Press 1638-igji (Glasgow 1931), p.127-28, 150 n.2,
157, 163, 164, 193; David Murray, Robert and Andrew Foulis and the Glasgow Press (Glasgow
1913), P-7, 99, 106, [115],
21. The 3rd ed. This volume is thought to be housed at the Bodleian Library, although I have
been unable to locate it.
22. See GUL MS General 4; Royal Faculty of Procurators MS 378.8.
23. Stewart, 'Life of Reid', in Works, p.ioa.
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Glasgow in 1766 (letter vn) and professor of natural philosophy at Edinburgh
in 1774. The influence of Reid's philosophy may be detected in Robison's
Proofs of a conspiracy (1797). Acknowledging his assistance with an optical
experiment, Robison would describe Reid as 'a most respectable and intelligent
friend' and 'a mathematician and naturalist of the first rank'.24
Reid was elected to the moral philosophy chair at Glasgow on 22 May 1764.
He was by no means a shoe-in for the job; eighteen days were allowed for the
choice of a successor to Smith.25 Reid's appointment was opposed by Black
and Millar but supported, both at Court and in the College, by James Ogilvy,
Lord Deskford (later 6th Earl of Findlater and 3rd Earl of Seafield; .'1714-
1770). Deskford wrote to the professor of medicine and chemistry at Edin¬
burgh, William Cullen (1710-1790),26 as soon as he got wind of Smith's
departure for France (and imminent demission) in January 1764, recom¬
mending Reid as 'the fittest Man in the Kingdom for that Profession' and
hoping to mobilise Cullen's Glasgow connections. Deskford suggested to
Cullen that: 'If you are of the same Opinion, it will be doing a Service to the
Publick to let your Friends who have Interest in the University of Glasgow
know your Opinion.'27 Deskford may also have approached his brother-in-law
Lord Hopetoun (2nd Earl; 1704-1781) on Reid's behalf. One wonders if it was
with some calculation that Reid dedicated his Inquiry, published on 8 March,28
to Deskford,29 and we might also speculate, given that Reid's acceptance of
the chair is dated Edinburgh 26 May,30 that he had been actively trying to
consolidate his Court support.31 If this is in fact the case, it belies Dugald
Stewart's portrayal of Reid as a man 'remote from the pursuits of ambition',32
itself an echo of Reid's demurring representation of himself in the 'Dedication'
to his Inquiry as one 'disengaged from the pursuits of interest and ambition'.33
Reid's appointment was also supported by an Aberdeen crony, Robert Traill
24. 'Impulsion', Encyclopedia britannica, 3rd edn, Supplement, vol. i (Edinburgh 1801), p.804;
Richard Olson, Scottish philosophy and British physics 1750-1880 (Princeton 1975), p.159-60.
25. Glasgow journal, 17/24 May 1764; GUA MS 26643, P-2^.
26. Formerly professor of medicine at Glasgow.
27. City of Edinburgh District Council Archives, Council Record, vols 81, p.404-407; 82,
p.150; Deskford to Cullen, 22 January 1764, GUL MS Cullen 78, f.2r; letter vi.
28. Glasgow journal, 1/8 March 1764.
29. Reid admitted later in life that he was not above currying favour by means of such
dedications. Reid to James Gregory, 30 July 1789, in Works, p.73a-b.
30. Reid to Sir Thomas Miller (Lord Advocate and Rector; 1717-1789), GUA MS 34687,
f. 1 r; cf. Miller to William Leechman, Edinburgh, 29 May 1764, GUA MS 34559, f ir.
31. Although Deskford says to Cullen: 'Mr Reid is quite ignorant ofmy writing, and I suppose
has no Thoughts of the Thing' (GUL MS Cullen 78, f.2r).
32. 'Life of Reid', in Works, p.[3]a.
33. Works, p.96b.
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(1720-1775), who was, like Reid, an original member of the Wise Club, and
who had been appointed professor of divinity at Glasgow in 1761 with
Deskford's help.34 Lord Karnes (1696-1782), with whom Reid had corres¬
ponded on philosophical subjects since at least 1762,35 was another who
supported the philosopher's appointment at Court. Lord Queensberry (3rd
Duke and 2nd Duke of Dover; 1698-1778) may also have added his voice at
Court to those ofDeskford, Hopetoun and Karnes. Gaining the Court interest
was especially important when the college recommendation was divided, since
the presentation of the chair lay with the Crown.
Dr William Wight (d. 1782),36 who had been appointed professor of church
history at Glasgow in 1762, and the professor of humanity George Muirhead
(d.1773) had also been considered within the college as successors to Smith.
Hume's friend Baron Mure (1718-1776)37 probably favoured Wight.38 Black
and Millar would have preferred Thomas Young, who had carried on Smith's
classes in the latter's absence. The eligibility of a certain Mr Baillie39 was being
urged by the Lord Privy Seal, James Stuart Mackenzie (?I7I9-i8oo), who
seemed anxious to carry on in the footsteps of his late uncle, the 3rd Duke of
Argyll, in exerting influence in college appointments.40 Black and Millar,
however, feared that Mackenzie would be swayed by Karnes's and Deskford's
support of Reid; Black wrote to Smith praising Young's performance, and
Millar urged Smith to prevail upon Mackenzie to block Reid's candidacy.41
Smith was evidently not uninterested in the prospects for his successor; it
seems that Henry Herbert (1741-1811)42 was sizing up the abilities of Reid
and of the principal of Marischal College, George Campbell (1719-1796), in
Aberdeen for him the previous summer (i.e. about the time when he was
34. Traill was distantly related to Deskford. Deskford had also been instrumental in getting
another of his kinsmen, namely William Ogilvie (1736-1819), appointed Reid's successor as
regent and professor of philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen, in 1764 (D. C. MacDonald,
biographical notes to Ogilvie, Birthright in land, London 1891, p.157, 159, 160).
35. E.g. Reid to Karnes, 29 December 1762, in Ian Ross (ed.), 'Unpublished letters of Thomas
Reid to Lord Karnes, 1762-1782', Texas studies in literature and language 7 (1965-1966) (New
York, London 1971), in which Reid mentions his 'Enquiry into the five Senses' (p.24).
36. Hugh Blair to [Hume], 6 April 1764, NLS MS 23153 (Hume Correspondence), no.52, f.it).
37. Himself elected Rector of Glasgow University in 1764 (GUA MS 26643, P-32i letter 1).
38. Cf. Hume to Mure, 27 October 1775, NLS MS 21352 (Hume Correspondence), no.15, f.i.
39. Undoubtedly Dr James Baillie (d.1778), who would fail in this contest but be appointed
professor of divinity after Traill's death in 1775.
40. Indeed Mackenzie complains about the impropriety of his not being consulted early on in
the selection process. Mackenzie to Mure, 2 February 1764, 15 February 176(4], 6 March 1764,
in Caldwell papers, pt 2, vol. i (Glasgow 1854), p.232, 171-72, 241.
41. Black to Smith, 23 January 1764; Millar to Smith, 2 February 1764, in W. R. Scott, Adam
Smith as student and professor (Glasgow 1937), p.256-57.
42. Later Baron Porchester.
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making arrangements to leave his post to become tutor to the Duke of
Buccleuch).43 It is not clear whom Smith eventually supported, although he
did assure Mackenzie that he had promised Young only a temporary post.
Whether Mackenzie abandoned Baillie, his original choice, is not known;
eventually, of course, Karnes's and Deskford's candidate won the day. A sixth
candidate, Samuel Charters of Luscar (1742-1825),44 apparently declined the
chair.45 Reid himself reports on none of these machinations to Andrew Skene,
but we may suppose it provides the background to his report that he has been
received with 'perfect civility' by the masters of the college, who 'manage their
political differences with outward decency and good manners although with a
good deal of Intrigue and secret caballing' (letter 1).
Throughout the letters Reid adverts to infighting among his colleagues and
it is clear that he found most 'disagreable' the 'Evil Spirit of Party' afoot in
the college (letter iv).46 An ongoing dispute centred on the respective powers
of, on the one hand, the rector, who presided over the so-called University
meeting, or Senate (which consisted of the rector, faculty dean, principal, and
professors), and, on the other, the principal, who chaired the College, or
Faculty, meeting (which was made up of the principal and professors only),
and concerned the ownership and control of college property and the adminis¬
tration of college revenue. Reid allied himself with the principal, William
Leechman, whose college rights party was eventually victorious.
Reid's teaching day at Glasgow began at 7:30 a.m. with a public 'prelection'
on moral philosophy — which for him comprised three branches: pneumatology,
ethics and politics - followed by an 'hour of Examination' at eleven. During
part of the term he gave a second, private, prelection at noon on 'the culture
of the human mind', which included eloquence and the fine arts. His salary of
£50 was amply supplemented by fees collected from his students. During his
tenure at Glasgow he held a range of administrative posts, including Vice-
Rector (to Edmund Burke), Quaestor (i.e. Librarian) and Clerk of the Senate,
and to Andrew Skene he complains of the onerous duty of attending five or
six college meetings a week. Outside the college Reid took up a number of
philanthropic causes. He was one of the founders and first president of the
Glasgow Society of the Sons of Ministers of the Church of Scotland, which
distributed large sums of money to 'the children of ministers, sons and
daughters, old and young', and whose objective was 'to bring forward well
43. Herbert to Smith, 11 September 1763, GUL MS Gen. 1035/147, f.ir.
44. Later minister of Kincardine-in-Menteith.
45. Hew Scott (ed.), Fasti Ecclesice Scoticance, vol. ii (Edinburgh 1917), p. 143.
46. Cf. Reid to Lady Karnes, 24 November 1783, SRO MS GD 24/1/650, f-33r (Abercairny
Muniments).
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educated young men into active life'. This charity was generously endowed
out of proceeds from the sale of the Statistical account of Scotland, in the
twenty-first volume of which appeared Reid's own contribution, 'A statistical
account of the University ofGlasgow'. 47 Reid was also involved in the Humane
Society of Glasgow, which provided equipment and offered rewards for water
rescue operations, serving as a director in 1793.48 And he actively promoted a
scheme for building the Glasgow Royal Infirmary in 1786, personally subscrib¬
ing £100, serving as a manager in 1793, and touring the wards and making
personal donations to patients.49 Such activities were of a piece with what Reid
was teaching in the classroom at this time. A hitherto unnoticed set of student
notes which I recently discovered in New College Library shows that Reid
taught that extending charity to those in need was an enforceable part of justice
no less than defending established rights to property.50
Smith's lectures on jurisprudence had attracted two Russian students and
Black's lectures on chemistry brought in students from Sweden and Geneva.51
Reid's lectures were as far as we know attended by students from closer to
home, and the motivation of some of these may have been pragmatic as much
as scholarly. The 'stupid Irish teagues', as he chooses to refer to his Irish
Presbyterian pupils in letter iv, had been excluded from Anglican-dominated
Trinity College, Dublin, and educated in dissenting academies, and had come
to Glasgow in the hope of becoming qualified in only two or three years 'for
teaching Schools or being dissenting teachers' (letter iv). English nonconform¬
ists barred from Oxford and Cambridge also made their way to Glasgow.
Despite Reid's testimony in letter vii, students and professors sometimes
enjoyed an uneasy relationship in this period. Reid himself was called in to
assist in the aftermath of one riot and played a role in restoring law and order
47. Leonard Dickson (ed.), Historical sketch of the Glasgow Society of the Sons ofMinisters of
the Church ofScotland, 7 th edn (Glasgow 1990), p. 17; The Glasgow Mercury, 29 March/5 April
1791, 4/11 May 1790, 22/29 November 1791, 27 December 1791/3 January 1792.
48. The Glasgow courier, 12 February 1793; The Glasgow Mercury, 28 September/5 October
1790.
49. The Glasgow courier, 27 March 1792, 29 March 1792, 31 March 1792, 3 April 1792,
3 January 1793, 8 January 1793, 12 February 1793, 7 January 1794; P. B. Wood, 'Thomas Reid
and the Scottish Enlightenment' [exhibition catalogue] (Toronto 1985), p. 17.
50. Reid scoffed at those - like Hume - who regarded justice as depending solely on public
utility, and who regarded perfect rights as 'those wc are for ye good of Society', for, as he
shrewdly observed, 'in this case I have a perfect right to a halfpenny yet tho it were not payed I
( dont think it could hurt the Society any'. Notes from 'Dr Reids Lectures' on moral philosophy
1768-1769 (possibly by John Monteath (?i753-i843), who matriculated at Glasgow in 1765) (MS
Box 32.3), p.135. See also R. Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Practical ethics (Princeton 1990), p.203;
Works, p.645b.
51. GUA MS 26650, p.77, 91.
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in the wake of a couple of other disturbances, in one case taking the part of
the excitable professor of natural philosophy, John Anderson, who assaulted a
student who had disrupted his class.52 Reid was also involved in policing the
college garden, where he liked to stroll, and which was being vandalised
by students.53
Although he finds much in Glasgow 'to amuse [him] in the literary way',
he confesses to some disappointment in the common Glaswegians, finding
them 'greatly inferior' to their Aberdonian counterparts, that is, 'Bcetian in
their Understandings, fanatical in their Religion, and clownish in their dress
and Manners' (letter n). He sounds somewhat oppressed by the 'gloomy
Entusiastical Cast' of the place, and wonders whether to ascribe this to the
'Air and Climate' or to the misguidance of the clergy (letters i and n). (In a
similar vein, Robert Foulis would later blame the slow progress of his Academy
on the cold climate.)54 At any rate, it is to this 'tame & sober' place that Reid,
his wife Elizabeth, and five of their children (Jean, Margaret, Martha, George
and David) migrated sometime between 14 August55 and 10 October 176456
to take up residence in a smallpox-infested street. We may gather, nonetheless,
that the Reids lived in some degree of comfort, and it seems from a passage
restored to letter 1 that they kept a womanservant. By 1769 Reid would manage
to wangle a finer house from the College, having begun to lobby for better
accommodation the year after his arrival. Upon his retirement from active
teaching in 1780, Reid would keep this house in the New, or Professors',
Court as a perquisite.57 In the meantime, Reid appears in his letters as a man
capable of adapting to new surroundings with some buoyancy of spirit; he
accounts himself lucky, at any rate, that his house is 'new and free of buggs'
and declares his view from the Drygate to be 'the finest prospect in Glasgow'.
Rudis indigestaque moles
With this Latin tag - Ovid's characterisation of chaos58 — Reid more than
52. GUA MSS 26643, p.313-16; 26644, P-53> 72> 74~75; 26690, p.141-46.
53. GUA MS 43370, cited in A. D. Boney, The Lost gardens of Glasgow University (London
1988), p.175.
54. Letter to Dr William Hunter, 11 November 1766, in David Murray, Some letters ofRobert
Foulis (Glasgow 1917), p.36.
55. See H. L. Ulman (ed.), The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758-1773
(Aberdeen 1990), p.124-25.
56. The date of Rcid's inaugural lecture.
57. GUA MSS 26644, P-88; 26650, p.99; 26691, p.364\ John Tail's Directory (Glasgow 1783)
(1871 facsimile edn), p.9.
58. Metamorphoses 1.7.
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once59 reflects upon the predicament of the eighteenth-century man of science.
Reid's appetite for knowledge was insatiable and opportunistic; he was a man
suited to his time, eager to enjoy the fruits of learning as they were cultivated
everywhere around him. In letter xi Reid confesses, nonetheless, to feeling
that he is attempting to contain the uncontainable. With no doubt some degree
of false modesty he reports:
I have long ago found my Memory to be like a Vessel that is full; if you pour in more
you lose as much as you gain; and on this Account have a thousand times resolved to
give up all pretence to what is called Learning, being satisfied that it is more profitable
to ruminate on the little I have laid up than to add to the indigested heap. To pour
Learning into a leaky vessel is indeed a very childish & ridiculous occupation. Yet
when a Man has leisure and is placed among books that are new to him it is difficult
to resist the temptation.
Reid was tempted by an impressive range of subjects, and in Andrew
and David Skene he found epistolary companions with whom to share his
enthusiasms. Relatively little is known about the Skenes, although a character
of the father is drawn in letter xi and the letters taken as a whole help to
establish what details are known of the son's life. It is evident from Reid's
queries that the younger Skene sustained an active correspondence with such
prominent contemporary naturalists as John Ellis, Linnaeus and Thomas
Pennant, and was, in Reid's judgement, an able natural historian in his own
right. As we shall see presently, Reid shared an interest in botany with David
Skene and encouraged and supported him in his other natural science studies.
David was, like Reid, a founder-member of the first Aberdeen Philosophical
Society where, unlike Reid, he concurred with certain of Hume's sceptical
ideas.
In a passage now restored to letter vii, Reid describes how a technique,
pioneered by William Smellie (1697-1763), for rotating the head in a forceps
delivery was used in the birth of his daughter.60 Reid was also au courant with
Black's doctrine of latent heat, and exerted some care in urging his friends not
to broadcast this discovery lest Black not be given full credit for it (letters in
and v). In his musings on the virtues of cinchona or Peruvian bark, hemlock,
rhubarb and wild carrot in the full text of letters ill, vm and ix, Reid explores
the meeting ground of botany and medicine.61 It is fitting, then, that Reid
59. i.e. in letter xi; Works, p.418a; and in Reid's curd prima on common sense, where it is
glossed in some depth (see D. F. Norton (ed.), Appendix, Louise Marcil-Lacoste, Claude Buffer
and Thomas Reid, Kingston, Montreal 1982, p.205f.).
60. Smellie, Treatise on the theory and practice of midwifery (London 1752), p.273-74; cf-
D. Skene to A. Skene, AUL MS 38, f.ior. David Skene had studied under Smellie.
61. See also Philip Miller, 'Daucus', The Gardeners dictionary, 8th edn (London 1768); The
Scots magazine xxviii (May 1766), p.250-51.
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should have exerted his influence to have a lectureship in materia medica
created and to have Black's laboratory assistant, Dr William Irvine (1743—
i787) _ who supervised, perhaps along with Reid,52 the construction of a
portable furnace for David Skene — appointed to the post in 1766.63 And he
followed with interest the work of Linnaeus, asking after the anticipated third
volume of the tenth edition of the Systema natures (i.e. 'Mineralia'), which in
fact was never published (letter x). Reid also took an interest in geological
phenomena closer to home, as we see from letter 11, where he demonstrates a
familiarity with Aberdeenshire's own Bennachie porphyry. Reputedly master
of Newton's Principia by the age of twenty, Reid had a life-long interest in
that natural philosopher, espousing his 'Rules of Philosophizing' in his own
natural philosophy lectures at King's College in the 1750s64 and heralding his
regulae philosophandi as 'maxims of common sense' in his own published
writings. It is not surprising, then, to find Reid describing a relatively obscure
double-refraction experiment in Newton's Opticks in letter 11.65
Reid kept his correspondents abreast of improvements made by Watt to the
steam engine and discussed Dollond's refinements to the telescope. A passage
now restored to letter ill positively identifies a perspective machine sent to
David Skene as being of Watt's design and shows that Reid had a familiarity
with the construction and operation of the device to be rivalled, perhaps,
only by that of the inventor himself.66 This is not surprising, given Reid's
mathematical predilections, especially as reflected in the long passage in his
Inquiry, published about two years earlier, on 'the geometry of visibles'.67 It
is possible to conjecture that the perspective machine must have appealed to
Reid, engaged as he was in the philosophical project of arresting the process
of visualisation before it becomes conceptualisation, i.e. of specifying the deep
geometry by which three-dimensional objects are represented to the mind's
eye automatically and without reflection. The objective of arresting 'the
operations of the mind' before they are determined by expectation and
habituation is one that Reid carries into all of his philosophical analyses.68 The
perspective machine was probably as close as Reid came to finding a 'Machine
[...] for analysing Ideas, Moral Sentiments, and other materials belonging to
62. Letters V and X.
63. David Murray, Memories of the Old College ofGlasgow (Glasgow 1927), p. 187.
64. AUL MS K.160, p.7, for example; cf. Robert Morgan's notes from Alexander Gerard's
philosophy lectures 1758-1759 (EUL MSS Dc.5.61-62), MS Dc.5.61 (i.e. vol. i), p.6.
65. Opticks (n.p. 1952), p.354-59, 373; Works, P.97R
66. For Watt's own description see in J. P. Muirhead, The Life ofJames Watt (London 1858), 1
P-54-55-
67. Works, p.i25b-i6oa, passim.
68. See Works, p.240b.
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the fourth Kingdom', but one which he nevertheless did not fail to fiddle with
(letter x). But even though Reid discovered a deep geometry in the structure
of perception, he did not try to generalise this result, but seems to have
remained true to his earlier verdict (i.e. in his 1748 'Essay on quantity') with
regard to the inappropriateness of applying mathematical categories to moral
subjects, and in particular to the discussion of virtue and merit.69 But Reid's
overall approach to the science ofmind remained scientific, even if it was not
entirely mathematical in its orientation.
Reid's efforts to wrest order out of chaos were not limited to his natural
philosophy interests; the categories of science were equally applicable to objects
on the mental horizon, as well as to moral and political phenomena, which
depend upon the science ofmind. There are scattered hints in the letters about
Reid's various attempts to reduce 'Political knowledge' to a science as part of
his ambition - announced in his King's College philosophical orations of 1753-
1762, repeated every year at Glasgow in his introductory moral philosophy
lecture, and elaborated in his 'Brief account of Aristotle's logic' (1774) - to
produce a new, post-Baconian organon, one in which pneumatology, or the
science ofmind, ethics, and politics are each accorded the rigour of a science.70
The first step in that process was to work backwards from hunches and
observations to 'axioms' or 'first principles'. Thus in the summer of 1767 Reid
read Sir James Steuart's Inquiry into the principles ofpolitical oeconomy71 and
heartily recommended it to David Skene as 'containing] more sound principles
concerning Commerce & Police than any book we have yet had' (letter xi). It
is clear that Steuart is effectively being congratulated on his contribution to
Reid's new organon. Steuart's interventionist principles would also have been
adaptable to the humanitarian objectives suggested by Reid's lectures on
jurisprudence of the same period. Even so, Reid's use of Steuart's doctrines
was not uncritical, for, speaking of that author and of other 'Philosophical'
writers on 'the wealth of a state' in the classroom a couple of years later, Reid
observed: 'It is evident that for want of dew knowledge many errors have
been committed.'72
69. There are no fewer than three drafts of the 'Essay on quantity' among Rcid's papers, all
bearing some variant of the following title: 'Concerning the Object ofMathematicks'. AUL MSS
2131/5/1/20, 5/1/22, 2/1/1; cf. 7/V/12. (The 2131, being common to all of the papers in the
Birkwood Collection (i.e. AUL MSS 2131/1-8), is omitted from all subsequent references to
material from this collection.)
70. AUL MSS 7/V/4, p.16, 6; 7/V/9, f.3u; 8/iv/5, f.ir; cf. 4/111/3, f.ir; D. D. Todd (ed.), 'The
philosophical orations of Thomas Reid', Philosophy research archives 3 (1977), P-938, 941-42,
948, 953-
71. London 1767.
72. Notes from Reid's lectures 1768-1769, NCL MS Box 32.3, p.217; cf. p.232.
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A snapshot of the local political scene in letter iv gives us a hint as to the
reactionary cast of some of Reid's political/jurisprudential principles. Here
Reid shows himself to be among those who favoured a crack-down on the
American colonists in the furore surrounding the passing of the Stamp Act in
t765-i766.73 About four years later, in 1769 (and, it would seem, year in and
year out until at least 1776), Reid would caution his students against Locke's
'absurd hypothesis' — which was a favourite of the Americans — 'that the
Government has no right to touch a farthing of the subjects Money w' out
their consent'.74 But not all of Reid's principles were so reactionary: he freely
criticised the law of entail, and thereby advocated the breakup of feudal
tenures.75 He also dosed his students in this period with some general reflections
on Harrington's Oceana, including, crucially, the agrarian law,76 and, late in
life, applauded the radical views of land reform contained in William Ogilvie's
Essay on the right ofproperty in land.1'
Real progress in the study of the thought (and, in particular, the political
thought) of Reid has been hindered by certain misconceptions, both about the
man himself and about the motivations and predispositions that informed his
writings. Recent attention paid by scholars to the vast body of Reid manu¬
scripts78 has done much to dispel these myths, but not enough emphasis has
been placed on the study of Reid's intellectual disposition as prerequisite to a
genuine understanding of his works. I believe that a close reading of Reid's
letters to the Skenes reveals the philosopher's mind at work, and thereby
affords an entree into his corpus, including the lectures on politics. The letters
demonstrate that Reid combined a highly disciplined intelligence with an
almost boyish curiosity about all things.79 They show him to be a thoroughgoing
man of science, abreast of the latest developments in medicine, chemistry,
botany, natural history and optics, and familiar with contemporary practitioners
in these fields. Most importantly, they reveal a man of measured judgement,
73. Lord Kames to D. Skene, 6 March 1770, NCL MS THO 2, f.331;; Reid to Kames, 27
February 1778, in Ross, 'Unpublished letters of Thomas Reid to Lord Kames, 1762-1782', p.33.
74. Notes from Reid's lectures 1768-1769, NCL MS Box 32.3, p.243-44; cf. Robert Jack's
notes from Reid's moral philosophy lectures 1774-1776 (GUL MSS Gen. 116-118), MS Gen.
II8, p.667: 'that a state has no right to take away a mans property for the common utility without
their consent'.
75. Practical ethics, P150-53, [2i3]-2i4.
76. AUL MSS 4/111/6, f.4r; 4/111/7, f.iv; cf. Practical ethics, p-207.
77. Aberdeen 1781. Reid to Ogilvie, 7 April 1789, in MacDonald, p.151-52. Ogilvie is
mentioned in letter in in connection with Black's chemistry lectures.
78. The great majority of which are in the Birkwood Collection.
79. This quality was described by the physician who attended Reid in his last illness ([Robert
Cleghorn], Sketch of the character of the late Thomas Reid, Glasgow 1796, p.5).
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or, as Reid would have it, of common sense.80 Indeed, in these letters 'Cadgers
are ay speaking of Crooksadles' (letter vil), that is, indulging in a good deal of
shop talk, and in so doing afford us a rewarding insight into Reid the scientist.
Schedule of restored passages and corrections
In the verbatim et literatim transcriptions of Reid's text in this schedule the
following principles have been employed. Spelling, capitalisation, punctuation,
and paragraphing all follow Reid. (Paragraphs, however, are sometimes indi¬
cated in Reid's text by extra space between sentences rather than by the start
of a new line, indented or otherwise.) False starts or slips of the pen of a minor
nature which have been overwritten or corrected by means of an inserted letter
are not recorded. Catchwords and inadvertent repetitions have been enclosed
in {braces}. Interlinear material is given in (halfbrackets]. Conjectural readings
of illegible, obscured, or damaged parts of the MSS have been enclosed in
{angle brackets). No attempt has been made here to represent material written
on the letter covers or to reproduce Hamilton's editorial notations on Reid's
MSS. Page, column and line references to Hamilton's text are given in the
left-hand column, while corrections to and material deleted from Hamilton's
text are supplied in the right-hand column according to the following model:
Hamilton's edition] Reid's text.
Letter I 2 fos, 2v cover, 32.5 x 19.8 cm
40a.25 are different so far] are different as far
40b. 18 David was seized] David after some weeks loosness which
reduced him was seized
40b.21 his mother.] his mother. Dr Black saw him sometimes & Dr
Hamilton very often.
They both agreed in an opinion which I apprehend showed
both Judgment and Honesty & that was that the best thing they
could do for him was to do nothing at all, because every thing
seemed to go on regularly. He has had no second fever altho' it
is now the 19th day, so that I think he is out of danger he got
one dose of physic and has been a little loose ever since. But he
is sometimes very troublesome & capricious sometimes making
his Woman rise in the middle of the night to make pottage to
him.





Dissentery accompanying the Natural Evacuation of the Sex.
She had something of the same kind about a month after. But I
think upon the whole she has had such interchanges of health
and ailments of low Spirits and good Spirits as she was wont to
have.
40b.44 sometimes [turning] round] sometimes [MS torn] round
40b.45 our [country] people] ou{r) [MS torn] people






on various parts] in various parts
Carburi says] Carburi say [H's note is incorrect; R is in fact
referring neither to Count Marino nor to Count Marco, but to a
third Count Carburi, namely, Jean-Baptiste (d. 1801), who was
nevertheless associated with the morefamous Count Marino Carburi,
having contributed an appendix to a book written by him. ]
Brazil pebble] brazil peeble
distinct speculums] distinct spectrums
the literary world] the literary wa{y)
Letter ill 2 fos, 6v containing notations not in R's hand, 32.6 x 19.8 cm
wrapt up in paper] wrapt up a paper
on that account much fitter] on that Account 2 sh dearer. The
last takes the temperature of any fluid much sooner, & is on that
Account much fitter
the first proper opportunity.] the first proper Opportunity. I
was obliged to send it in two parcels; one consisting of the three
white Iron feet, one within another, closed at top with the plug
of the largest foot, & bound over with paper. The other parcel
contains the Machine itself, in a green cloth bag, which with
the two other plugs is put in to a white iron case bound up in
gray paper and directed to you.
When the Machine is taken out of the bag, you will see that
it consists of a Mahogony box clasped. Opening it while the
clasps are on the under side, you will find the apparatus within
it together with a printed paper of directions for setting it up
and using it. I wish the directions were more distinct; but the
Author, seems to have a [a] better talent for invention than for
description. The Mahogony box when spread out serves for the
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it is used, with that side downward which hase [sic] the Mortoise
holes in it. There are four Springs at the four Corners for fixing
the paper on which you draw, tight to the board. The board is
kept Spread by skrewing on the two plugs which receive the
two smaller feet, with two Skrews which you will find in the
Machine. The third plug which receives the largest foot is
skrewed tight upon the X which you will see fixed in the
Machine
The rest of the Apparatus consists of a parallelogram piece,
an Index, & an Eye piece
The parallelogram piece has two Ends shod with brass which
you push into the two mortoise holes in the under side of the
board. There are {are} two catches with springs in the innersides
of the board which fix these ends when they are pushed far
enough. And when you take off the piece again by pulling the
ends out of the mortoise holes, you must take care to raise the
catch with your finger. The Eye piece consists of several joynts,
by which while one end of it is fixed within the box in the
manner you find it, the second joynt is brought over the upper
side of the board, & by means of the remaining joynts, the
perforated brass plate at the other End is brought to the place
of the eye, or what in the terms of art is called the point of
View.
The Perspective plain, is an imaginary Rectangle, equal to
the board, and placed above the board so as that the upperside
of the board and the lower side of the perspective plain do
coincide.
The Index has at the lower end a brass plate fixed across which
joyns it to the lowest side of the parallelogram piece. This plate
has a skrew hole in the middle, into which is skrewed the hose
of the pencil. The pencil must be thrust into this hose so that
its point reaches about a twentieth part of an inch beyond the
hose. The length of the Index is equal to the breadth of the
board and it ends above in a bra<{ss) point. You will easily see
by the construction of the parallelogram piece, that the penc^il)
when fixed to it can easily be carried over the whole board; and
that as you describe any figu(re) whatsoever upon the paper
applyed to the board, the upper end of the Index describes a
figure in the imaginary perspective plain, exactly similar and
equal. And therefore when you apply your eye to the point of
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view, and keeping the Eye in that place, survey your Object
through the small hole in the brass plate of the Eye piece; if you
apply your Right hand to the pencil, and carry it over the board
so that the point of the Index touches the out line of the Object
in the perspective plain; your pencil draws a similar out line
upon the paper on the board. The stroke of the pencil ought to
be as slight as possible; and it is proper to keep the paper always
close to the board by the left hand. It requires practice to do an
outline by this Machine tollerably neat and handsom, but it
must be exact & according) to the rules of Perspective. I have
seen the Machine used for taking off a smal Map from a large
one. You will easily see that this is done by making the large
Map the Object and the small one the perspective draught of
that Object. I have also seen drawings of busts and Statues taken
by it. The price including theWiteiron case is £3-6-0 the circular
Thermometer £0.10.6 the other £0.12.6. Which you may pay
to D. Bartlet.
42b. 11 of this kind] of that kind
42b. 13-14 three-parts fire-sand] three parts fine Sand
42b.31-32 as far as I see] as far I see
42b.40 so far as] as far as
42b.46 put it in the box] put in the box
42b.58-59 double ours] double of ours
Letter iv 2 fos, 8v cover, 20.4 x 16.0 cm
43a.46 how many people] how people
43b.6 than was the last] then was the last
43*0.64 Dec. 30, 1765.] Deer 30 1765
I wish you many happy years
Letter v 2 fos, 20.5 x 16.2 cm
44a. 19 affects me deeply] afflicts me deeply
44a.22 cannot but give you] cannot but give me
44a.22-23 You know his worth] You knew his worth
44b.29 can wholly be] can be wholly
45a.6-7 Thus, if a pound of water of 40° be mixed] Thus a pound of
Water 40deg mixed
45a.7-8 the mixed is found] the Mixt is found [/? no doubt means
'mixture'.]
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Letter vi i fo., 25U cover, 32.3 x 20.1 cm
45b-4i-42 The chemical class this session might bring] The Chemical
Class this Session I conceive might bring
45b.46-47 £20, and give] 20 f or give
45b.53 leave him but little time] leave him litte time
45b. 54 his chemical discourses] his Chemical Discoveries
463.37-38 the man - that is, next to you] the Man that next to you
468.40 determined more by the public good] determined more b(y)
[AhS torn] publick Good
Letter vii 2 fos, 12V cover, 20.1 x 15.7 cm
468.47-48 anything in it I ought to answer] any thing in it that I ought to
answer
46a.55 is in a good way.] is in a good way. Dr Hamilton our Professor
ofAnatomy was Operator. I believe he is excellent in Midwifery,
though one would not be apt to think that you and he should
both excell in it as you differ so much from one another. He is
a Man about the Size of the late W. Johnston the Pewterer, a
lazy indolent Mortal, & when he is well set down is not easily
raised, but good Nature & skill in his Profession as a Surgeon
Anatomist and Man Midwife cover all his infirmities.
46b.3 all that we do] all that we can do
46b. 16 the duties of his office] the duty of his office
46b.40 have an ebb and flow] have an ebb & a flow
46b.63 honour the magistrates] Honour which the Magistrates
47a. 1 I like the honour better than the office] I like the honour more
than the Office<(.)
We are all well if Mrs Reid was well, she is perfectly quiet &
sweat^s) plentifully. Mr Hamilton told me he was obliged to
use Forceps on account of the weakness of her Pains & a wrong
position of the Chi<(ld) the face being turned to the Os Pubis.
But it does not appear that the child has got the least hurt.
47a.6 eleven at night] eleven at night
May 14th
I missed the opportunity of sending this and the Thermome-
meter by Mr Duguid. Mrs Reids recovery has been but very
slow. She got little sleep for several Nights and continued very
weak but she rested well last night & is greatly relieved. Little
Bess is very well, and very civil, she sucked sturdily before she
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was twelve hours old and seems to have no resentment of the
rough manner in which she was introduced into the world.
Letter vm 2 fos, iy cover, 14.V blank, 18.4 x 14.7 cm
47a.9 ellipsis] Dear Sir
I received yours with the thermometer and £0.12.6 from Mr
Cruden. I wish you had not sent the money for I cannot get the
thermometer repaired for some time. Dr Wilson who is the
onely man that makes them, is gone to London and is not
expected home before the Month of October, & I dont know
any other that can be trusted with the repairing it. I hope to
have the pleasure of seing you about the beginning of August &
Mrs Reid intends to come along with me. Mrs Reid had yesterday
a severe fit of the bilious disorder in her Stomach. Dr Black has
recommended to her Hemlock leaves in pouder to be taken
when she is well, but you know she never takes medicines when
she is well. Jeannie has likewise been distressed for a fortnight
with her headach and sore Eyes, but she is now recovered. Pattie
is at Edr with my Sister. I believe I shall take Edr in my way to
Abd" &. if you have any commissions here or there that I can
execute I beg you will employ me.
47a.30 our surgeons eclipse] our Surgeons rather ecclipse
Letter ix 2 fos, i6r cover, i6v blank, 18.2 x 14.8 cm
47a.46 ellipsis] Dr Sr
I long to write you & to hear from you, & tho this must be
short & hurried for want of time I resolved not to slip this
opportunity. I sent your Thermometer repaired about three or
for weeks ago by Capt Burnet. Jamie Burnets Son who was so
kind as {as} to see us in his passage from Ireland to Aberdeen
He was to be a week or two at Edr, however I hope before this
time you have received the thermometer from him. We have
had a long trait ofbad weather here, & colds and sore throats have
been epidemical several children have died of a mortification in
the throat which was past cure before it was observed. Where it
has been taken in time the bark has been found of great Use.
Most ofmy family have had sore throats but in a slight degree.
47b.5 more inflamed than last session.] more enflamed than last Ses¬
sion.
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Mrs Reid begs to be remembred to you kindly & blames her
self for not writing you before now. Be so good when you see
Dr Burnet to make our kind Compliments to h{im) and to Mrs
Burnet.
Letter x 2 fos, i8r cover, i8t> blank, 22.8 x 18.7 cm
48a. 19 as often as] so often as
48a.23 might have been construed] might have been constructed
48a.31 time to write.] time to write.
Mrs Reid & the rest of my family joyn with me in their
Respects to your {to your} Papa your Sisters & George. Mrs
Reid is very tender and most of the young folks have had colds
or other ailments since the Snow went off The cold here
when greatest I am told was at eleven degrees of farenheits
thermometer this answers to 8 degrees in the Country for there
is commonly three degrees of odds. Mrs Reid wants to have her
young Daughter inoculated, and we have not the small pox in
this Neighbourhood just now(.) If there is good matter to be
got with you, could you send a little of it with Mr Duguid the
bearer of this at his return. Do in this as you judge reasonable.
I am Dear Sir
Yours most affectionately
Tho Reid
Letter xi 2 fos, 201; containing notations not in R's hand, 23.3 x 18,3 cm
48a.35 It gives me] It gave me
48a.44 with him in that entire confidence] with him, with that entire
confidence
48b. 17 respect and sympathy.] Respect and Sympathy. We have most
of us had ailments that go by the Name of the Influenza: and
indeed few here have escaped it; but the Symptoms in different
persons have been so various that I cannot describe them
Intermitting headaches, and Sweatings have I think been the
most general Symptoms.
48b.41 childish and ridiculous imagination] childish & ridiculous occu¬
pation
48b.56-57 which grew on rotten wood in pure water] which grew on rotten
Wood int{o)> pure water
49a.6-7 the reason ofmy observing] the occasion of my observing
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49a.35 with spirit. I am] with Spirit, & I am
Letter XII 2 fos, 2iv-22r blank, 22V cover, 30.2 x 16.4 cm
49b.2 for that purpose] for this purpose
49b.6 You were] You was
49b. 15 such a crop] such a Cropt
Letter xm 2 fos, 24r cover, 24P blank, 22.5 x 18.1 cm
49U25 [July 1770]] July 70 \not in R's hand]
496.47-48 you know we moralists] you know that we Moralists
5°b-3 indulge me with the pleasure] indulge me the pleasure
Appendix
MSS not described in the text of this article are as follows: five letters from
Lord Karnes to D. Skene;81 nine letters to D. Skene from the naturalist
Thomas Pennant (1726-1798),82 who was then completing his tour of Scotland
and preparing his observations for the press; one letter from George Campbell
to D. Skene;83 one letter from Lord Deskford to A. Skene;84 one letter from
the first professor of anatomy at Edinburgh University, Alexander Monro,
primus (1697-1767), to D. Skene;85 one letter from the minister ofMoffat (and
later professor of natural history at Edinburgh), John Walker (1731-1803), to
David Skene;86 one unsigned letter to the episcopal minister of Banff, Charles
Cordiner (?I746-I794);87 one letter from David Steuart Erskine (nth Earl of
Buchan; 1742-1829), to D. Skene;88 six drafts of letters from D. Skene (in his
81. Letter 1: Edinburgh, 1 December 1766, f.26r-v. Letter 2: Edinburgh, 17 March 1767,
f.27r-28v. Letter 3: Blair Drummond, 14 April 1767, 29V-30V. Letter 4: Blair Drummond, 11
January 1769, 3ir-32v. Letter 5: Edinburgh, 6 March 1770, 33^341:. (Handwritten copy of letter
1: AUL MS 483, f.75-76.)
82. Letter 1: Slains, 10 August 1769, f.35r-v. Letter 2: Edinburgh, 13 September 1769, f-36r-
37V. Letter 3: Downing, 10 November 1769, 38^391), f-39v containing a draft of Skene's reply.
Letter 4: Downing, 7 January 1770, f.40^411'. Letter 5: London, 5 March 1770, 42^431). Letter
6: Downing, 7 April 1770, 44^-451'. Letter 7: Downing, 22 May 1770, 46^470. Letter 8:
Downing, 12 August 1770, 48^49^. Letter 9: Downing, 5 October 1770, sor-jit. (Handwritten
copies of letters 1-9: AUL MS 483, 56-71.) A letter addressed to Skene dated London, 23
October 1770 concerning Pennant follows at f.52r-v.
83. Whitehouse, 1 August 1770, f.53-54.
84. Cullen House, 16 January 1762, S5r~5^v-
85. Edinburgh, 15 July 1758, 57r-s8v.
86. Moffat, 14 April 1770, 59t>-6or. (Handwritten copy: AUL MS 483, f.48-52.)
87. Fordyce, 9 August 1777, 6ir-62t>.
88. Middleton, 12 May 1770, f.63r-v. (Handwritten copy: AUL MS 483, f.46.)
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own hand) to various people, including one to the professor of botany and
materia medica at Edinburgh, John Hope (1725-1786),89 one to Kames,90 one
to Deskford,91 one which is unaddressed,92 and two to the naturalist John
Ellis (?i7io-i776);93 two further items by D. Skene;94 an unidentified paper
apparently addressed to A. Skene;95 and seven additional items,96 including
five papers all marked with some variant of the following note: 'Found among
Dr. Hamilton's papers from Eastfield'.97
Abbreviations used in the notes
AUL Aberdeen University Library
EUL Edinburgh University Library
GUA Glasgow University Archives
GUL Glasgow University Library
NCL New College Library, University of Edinburgh
SRO Scottish Record Office
89. 27 April 1764, 64r.
90. Aberdeen, 3 December 1765, 64r.
91. undated, f.641;.
92. Aberdeen, 21 March 1765, 64.V.
93. The first: Aberdeen, 15 April 1765, 65?-. The second: 16 May 1765, 65V.
94. The first, dated 23 April 1753, is a statement of'the proper rules [he] ought to observe
with regard to [his] business and conduct' and comprises f.66r-6-jv; the second, undated, contains
a list of 'Regulations for spending [his] Time' and comprises f.68r-v. (Handwritten copies: AUL
MS 483, f. 17-19, 53-54.)
95. f.75r-v.
96. f.j6r-86v.
97. f.8iv, 821), 83V, 85*% 86r. Dr Hamilton of Eastfield was probably Alexander Thomson of
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